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all's fair 


Digitized by the Internet Archive 

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Microsoft Corporation 


The Inside Story of German 
Sabotage in America 


Profusely Illustrated with Photographs and 
Photostatic Copies of Original Documents 


Copyright, igs7> ^V Henry Landau 

All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, must 
not be reproduced in any form without permission. 

First Impression 


FEB 2 01967 






Part I 





IV. "buy up or blow up" 36 









Part II 





















INDEX 311 

List of Illustrations 

The Fire Raging in the Black Tom Terminal . . . Frontispiece 


Count Johann von Bernstorfl 22 

Dr. Heinrich F. Albert 22 

Captain Franz von Papen 23 

Captain Karl Boy-Ed 23 

Consul General Franz von Bopp 70 

Vice Consul Wilhelm von Brincken 70 

Wolf von Igel 70 

Paul Koenig 70 

Captain Franz von Rintelen 71 

Robert Fay 71 

Inspector Thomas J. Tunney 71 

The Ship Bombers on Their Way to Jail 71 

LotharWitzke 102 

Kurt Jahnke 102 

Colonel Walter Nicolai 103 

Captain Rudolf Nadolny 103 

"Wanted" Poster for Kristoil 134 

Charles Wunnenberg 135 

German Bombs Seized in Hoboken 135 

Fire at Kingsland 166 

Sketch of Incendiary Pencil 167 

Fiodore Wozniak 167 

Paul Hilken 198 

Captain Frederick Hinsch 198 



Dr. Paul Altcndorf 199 

Fred Herrmann and Adam Siegel 199 

Admiral Sir Reginald Hall 230 

Amos J. Peaslee 230 

Robert W. Bonynge 230 

The Famous Sabotage Cable of January 26, 1 915 231 

The Vital Evidence in the $50,000,000 Claims 262 

Facsimile of the Table of Contents of the Herrmann Message 

Magazine 262-263 

Frederick Hinsch and His Wife 263 

Raoul Gerdts 263 


In this book I have endeavored to present the true facts, as far as they 
are know^n, concerning German sabotage in the United States during 
the period between the outbreak of the World War and the entrance 
of the United States into the war. I have concentrated principally on 
the Black Tom and Kingsland cases, as they were the most devastating 
acts committed and the only ones, with the exception of an explosion 
in Tacoma Harbor, in which any attempt has been made to prove 
German complicity and to collect damages. 

Having assisted the American claimants in their investigations in 
connection with the Black Tom and Kingsland cases, I have known 
intimately many of the principal characters involved and have obtained 
from them their personal stories. Because of this connection, too, the 
voluminous records of these cases, consisting chiefly of exhibits, briefs, 
oral arguments before the Mixed Claims Commission, and reports of 
the various American investigators have been at my disposal. 

This book has been written entirely at my own volition and has been 
inspired neither by the American claimants nor by their German op- 
ponents; nor is it my object to try the case in public before a final 
decision has been reached by the Mixed Claims Commission. I have 
been prompted solely by a desire to tell the general story of German 
sabotage here and in particular to cover the amazing fight which the 
American claimants have put up during the last fifteen years in their 
efforts to prove Germany's guilt in the destruction of Black Tom and 
Kingsland. The story of these cases, probably the most intricate and 
bitterly contested ones ever argued before an international court of 
law, has never been told before. In view, too, of the present war clouds 
gathering in Europe and the Orient and in view of the fact that the 
United States is still as vulnerable as ever to the saboteur, it is high 
time that the lessons of Black Tom and Kingsland be revealed. 

Far be it from me to indict Germany. Many arguments can be ad- 


vanced in support of her contention that, while the United States was 
technically neutral during the neutrality period, actually she was 
affording material and financial aid to Germany's enemies and that 
Germany was justified, therefore, in the use of sabotage to impede 
the flow of munitions and supplies to the Allies. In wartime every 
nation adopts the most expedient methods to guard its vital interests, 
and American unpreparedness in the field of counter-espionage was an 
open invitation to Germany to conduct a campaign of sabotage in the 
United States. 

In depicting the background of the fight which the American in- 
vestigators have waged against the German Secret Service and in 
analyzing the evidence, I have drawn on my own war experience 
in the British Secret Service. During that period I had unique oppor- 
tunities to learn the methods and psychology of the German Secret 

A final word must be added concerning the German wireless and 
cable messages which the British intercepted and decoded during the 
war. Although an explanation of how Amos Peaslee came into pos- 
session of them is not given until Part II, they have been inserted 
throughout the text of the book wherever they apply. Their authenticity 
has been admitted by the German Government. 

August 23, 1937. H. L. 


Chapter I 

Before the World War Germany had made all her war calculations 
on the basis of a short but decisive campaign through Belgium and 
northern France. When this failed, she realized that she was in for a 
long war in which economic strength would be the decisive factor. On 
account of her miscalculation on winning the war in a few months she 
had not given much attention to the United States. All her energies 
had been devoted to preparing against Russia, France, and, to a lesser 
extent, England. 

But the heads of the government and the army soon came to realize 
that America's resources might well be the key to victory for whichever 
side could obtain access to them. British sea power precluded Ger- 
many's having any chance of drawing on the American market, her- 
self; but at least she could and must try to keep her enemies from 
exploiting their advantage. There were only two means of doing this 
which held out any hope of success, the submarine and sabotage. But 
Germany had too few underseas craft in the first year of the war to 
enable her seriously to cripple shipping. She therefore felt obliged to 
direct the German Military and Naval Intelligence Services to under- 
take a sabotage offensive. 

Before the World War Gerniany possessed the largest and most effi- 
cient secret service organization in Europe. Most of her espionage 
activities, however, had been directed against likely enemies on the 
continent. She had thought it worth while to plant only one part-time 
spy in the United States and had limited his activities to reporting on 
new industrial and chemical developments. 

As Germany was automatically cut off from the world across the sea 
on the outbreak of hostilities, it was then too late to send any great 
number of trained spy and sabotage agents to the United States. She 


had to rely, therefore, on her diplomatic representatives here to build 
up the necessary organization during the early stages of the war. These 
were few in number and had been chosen for their posts with no 
thought that they would ever be called upon to carry on more than 
normal consular and diplomatic business. The Embassy was staffed 
by four executives: an Ambassador, a Commercial Attache, a Military 
Attache, and a Naval Attache. 

The Ambassador, Count Johann von Bernstorff, was a career diplo- 
mat who had had many years training in the diplomatic service. His 
deep, dome-shaped head and furrowed face revealed the thinker — a 
man endowed with great power of concentration. A firm mouth and 
chin, and a Kaiser mustache lent him a certain air of fierceness in 
contrast to his otherwise delicately molded features. Cold eyes, peering 
at times through half -closed lids, gave an impression of cunning, which 
was immediately dispelled by his ingratiating smile. Tall, slender, al- 
ways immaculately groomed, he had a distinguished appearance. He 
Was an aristocrat, a member of an old Saxon family which had sup- 
plied Saxony with many of her statesmen. 

As an ambassador he had the entree to the White House, a seat in the 
diplomatic galleries of the Senate and House of Representatives, and 
was in close contact with those Senators, Congressmen, and appointees 
who hailed from the sections of the country which had an influential 
German-American vote. He had his finger on the pulse of official 
Washington and was easily able to keep his government closely in- 
formed on all important issues and political events in the capital. 

Socially he was much sought after, not only by those to whom spon- 
sorship by an ambassador is always an attraction but also by many 
Americans of German extraction who were anxious to be useful. He 
was a keen judge of character, and many of these men and women he 
astutely used on any occasion they could be of service to him. 

Germany's Commercial Attache was Privy Councilor Dr. Heinrich 
Albert. Not only was he the paymaster of all Germany's diplomatic 
and consular representatives in the United States, but he also dis- 
bursed funds for supplies purchased by his government, and finally 
also paid out money — at least $30,000,000 that we know of — for propa- 
ganda, sabotage, and secret service purposes. He had a joint account 


with von Bernstorff in the Chase National Bank, which often amounted 
to several million dollars. As American treasurer for the Imperial Ger- 
man Government, he had great influence with bankers, manufacturers, 
and others with whom he did business. His office during the war was 
in the Hamburg-American Building at 45 Broadway, New York City. 

He was tall and slim. His countenance was open; and in spite of 
several saber scars on his cheeks, his fair hair and mild blue eyes gave 
him a friendly appearance. He was always well dressed, extremely 
polite, and punctilious. He was liked and held in high esteem by his 
colleagues, who credited him with expert knowledge of economic con- 
ditions in the United States. His methods were quiet and successful; 
his participation in secret service and other clandestine activities v/as 
carefully camouflaged and but for an accident might even have passed 
entirely unnoticed. 

Long afterwards, when Congress got down to investigating his ac- 
tivities, he was characterized by Senator Nelson as the "Machiavelli of 
the whole thing ... the mildest mannered man that ever scuttled ship 
or cut a throat." 

Captain Franz von Papen held the post of Military Attache. At the 
time of his appointment, in 191 3, there was no thought that any big 
task might devolve on him. From the viewpoint of the large standing 
armies of Europe, Washington was a minor post; and for that reason 
the Military Attache occupied a dual position: he was attached both 
to the German Embassy in Washington and the German Legation in 
Mexico City. To assist him in covering this wide field of activity, he 
had only a secretary. Wolf von Igel. 

At the time, von Papen was a young cavalry officer in a regiment of 
Uhlans. He had married a Miss Boche, the daughter of an immensely 
wealthy Alsatian pottery manufacturer; and his new wealth, added to 
his social and military standing, had won for him the Washington 
appointment. His appearance reflected energy: he was tall, broad- 
shouldered, and erect; his face was clean-cut, with large bones, a large 
nose, prominent ears, keen eyes, a military mustache, and a strong jaw. 
He was vigorous in speech, and quick and daring in action. Intoler- 
ance, arrogance, and bluntness in criticizing his associates also were 
prominent among his characteristics. Coupled with all these was a 


capacity for cunning, intrigue, and hard work. He liked women and 
used them whenever he could. 

The Kaiser's Naval Attache was Captain Karl Boy-Ed, the son of a 
German mother and a Turkish father. So brilliantly had he acquitted 
himself at the outset of his naval career that he had been one of six 
young officers chosen by the German Naval Command for training 
for high executive posts. Attached to the staff of Admiral von Tirpitz, 
he had successfully directed a press campaign in 1910 to influence the 
public on the eve of requests for heavy naval appropriations, which 
amounted in that year to 400,000,000 marks. Later his duties had 
taken him to various parts of the world as Naval Attache, and 1914 
found him at the Washington post. 

In appearance he was heavy-set, bull-necked, with a massive jaw. 
He was polished and had considerable charm. He was less impulsive 
than von Papen and exercised much more care in covering up his 
tracks. He was often at loggerheads with the Military Attache. On one 
occasion von Papen telegraphed him to be more careful. To this he 
replied in a letter: 

Dear Papen: 

A secret agent who returned from Washington this evening made the 
following statement: "The Washington people are very much excited about 
von Papen and are having a constant watch kept on him. They are in 
possession of a whole heap of incriminating evidence against him. They 
have no evidence against Count B. and Captain B-E (!)." In this connection 

1 would suggest with due diffidence that perhaps the first part of your 
telegram is worded rather too emphatically. 

These then were the men entrusted with the launching of Germany's 
campaign of sabotage and obstruction in the United States. It must 
be borne in mind, however, that as the war progressed both German 
secret services sent free-lance agents to the United States, many of 
whom operated independently of Germany's diplomatic represen- 

When the news was flashed to the United States that the Austrian 
Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife had been assassinated in 


Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, Count von Bernstorff v^as having dinner 
w^ith the Spanish Ambassador at the MetropoHtan Club in Washington. 
Von Bernstorff fully comprehended that this might be the spark that 
w^ould touch off the general European v^ar v^hich the v^^hole world 
knev^ was impending. He at once arranged for his summer leave and 
on July 7 sped to Berlin. In the light of his subsequent activities, we 
can take it for granted that, in addition to receiving his instructions 
from the German Foreign Office, he was also interviewed by the es- 
pionage bureaus. 

The first of these, commonly known as the German Secret Service, 
comprised Section III B of the Great General Staff and was under the 
able direction of Colonel Nicolai. In addition to this organization there 
also was a Naval Intelligence Service, which, although a much smaller 
unit, also operated on a secret service basis. As was the case with the 
Allies, both German secret service bodies established spy bases in the 
principal neutral countries and from these directed spy activities against 
the enemy. Belligerents on both sides tied in their secret service organ- 
izations with their naval and military attaches. But if this was common 
to both sides, the attaches and secret services of the Allies were at least 
wise enough not to engage in any activities which could be construed 
as at all detrimental to the neutral countries in which they were located. 
Although the attaches acted in an advisory capacity concerning the 
objectives to aim at in enemy territory and also telegraphed the spy 
reports to headquarters, they never came into contact with the actual 
agents. Their dealings were exclusively with the chiefs of the spy bases, 
who recruited and directed the individual agents. 

However, since Germany had no organized espionage base in the 
United States before the war, she had perforce to instruct the Military 
and Naval Attaches to undertake personally the task of forming one. 

On August 5, 1 91 4, when England declared war, von Bernstorff was 
already on his way back to the United States, having sailed three days 
previously. Accompanying him were Dr. Albert and Dr. Dernburg, 
former Secretary of State for Colonies, whose chief duty was to be 
the spreading of German propaganda. 

In the Ambassador's possession was $150,000,000 in German treasury 
notes, which, according to Dr. Albert's later admissions, was to serve 


for "buying munitions for Germany, stopping munitions for the Allies, 
necessary propaganda, forwarding reservists — and other things." In 
order to guard against this treasure's falling into the hands of patrolling 
British warships, it was always kept close at hand so that, in the event 
of the ship's being stopped and searched by a boarding party, it could 
be thrown overboard at a moment's notice. 

If the German Secret Service lacked a prewar organization in the 
United States, here were the funds to create one immediately. An 
ample surplus would remain after attending to the objectives out- 
lined by Dr. Albert. There remained only the handing over of the 
instructions from Berlin to von Papen and Boy-Ed before the ma- 
chinery would be set in motion. 

Captain von Papen was in Mexico City at the outbreak of hos- 
tilities. He hurried north immediately to meet von Bernstorff in Wash- 
ington and after a conference with him established headquarters in 
New York City at 60 Wall Street, where he took a suite of offices which 
was known as the Bureau of the Military Attache, or the War Intelli- 
gence Center. Meanwhile Captain Boy-Ed had also had an interview 
with his Ambassador; and he too located himself in New York with 
an office at 11 Broadway, close to the New York Custom House. As 
has already been mentioned. Dr. Albert's headquarters were a stone's 
throw away, at 45 Broadway. 

If there are any doubts as to the nature of the orders von Bernstorff 
passed on to his Attaches, we need only turn to the very definite instruc- 
tions which were later issued by the authorities in Germany. On 
January 26, 1915, the General Staff telegraphed the Embassy in Wash- 
ington via the Foreign Office a message the meaning of which is unmis- 

For Military Attache. You can obtain particulars as to persons suitable 
for carrying on sabotage in the U. S. and Canada from the following persons : 
one, Joseph MacGarrity, Philadelphia, Pa.; two, John P. Keating, Michigan 
Avenue, Chicago; three, Jeremiah O'Leary, 16 Park Row, New York. 

One and two are absolutely reliable and discreet. Number three is reliable 
but not always discreet. These persons were indicated by Sir Roger Case- 
ment. In the U.S. sabotage can be carried out in every kind of factory for 
supplying munitions of war. Railway embankments and bridges must not 


be touched. Embassy must in no circumstances be compromised. Similar 
precautions must be taken in regard to Irish pro-German propaganda. 

Zimmermann * 

The abrupt opening of the above cable indicates that there must 
have been instructions issued relative to sabotage in the United States 
prior to the sending of this message. By these orders Germany's diplo- 
matic representatives in the United States were compelled to play a 
dual role. On the surface they were to carry out their diplomatic func- 
tions and preserve friendly relations with the United States; surrepti- 
tiously they were to direct Germany's sabotage activities. And above 
all Dr. Jekyll was always to deny and repudiate what Mr. Hyde was 

Count von Bernstorff as the commander in chief was to keep in the 
background as much as possible, his principal duty being to watch 
Congress and the President in order to prevent any political action 
unfavorable to Germany. Dr. Albert was to handle the funds, also to 
act as the director of activities to tie up Allied munitions orders. Cap- 
tain von Papen was to supervise an active army of spies and sabotage 
agents both in the United States and in Canada. Captain Boy-Ed was 
to direct sabotage on ships transporting munitions to the Allies, to 
arrange for coal and supplies for German warships and commerce 
raiders, and also to recruit spies to send to enemy countries in Europe, 
chiefly England. In this work these four chiefs were to be actively 
assisted by the various German Consuls and consular representatives 
scattered throughout the United States. 

But, before these plans could be put into operation, von Papen and 
Boy-Ed were swamped by another and more pressing task. Immedi- 
ately war was declared the thousands of reservists resident in Amer- 
ica were required to go home and rejoin the colors. The burden of 
figuring out ways and means of getting them through the blockade 
fell on the two Attaches, and for some time this chore absorbed the 
major part of their energies. 

* Throughout most of the war Zimmermann was a prominent official of the 
Foreign Office, holding successively the posts of Undersecretary and Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs. 

Chapter II 

Passport control is an outgrowth of the World War. Before the war, 
it was possible to travel all over the world without a passport; it was 
only the careful traveler who availed himself of this means of personal 
identification. He carried it for his own convenience, and foreign gov- 
ernments rarely used it to check up on him. Consequently, in the 
United States obtaining a passport was a simple matter which resolved 
itself into filling out an application form signed by two witnesses of 
American nationality who certified that they knew the applicant to 
be an American citizen. The passport carried a rough general descrip- 
tion of the bearer but no photograph. To prevent the return of reserv- 
ists to the Central Powers the Allies insisted on every traveler's carry- 
ing a passport. Passports were examined at all Allied ports; and, as the 
cordon tightened, every merchant vessel was stopped at sea by patrols 
and searched for suspects. 

Von Papen and Boy-Ed were therefore immediately faced with the 
problem of securing neutral passports for the thousands of reservists 
who were pouring in on them. Since the peacetime passport regula- 
tions remained in force for some time, the task was at first a simple 
one; but soon the Government tightened its rules; the applications 
were closely scrutinized and checked; and more and more informa- 
tion was required on the instrument, such as the names of the coun- 
tries the holder intended visiting. A photograph was also added to the 
requirements. It became necessary, therefore, for the two Attaches to 
set up a special organization for supplying passports. They realized, 
too, that the difficulties were now such that they would have to aban- 
don sending back reservists on a wholesale scale, and instead would 
have to concentrate on the officers, of whom there were from 800 to 
1,000 scattered through North and South America and who, as they 


were sent on by the various German Consulates, were flowing into 
New York in a steady stream. 

Hans von Wedell, a reserve officer who had many connections in 
New York and who knew the city well, having both practiced law 
there and served as a newspaper reporter, was designated to head the 
organization. Furthermore, he had already made a trip to Germany 
as a courier for von Bernstorff, and while there had discussed the 
reservist question with his uncle, Count Botho von Wedell, a Foreign 
Office official in Berlin. 

When approached by von Papen, von Wedell eagerly undertook the 
task. He opened up an office in Bridge Street and then set about acquir- 
ing neutral passports. German-Americans in Yorkville and Hoboken, 
bums on the East Side, and longshoremen and sailors of Spanish, Scan- 
dinavian, or other neutral nationality, who frequented the water front, 
were his prey. For the $io to $25 he offered them they delivered to him 
the passports he had persuaded them to apply for in their own names. 

For a time von Wedell got along famously. The two Attaches sent a 
steady stream of reserve officers to him, and with the false neutral pass- 
ports furnished by him they were successfully sent on their way to 
Scandinavian, Dutch, and Italian ports. His bills were paid by Captain 
von Papen. Proof of this was revealed later when the Attache's check 
books were seized by the British at Falmouth while he was en route 
home after being recalled. 

Soon, however, von Wedell was in difficulties; some of his men 
started blackmailing him. This was followed up by the disturbing news 
that the Department of Justice was on his trail. He was an American 
citizen, and as a lawyer he knew the penalties ahead of him. Hence, 
deciding that discretion was the better part of valor, he fled to Cuba; 
but not, however, before sending von Bernstorff the following letter, 
dated December 26, 1914, from the Hotel St. George, Nyack-on- 
Hudson, which clearly implicated von Papen and his assistant, von 


His Excellency 

The Imperial German Ambassador 

Count von Bernstorff 

Washington, D.C. 

Your Excellency: 

Allow me most obediently to put before you the following facts: It seems 
that an attempt has been made to produce the impression upon you that I 
prematurely abandoned my post, in New York. That is not true. 

I — My work was done. At my departure I left the service, well organized 
and worked out to its minutest details, in the hands of my successor, Mr. 
Carl Ruroede, picked out by myself, and, despite many warnings, still tarried 
for several days in New York in order to give him the necessary final direc- 
tions and in order to hold in check the blackmailers thrown on my hands 
by the German officers until after the passage of my travelers through 
Gibraltar; in which I succeeded. Mr. Ruroede will testify to you that without 
my suitable preliminary labors, in which I left no conceivable means untried 
and in which I took not the slightest consideration of my personal weal or 
woe, it would be impossible for him, as well as for Mr. von Papen, to for- 
ward officers and "aspirants" in any number whatever, to Europe. This 
merit I lay claim to and the occurrences of the last days have unfortunately 
compelled me, out of sheer self-respect, to emphasize this to your Excellency. 

II — The motives which induced me to leave New York and which, to 
my astonishment, were not communicated to you, are the following: 

1. I knew that the State Department had, for three weeks, withheld a 
passport application forged by me. Why? 

2. Ten days before my departure I learnt from a telegram sent me by 
Mr. von Papen, which stirred me up very much, and further through the 
omission of a cable, that Dr. Stark had fallen into the hands of the English. 
That gentleman's forged papers were liable to come back any day and could, 
owing chiefly to his lack of caution, easily be traced back to me. 

3. Officers and aspirants of the class which I had to forward over, namely 
the people, saddled me with a lot of criminals and Jjlackmailers, whose 
eventual revelations were liable to bring about any day the explosion of the 

4. Mr. von Papen had repeatedly urgently ordered me to hide myself. 

5. Mr. Igel had told me I was taking the matter altogether too lightly and 
ought to — for God's sake — disappear. 

6. My counsel . . . had advised me to hastily quit New York, inasmuch as 
a local detective agency was ordered to go after the passport forgeries. 


7. It had become clear to me that eventual arrest might yet injure the 
worthy undertaking and that my disappearance would probably put a stop 
to all investigation in this direction. 

How urgent it was for me to go away is shown by the fact that, two 
days after my departure, detectives, who had followed up my telephone 
calls, hunted up my wife's harmless and unsuspecting cousin in Brooklyn, 
and subjected her to an interrogatory. 

Mr. von Papen and Mr. Albert have told my wife that I forced myself 
forward to do this work. That is not true. When I, in Berlin, for the first 
time heard of this commission, I objected to going and represented to the 
gentleman that my entire livelihood which I had created for myself in 
America by six years of labor was at stake therein. I have no other means, 
and although Mr. Albert told my wife my practice was not worth talking 
about, it sufficed, nevertheless, to decently support myself and wife and to 
build my future on. I have finally, at the suasion of Count Wedell, under- 
taken it, ready to sacrifice my future and that of my wife. I have, in order 
to reach my goal, despite infinite difficulties, destroyed everything that I 
built up here for myself and my wife. I have perhaps sometimes been 
awkward, but always full of good will, and I now travel back to Germany 
with the consciousness of having done my duty as well as I understood it, 
and of having accomplished my task. 

With expressions of the most exquisite consideration, I am your Excellency, 

Very respectfully, 

Hans Adam von Wedell 

Carl Ruroede, a former senior clerk in Oelrichs and Company, re- 
ferred to in the above letter, whom von Wedell had carefully 
groomed to take his place, was not long left in peace. Albert G. Adams, 
an agent of the Department of Justice, cleverly disguised as a pro- 
German Bowery tough, managed to enroll himself as one of Ruroede's 
agents in obtaining fake passports. They bargained over the price and 
finally agreed on $20 each for passports of native-born Americans and 
$30 each for passports of naturalized citizens — the higher price was 
fixed for the latter as the application requirements were more severe. 

A few days later Adams dashed into Ruroede's office brandishing 
four passports. Ruroede expressed satisfaction, as indeed he should 
have; for they were perfect, having been made out by the State Depart- 
ment at the special request of the Department of Justice. 


"But what about the photographs ?" said Adams with a worried look, 
after Ruroede had got through examining them. 

"Oh! That's simple," replied Ruroede; "watch me." 

At this, Ruroede took one of the passports, examined it carefully, 
then from a stack of passport photographs picked out one of a reservist 
officer whose description fitted the one shown on the instrument. Next 
he moistened this photograph, applied some mucilage, and then stuck 
it over the photograph on the passport, which had been similarly 
dampened. He then turned the paper over, laid it on a cloth, and with 
a dull-pointed bone knitting needle traced out the lettering on the seal. 

"When this dries," said Ruroede with a triumphant smile, "the new 
photograph will bear the imprint of the United States seal and Arthur 
Sachse, Reserve Lieutenant in the German Army, will have become 
Howard Paul Wright, bearer of passport Number 45573." 

The unfortunate Ruroede little knew that Howard Paul Wright 
happened to be a Department of Justice agent. 

It was not difficult for Adams to discover that the reservists who had 
received the four passports furnished by him, under the names of 
Howard Paul Wright, Peter Hansen, Stanley F. Martin, and Herbert 
S. Wilson, were to sail on the S.S. Bergensfjord, a Norwegian liner, 
bound for Bergen, Norway. 

On January 2, 191 5, as soon as they received word that Ruroede had 
been arrested, four agents of the Department of Justice hurried to the 
Barge Office and boarded a revenue cutter, on which they overtook 
the Bergensfjord a few minutes after it had sailed. The ship was or- 
dered to heave to. All the male passengers on board were lined up, 
and the four bearers of the passports were picked out. After a short 
interrogation they realized that they had been trapped, and identified 
themselves as Sachse, Meyer, Wegener, and MuUer, reservists home- 
ward bound to the Fatherland. 

On the same day, while Department of Justice agents were gathering 
up the papers in Ruroede's office at 11 Bridge Street, a German walked 
in bearing a letter of introduction from von Papen and introduced 
himself as Wolfram von Knorr, Captain of Cruiser, who up to the out- 
break of war had been Naval Attache in Tokio. Cleverly drawn out 
in conversation by Joseph A. Baker, Assistant Agent in Charge of the 


Federal Bureau of Investigation in New York, von Knorr guilelessly 
admitted that von Papen had sent him over to get a passport. He v^as 
allow^ed to depart; and it was only the next day, vv^hen he read the 
morning paper, that he realized he had been questioned by a Depart- 
ment of Justice agent. 

Von Knorr also unw^ittingly supplied additional proof of von Papen's 
complicity in Ruroede's activities. Expert examination showed that the 
typewriter used in writing the letter of introduction was the same one 
employed in typing the lists of names and descriptions of reservists 
which were found in Ruroede's office. 

Faced with the facts, Ruroede confessed. He was sentenced to three 
years in Atlanta prison. The four reservists, advancing the plea that 
they had accepted the passports out of patriotism, were fined $200 each. 

There was still, however, one more act to the drama. The luckless 
von Wedell had returned from Cuba and was on the Bergensfjord at 
the time of the search. This came out in Ruroede's confession. The 
Department of Justice had missed him in the line-up; but there was 
still the wireless. 

On January 11, 191 5, the boarding officer of a British patrol boat 
took Rosato Sprio, a Mexican, off the Bergensfjord, Sprio admitted 
after close interrogation that he was Hans von Wedell, an American 

The British patrol boat never made port. She struck a German mine, 
and von Wedell went to the bottom with her. 

The attitude of official Germany to these passport frauds can be 
gauged from coded telegram Number 39 which passed between Wash- 
ington and Berlin, on January 7, 1915 : 

In consequence of the instructions sent to me by private letter from the 
[ ? ] and officially to Herr Papen to send home the largest possible number 
of German officers, it was necessary to furnish the latter with false passports, 
in regard to which I had, in the circumstances above referred to, no thought 
of objection. Details have unfortunately become known to public opinion and 
the American Government started an investigation, in the course of which 
there is no reason to fear that the Embassy will be compromised. State De- 
partment informed me definitely that this Government attached no impor- 
tance to the rumors that the Embassy had been concerned. But in regard to 


this question, a strong difference of opinion has arisen between Consul 
General Falcke and me. The Consul General considered himself bound to 
raise pedantic objections, while I only wanted to give weight to the point 
of view that it was incumbent on Hcrr Papen to see that as many officers 
as possible were provided. I have already submitted to your Excellency part 
of the correspondence with the Consul General. The rest of the papers are 
to follow as soon as the matter has been settled. 


Fully agreeing with von Bernstorff in his estimate of Consul General 
Falcke, Zimmermann replied on January ii, 1915: 

Intelligence has reached us from private sources which raises doubts as 
to whether the Consulate General at New York is at present in competent 
hands. Please acquaint me with your views by telegraph. 

Von Bernstorff then promptly replied on January 12, 1915, suggest- 
ing the transfer of Falcke: 

Unfortunately I have to confirm the news which has reached Your Ex- 
cellency. As I have informed Your Excellency in my dispatches . . . various 
differences of opinion have arisen between Falcke and me. He always ended 
by yielding to my direct orders, and I have exerted myself to the utmost to 
avoid a conflict at this juncture. All the time I took into account the fact that 
it was all but impossible for Falcke to travel from here to Europe. Perhaps 

he could be transferred to a South American post Albert already sees to 

many matters which ordinarily the Consul General would have dealt with 
because we had to take Falcke's passive resistance into account. 

The arrest of Ruroede did not put an end to the passport frauds, 
though their execution became much more difficult. Von Papen and 
Boy-Ed continued to hire men to secure passports for them. One of 
the latter's men, Richard Peter Stegler, a reservist, was arrested in Feb- 
ruary 1915. He admitted that on instructions from Boy-Ed he had 
obtained the birth certificate of Richard Madden, of Hoboken, and 
had used it to obtain an American passport for which he paid Madden 
$100. Both of them were sentenced to a term in prison. 

Not only reservists but also spies were sent over to Europe with these 


false passports. Several of those recruited and sent over by Boy-Ed were 
caught by the British. Of them, Karl Lody, was shot in the Tower of 
London, and Kuepferle committed suicide in Brixton Prison. 

When such of the reservists as managed to get across the Atlantic 
reached Germany, their passports were carefully collected by the Ger- 
man Secret Service and were again used to send spies from Germany 
into England, France, and Russia — fully 90 per cent of the spies who 
were sent out from the various German spy bases were equipped with 
neutral passports. As the war progressed, the German Secret Service 
became more scientific; they copied minutely the texture of the paper, 
the seals, and even the watermark, and made up passports in Germany 
which would have defied expert examination. Such, however, were not 
available to von Papen and Boy-Ed, who had to continue to rely on the 
ones obtained by von Wedell and Ruroede. 

But the Department of Justice steadily increased its vigilance, and 
the State Department changed the form of the passport and made the 
application requirements more severe. These measures rapidly reduced 
the number of passport frauds. The passport control of the Allies, too, 
became more efficient. But during the first few months of the war only 
von Papen and Boy-Ed can tell how many hundreds of false passports 
they made use of. 

Chapter III 

But Germany was far from content with confining the activities of her 
representatives to such relatively innocuous enterprises as smuggling 
reservists home with forged passports. She was determined to block 
the flow of munitions and supplies from Canada and the United States 
to the Allies. In spite of her original error in not building up an 
espionage service here, she made desperate efTorts to remedy the 
situation as rapidly as possible. All available agents in the Western 
Hemisphere and the Orient were mobilized and ordered to the United 

Prominent among these professional German agents was Horst von 
der Goltz. At the outbreak of the war he was combining the trades of 
spy and soldier of fortune in the Mexican Army. When the European 
crisis took a critical turn, he was ordered to hold himself in readiness, 
and as he subsequently stated: 

A few days later, the 3rd of August, 1914, license was given by my com- 
manding officer to separate myself from the service of my brigade for the 
term of six months. I left directly for El Paso, Texas, where I was told by 
Mr. Kueck, German Consul at Chihuahua, Mexico, who stayed there, to put 
myself at the disposition of Captain von Papen. 

This was the day before the declaration of war. 

Von der Goltz lost no time in reporting to von Papen. He traveled 

to Washington, and from there the German Embassy sent him on to 

New York. The Attache was immensely relieved at his arrival. Berlin 

had demanded action, and here was a daring and experienced secret 

service agent ready to do his bidding. Von der Goltz himself was full of 

grandiose schemes to pour into von Papen's willing ears. One was no 

less than an invasion of Canada through British Columbia with the aid 



of German warships in the Pacific and reservists then in the United 
States. This foolhardy plan was submitted to von BernstorH, who, 
fully realizing its impracticability, promptly squashed it. 

The idea of an attack on Canada, however, appealed especially to von 
Papen, as it would have the desirable effect of holding back Canadian 
supplies, foodstuffs, and troops destined for France. Furthermore, once 
a foothold had been estabHshed in Canada, an attempt could be made 
to purchase American arms and supplies. Such an embarrassment 
might force the American Government to refuse to supply either side, 
and thus the flow of munitions and other supplies to the Allies in 
Europe would be effectively stopped. Absurd as it was from any prac- 
tical standpoint, the idea lingered on in von Papen's mind ; and we find 
that on at least two future occasions he seriously entertained it. 

But von der Goltz had his eyes too firmly riveted on Canada to be 
diverted; in September 1914 he was back with another scheme. This 
time it was to blow up the Welland Canal. Von Papen readily fell in 
with his plans. The scheme had to be abandoned, however, because 
the Canal was too well guarded. 

Not long afterwards von der Goltz returned to Berlin for further 
orders. The British caught him on his way back to the United States 
with sabotage instructions which, as he described them, "left nothing 
to be desired . . . seditions, strikes in munition plants, attacks upon 
ships carrying supplies to the Allies, bomb outrages." Later he was 
extradited to the United States and turned State's evidence against his 
accomplices in the Welland Canal attempt. But all this has been told 
in many other places — in fact it is one of the few well-known stories of 
German activity here — and we will confine ourselves to this passing 

The Germans were not, however, to be discouraged by the failure 
of von der Goltz's plans. On December 12, 1914, the following cipher 
telegram. Number 357, was sent from Berlin to von Bernstorfl: 

Secret: — The transportation of Japanese troops through Canada must be 
prevented at all costs if necessary by blowing up Canadian railways. It would 
probably be advisable to employ Irish for this purpose in the first instance 
as it is almost impossible for Germans to enter Canada. You should discuss 
the matter with the Military Attache. The strictest secrecy is indispensable. 


This was followed up on January 3, 191 5, by a second cipher tele- 
gram, Number 386, to the Ambassador: 

From Berlin 

To Washington 

With reference to my telegram No. 357. 

Secret. The General Staff is anxious that vigorous measures should be 
taken to destroy the Canadian Pacific in several places for the purpose of 
causing a lengthy interruption of traffic. Captain Boehm who is well known 
in America and who will shortly return to that country is furnished with 
expert information on that subject. Acquaint the Military Attache with the 
above and furnish the sums required for the enterprise. 


Spurred on by the telegrams, von Papen looked around for recruits. 
His choice fell on Werner Horn, a reserve officer who had come up 
from Guatemala to New York to seek means of reaching Germany. 
Horn traveled to Vanceboro, Maine, and blew up the international 
bridge there. But so amateurish was his technique that he was quickly 
arrested. He then confessed but loyally refused to implicate von Papen. 

When the news of his confession reached the Canadian authorities, 
they promptly applied for his extradition. At this the worried von 
Bernstorfl immediately telegraphed Zimmermann: 

Most Secret, nth of February, 1915. 

The carrying out of your telegram, No. 386, for Military Attache was en- 
trusted to a former officer, who has been arrested after [causing] an explosion 
on the Canadian Pacific Railway. Canada demands his extradition. I request 
authority to protect him; according to the laws of war, the decision ought 
presumably to be: Non-extradition, provided that an act of war is proved. 

I intend to argue that, although the German Government has given no 
orders, the Government regarded the causing of explosions on an enemy 
railway as being, since it furthered military interests, an act of war. 

Zimmermann fell in with this proposal, for on February 19 he gave 
von Bernstorff instructions to protest against Horn's extradition and 
also ordered that he "should at the same time see that the extradition 
proceedings are carried to the Supreme Court. Adequate legal assistance 


should be provided and the cost will be borne by the Imperial Ex- 

Horn was indicted on a charge of having transported explosives 
from New York City to Vanceboro. He pleaded guilty and was sen- 
tenced to the Federal Penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia. This, too, is one 
of the better-known sabotage incidents. 

In 1915 there was yet another bomb plot prepared against Canada 
on American soil at the instigation of the Attache. Among check books 
and other documents which were later seized by the British and by 
the Department of Justice, there appear the following records of pay- 

Paid to Albert Kaltschmidt either by Capt. von Papen or by W. von Igel, 
his assistant — 

$2,000 on January 27, 1915, 
$1,000 on March 27, 1915, 
$1,800 on July 12, 1915, 
$1400 on September 29, 1915, 
$4,000 on December 6, 1915. 

In addition, these documents show that on October 5, 1915, $25,000 
was paid to Kaltschmidt out of an account of Dr. Albert's in the Chase 
National Bank, and was later refunded to Dr. Albert out of one of 
Count von BernstorfJ's accounts. 

Albert Carl Kaltschmidt had emigrated from Germany a number 
of years before the war, had settled in Detroit, and had prospered. 
Among other things, he was the owner of a small machine shop. While 
he did business with Americans, his moments of leisure were spent 
among the German colony in Detroit. He was the Secretary of the 
Deutscherbund, and as such felt the urge to strike a blow for the 

Early in May 1915, he called a meeting in his office in the Kresge 
Building. Among those present were Walter Scholz, Charles Francis 
Respa and his brother-in-law Carl Schmidt. Appealing to them as 
German patriots, Kaltschmidt passionately addressed them: "We must 
do something for our dear Fatherland. You should not care anything 


for America or Americans because America will throw you out from 
your work, but we will give you good jobs after the war is over, and 
Americans will trample you with their feet." He stressed the immense 
aid the United States was giving the Allies in supplying munitions and 
supplies to them and outlined a plan for the destruction of some of the 
munitions factories. 

' After the group had promised to stand loyally by him, plans were 
discussed, and it was decided to make a start by blowing up the Detroit 
Screw Works. But after reconnoitering it, Kaltschmidt decided it was 
too well guarded. He then turned his eyes across the border to the 
Peabody Overall Company's factory in Walkerville, where he hap- 
pened to know William Lefler, one of the night watchmen. 

On June 21 he called Respa to his office, and there introduced him to 
William Lefler as "Roberts." He handed them two time-clock devices, 
and then took them over to his garage at 84 East Hancock Avenue, 
where he showed them about one hundred and fifty-six sticks of 40 
per cent dynamite which he had in a packing case. He ordered them to 
carry the clocks and dynamite across the Detroit River to Windsor, 
Ontario, and offered to pay them $200 each to blow up the Peabody 
factory, and the Windsor armory. 

As soon as darkness had set in, Respa and his sister, Mrs. Schmidt, 
crossed the border carrying the explosives in two suitcases. At the 
Peabody factory Respa handed Lefler half the dynamite and attached 
one of the clocks. The other charge was set in the rear of the Windsor 
armory, in which Canadian troops were billeted. Then he and Mrs. 
Schmidt hurried to the ferry and crossed back to Detroit. At 3 o'clock 
in the morning the factory bomb exploded. The one at the armory, 
however, failed to go off. 

The Canadian authorities were immediately suspicious of Lefler, and 
on June 26, 1915, he was arrested. He confessed and involved Respa, 
who was warned in time, however, by Kaltschmidt's sister Ida. She 
gave him $40 and advised him to slip away to New York. Running 
out of funds, he soon returned to Detroit, where his arrest immediately 
followed. Information given by him and Lefler led quickly to the 
arrest of Kaltschmidt and the rest of his associates. 

Brown Brothers 

Count Johann von Bernstorff, Imper- 
ial German Ambassador to the United 
States. His Machinations Continued 
until the Severance of Diplomatic Re- 
lations in 191 7. 

Keystone Studios 

Dr. Heinrich F. Albert, Imperial 

German Commercial Attache. "The 

Mildest-Mannered Man That Ever 

Scuttled Ship or Cut a Throat." 

Brown Brothers 

Captain Franz von Papen, Imi>erial 
Germa?t Military Attache. 

Harris and Euing 

Captain Karl Boy-Ed, Imperial Ger- 
man Naval Attache. 

Saboteurs Extraordinary 


Thanks to the efforts of Horn and Kaltschmidt, the Germans had 
succeeded in carrying out two minor acts of sabotage in Canada; but 
their main objective, the blowing up of the Canadian Pacific Railway, 
had not been attained. Believing that they would have a better chance 
of success in the West, they now switched to the Pacific Coast in an 
attempt to find an unguarded area in Canada. 

In this territory the German sabotage campaign was being conducted 
by Franz von Bopp, the German Consul General in San Francisco. 
Von Bopp was on vacation in Germany when the war broke out, and 
it was not until March 1915 that he succeeded in getting back to San 
Francisco. He later admitted that he returned amply provided with 
funds, and he undoubtedly had also received specific secret service in- 
structions in Germany. As a consular officer, von Bopp was under the 
direct orders of von Bernstorff. We also know that both von Papen 
and Dr. Albert traveled out to San Francisco to see him, and no doubt 
there was a close connection between them. In his sabotage work von 
Bopp was aided by his two Vice Consuls, Wilhelm von Brincken and 
E. H. von Schack. 

In April 1915 a gentleman named van Koolbergen, a Dutchman by 
birth and a British subject by naturalization, met von Brincken in the 
Heidelberg Cafe in San Francisco. According to van Koolbergen von 
Brincken "was very pleasant and told me that he was an officer in the 
German Army, and at present working in the Secret Service of the 
German Empire and worked here under Mr. Franz von Bopp, the 
Imperial German Consul." 

Von Brincken had evidently previously checked up on van Kool- 
bergen and had satisfied himself that he was reliable, for he offered 
him $100 for the use of his passport for a trip to Canada. Sensing that 
there was money to be made, van Koolbergen drew the German out, 
and at the end of a long conversation in which various plans were dis- 
cussed, he agreed for a fee of $3,000 to blow up the tunnel on the 
Canadian Pacific between Revelstoke and Vancouver. 

Whether van Koolbergen from the outset had no intention of be- 
traying the country of his adoption or whether he grew afraid is not 
known, but the next day he betrayed the whole deal to A. Carnegie 
Ross, the British Consul General in San Francisco, and to T. K. Cornac, 


the Consulate's legal adviser. The Canadian authorities were advised, 
and in consultation with the Canadian Pacific Railway in Vancouver, 
a scheme was devised to enable van Koolbergen to collect his money 
and at the same time furnish incriminating evidence against von 

A few days after the departure of van Koolbergen, the Vancouver 
newspapers carried a prepared story that the railway tunnel in the 
Selkirk Mountains had caved in. Armed with the newspapers as evi- 
dence that he had successfully accomplished his mission, van Kool- 
bergen returned to San Francisco. 

However, he had no intention of being involved in any court action 
against the Germans. His chief interest now was to collect the money; 
and so, keeping both the American and Canadian authorities unin- 
formed of his plans, he reported the success of his mission to von 
Brincken. The Vice Consul was delighted, paid him $200, and asked 
him to come to the Consulate the next day for the balance of his fee. 
"An arrangement was made that all I had to do to get access to the 
private office of the German Consul was to knock as follows — ^two 
long and two short knocks." 

At the agreed signal, von Brincken opened the door and introduced 
him to the Consul General and to von Schack, both of whom were in 
the room. In spite of von Brincken's elation at what his minion had to 
tell, von Bopp was skeptical, and van Koolbergen only received $300. 
A heated argument ensued in which the double-dealing Dutchman 
alternately threatened blackmail and wheedled for the money. He 
eventually agreed to cut his fee to $2,250 and was then promised that 
the balance would be paid the next day. 

At the scheduled time von Brincken met him in the lobby of the 
Palace Hotel, and pulled out of his pocket a roll of $1,750 in bills. 
Of this he paid van Koolbergen $1,500, and retained $250 as a com- 
mission for himself. 

The crafty van Koolbergen thus obtained his money without in- 
volving himself. But the Canadian authorities were without their 
evidence, and von Bopp and von Brincken were free to continue their 

Von Bopp next turned his attention to sabotage objectives in the 


United States. He found the recruiting of suitable agents the most 
difficult part of the job. It was not rendered easier, either, by the fact 
that his official position made it imperative for him to avoid being 
compromised if possible. He therefore detailed von Brincken to enroll 
the operatives. 

One of the new agents thus enlisted was C. C. Crowley, who for a 
number of years had been head detective in San Francisco for the 
Southern Pacific Railroad but had lately been discharged. Crowley 
heard that the Germans were paying good money and volunteered 
his services to von Brincken. The detective evidently made a good 
impression, for we soon find him installed in an office of his own 
boasting a private secretary. 

His first duty was to act as an intermediary in recruiting other agents. 
Through a mutual acquaintance, a German who owned a small cigar 
store opposite the Gartland Hotel, where he was staying, Crowley be- 
came acquainted with Lewis J. Smith, an American of German descent. 
Crowley learned that Smith had been employed in the Hercules Powder 
Mills at Pinole across the bay but had lately been fired. As these 
mills were on his list of factories in the San Francisco area which had 
to be watched to check on shipments to the Allies, Smith was promptly 
hired. Smith soon found out that the powder at the mills was to be 
shipped to Russia and that it was to be taken to Tacoma on a large 
scow for transshipment to Vladivostok. 

On receiving the report von Brincken dispatched Crowley and Smith 
to Tacoma to put time bombs on the S.S. Hazel Dollar and three other 
ships which were to load the powder. Smith was a zealous recruit and 
lost no time in buying dynamite and fuse from the Du Pont Powder 
Works at Seattle under the name of Walter Weaver, on the pretense 
that he wanted to clear his farm of tree stumps. 

On May 30, 1915, Tacoma and Seattle were jarred by a mighty ex- 
plosion. The barge load of powder from the Hercules Powder Com- 
pany had disappeared in a blinding flash. 

There was an immediate investigation. Smith's purchase of dynamite 
and 450 feet of fuse came to light, and he was promptly arrested. But 
he had a pat story; and, aided by a skillful lawyer, he managed to get 
an acquittal. Smith returned to San Francisco to collect his reward and 


to join Crowley, who had not lost any time in getting out of Tacoma. 

Von Bopp and von Brincken were in a panic. Their one thought was 
to get Smith and Crowley out of San Francisco as quickly as possible. 
They hustled them oiff, therefore, to Detroit, once more on a Canadian 
mission. This time it was to destroy some of the freight trains routed 
through the Province of Ontario and, if possible, the Port Huron Tun- 
nel. Smith and Crowley, however, had a healthy respect for the Ca- 
nadian police and found it simpler to draw their pay and not risk 
their necks. 

A few weeks later, in July 1915, they returned to San Francisco with 
a fabricated report that they had blown up a horse train at St. Thomas, 
Ontario. For this they demanded a bonus of $300, and in addition pre- 
sented an expense account of $845.80. These sums von Bopp paid with- 
out demur. 

Smith, however, was the last person whom the Consul General 
wished to have around his bailiwick; consequently he packed him off 
again, this time to blow up the powder works at Gary, Indiana, and at 
Ishpeming, Michigan. On his arrival in Detroit, the unsuspecting 
Smith got a telegram from San Francisco announcing that the scheme 
was off. To his appeals for money the Germans turned a deaf ear. They 
had gotten him out of the way and intended to keep him at a distance. 

As Smith and his wife, whom he had brought along with him, were 
left stranded, there was nothing left for him to do but to search for a 
job. He managed to secure work in a Detroit automobile factory. 

As the weeks went by, however, his conscience began to worry him, 
and he started seeing things. On several occasions he thought he saw 
Crowley shadowing him. One day his wife pointed out from behind 
the curtains an individual across the street who she claimed had been 
following her all morning. Fearing alternately that the Germans were 
trying to get him out of way because he knew too much and that the 
Department of Justice would find out about his activities, he finally 
decided to turn State's evidence. In October 1915 he appeared in the 
office of the United States Attorney in Detroit and told his story. 

The Department of Justice had gradually been piling up evidence 
and building a case against von Bopp and his associates on the score 
of "violations of the Federal Criminal Statutes in connection with 


conspiracies to interfere with the transportation of munitions of war 
and supplies needed for the AlUed Governments, by dynamiting and 
blowing up factories, railroad bridges and tunnels, trains, docks and 
steamships." The investigators had not succeeded, however, in definitely 
connecting the Consulate with sabotage acts until Smith's evidence 
gave them a positive link. Even then the supplementary investigation 
took so long that it was not until late in 191 6 that the case was ready 
for prosecution. 

All telegrams which had passed between Smith and Crowley, and 
between them and von Bopp, von Brincken, and von Schack were 
uncovered by the Department of Justice and were later admitted in 
evidence at the trial. The telephone records of the Gartland Hotel, 
where Crowley stayed when in San Francisco, and of the Hotel Beres- 
ford, the Piccadilly Apartments, and the Palace Hotel, where von 
Brincken resided in succession, showed that Crowley had been in con- 
stant touch with the German consular ofl&cials in San Francisco. The 
books of the Du Pont Powder Company in Seattle revealed a purchase 
of 190 sticks of 100 per cent nitroglycerine by "Walter Weaver," alias 
Smith, for which he paid I6.50 and was given an order calling for its 
delivery from the launch Du Pont at the Harrison Street dock, where 
the powder was delivered to him. Witnesses from the Hercules Powder 
Mills testified that nothing unusual was noticed about Smith during 
the time of his employment at the mills, but after the explosion of the 
powder barge various workmen came to the officers of the company 
and stated that the explosion recalled to their minds a number of 
suspicious circumstances regarding Smith. A report drawn up by the 
Hercules Powder Mills was revealing: 

Some of the workmen had observed Smith copying Russian characters 
from the powder boxes. . . . He had so little money that it was necessary for 
him to borrow money to pay his carfare to San Francisco. Sunday evening 
(two days after powder was shipped from the factory) he returned to the 
Powder Works in an automobile and exhibited a roll of bills which some of 
the men estimated as containing about $400. A day or two later, some of 
the men around the plant saw him on the observation car of one of the 
trains going north. In connection with the suspicious actions of Smith it has 
been learned by the investigations of the powder company that, while the 


barge loaded with powder was in San Francisco Bay, Smith called at the 
office of the Crowley Laurel Co. (no connection with C. C. Crowley) 
and asked permission to go on board the barge, stating that he had been 
engaged in loading the powder and that he had broken his watch chain and 
lost therefrom his wife's wedding ring, which he wished to search for. 

Von Bopp and his associates were arrested late in 1916 and, as we 
shall see later, were brought to trial. Smith and his wife were given im- 
munity for turning State's evidence. Smith steadfastly denied, how- 
ever, that he had blown up the barge in Seattle harbor, and there 
was no direct evidence to disprove him. (A watchman had been blown 
up with the barge and a murder charge would have been involved.) 
He claimed that the dynamite which he had bought under the name 
of "Weaver" had been obtained to show Crowley, who had commis- 
sioned him to place dynamite bombs on the Hazel Dollar and on the 
three other ships which were to load the powder for Vladivostok. But 
he had hoodwinked Crowley, he maintained, and, instead, had thrown 
the dynamite into a creek. After the war, however, the Germans, 
although they denied liability, paid a $500 claim for damages in con- 
nection with the explosion. 

While the Department of Justice had been preparing its case, how- 
ever, von Bopp and von Brincken had had their fingers in other 
activities as well. In its inception, they were involved in a Hindu- 
German plot to promote sedition in India. 

Among the Indian students entered at various American universities 
before the war, there soon arose a strong nationalist movement for 
home rule in India. Funds were freely provided by certain misguided 
Americans, many of whom in good faith thought they were furthering 
enlightenment in India, others of whom sincerely believed British rule 
in India was tyrannical, and, finally, some of whom were willing to 
support anything that was anti-British. 

Branches of this Indian nationalist organization were established in 
various parts of the United States, but it was among the Indian 
students at the University of California in Berkeley that the movement 
reached its peak. There, in November 1913, Har Dyal, a postgraduate 
student, founded a paper called Ghadr, which being translated means 
"revolution." Published in Urdu and other Indian dialects, it freely 


preached an uprising in India and for its fulfillment urged resort to 
anarchist methods of assassination and bombing. 

On the outbreak of war the attention of Germany's representatives 
in the United States was immediately focussed on Har Dyal and his 
activities. An uprising in India would serve a double purpose : it would 
not only keep Indian native regiments from joining the British Ex- 
peditionary Force in France, but it would also divert British troops to 
India. It was also an opportune moment to approach Har Dyal, for 
his bloodthirsty crusade had displeased the American authorities, and 
he was being held for deportation as an undesirable alien. Thus, with- 
out difficulty he was persuaded to proceed to Berlin; and another 
Hindu, Ram Chandra, was left as his successor to edit Ghadr. 

In Germany Har Dyal was taken in hand by von Wesendonck, sec- 
retary in charge of the Indian Section of the Foreign Office; and to- 
gether they organized the "Indian Independence Committee." At their 
rallying call numerous Indian nationalists, chiefly students in various 
European universities, flocked to Berlin. Regular meetings were held, 
attended by German officials who knew India well; a special fund 
amounting to several million marks was provided by the Imperial 
Government; and a campaign was outlined to promote sedition in 
British India. Emissaries were sent there through Turkey and 
Afghanistan, and the organization in the United States was brought 
under the direction of the Central Committee in Berlin. Finally, 
Germany's diplomatic representatives throughout the world were in- 
structed by the German Foreign Office to render material aid and 

On December 27, 1914, the following coded cable. Number 449, was 
sent by Zimmermann to von Bernstorff : 

A confidential agent of the Berlin Committee, Heramba Lai Gupta, is 
shortly leaving for America in order to organize the importation of arms 
and the conveyance of Indians [plotters] now resident in the United States 
to India. He is provided with definite instructions. You should place at his 
disposal the sum which he requires for this purpose in America, at Shanghai 
and Batavia, viz., 150,000 marks. Sanction should be requested by telegraph 
for any additional expenditure under this head. Sarkar must postpone further 


action until the confidential agent joins him but he should not for the time 
being be told the name of the latter. 

This was followed up on December 31, 1914, by a further coded 
cable from Zimmermann to Washington: 

In continuation of No. 449. You should in conjunction with Gupta — ^but 
without attracting attention — take steps to have such Indians as are suitable 
for this purpose instructed in the use of explosives by some reliable person. 

Von Bernstorfl took immediate steps on receipt of these cables. Cap- 
tain Hans Tauscher, the New York agent for Krupp's, who also pro- 
cured for von der Goltz the dynamite in the Welland afjfair, was called 
into action. Through various channels, on instructions from von Papen, 
he bought up rifles and cartridges, and in January 1915 shipped 10 car- 
loads of freight containing 8,000 rifles and 4,000,000 cartridges to one 
"Juan Bernardo Bowen," care of M. Martinez and Company, ship 
brokers, San Diego. 

In the meantime, Ram Chandra had been in active contact in San 
Francisco with the Consulate General. Von Bopp, therefore, was not 
surprised when the German Embassy in Washington apprised him 
of plans to ship arms to India and instructed him to provide ships for 
the purpose. To conceal the German source of the money funds were 
transferred by wire through several intermediaries from San Francisco 
to Martinez and Company in San Diego, and a small vessel, the Annie 
Larsen, was chartered. At the same time, through Fred Jebsen, a former 
lieutenant in the German Navy, the Maveric\, an oil tanker, was pur- 
chased in San Francisco from one of the Standard Oil Companies. 

The arms were secretly loaded aboard the Annie Larsen, and on 
March 8, 191 5, she sailed with clearance papers made out for a Mexican 
port. Her real destination was the Island of Socorro in the South Seas, 
where she was to meet the Maveric\. Here the Maveric\ was to trans- 
ship the arms, hide them in her oil tanks, against the possibility of her 
being searched, and proceed to the coast of India near Karachi. There 
she was to be met by fishing craft which would land the arms and 
several bales of seditious pamphlets which had been put on board by 
Ram Chandra. On shore the rifles, cartridges, and literature were to be 


handed over to Indian plotters who had been sent from BerUn to 
India to organize a rebellion in the Punjab. 

This well-thought-out plan missed fire. After waiting around for a 
whole month at Socorro Island, the Annie Larsen ran short of water. 
An attempt was made to sink a well; but, when at twenty-two feet 
hard rock was struck without a sign of water, the captain of the ship 
sailed away for the Mexican coast. A few days later the MavericJ^ 
arrived at the island; unfortunately, however, there was no trace of 
the Annie Larsen, and a British warship appeared on the scene. What 
the Mavei'ic\ would have done with the rifles is not known, but on the 
approach of a boarding party the captain lost no time in getting rid 
of the bales of compromising pamphlets — they were hurriedly thrown 
into the fire box. 

After wandering around for several months in the Pacific, the Annie 
Larsen put in at Hoquiam, Washington, on July i, 1915, where the 
cargo was immediately seized by the authorities. The Maveric\ even- 
tually reached Batavia, Java, where she was finally sold at a loss. The 
filibuster thus ended in costly failure involving a loss of several hun- 
dred thousand dollars; and, what was a far greater disappointment to 
Germany, her plans for an armed revolt in India had for the time 
being vanished in smoke. 

As usual, von BernstorfiF issued a denial. On October 5, 1915, he 
officially stated that the German Government knew nothing about 
the shipment; consequently, for the time being the matter was 
dropped. The American Secret Service was not surprised, however, 
when among the documents it seized in von Igel's office during a 
raid on April 18, 1916, it discovered entries in his notebook defi- 
nitely linking up both the Annie Larsen and the Maveric\ to the Ger- 
man Consulate in San Francisco. 

While the Germans were anxiously waiting for news that the 
Maveric\ had kept its rendezvous with the Annie Larsen and that the 
arms had been landed in India, von Papen started a Hindu adventure 
of his own in the Northwest. 

In May 1915 he toured the United States, visiting German Consuls 
and discussing plans with them. On May 11 he was in Seattle and there 
met Franz Schulenberg, a German agent who had been associated with 


von Brincken in San Francisco. Schulenberg had been in contact with 
Ram Chandra; and when on his arrival in Seattle he learned that 
there was a large population of Hindu coolies in Vancouver, he was 
quick to suggest to von Papen that they should be used. This fitted in 
well with von Papen's plans, as he was still trying to follow the in- 
structions contained in Zimmermann's telegram of January 3, 1915, 
stating that the "General Staff is anxious that vigorous measures should 
be taken to destroy the Canadian Pacific in several places." Therefore, 
a scheme was devised to employ Hindu coolies in the Canadian North- 
west to dynamite railway bridges and tunnels, and von Papen per- 
sonally paid Schulenberg $4,000 to buy a ton of dynamite and 50 rifles 
fitted with Maxim silencers to shoot any guards in the way. 

Schulenberg had actually bought the dynamite and had arranged for 
it to be delivered to one Singh, near the Canadian border, when von 
Brincken learned that the Annie Larsen had put into Hoquiam, Wash- 
ington. Fearing that Schulenberg's plan would be uncovered and not 
wishing to have further complications on his hands, he instructed him 
to break off relations with the Hindus and flee to New York. Von 
Papen himself was in a nervous condition at the time; and, therefore, 
on Schulenberg's arrival he instructed Koenig, one of his sabotage 
directors, to give him a railroad ticket to Mexico City with orders to 
get across the border as soon as possible. 

Nothing further would have been heard about this abortive 
Canadian-Hindu scheme had not Schulenberg returned to the United 
States. Stranded and without funds, he was picked up as a vagrant by 
the police in San Jose, California, in December 191 7. There, completely 
broken down in health, he confessed the details of the plot. 

In the meantime Heramba Lai Gupta, the Indian student whose de- 
parture for the United States had been announced in Zimmermann's 
two cables to von Bernstorff, had arrived in New York. Working to- 
gether Gupta and Dr. Chakravarti, a graduate of the University of 
Calcutta who had fled from India to avoid arrest, took over, under the 
guidance of von Bernstorff, von Papen, and later von Igel, the direction 
of the Hindu plots, with which von Bopp and von Brincken now had 
nothing further to do. Although the Hindu agents had been success- 
ful in running a certain amount of arms into India under false 


manifests, the British were on the alert. On information supplied by 
the British Intelligence Service, Chakravarti and Gupta were arrested 
in New York in March 1917, and this led to the apprehension of the 
whole Hindu-German organization in the United States. 

As von Bopp and his associates were intimately mixed up in the plot, 
they were tried together with the Hindus involved. The trial began 
on November 19, 1917, in San Francisco, with Judge van Fleet on 
the bench. Nearly one hundred defendants were assembled, including 
the personnel of the San Francisco German Consulate, the German 
Consul at Honolulu, a large number of Hindu students, and a 
"shipping group" who had acted as intermediaries in the chartering 
and purchase of the Annie Larsen and Maveric\. 

The trial of these men was one of the most picturesque ever con- 
ducted in an American court. The turbaned Hindus lent an Oriental 
atmosphere. Among the evidence were publications in six Indian 
dialects, also coded messages, all of which called for constant trans- 
lation by interpreters and cryptographers. Witness after witness recited 
his amazing story of adventure. The action shifted quickly between the 
three focal points, Berlin, the United States, and India, with" inter- 
mediate scenes laid in Japan, China, Afghanistan, and the South Seas. 
The climax occurred on the afternoon of April 23, 1918, the last day 
of the trial, when, in the crowded court room, Ram Singh shot and 
killed Ram Chandra, whom he suspected of betraying the organiza- 
tion. A moment later. United States Marshal James Holohan shot 
the murderer dead in his tracks. 

A verdict of guilty was returned against twenty-nine of the de- 
fendants. The officials of the San Francisco German Consulate were 
sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from i year to 2 years, 
plus in some cases fines of from $2,000 to $10,000. The Hindus, chiefly 
students, received lighter sentences, running from 2 months up to 18 
months in the penitentiary. Chakravarti, because of assistance he finally 
gave the prosecution, escaped with a sentence of 60 days. 

The Department of Justice congratulated itself on its success in 
clearing up the von Bopp organization; but, without any of its mem- 
bers even being aware of their existence, two of the convicted Consul's 


principal agents, Kurt Jahnke and Lothar Witzke, had slipped through 
the net. 

Jahnke was born in Germany in 1882. We owe a description of him 
to an American Intelligence report, obtained by an agent in Mexico 
after we entered the war. He was five feet eleven inches tall, about 
one hundred and sixty pounds in weight, swarthy, pimply faced, with 
blond hair and small weasel eyes. We know little about his ante- 
cedents except that he came to the United States several years before 
the war, became a naturalized American citizen, and served some time 
in the United States Marines. 

In June 19 15, we find him one of von Bopp's principal sabotage 
agents. Following out the usual practice of secret service agents every- 
where, he established a cover for himself by joining the Morse Patrol, 
a night watchman agency, in San Francisco. Whether he actually did 
the work himself or obtained a substitute is not known, but he achieved 
his object by having his name on the daily work sheets — a convenient 
alibi if suspected of sabotage in other parts of the country. 

In order further to divert suspicion from himself and to display 
his patriotism as a naturalized American citizen, he boldly walked 
into the office of the Secret Service in San Francisco on February 10, 
191 6, and reported to the agent in charge that he had discovered a plot 
to blow up the navy yard at Mare Island. However, as the source of 
his information was an overheard conversation between alleged Ger- 
man agents whose whereabouts were unknown to him, the authorities 
paid little attention to his warning. From this inactivity they were to be 
rudely awakened shortly afterwards, when with startling suddenness 
a magazine blew up at the navy yard. There seemed to be no explana- 
tion of the explosion, and the authorities began to ponder over the 

By May 1916 Jahnke had become the director of von Bopp's sabotage 
activities. Just at this juncture he met Lothar Witzke; and thus was 
formed one of the most deadly teams of saboteurs in history, a team 
whose activities we shall frequently encounter as we unravel the web 
of German intrigues in this country. 

Witzke was born in Posen, East Prussia, in 1895. After attending 
grammar and high school, he spent a year at Posen Academy. At the 


age of seventeen he entered the German Naval Academy as a cadet. 

By the beginning of the war he v^as a well-built, athletic young fel- 
low, good looking, with keen blue eyes, fair hair, and ruddy com- 
plexion, serving aboard the cruiser Dresden in South American waters. 
He also had the usual sailor's fondness for wine, women, and song. 
After many months of excitement, during which the Dresden was alter- 
nately playing havoc with Allied shipping and hiding from British 
warships, she was eventually caught and sunk. Witzke's leg was broken 
in the action, and together with other survivors of the crew he was 
interned in Valparaiso. 

Early in 1916 he escaped; and as a seaman, under an assumed name, 
he succeeded in reaching San Francisco in May 1916 on board the 
S.S. Caltisa, There he reported to Consul General von Bopp, who put 
him in touch with Jahnke. 

At this time the American authorities knew nothing of Jahnke's and 
Witzke's surreptitious activities. Both showed special aptitude for secret 
service work and were of a caliber far superior to the rest of von Bopp's 
agents. So cleverly did they cover their tracks that they were never even 
suspected during the neutrality period. 

In addition to their work on the West Coast, they made frequent 
trips east on sabotage missions. After von Bopp's arrest they gradually 
shifted the theater of their operations to the industrial areas of the 
Eastern Seaboard. 

Chapter IV 

It was not until the early part of 191 5 that American munitions 
plants really became adjusted to large-scale production. But in the 
meantime the Germans had thrown together a sabotage organization 
and were prepared to launch a major offensive. Soon the papers were 
filled with accounts of mysterious fires and explosions in ships and 
factories. Scarcely a week went by during the last months of 1915 
without such a happening, many of them resulting in millions of 
dollars' worth of damage, and not a few in loss of life. During 191 6 
the rate and amount of destruction increased to even more alarming 
proportions. A few of the disasters can be written down to accidents 
or carelessness due to the sudden increase in the manufacture of 
munitions, but German sabotage agents were undoubtedly responsible 
for the bulk of them. 

A cursory glance at the partial list incorporated in the Appendix 
will reveal the almost incredible toll levied on neutral America. 
This chronological table shows that the destructions started on January 
I, 1915, with a mysterious incendiary fire at the John A. Roebling 
Company plant at Trenton. It further lists, between this date and 
America's entry into the war, the names of forty-seven ships on which 
bombs or other incendiary devices were found while en route to Allied 
countries from American ports and also forty-three American factories 
and a few freight yards where arson or explosions caused either partial 
or complete destruction. It will be shown later that most of the 
German agents fled to Mexico on America's entry into the war; and 
it is significant, as is shown by the Appendix, that the incendiary 
fires and explosions in American factories and on ships sailing from 
American ports also ceased abruptly on this date. 

Towards the end of April 1915 the S.S. Cressington Court caught 



fire at sea, two bombs were found in the cargo of the S.S. Lord Erne, 
and a bomb was found in the hold of the S.S. Devon City. On May 
8, 1915, two bombs were discovered in the cargo of the S.S. Ban\dale, 
On May 13, 1915, the S.S. Samland mysteriously caught fire at sea. 
On May 21, 1915, a bomb was found on board the S.S. Anglo-Saxon. 
All these ships had sailed from American ports. The shipowners, the 
public, and the press clamored that action should be taken by the 
proper authorities to discover those responsible for these outrages. The 
result was that in New York Harbor the special job of tracking down 
the saboteurs was assigned to Inspector Thomas J. Tunney, head of the 
Bomb Squad of the New York Police Department. 

It did not take Tunney long to realize that he was up against one 
of the hardest assignments of his career. Anyone familiar with the 
water front of a great port can appreciate the difficulties. Miles of 
shore line and docks, extremely busy during the day but dark and 
deserted at night; also in many sections a maze of narrow streets and 
dark alleys backing the docks. 

Ninety-odd ships of the German merchant marine, ranging from 
small tugs to the giant Vaterland, at that time the largest vessel in the 
world, were confined in American ports by the vigilance of the British 
fleet. The several hundred men composing the crews were free to cir- 
culate, and each was a potential agent who could be employed for 
sabotage purposes. Added to them were the thousands of stevedores of 
all nationalities who frequented the crowded wharves. They worked 
by the day or by the job. They were hired on the spot as they gath- 
ered round. The shipping companies did not know and did not care 
where they lived. All they demanded was an able-bodied man; and 
with the tremendous volume of cargoes to be shipped, they had no 
time to keep superfluous records or to be particular about whom they 
employed. In addition no information had been obtained from the 
bombs; for, if they did not explode and were discovered at sea, the 
crew lost no time in hastily dumping them overboard. 

However some information was gleaned at the end of May 1915. 
The S.S. KirJ{^ Oswald, out of New York, docked at Marseilles. In 
four sugar bags in her hold bombs were found. On urgent cable de- 
mand, the bombs were sent back by the French Government. They 


were found to consist of lead pipes, each divided by a copper disc into 
two compartments, one of which held potassium chlorate, the other 
sulphuric acid. The action of the acid on the copper took place at a 
uniform rate and thus determined the time at which the two chemicals 
would unite to produce the explosion. In this case the copper disc had 
been too thick. 

Tunney and his agents followed every possible lead, but they led 
nowhere. Sugar shipments were traced from factory to vessel, pur- 
chases of potassium chlorate and sulphuric acid in New York City 
were investigated — all to no avail. 

The first break came at the end of October 1915. Captain Martin, 
the French Military Attache, who was stationed in New York, tele- 
phoned Police Headquarters that an exporter of war supplies, Carl 
Wettig by name, Managing Director of the Whitehall Trading Com- 
pany, had given information that a man called Paul Siebs, who resided 
at the Hotel Breslin and who had rented desk space from him, had 
asked him to purchase a supply of T.N.T., and to deliver it to a garage 
in Weehawken. 

Tunney was immediately on the alert; he called on Paul Siebs and 
demanded to know what he intended to do with the purchase. Siebs, 
who Tunney found out later also used the name of Karl Oppegaarde, 
was able to furnish no other information than that he had been re- 
quested to make the purchase by Dr. Herbert Kienzle, a German clock 
maker who had been referred to him by Max Breitung, a mutual ac- 
quaintance, and that Kienzle had told him that the T.N.T. was to be 
delivered to a man called Fay at a garage on Main Street, Weehawken. 

Not wishing to make a premature arrest, Tunney laid a trap for Fay. 
A package containing twenty-five pounds of trinitrotoluol was handed 
to Wettig; and on Tunney's instructions, accompanied by two of his 
agents, Wettig set out for the garage to deliver the explosive to Fay. 
He was absent, but they were directed to his boarding house at 28 
Fifth Street by a workman. On inquiry from the landlady they found 
that he was not at home, and so with her permission they mounted 
to his bedroom and left the package on the dresser, together with a 
note from Wettig informing him that he had failed to find him 
at the garage. 

*'buyuporblowup" 39 

For the next few days close watch was kept on Dr. Kienzle and Fay, 
also on Walter Scholz and Paul Daeche, two men who were constantly 
seen with Fay. 

Fortune now again favored Tunney. Wanting to test the T.N.T., Fay 
asked Wettig to accompany him during the trials. Warned in time by 
Wettig, a swarm of detectives were posted in the woods at Grantwood, 
New Jersey, where the tests were to be made; and after one or two 
experiments with the explosives had been carried out, they stepped in 
and arrested Fay together with Scholz, his brother-in-law, who had 
accompanied him. The detectives making the arrests were assigned by 
Chief William J. Flynn of the Secret Service, as the New York police 
did not have the power of arrest in New Jersey. 

A quick search of the boarding house and of the garage resulted 
in the discovery of a number of ingenious mechanical contrivances 
which were immediately recognized as parts of bombs. In the garage 
25 sticks of dynamite, 450 pounds of potassium chlorate, 400 detonating 
caps, and 200 bomb cylinders were found; and in a packing case they 
uncovered 4 finished bombs. In his rooms a chart of New York Harbor 
was found, also information which led to the discovery that he was the 
owner of a powerful motor boat, moored at the docks opposite West 
42nd Street. 

Even more interesting than the discovery of the bombs was the story 
which Fay had to tell. He was in Germany when the war broke 
out, and was immediately called to the colors. He was posted as a 
lieutenant to an infantry battalion in line successively in the Vosges 
Mountains and in Champagne, where he saw some of the bitterest 
fighting of the war. An examination of Allied shells revealed that 
much of their superiority was due to the munitions that were being 
sent over from the United States. Fay's ingenious mind evolved a 
scheme to stop this supply, and he lost no time in putting the plan 
before his commanding officer. In due course. Section III B of the Ger- 
man General Staff equipped him with a neutral passport, handed him 
$4,000 in American currency, and sent him off to report to von Papen. 
He reached New York on the S.S. Rotterdam on April 23, 1915. 

Fay was well qualified for the task. He was thirty-four years of age, 
and an engineer; he also spoke English fluently. The first man he 


looked up was Walter Scholz, a former engineer of the Lackawanna 
Railroad, who, as we have already mentioned, was employed by 
Kaltschmidt in his abortive attempt to blow up the Detroit Screw 
Works. Scholz readily fell in with his plans and recruited as an 
assistant Paul Daeche, who belonged to the Schlarafia organization, a 
fraternal society composed of German-speaking people, of which Scholz 
was also a member. 

Although at the time of his arrest Fay refused to implicate von Papen, 
he revealed his connection with him in a confession which he made 
three years later: 

My first arrival in New York City was in May [?] 1915, having been 
ordered there by the Intelligence Department o£ the German War Office for 
the express purpose of sabotage activities in connection with the shipments 
of munitions to the Allies, as well as factories manufacturing said munitions. 
As directed I reported to Captain von Papen 

After meeting Captain von Papen at the Deutscher Verein in New York 
City and discussing the matter with him, I went to work on the manufacture 
of bombs to be attached to cargo ships sailing with supplies for the Allies. . . . 
In most of my subsequent transactions with Captain von Papen, Dr. Kienzle 
acted as intermediary . . . Captain von Papen not wishing to have me seen 
about the office. 

The bombs manufactured by Fay were studied independently by two 
sets of military experts of the United States Government, who re- 
ported that they were mechanically perfect. The bombs were so de- 
signed that they could be fitted to a ship's rudder. By means of a rod 
attached to the rudder each swing of the blade wound up a mechanism 
which eventually struck down on a cap which fired the T.N.T. in the 
container. There was sufficient explosive in it to have sunk the most 
heavily armored dreadnought if exploded under the stern. It was Fay's 
intention to use his motor boat at night to attach his diabolical devices, 
all his plans for the planting of which had been perfected at the time 
of his arrest. 

Fay and all his confederates were tried together and convicted. 
Fay was sentenced to Atlanta, Georgia, for eight years; Scholz, for six; 
and Daeche, for four. Kienzle and Breitung were not brought to trial 
and were later interned. 

*'buy up or blow up" 41 

In August 1916, a month after his arrival at the Atlanta Penitentiary, 
Fay escaped by means of a forged pass. At various German Consulates 
about the country he w^as given money, by means of which he was 
enabled to flee to Mexico. From there as a stowaway he succeeded in 
reaching Spain. After trying in vain to go on to Germany, he appar- 
ently lost heart, and finally surrendered to the American Consul in 
Malaga. From there he was returned to the United States to serve out 
the rest of his term. 

Fay was arrested and convicted for what he had intended to do. His 
plans had been nipped in the bud before he could put them into 
effect. His arrest had not solved the mystery of a single one of the 
bomb outrages on any of the ships we have mentioned, and there was 
ample proof that the sabotage agents responsible were still at large: 
On October 26, 1915, two days after Fay was arrested, the S.S. Rio 
Lages mysteriously took fire at sea; on November 3, 1915, a fire sud- 
denly broke out in the hold of the S.S. Euterpe; on November 6, 191 5, 
a similar fire occurred on the S.S. Rochamheau, en route to Europe; 
and on the next day an explosion took place on the S.S. Ancona while 
at sea. 

Frantic attempts were made to make Fay talk. He freely admitted 
and took the responsibility for all that Tunney had uncovered about 
him, but professed complete ignorance as to who was making the 
bombs of the Kir\ Oswald type and as to who was placing them on 
the ships. Later, in 1918, when he surrendered and was returned to 
Atlanta, he revealed in an affidavit that he had known right along all 
the principals who were involved. 

As the arrests which had been made so far in connection with 
land sabotage cases had shown that the agents involved were mostly 
of German nationality or of German descent. Inspector Tunney de- 
cided to concentrate on the restaurants, hotels, and beer gardens fre- 
quented by Germans along the Hoboken water front. He picked out 
three of his ablest men, good Americans of Teutonic parentage, who 
spoke German perfectly, and assigned them separately to the job, 
instructing them to pass themselves off as Germans among the habitues 
of these establishments. 


Several weeks went by; and then, finally in April 191 6, a break came 
to Henry Earth, one of the three. By dint of patience and much boast- 
ing of his loyalty to the Fatherland and by occasionally hinting that 
he was in German Secret Service employ, he won the confidence of a 
German with whom he had struck up an acquaintance. One day his 
confidant disclosed to him that a certain Captain von Kleist had a 
grievance against a Dr. Scheele for nonpayment of two notes for $117 
each, owed to him for secret service work. Earth's informant also added 
that von Kleist had written that day to von Igel, head of the German 
Secret Service in America, asking for an interview. 

The detective was quick to seize his opportunity. Having obtained 
from his German friend von Kleist's telephone number and address 
in Hoboken, he called him up, posed as one of von Igel's assistants, 
referred to von Kleist's letter to von Igel, and stated that he was com- 
ing over to Hoboken to see him. 

Von Kleist fell completely into the trap. In his eagerness to get pay- 
ment of the two notes, he not only revealed that Dr. Scheele was 
making bombs to place on ships but also took Earth over to his own 
home at 121 Garden Street, Hoboken, and there showed him several 
bombs which Earth immediately recognized as identical with the ones 
which had been found on the S.S. Kir\ Oswald. Von Kleist's lack of 
caution may seem incredible; but secret service records show that even 
secret agents cannot resist the innate human urge to air their grievances, 
though jail or the firing squad is likely to be the penalty for indis- 

The saboteur's fate was sealed; and after long questioning sufficient 
information was extracted from him to effect the arrests of Dr. Scheele 
and others, which eventually led to the rounding up of all who were 
involved in this particular ring. It was not, however, until March 1918 
that the final arrest was made. From the evidence uncovered by 
Tunney and revealed at the trial it has been possible to reconstruct this 
ship-bombing organization. It was established that the originator of 
this organization, and director of it during the initial stages, was Franz 
von Rintelen. 

Von Rintelen was a Captain-lieutenant in the German Naval Re- 
serve. After serving his time in the Navy, he spent several years abroad 


acquiring international banking experience. For a time he was em- 
ployed in a London banking house and then went to New York, where 
he was associated with Ladenburg, Thalmann and Company. During 
his stay in America he had the entree wherever he went. He was 
a member of the New York Yacht Club, the only other German mem- 
bers of which were the Kaiser and his brother Prince Heinrich; he 
was a familiar figure also at Newport and on Park Avenue. 

Even in these circles he attracted attention. He came of an aristo- 
cratic family. Both his features and his easy carriage reflected breeding. 
There was little of the Teuton in his appearance — he could easily have 
passed for an Italian. In build he was trimly athletic. His quick nervous 
movements, his sharp intelligent eyes, and the broad sweep of his fore-^ 
head revealed a man of action and of intellectual brilliance. 

His banking connections enabled him to acquire a first-hand knowl- 
edge of American principles and methods of finance and industry. 
From New York he went to open branches of a German bank in 
Mexico and South America, and shortly after his return to Berlin 
was appointed a director of the Deutscher Bank. 

The onset of the war brought him an important post on the stafiF 
of Admiral von Tirpitz, where on account of his banking knowledge 
his first assignment was to make transfers of money abroad for the 
use of the raiding German warships then still at large in the Pacific 
and in South American waters. 

As we already know, the question of America's munitions supplies 
to the Allies came to occupy more and more the minds of the General 
Staffs of the Army and Navy the longer the struggle continued. Ac- 
cording to von Rintelen's own statement, made after the war, he had 
plans to meet this problem: 

It was accepted in all quarters in Berlin that something of a more forceful 
nature must be done than hitherto. Indeed conferences took place in the War 
Ministry, the Foreign Office, and the Finance Ministry, in each of which I 
outlined my plans, insofar as I could gauge the situation from my post in 
Berlin. The impression of energy and determination which I contrived to 
make gave considerable satisfaction. Men of action, particularly men like 
Hel£ferich and Zimmermann, could not help smiling when I concluded one 


speech with: "I'll buy up what I can, and blow up what I can't." One and 
all they all resolutely agreed with me that sabotage was the only alternative. 

And so von Rintelen v^as duly commissioned by the War Minister, 
General von Wandel, to carry out his plan in the United States. On 
March 22, 1915, armed v^ith a munificent credit of $500,000 he set out 
from Berlin for Christiania aboard the S.S. Kristianiafjord. As Emile V. 
Cache, a Swiss citizen and bearer of a Swiss passport (manufactured 
in Germany), he brazenly visited the British and American Consulates 
in Christiania, obtained their vises and proceeded unmolested to New 
York, where he arrived safely on April 3, 1915. 

He immediately discovered that the first part of his plan — ^to corner 
the American munitions market — was impossible. The supplies were so 
large that even the thought of it was ridiculous. He therefore decided 
to carry out at once the second alternative — to blow up as much as he 

When his plans were communicated to von Papen and Boy-Ed, both 
gave their willing support. Explosives were nothing new to them, as 
for several months already they had been making considerable use of 
them, especially in their Canadian ventures. 

For the manufacture of bombs, von Papen offered the services of an 
expert. Dr. Walter T. Scheele. In his youth Scheele had served as a lieu- 
tenant in Field Artillery Regiment Number 8, and after a few years' 
service had applied for leave to go to the United States for the purpose 
of chemical research. His leave had been granted, but at the same time 
he had been ordered to put himself at the disposal of the Military 
Attache in Washington. There he had received the assignment of keep- 
ing track of, and reporting on, explosives, and new chemical discoveries 
as related to warfare. So valuable had been his information that he 
had never been recalled in twenty-one years and without any extra 
military service had been advanced from the rank of lieutenant to 
major in the reserves. In addition to having the distinction of being 
Germany's only prewar spy in the United States, he was also paid an 
annual retainer of $1,500 a year. 

Scheele had ideal cover. His work as a commercial investigator in 
German pay was only a part-time job. He was also engaged in private 

< < 5 > 


enterprise and was the president of the New Jersey Agricultural Chem- 
ical Company. He was just the man von Rintelen was looking for, 
and he did not hesitate a moment in sending for him and setting him 
to work. 

By means of a few experiments, Dr. Scheele quickly evolved the 
bomb which has already been described: a lead tube with a metal disc, 
either copper or aluminum, separating sulphuric acid from either 
potassium chlorate, picric acid, or a mixture of urotropin and sodium 
peroxide. For incendiary purposes picric acid was usually used, and the 
ends of the tube were sealed with wax instead of with solid plugs. 
The mingling of the sulphuric acid with the picric acid caused the 
emission of a white hot flame. 

At this stage Carl von Kleist appeared on the scene. In some re- 
spects he was the Count von Luckner of an earlier generation. As he 
was the scion of one of the oldest aristocratic families of Germany, 
a career had been open to him in a regiment of the Guards. Instead 
he had run away to sea as a boy, and after serving his time on a wind- 
jammer had transferred to steamships, obtained his master's certificate, 
and eventually the command of an Atlantic liner. He was now an old 
man, living in retirement in Hoboken. Von Rintelen was acquainted 
with his family and in this way came into contact with him. 

Von Kleist knew all the interned German sailors and numbered 
among his personal friends most of the captains and officers of the 
German vessels laid up in New York Harbor. Von Rintelen found him 
a ready tool. Here was adventure after the old man's heart, and he 
jumped at the opportunity to serve his country. Together the two of 
them worked out a scheme to make use of the interned S.S. Friedrich 
der Grosse as a workshop; and Carl Schmidt, the chief engineer, Ernest 
Becker, an electrician, and George Praedel, WiUiam Paradies, and 
Friedrich Garbade, members of the crew, were enrolled in the or- 

Soon the workshop in the Friedrich der Grosse was humming with 
activity. Von Rintelen purchased large quantities of lead tubing and 
copper rods of the right dimensions through the firm of E. V. Gibbons, 
Incorporated, with offices in Cedar Street, which he had specially set 
up as a blind. Through the same firm he bought the machinery to 


cut the lead piping and the copper discs to the proper dimensions. 
Under cover of darkness the prepared tubes were taken over to Dr. 
Scheele's laboratory at 1133 Clinton Street, Hoboken, w^here they w^ere 
filled. Eventually these bombs, or "cigars" as they v^ere called, were 
being manufactured at the rate of fifty a day. 

For the distribution of the bombs to suitable stevedores who had 
access to the ships. Captain Carl Wolpert, an officer of the German 
Naval Reserve, Superintendent of the Atlas Line, a subsidiary of the 
Hamburg-American Steamship Company, and Eno Bode, a captain 
in the service of the North German Lloyd Steamship Company, 
were enlisted. A glance at the records of marine disasters for 1915 
and 1916 is sufficient to show the zeal and efficiency with which they 
carried out their mission. 

But von Rintelen was not content to confine his activities to New 
York Harbor. Large shipments were being made to the Allies from the 
port of Baltimore, and to this center he now turned his attention. 
In moving about among the leaders of the German colony there, he 
soon made the acquaintance of the Hilken family. They were of 
superior social status and unswervingly loyal to the Fatherland. 
Henry G. Hilken, the father, had emigrated from Germany to Amer- 
ica in 1866, and after he had been settled here some time had married 
an American girl. Later a son, Paul Hilken, had been born. At the 
outbreak of the war both father and son were partners in the firm of 
A. Schumacher & Company, tobacco exporters, and at the same time 
Baltimore representatives of the North German Lloyd Steamship Com- 

In the spring of 1915, shortly after young Hilken had returned from 
a South American trip, von Rintelen came down to Baltimore to discuss 
with him the ship-sabotage campaign. Hilken readily fell in with von 
Rintelen's plans and consented to act as paymaster. He also proposed 
employing Frederick Hinsch to distribute the bombs. 

They could not have hit on a better person. Hinsch, then in his early 
forties, was a huge, burly individual with typical German features: 
fair hair, blue eyes, ruddy complexion, round full face. At the time 
he was captain of the S.S. Nec\ar, a. North German Lloyd ship. At the 
commencement of the war he had remained in the South Adantic, 

c c > > 


dodging British cruisers and attempting to use his ship as a collier and 
supply base for German warships still at large. Late in 1914 he had 
finally been forced to put into Baltimore, where his ship was interned. 
Hinsch was fearless. He knew how to handle the men on the 
docks and commanded their respect by his shrewd intelligence, his 
flow of seafaring language, and the ready use of his fists when neces- 
sary. He accepted von Rintelen's proposal eagerly and soon had a band 
of trusty dock workers planting the bombs. 

With the Baltimore organization completed, von Rintelen turned 
his attention to New Orleans. It is here that a mysterious Erich von 
Steinmetz, alias "Captain Steinmetz," comes on the scene. Although 
a captain in the German Navy, he managed to reach the United States 
via Vladivostok, disguised as a woman. On arrival here he reported to 
von Rintelen and became one of his chief assistants. Von Steinmetz 
brought with him cultures of glanders for the purpose of inoculating 
horses and mules intended for shipment to the Allies. For a time his 
activities were confined to trying out his cultures in the field. He 
soon found, however, that they were not taking effect. Under the pre- 
tense that they were intended for experimental purposes, he boldly 
took them to the Rockefeller Institute for testing. Pronouncement that 
the cultures were all dead liberated him for action in other fields. 
Von Rintelen promptly sent him to New Orleans to take charge of 
a ship sabotage campaign there. Through E. J. Conners, an American 
citizen who as a gun runner had been mixed up in several Mexican 
revolutions, the Captain was able to build up an effective and well 
concealed organization. 

As soon as Von Rintelen had completed his ship-bombing organi- 
zations and they were operating smoothly under the direction of von 
Kleist, Wolpert, Bode, Scheele, Hinsch, and Steinmetz, he himself 
turned to other activities. Of these, the creation of "Labor's National 
Peace Council" was the most spectacular. 

The ostensible object of the Council was to promote world peace, 
but its real objective was to procure an embargo upon the shipment 
of munitions abroad. Von Rintelen remained behind the scenes, sup- 
plied the money, and left the promotion to David Lamar, a brilliant, 
though crooked, operator in Wall Street, who had been indicted for 


attempting to defraud J. P. Morgan and Company. A number of well 
meaning enthusiasts joined the Council, several strikes were fostered 
among stevedores loading munitions on the docks, considerable lobby- 
ing was done in Washington, and the movement gained some mo- 
mentum; but, when it was realized that Germany was backing it, or- 
ganized labor refused to join in, and it died a natural death. Von 
Rintelen sadly admitted that his transactions with Lamar had cost him 
several hundred thousand dollars. 

He made other attempts at fostering German propaganda through 
Walter Schimmel, at founding an illegal and fictitious trade union 
among dock workers to promote strikes, and at plotting with the Irish 
leaders in the United States. But these v/ere neither more successful 
nor less costly. 

His most expensive adventure, however, was his attempt to foment 
a revolution in Mexico. Huerta, the former President, was in exile in 
the United States; and, since he ascribed his fall to American support 
of his enemies, he had no special love for this country. Von Rintelen 
believed that by restoring him to power he could force the United 
States into intervening, and thus divert large quantities of munitions 
to the American forces fighting in Mexico. Consequently, he met 
Huerta secretly at the latter's hotel in New York, and there arranged 
with him German financial support for the plots which the ex- 
President was hatching in Mexico. 

During the month of May 1915 Huerta had several conferences with 
a member of the German embassy who was acting in consort with von 
Rintelen. Carranzista agents, however, had been keeping a watchful eye 
on him; and one of them succeeded in attending a meeting of Huerta* 
adherents on June i, 1915, in the Holland House, when plans for the 
plot were discussed. The American authorities were promptly advised. 

Shortly afterward Huerta slipped away from New York, ostensibly 
to visit the San Francisco Exposition. But Government agents were 
shadowing him and were ready at hand when he reached the Mexican 
border. He was arrested on a technical charge and jailed. Already 
advanced in years and broken down by the failure of his plans, he 
died in January 191 6. Thus another wild dream of von Rintelen's was 

< c > > 


Because of these extraneous activities and his prodigal spending, 
von Rintelen became embroiled v^ith von Papen and Boy-Ed, v^ho v^^ere 
jealous of the extensive free-lance authority v^^hich had been given 
him in Berlin. The result v^as that strings v^ere pulled, and he found 
himself suddenly recalled to Germany. 

There was nothing left for him to do but to obey; and, after trying 
in vain to procure an American passport under the name of Edward V. 
Gates, he sailed for a Dutch port on the SS. Noordam, once again as 
R V. Gache. The British, however, had been intercepting and decoding 
wireless telegrams for him from Berlin, among which was his recall 
order. A cable to British Intelligence Officers in New York brought 
them into action, and it was no trick for them to determine that he 
was sailing under the name of Gache and to pass this information and 
an accurate description of him on to London. This time his neutral 
passport was of no avail, and on August 13, 1915, when the Noordam 
put in at Falmouth on her way to Holland, he was taken off the ship 
and interned at Donnington Hall as a prisoner of war. 

In the meantime his ship bombing organizations in the United States 
continued to flourish with ever increasing activity until the New York 
one suddenly came to an end with the arrest of Captain von Kleist on 
April 10, 19 1 6. 

The organizations in Baltimore and New Orleans, however, had been 
kept as separate and independent nests and therefore were not involved. 
But von Steinmetz was thoroughly frightened and, once again dis- 
guised as a woman, fled to Germany. Hinsch also disbanded his water- 
front organization and turned his attention to other sabotage fields. 

Von Rintelen himself was extradited as soon as America entered the 
war. Eventually brought to trial, along with his New York subor- 
dinates in May 1917, he was sentenced to four years' penal servitude 
in the Federal Penitentiary at Atlanta. His associates received lesser 
terms of imprisonment. At that time the Espionage Act had not yet 
been passed, and the group had to be tried on a charge of conspiracy 
to violate the Sherman Act. This accounts for the mildness of the 

Dr. Scheele was the last to be caught. The moment von Kleist was 
arrested, von Igel, who knew he was the missing link connecting up 


the German Government with the conspiracy, gave him $i,8oo in cash 
and ordered him out of the country to Cuba as fast as he could go. 

In Havana Scheele reported to the German Minister, v^ho passed 
him on under the name of James G. Williams, an American citizen, to 
one Juan Pozas, who outwardly posed as a wealthy and respectable 
merchant but actually was the secret owner of hundreds of small smug- 
gling craft operating off the coast of Cuba. Scheele soon found himself 
a virtual prisoner in various country homes of the smuggler king and 
other German adherents. He was allowed to go nowhere without an 

The arrest in Havana of Richard Guttman, a German agent and 
intermediary of the German Legation, which had been paying for 
Scheele's keep, led the Cuban police to the fugitive's retreat. He was 
arrested in March 1918 and was extradited without delay to the United 

The Germans had every reason to be afraid of Scheele, for in his 
eager attempts to secure immunity he freely betrayed to the American 
authorities German secret formulas for poison gas, incendiary bombs, 
liquid-air bombs, high explosives, and dye stuffs. 

Anxious to get an expert opinion on the value of this information, 
he was examined, at the request of the Government, both by Thomas 
A. Edison and his chief chemical assistant, who reported that "he was 
an eminent German chemist with unquestioned knowledge of the 
most important phases of contemporary chemical warfare methods and 
German commercial practice." 

Although Scheele efficiently carried out the ruthless demands of his 
country, his motives were largely mercenary. He did not hesitate to 
extract both from von Papen and von Rintelen large sums of money 
for his services. On one of the von Papen check stubs seized at Fal- 
mouth was an item: "$10,000 paid Scheele (Rintelen affair)." 

In addition to the manufacture of bombs, he figured in several other 
of von Rintelen's activities. He was paid lavishly by him to devise a 
method of smuggling oil out of the United States. This he did by 
solidifying the oil with magnesium carbonate. The oil was then 
shipped to Denmark under false manifests by cleverly impregnating 
fertilizer with it. On its arrival on the other side the valuable lubricant 


could be easily extracted by putting the fertilizer in water and adding 
a benzine salt, which caused the oil to float to the surface. It was also 
he who thought up the plan of dropping methylene blue capsules into 
shipments of corn, causing the flour milled from the corn to turn a 
deep blue. The capsules were made up to appear as grains of corn. 
Money was handed him so freely that later he could not resist the 
temptation to accept $20,000 from von Rintelen for munitions to be 
shipped as agricultural implements; this time, however, he kept the 
$20,000 and actually shipped a cargo of farm machinery. 

According to Scheele's own estimate, the bombs he had manufac- 
tured had been instrumental in destroying cargoes to the value of 
$10,000,000 in 36 different ships. He added, however, that only about 
25 per cent of the bombs handed out by Wolpert and his associates had 
actually been placed on ships. The remainder were thrown overboard 
after the money had been pocketed by the dock hands employed to 
plant them. 

Chapter V 

Until the middle of 1915 the diplomatic representatives of the Central 
Powers seemed to be succeeding admirably in their efforts to promote 
sabotage and other activities violating American neutrality and at the 
same time to avoid any unpleasantness v^ith the State Department. 
Of course, the v^idespread destruction of ships and factories, the pass- 
port frauds, and Horn's melodramatic escapade had led to a certain 
amount of newspaper talk about spy plots and sinister activities on the 
part of the Teutonic diplomats. The sensational Providence Journal, 
especially, had been filled with stories of wildly improbable 
schemes directed against the United States. But the Government 
seemed as trustful as ever, and the self-confidence of the diplomats and 
their contempt for American gullibility grew steadily. 

This idyllic condition was short-lived, however. On September i the 
British staged a coup. They removed Mr. James J. Archibald from a 
ship being searched at Falmouth and seized his papers. Archibald was 
an American newspaper correspondent who had been covering Ger- 
many for some time. Gradually he had drifted into acting as a German 
propagandist and bearer of dispatches to and fro through the blockade. 
Among the seized papers the British found several communications 
from Dr. Dumba, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, to his Foreign 
Office. One of these outlined a program for fomenting strikes in the 
Bethlehem Steel Company plants and requested permission to put it 
into effect; another reflected on the disinterestedness of American 
foreign policy and even made disparaging remarks about the President. 
Motivated by a fine unselfishness, the British released the text of these 
to the press and furnished the American Embassy with photostatic 
copies of the originals. 

This was too much for the President, and a week later the State Dc- 



partment demanded Dumba's recall. The Dual Monarchy had no re- 
course except to swallow this bitter pill with the best grace it could 

But the Dumba documents did not exhaust the treasures among 
Archibald's papers. There was a letter from von Papen to his wife, in 
the course of which he remarked: "...How splendid on the Eastern 
Front ! I always say to these idiotic Yankees that they should shut their 
mouths and better still be full of admiration for all that heroism." 

When these remarks of the Attache's were published along with the 
Dumba material, there was immediately unloosed a storm of public 
indignation. The State Department held its hand for the time being, 
but von Papen was a marked man. Behind the scenes the Government 
began quietly collecting a dossier on his activities and those of Captain 
Boy-Ed, both of whom had been under surveillance since early in the 
year. There was ample evidence that they had strayed far from the 
paths of diplomatic rectitude. 

No sooner had this excitement begun to die away than the arrest of 
Fay revived it in full force. There were strong indications that von 
Papen was involved. (These were later confirmed by Fay's confession 
on his return from Spain.) At the same time a renewed wave of factory 
bombings added fresh fuel to the fires of popular hysteria. At last, en 
December 8, the Government bowed to popular opinion and asked for 
the recall of the two attaches as personce non gratce. 

The situation was well summed up by President Wilson in his ad- 
dress to Congress regarding their recall: 

A little while ago such a thing would have seemed incredible. Because it 
was incredible, we made no preparation for it. We would have been almost 
ashamed to prepare for it as if we were suspicious of ourselves and our 
comrades and neighbors. 

But the ugly and incredible thing has actually come to pass and we are 
without adequate Federal Laws to deal with it. I urge you to enact such 
laws at the earliest possible moment and feel that in doing so I am urging 
you to do nothing less than save the honor and self-respect of the Nation 

They have formed plots to destroy property, they have entered into con- 
spiracies against the neutrality of the Government, they have sought to pry 
into every confidential transaction of the Government in order to serve in- 
terests alien to our own. 


Serious as had been the blunders of the Attaches, these had been 
mosdy mistakes caused by their lack of previous experience in secret 
service v^ork at the start of their campaign. As time v^ent on their 
technique improved. It would be doing scant justice to their cunning 
and training to assume that more than a small percentage of their vs^ork 
ever w^as discovered. 

Commenting on the incendiary fire v^hich had occurred on the previ- 
ous day in the Roebling Plant at Trenton, Nev^ Jersey, v^here wire 
cables v^ere being made for the Allies, the Literary Digest for Novem- 
ber 27, 1915, estimated that "already according to a list published in 
the New^ York Journal of Commerce there have been about forty of 
these fires involving more than a score of lives." It then went on to add 
that the Attorney General of the United States had appealed to the 
State authorities to aid him "in prosecuting the plotters everywhere." 

Had the two Attaches committed similar acts in any neutral country 
in Europe, their recall would have been insisted upon within a month 
after the outbreak of hostilities. But von Bernstorfl's skill in denial and 
the amazing credulity of the State Department in believing him per- 
mitted von Papen and Boy-Ed to continue their ruthless destruction 
unmolested for a year and a half. 

Four days before Christmas, 191 5, von Papen sailed for England and 
Holland, and on New Year's Day was followed by Boy-Ed. Both had 
been granted a "safe conduct" by the British, a privilege accorded to 
all diplomatic representatives recalled to their countries during the war. 
On January 2 and 3, 1916, von Papen's baggage was searched by the 
British at Falmouth, and a mass of documents and records that he was 
foolishly carrying with him were seized. To the explosive and protest- 
ing von Papen the British authorities explained, not without some 
humor, that the "safe conduct" referred to his person and not to his 

The most important of these records were the check books to which 
we have already referred on numerous occasions. He had received from 
Dr. Albert over $3,102,000 * for the carrying on of his work, and we 

* Taken from a report of Dr. Albert's to the State Secretary of the Imperial 
Treasury. This along with many of his other papers eventually fell into the 
hands of the United States Government. 


do not know how much additional money came to him direct through 
mihtary channels. Here in the stubs of his check books was absolute 
proof of his connection with Werner Horn, von der Goltz, and other 
of the German sabotage agents who had been caught and convicted. 
The British again showed their exquisite regard for the welfare of the 
United States by passing on the evidence to the United States Gov- 

Both von Papen and Boy-Ed were awarded decorations on reaching 
Germany, and both of them were promoted: Boy-Ed to an important 
post on the Admiral Staff of the Navy, and von Papen to the rank of 
major. The latter was transferred to the staff of General Liman von 
Sanders in Palestine, and a few months later barely escaped capture 
by the British cavalry at Nazareth. So precipitate was his flight that 
once again he left several compromising documents in the hands of the 
British. One was a note from Boy-Ed in Berlin enclosing a letter 
which had somehow come into his hands and which he asked von 
Papen "to destroy immediately in the interests of safety." The letter, 
apparently addressed to a high official in Germany, was written by 
"His Excellency von Igel Schwerin," an acquaintance of von Papen's 
and Boy-Ed's who had been in intimate contact with them during 
their many months' stay at the German Club in New York City. As 
von Igel Schwerin gives an accurate account of the acts of the two 
Attaches immediately preceding and following their recall, and adds a 
frank appraisal of their effect on the American Public, the Press, and 
the Government, his letter is quoted here at some length: 

. . . Then Herr Boy-Ed made a fresh mistake wiien he addressed a com- 
munication to the American people before his departure, in which he affirmed 

that he was being sent home guiltless Then, however, he enters on a 

boundless lack of circumspection, attacking in this communication the 
American press in general, and the celebrated Providence Journal 

As could have been seen, the paper on the following day fell all over him 
and sent him a series of vulgarities on board by wireless. Others called him 
a liar, and such are the parting words which have hung on in the public 

mind, and not the words of his communication Herr von Papen's career 

closed with quite a disaster. He was charged with being concerned in the 
many explosions in the munition factories, in so far as he had given the 


money for the procuring of materials and had instructed the people. It 
appears, too, that some really childish arrangements were made. . . . 

. . . All that could have been forgiven, since failures in such things cannot 
alvs^ays be avoided, also much has been performed by Herr von Papen ad- 
vantageous to us, if still the prime stupidity had not followed when Herr 
von Papen had to leave the country. One could have assumed that he would 
have previously destroyed the critical documents left here, or at any rate have 
safely disposed of them somewhere or other, so that they could not fall into 
the possession of outsiders. But Herr von P. left his bureau, with all these 
unfortunate documents, to his young and harmless secretary, Herr von 

Igel He himself had obtained a pass through the EngHsh lines, in which 

it was expressly noted that only his person would be let through, and that 
he must not take with him either letters or anything else. Moreover, he had 
instructions from Count von B. to take nothing with him, and all his friends 
had warned him urgently "for God's sake, don't take any compromising 
papers with you! . . ." Above everything else [he had with him] the rest 
of the cheque books, in which he had quite naively noted in plain language 
all receivers who had received money from him. He had besides a whole 
series of compromising private letters with him. 

The excitement here was immense as these facts became known. . . . 

. . . Worse still was it that these letters . . . opened the eyes of the Americans 
to what was going on, and called forth a storm of indignation. It was fully 
justified, since Herr von P. had also on his departure left behind an open 

communication in which he protested his innocence After both men, 

however, had publicly declared that they were innocent and were unjustly 
banished, one could not expect anything else than that the Government 
should now show evidence that it had acted with perfect justness 

All that we have heard is the bestowal of orders to Herr Boy-Ed and von 
Papen, as well as the promotion of Herr von Igel to Vice-Sergt.-Major. You 
can judge, too, how extraordinarily fitting it is to publish these distinctions 

throughout the whole world Thereby all these things appear not to have 

detracted from the self-conceit of these men in the very slightest, on the 
contrary they hold themselves, as before, for geniuses. I learn through a good 
source, which stands in direct connection with Washington, how this self- 
sufficient manner damages. The officials here complain bitterly about the 
haughty demeanor of our people, who think by means of a stiff bearing to 
compensate for their lack of knowledge of the conditions of the place. Count 
von B. and Privy Councillor A. are looked upon in Washington in the light 
of emetics. . . . 


After the publication of the Papen letter, in which Herr von P. spoke 
of the idiotic Yankees, the general feeling here was so uncomfortable that 
Herr von P. thought it well to disappear for some weeks* He went with 
Prince Hatzfeld to the West, and I met the gentlemen at Mammoth Springs 
in the Yellowstone Park. I at once understood the object of their journey 
and avoided addressing them by name or title, in the supposition that they 
were travelling under assumed names. That, however, was a mistake, they 
had registered themselves with full title, their arrival was announced in all 
the papers, and on their further journey an army of reporters and photogra- 
phers followed them. They were pestered at every step they took with the 
request to give an explanation about the "Idiotic Yankees." Their reply "we 
have nothing to say" was pubUshed with the photographs in all the papers. 
I met the gentlemen later in Denver, where the business was at its maddest. 
The reporters from San Francisco instructed to do so, had sworn to compel 
Papen to an utterance, and followed the two gentlemen everywhere. Both 
held newspapers in front of their faces in order not to be snapshotted, and 
a whole series of laughable photographs resulted, which circulated through- 
out the States. On the papers held up in front of them appeared printed in 
German "Wir haben nichts zu sagen" [we have nothing to say]. A mad 
comedy at our expense! It is unpleasant to the writer to have to say all this. 
With the exception of Bernstorfl and Dernburg, I know all the gentlemen 
personally, have lived in the German Club with most of them, and have 
always been nicely received by them. ... 

However, these final acts of von Papen's and Boy-Ed's must not be 
taken as a gauge of their caliber. What seems to be the quintessence of 
stupidity was simply another manifestation of the same brazen ef- 
frontery which had hitherto crowned their efforts with success. Thus 
far the "idiotic Yankees" had believed their denials; von Papen and 
Boy-Ed did not realize that they were now being seen in their true 

Whatever criticism may be leveled at the two Attaches, they had 
carried out implicitly the instructions issued to them by the German 
High Command, and apparently Berlin was satisfied with the cam- 
paign of sabotage which they had directed on such a vast scale. Proof 
of the capacity of von Papen is that he subsequently became Chancellor 
of Germany; and at present, as Ambassador in Vienna, he is conduct- 
ing the Nazi campaign in Austria. 


In spite of the storm which had been raised, the acts of violence con- 
tinued. There was a worthy successor to take over the work of von 
Papen, and the cogs at the War IntelUgence Center at 60 Wall Street 
kept turning without missing a beat. Immediately upon the recall of 
Captain von Papen, the German Ambassador addressed the following 
communication to the American Secretary of State: 

Mr. Wolf von Igel, a German citizen, Secretary of von Papen, will continue 
the current business of the Military Attache until the Emperor should name 
a successor to the Military Attache. 

No other successor was appointed. Von Igel was still at his post when 
diplomatic relations were severed just prior to the entry of the United 
States into the war. 

On the one hand, Germany continued on the same scale her cam- 
paign of sabotage; on the other hand, she never ceased to protest her 
innocence. On November 25, 1916, von Papen sent to von Bernstorff, 
through von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a complete 
denial of any connection with the ship bombing: 

The War Ministry advises as follows: 

The former Military Attache in Washington, Captain von Papen, has 
been required to answer to the charge made against him in New York and 
reports as follows: 

"... The incredible part 6f the matter is that the charge could in the first 
place be construed from the documents and accounts that were illegally taken 
from Mr. von Igel * 

"As appears from American papers, Dr. Scheele is charged with the manu- 
facture of incendiary bombs, with what right is past my knowledge. 

"It is, however, published at the same time that Dr. Scheele had received 
large amounts through me or my office [Mr. von Igel], whereby it is also 
indubitably shown that I was the instigator of these plots. I must naturally 
lay the greatest value on establishing beyond question that my relations with 
Dr. Scheele were exclusively of a business nature and I am in a position to 
corroborate this by the documents that account for every amount." 

In the opinion of the War Ministry it would be desirable to request of 

* As is related in the next chapter, these papers were seized during a raid on 
von Igel's office. 


the Government there an official denial that official persons of the Imperial 
German Government were implicated in the so-called "Ship-Complots" or 
similar instances. 

Please test the matter there and as far as there are no objections make 
further arrangements. Report requested. 

(Signed) von Jagow 

This denial of the Captain's speaks well for his persistence, but in 
considering the facts revealed in the preceding chapters he must blush 
if he ever thinks back on it now. 

Chapter VI 

Brilliant as had been the success of Tunney and his bomb squad in 
running to earth those German agents engaged in ship sabotage in 
New York Harbor, and granting the Government full credit for tardily 
obtaining enough evidence on- the Attaches to effect their recall, still 
the efforts of the various American authorities to put a stop to the land 
sabotage proved an utter failure. And yet in American factories, freight 
yards — ^in fact, everyv^here on American soil where supplies for the 
Allies were being transported or assembled — this sabotage was being 
carried out on a scale which made the ship bombings appear almost 

The preponderating reason for this failure was the lack of coordina- 
tion among the various police authorities and between them and the 
Department of Justice. This in turn was largely due to the fact that 
until the Espionage Act was passed the Department of Justice was 
never quite sure whether an individual case of land sabotage was an in- 
fraction of a Federal law; consequently there was a disposition to allow 
the local authorities to handle the matter. The result was that, since the 
sabotage agents were constantly on the move from State to State, the 
individual threads of evidence uncovered by the local police were in- 
sufficient to disclose the identity of the agents; but in the aggregate 
these could have been so tightly knit together by a central organization 
covering the whole country as to make rapid solutions of the cases 
nearly inevitable. 

The main reasons for Tunney's success were that the ring he was 
fighting was located largely in his own area and that he was allowed 
to concentrate on this one assignment. Had there been coordination 
between New York and Baltimore, Hinsch, the organizer of the Balti- 
more group, would not have escaped detection. 



Compelling evidence that a central counter-espionage service could 
have enormously diminished the acts of sabotage in the United States 
during the neutrality period is that in the neutral belligerent countries 
in Europe, all of which possessed an efficient central organization to 
combat the spy and saboteur, such sabotage was negligible during the 

We might also note that as soon as the United States entered the 
war and organized an effective Military Intelligence Service, sabotage 
dwindled to the vanishing point; that when kidnaping was attacked 
by a centralized and nation-wide police organization, the percentage 
of solved cases leaped up almost astronomically. 

A cardinal error was also committed in delaying the demand for 
the recall of von Papen and Boy-Ed. By the time the recall finally 
came, they had already delegated the direction of spy and sabotage 
activities to others who remained behind. The German Secret Service 
and the German Naval Intelligence Service were also given time and 
opportunity during this early period to send free-lance agents out 
from Germany equipped with independent funds. Once in the coun- 
try, many of them operated as centers of separate and independent 

Except for those agents who were employed in sabotage on ships or 
were operating in Canada, the American authorities had only the 
most meager information at the time of the saboteurs and spies abroad 
in the land. 

Of the spy directors whom von Papen left behind him, Paul Koenig 
was one of the most important. The Department of Justice and the 
detectives of the New York Police Department often crossed his path; 
but, in spite of leaving a volume of mystifying records in their hands, 
he escaped with no other penalty than confinement in a civilian in- 
ternment camp when America entered the war. 

Koenig had been head detective of the Atlas Line, a subsidiary of 
the Hamburg-American, for a number of years preceding the war. In 
this capacity he had come into close contact with sailors, tug skippers, 
and dock hands, and knew intimately both the topography and life of 
the water front. 

He was massively built and was endowed with great bodily strength. 


The set of his mouth and eyes suggested craft and brutality. He was 
extremely alert mentally and was gifted with supreme self-confidence. 
Distrustful of those who worked for him, he earned their hearty dis- 
like; but through fear he commanded their respect. 

Von Papen saw in Koenig's small detective force the nucleus of 
just the organization he required, and so we see in Koenig's memo- 
randum book the following entry, under date of August 22, 1914: 

German Government, with consent of Dr. Buenz,* entrusted me with 
the handling of a certain investigation. Military Attache von Papen called 
at my office later and explained the nature of the work expected. (Beginning 
of Bureau's service for Imperial Government.) 

Koenig's duties were varied and many. As cover, he provided guards 
and confidential messengers for von Bernstorff , Dr. Albert, Dr. Dumba, 
and for von Papen and Boy-Ed; secretly he was engaged in spy and 
sabotage activities, the scope of which can be roughly gauged from the 
entries in his memorandum book. We know from this book that as 
far back as September 1914, he sent into Canada two spies, one, an 
Irishman named Edmond Justice, the other, Frederick Metzler, of 
Jersey City, and that he received from them a report on the fortifi- 
cations at Quebec and on the number of soldiers who were training 
in the camps in that area. 

From Koenig's prewar detective activities, Tunney and the New 
York police knew him well: they had often cooperated with him on 
cases of petty theft and other crimes affecting the Hamburg-Ameri- 
can Line. Now, however, they were suspicious of him. In spite of the 
fact that all the ships were laid up, Koenig was busier than ever. There- 
fore, they decided to watch him. 

Koenig, however, was a slippery fish — he was constantly on the alert 
and knew all the arts of sleuthing. When shadowing proved useless, 

* Managing Director of the Hamburg-American Line. During the early stages 
of the war, on instructions from Captain Boy-Ed, he sent out from American 
ports, under false manifests, several of the Hamburg-American ships with sup- 
plies for German warships then still at large. He was subsequently arrested for 
these activities and sentenced to eighteen months in Atlanta, but owing to 
various appeals did not commence to serve his term until April 19 18. 


they tried tapping the telephone line which led to his office at 45 
Broadway. Here again for a time he outwitted them; for both the in- 
coming and outgoing conversation was always in guarded language; 
and it was soon found that when, for example, he said he was going 
out to meet some one at the Staten Island Ferry he meant the Unter 
den Linden Bar, and so on: in other words, he had a prearranged 
code both as to time and place. But eventually their patience was re- 
warded. After listening in for several weeks, a voice came over the 
phone which upbraided Koenig in no uncertain language and, finally, 
bitterly accused him of being a double-crosser. 

The detective listening in acted promptly. He traced the call and 
found out that it had been made by a George Fuchs. Discreet inquiry 
disclosed that George Fuchs was unemployed and was looking for 
work. An offer of a job and an opportunity to pay off his score against 
Koenig soon brought Fuchs to heel. He stated that Koenig was a 
distant relative of his and that in September 1915 Koenig and his wife 
had visited in Niagara Falls, New York, where Fuchs lived at that 
time with his mother in the Lochiel Apartments. It was not long be- 
fore Koenig proposed to Fuchs that he should undertake some spying 
for him in Canada. Fuchs accepted, crossed the border, and returned 
a couple of days later with a detailed report on the disposition of 
the guards around the Welland Canal. 

On the invitation of Koenig, Fuchs moved to New York and 
there was enrolled as an agent at $18 a week. In New York a plan 
to blow up the Welland Canal was discussed between Koenig, 
Richard Emil Leyendecker, and Fred Metzler, Koenig's secretary. It 
was arranged that Fuchs should row a boat load of dynamite across 
the upper Niagara River to the Canadian side of the border and there 
deliver it to Leyendecker and Metzler. 

Fuchs, however, fell to drinking in New York. And it was here that 
Koenig committed a cardinal error. Judging Fuchs unfit for the serious 
job on hand, he discharged him and, what was still more unwise, 
quarreled with him over the payment of the paltry sum of $2.57 for 
time which Fuchs claimed he had put in. This rankled in Fuchs's mind 
with the result that the New York police scarcely needed to urge him 
to tell his story. His story, as we can well see, was ample evidence 


to justify an arrest. A raid on Koenig's office and on his home also fol- 
lowed. In the process of searching his house, a little black book was 
brought to light, the memorandum book which we have already men- 
tioned. It was loose-leaf, carefully typewritten, and had been kept up 
to the day of the raid. It told the story of Koenig s "Bureau of Investi- 
gation." Although the most interesting part of it was in code, still a 
study of it gave the police not only a close insight into Koenig's 
methods but also some indication of what those activities were which 
had so baffled them. 

The central office was in Rooms 82 and 83 at 45 Broadway, New 
York City. Here were established two of the three divisions of 
Koenig's organization: the Pier Division, and the Division for Special 
Detail. These two divisions apparently occupied themselves with 
routine investigations and commissions assigned either by the Gei- 
man Embassy or by the German Consulate in New York City. 

The third division, the Secret Service Division {Geheimdienst), 
performed the real work of the organization; the other two divisions 
acted chiefly as a blind. 

Agents of the Secret Service Division never came to the Central 
Office — Koenig always met them outside. In his notebook is an out- 
line of a special "Safety Block System," which was devised for the 

A street number in Manhattan named over the telephone means that the 
meeting will take place five blocks further uptown than the street mentioned. 
Pennsylvania Railroad Station means Grand Central Depot. Kaiserhof means 
General Post Office in front of P. O. Box 840. Hotel Ansonia means cafe in 
Hotel Manhattan [basement]. Hotel Belmont means at the bar in Pabst's, 
Columbus Circle. 

Not satisfied with these precautions, he continually changed the 
code; for two weeks later, under date of December 12, it appeared that 
a street number in Manhattan named over the telephone now meant 
five blocks further downtown instead of uptown; and that Pabst's bar 
was indicated by the Borough Hall, Brooklyn, instead of the Hotel 


Under date November 23, 1915, was a note: 

Beginning with November 28, 1915, all operations designated as D-cases 
will be handled exclusively by the Secret Service Division . . . great care is to 
be taken that operatives and agents of the Secret Service Division remain 
entirely unknown to members of the Central Office and other divisions. 

On December i, 1915, further precautions were adopted: 

Operatives of this Division will be requested to desist from sending reports 
to P. O. 840 as heretofore. Instead, these reports will be handed to me per- 
sonally or to the Division's Secretary. 

A later entry reads: 

In order to safeguard the secrets and affairs of the Department, prior to 
receiving a caller, my desk must be entirely cleared of all papers except those 
pertaining to the business at hand. 

And then another change of meeting place: 

Volk's Cafe, 658 Third Avenue, one of the meeting places of the Secret 
Service Division, must not be frequented after today until January i, 1916, 
for safety's sake. 

It was, however, the page in Koenig's notebook marked, "Secret 
Service Division, list of aliases used by X.X.X.* D-Cases," which fur- 
nished definite evidence that these "D-Cases" referred to destruction or 
sabotage cases; for among the thirty-four Secret Service Agents listed 
with their aliases we have already mentioned the following three as 
being known to the police: Werner Horn, who was indicted for dyna- 
miting the Vanceboro Bridge, labelled "D-Case 277" ; Dr. Kienzlc, who 
was associated with Robert Fay in the work of making bombs for the 
rudders of ships, "D-Case 316"; and Leyendecker, "D-Case 344." 

For his own person, Koenig was particularly liberal with aliases. 
He had painstakingly listed thirty-seven of them, such as: "Blohm," 
"Bode," "Brandt," "Burg," and so on alphabetically down to "Z." 

* Paul Koenig. 


Further evidence that the "D-Cases" were sabotage cases is the fol- 
lowing entry: 

[Newspaper] clippings that refer to D-Cases of this Bureau will continue 
to be placed in the private files together with their respective reports. An 
exception to this particular rule may be had in the event that there are too 
many clippings to be had in which case they may be bound together and 
kept separate. 

All acts of sabotage were newspaper copy. The newspaper stories not 
only furnished proof to Koenig that the particular jobs had been car- 
ried out, but in their aggregate were a gauge of the work accomplished 
by his organization. 

His notebook also betrayed his connection with the official German 
representatives in the United States, for we find the following: 

Secret Service Division Key to Bureau's Connections 

(In use since Oct. 20, 1915) 
M.A.C.— I. G. Embassy 
H.M.G.— I. G. MiUtary Attache 
W.N.N.— I. G. Naval Attache 
B.C.D. — I. G. Commercial Attache 

There was also an alternative key: 

5000 — I. G. Embassy 
7000—" " Military Attache 
8000—" " Naval Attache 
9000—" " Commercial Attache 

In addition to the evidence of the notebook we now have access to 
other documents which throw light on Koenig's activities. Among 
them are partial records of the money paid him by these officials of the 
Imperial German Government. They alone show 30 payments, aggre- 
gating $159,073.38. 

Busy as he was directing the campaign of sabotage covered by the 
D-Cases, he was invariably called in as an intermediary when either 
the German Embassy or its Attaches wished to avoid being com- 


promised. Thus it was Koenig who, at Boy-Ed's instigation, paid a 
German, Gustave Stahl, to swear to an affidavit that he had seen guns 
on the Lusitania. And when, after investigating this affidavit, the De- 
partment of Justice found it to be a perjury, it was Koenig again who 
hid Stahl and then later produced him at the command of the Federal 
authorities. Likewise many a material witness or fugitive German 
agent was hidden by him or supplied with funds to escape from the 
country. In his second affidavit, given after his escape from the Atlanta 
Penitentiary and after his subsequent extradition from Spain, Robert 
Fay stated that it was Koenig who met him and gave him the money 
with which he reached Mexico. When von Papen was recalled, it was 
also to Koenig that he left the task of transferring from New York 
to the Embassy those compromising papers he was not taking with 

In connection with these and other services, Koenig proudly re- 
corded in his notebook, under date December 13, 1915: 

At 6.30 P.M., Captain von Papen, German Military Attache, received me 
at the German Club to express his thanks for the services which this Bureau 
have rendered to him. At the same time he bade me good-bye. 

It was, however, the list in the little black book giving the names of 
secret agents engaged in D-Cases which riveted the attention of the 
New York poUce. The fact that the three who had been identified were 
known sabotage agents convinced the police that the remaining thirty- 
one were equally dangerous. A study of the names and their aHases 
revealed only one clue. The name of Schleindl was familiar. A de- 
tective who had trailed Koenig had reported that a man whom Koenig 
had met at the Eastern Hotel had been followed and his identity had 
been established as Frederick Schleindl, a clerk in the employ of the 
National City Bank. 

Opposite the name Schleindl appeared the notation: "D-Case 343." 
And it was obvious from the entries in Koenig's notebook that it was 
an unusually important case. We read that 

Beginning with November 6th [1915] no blue copies are to be made of 
reports submitted in connection with D-Case 343, and the original reports 
will be sent to H. M. G. [von Papen] instead of the duplicates. 


A further entry continues: 

In order to accomplish better results in connection with D-Case 343, and 
to shorten the stay of the informing agent at the place of meeting, it has 
been decided to discontinue the form of practice of dining with this agent 
prior to receiving his report. It will also be a rule to refrain from working 
on other matters until the informant in this case has been fully heard, and 
all data taken down in shorthand. 

An examination of the entries reveals that Schleindl, who was first 
known as operative Number 51, and later as agent CO., from October 
21, was designated as agent B.I. This enables us to interpret the next 

Supplementing rule 2, it has been decided that I refrain from drinking 
beer or liquor with my supper prior to receiving agent B. I. for the reason 
that I wish to be perfectly fresh and well prepared to receive his reports. 

Schleindrs arrest promptly followed on the same day as that of his 
mentor, December 18, 191 5. In his pocket were two cablegrams ad- 
dressed to the National City Bank: one from the Banque Beige pour 
Etrangers relating to a shipment of 2,000,000 rifles, the other from the 
Russian Government authorizing the bank to accord certain large 
credits to the Russian Naval Attache and Purchasing Agent. 

Under interrogation the young and emotional Schleindl freely con- 
fessed. Being a German reservist, he had reported on the outbreak of 
the war to the German Consul in New York. Months had gone by 
without his receiving any word, until one day in May 1915, he re- 
ceived mysterious instructions from the Consul to report that night to 
a German named "Werner," who would be waiting for him in the bar 
of the Hotel Manhattan. "Werner" turned out to be Koenig. Playing 
on his patriotism and greed, Koenig had no difficulty in enrolling him 
as an agent. 

Through Schleindl's hands passed not only telegrams from the Al- 
lied countries transmitting money for the purchase of war material but 
also the orders for them and letters of advice from the manufacturers, 
which frequently named the railway by which the munitions were to 
be transported and the vessels to which they were consigned. For men 


who were endeavoring to burn or blow up supplies intended for the 
Allies in the factories or during transport, here was invaluable infor- 
mation ; and Koenig made full use of it. Every evening over a period of 
eight months either he or his secretary, Metzler, spent hours copying 
the cables, letters, and papers supplied to them by Schleindl. In the 
morning Schleindl made a point of arriving in sufficient time at the 
bank to restore the documents to their proper place before the business 
day commenced, and in the meantime the information was being 
passed on to those engaged in ship sabotage or in the destruction of 
factories or supplies on land. 

Schleindl further confessed that he had also been approached by an- 
other sabotage group, which was working independently of Koenig. 
In 1915 Alexander Dietrichens, who had been a classmate of his in 
Germany, arrived in the United States on a sabotage mission. Die- 
trichens lost no time in looking him up and outlined to him a plan to 
blow up the Aetna, Du Pont, and Hercules Powder Companies; a 
factory in Eddystone, Pa.; the Savage Arms Co. in Utica; the Poole 
Engineering Corporation in Baltimore; the Roebling Works in Tren- 
ton, N. J.; the Kastner Chemical Company in Niagara Falls; and an- 
other chemical company in West Virginia. Subsequently he met 
Dietrichens again at the Cafe Bismarck, and at Schumann's Cafe at 
47 West 125th Street. On this latter occasion, Dietrichens, who was 
then passing under the name of "Willisch," had three friends with him, 
who joined him in attempting to persuade Schleindl to assist them; 
and to show that they were in earnest they took him out to a shack 
near Tenafly, New Jersey, and showed him a cache of dynamite. 
Schleindl confessed, however, that he was more interested in the $25 
per week retainer that he was getting from Koenig over and above his 
regular pay as a clerk, that he thought there was little risk of discovery 
at the bank, and that he did not have the stomach to take a hand per- 
sonally in an explosion where there would be loss of life. Therefore he 
turned down Dietrichens' proposition. 

Explosions and incendiary fires did subsequently break out at some 
of the factories cited above, but their origin remained a mystery. It is 
highly probable, however, that either Dietrichens or one of his agents 
had a hand in them. 


Schleindl was tried, convicted, and sentenced to an indefinite prison 
term for the theft of documents. Koenig pleaded guilty to the same 
charge but was given a suspended sentence. 

Thus Koenig was released to continue his sabotage activities. But he 
had been caught once, and from now on he was more wary. If he kept 
notebooks or records, he saw to it that they never again fell into the 
hands of the police. His name is to appear again later in the Black Tom 
case, and it was only his internment at the time of America s entry 
into the war that put an end to his plotting. 

The office of the Military Intelligence Center at 60 Wall Street, under 
the direction of von Papen's successor, Wolf von Igel, also continued 
its work unabated. Here we have some measure of the extent of the 
activities; for on April 18, 1916, acting on information supplied by 
von der Goltz to the British concerning the first Welland Canal plot, 
the office was raided by agents of the American Secret Service. Von 
Igel, who happened to be near the safe, made a frantic effort to close 
it, but was knocked over by one of the agents, who had a warrant for 
his arrest. Though von Igel claimed that the office was part of the Ger- 
man Embassy, none the less a rich haul was made of compromising 
documents, many of which will be referred to later. Among the papers 
were some of von Igel's account books. They were in a simple alpha- 
betical code which was quickly broken by an expert cryptographer. 
Payments to "Zkjaara" (Scheele), "Cranzd" (Kleist), "Pyta" (Bode), 
"Vyrbald" (Wolpert), and "Zkjunnar" (Schimmel) estabhshed a clear 
connection between von Igel and the ship-sabotage group. 

Among many other payments the account showed that four sums, 
aggregating $4,000, were paid to Pyajn (Boehm) between March 20, 
1916, and June 10, 1916. This is of special interest as we have already 
seen that in Zimmermann's coded telegram of April 3, 1915, ordering 
the destruction of the Canadian Pacific Railway, it was mentioned that 
"Captain Boehm who is well known in America and who will shortly 
return to that country is furnished with expert information on that 
subject." Boehm was only one of the numerous secret agents who were 
sent direct to the United States by the German Government with 
specific instructions to bring about explosions or in other ways cause 
the destruction of munitions of war intended for the Allies. 

International A'rui Photos 

Consul General Franz von Bopp. 

Brown Brothers 

Von Papen's Assistant, Wolf von Igel. 

Intt, "ational News Photos 

Spy Director Paul Koenig. 

International News Photos 

Captain Franz von Rintelen, 
as He Appears Today 

International Xews Photos Courtesy of Inspector Tunney 

Robert Fay. Inspector Thomas J. Tunney, 
of the Bomb Squad. 

International News Photos 

Ship Bofnbers — Von Kleist, Schmidt, Becker, Paradies, 
Praedel, Karbade, Fritzen — on Their Way to Jail. 

Leading Figures in thi Ship-Bomb Complots 


Although the German sabotage agents involved in the Welland 
Canal affair were tried and convicted and von Igel W2is indicted, yet 
through the intervention of Count von Bernstorff he v^^as able to fur- 
nish bail and was never brought to trial. Hov^ lightly the Germans 
took von Igel's arrest can be gathered from the foUov^ing passage in a 
letter from Dr. Albert to von Papen which was subsequently captured 
by the British in Palestine: 

New York, 
November 16, 1916. 

Your name has already been mentioned several times because your friend, 
Igel, after a number of official papers had been taken from him by force, 
has been working in my offices, which also afford asylum to the remainder 
of the staff of the office of our former Naval Attache. The Consulate Gen- 
eral having dismissed these gentlemen to avoid the risk of being com- 
promised ... how slight is the attention we pay to the alleged fact of his 
having been compromised — which to one acquainted with the local condi- 
tions does not appear bad and has in the meantime been almost forgotten — is 
shown by the fact that I have not hesitated to take a step further and grant 
power of attorney to him. . . . 

Chapter VII 

But von Igel and Dr. Albert were not the only spy paymasters in the 
United States; therefore, their records revealed nothing of another 
group of sabotage agents v^ho v^ere functioning entirely independently 
of them, and of v^hom the American authorities only learned long 
after the v^ar. 

On von Rintelen's departure from the United States he had left cer- 
tain funds v^ith Paul Hilken to finance Hinsch and his group of agents 
in Baltimore. Hinsch did not confine his activities to ship sabotage, 
but turned his attention to land operations as weW. In addition to blow- 
ing up factories and starting incendiary fires, he organized a band of 
agents to inoculate with anthrax and glanders germs mules, horses, and 
cattle which were awaiting shipment to the Allies. His germ supply 
was received from Anton Dilger, a special agent who was sent out 
from Germany. 

The Dilger family had emigrated from Germany in the 1870's, and 
after remaining for some time in Chicago had finally settled in Vir- 
ginia. There were now four daughters and two sons, Anton and Carl. 

Anton, a medical graduate from Johns Hopkins University, was in 
Germany when the war broke out. Having previously obtained con- 
siderable experience with a hospital unit during the Serbo-Bulgarian 
War, he offered his services to Germany. Shortly thereafter Germany 
detailed him to secret service work, and he was sent back to the United 
States with a supply of cultures of glanders and anthrax germs, and 
instructions to work with Hilken and Hinsch. In Chevy Chase, near 
Washington, he installed a laboratory; and, assisted by his brother 
Carl, he started in on his work of propagating germs. 

The actual inoculating was carried out by J. Edward Felton, a col- 
ored foreman of the Negro stevedore crews who worked for Hinsch in 



Baltimore. In the fall of 1915, on Hinsch's instructions, Felton organ- 
ized a band of a dozen Negro assistants to travel round the country. 
They carried the germs in glass bottles. Each of these was about an 
inch and a half long and three-quarters of an inch in diameter and 
stoppered by a cork through which was stuck a long needle extending 
into the liquid culture. 

Felton and his band did their work by walking along the fences 
which enclosed the horses and mules and jabbing the animals with 
the needles as they came alongside. The germs were also spread on the 
food and in the water they drank. 

This new campaign, as well as the ship sabotage, was in full swing 
when in January 1916 Anton Dilger was ordered to report to Berlin. 
He took ship immediately for Norway, intending to reach Germany 
via this neutral country. Passing through Denmark on his way south, 
he stopped in at the office of the German Naval Intelligence Service in 
Copenhagen. There, to his surprise, he met Fred Herrmann, a young 
fellow passenger with whom he had struck up an acquaintanceship on 
his way over. Neither had confided in the other, and they now had a 
hearty laugh over their mutual deception. 

On the next day they boarded a train for Berlin. Herrmann at this 
period of his life was a tall, slender, blond youth, described by one 
who knew him in 1916 as being very similar in appearance to Colonel 
Lindbergh. Dilger found him not without charm as a traveling 
companion. As they watched the snow-covered fields flash by their 
compartment window, Herrmann's reserve melted; and he was soon 
telling his life story. 

He was born in Brooklyn on September 10, 1895. His father had 
come from Germany and was a naturalized American citizen. His 
mother was born in the United States. Some time before the war the 
family moved to Roselle Park, New Jersey, which is not far from 
Kingsland. There were three other brothers, Edwin, Carl, and John. 

In 19 14, shortly after the outbreak of the war, Fred Herrmann sailed 
for Rotterdam, Holland, on the Ryndam on a visit to his grandmother 
in Germany. On board ship he met a German agent named von Dalen, 


who was voyaging under the name William Kottkamp as a traveling 
salesman for the European Textile Company. 

Von Dalen saw enough of young Herrmann on the steamer to de- 
cide that he would make an ideal spy, and on their arrival in Holland 
the subject was broached. The adventure appealed to Herrmann, and 
he arranged to meet von Dalen in Berlin. There he was introduced to 
Captain F. Prieger of the German Naval Intelligence Service. The out- 
come was that Herrmann was sent with von Dalen to England, and 
cover addresses were furnished them in neutral countries to which they 
could send their reports. 

Herrmann had several close shaves in the course of these spy activi- 
ties. But, as he told Dilger of his adventures, it was the humorous 
incidents which he chiefly recalled. On his arrival in England, in order 
to have an excuse for traveUng around the country, he decided to pose 
as the representative of an American firm selling church vestments. 
The acquisition of an American catalogue furnished him both with the 
name of an employer and also a talking knowledge of the articles. 
Herrmann, of course, was unable to effect delivery, but by quoting 
exorbitant prices he succeeded in avoiding an actual sale. One day, 
however, overcome by the tyro's salesmanship, a parson, evidently 
in charge of a wealthy parish, insisted on placing an order. Herrmann 
had to undo the effects of his eloquence, and in doing so suddenly 
became an ardent Catholic. He quoted the name of a Catholic bishop 
in London as being that of one of his best customers, and for good 
measure told of a sale he had made to the Pope himself. The Church 
of England parson became quite irascible and, to Herrmann's relief, 
showed him the door. 

After remaining in England for several months, reporting on the 
movements of warships and other naval activities, Herrmann returned 
to the United States. 

On instructions from Boy-Ed, he sailed for Norway in the fall of 
1915, and from there crossed over to Scotland, where he enrolled him- 
self in the University of Edinburgh, ostensibly as a student of forestry 
but actually to watch the British naval bases on the East Coast of 
Scotland. In spite of this cover, however, he aroused the suspicions of 
the British; and after an examination at Scotland Yard he was told to 


leave the country, and was put on board a ship saiHng for the United 

In the meantime Paul Hilken had received a cable from Herr Stape- 
feldt, a high official of the North German Lloyd, requesting him to 
come to Bremen at once. On his arrival there he found that he had 
been called over to make arrangements in connection v^ith the con- 
templated U-boat commercial service with the United States which 
was to be inaugurated by the submarine Deutschland, 

From Bremen Hilken went on to Berlin to arrange for credits for 
the purchase of such raw materials in the United States as were to be 
shipped to Germany in the Deutschland. While there he met von 
Papen, who had lately been recalled to Germany, also several other 
German officials; and it occurred to one of them that Hilken could ex- 
tend his role of paymaster to additional sabotage agents in the United 
States beyond those connected with Hinsch. 

In Berlin Anton Dilger introduced Herrmann to Paul Hilken; and 
the two of them persuaded Herrmann to transfer his services to Sec- 
tion III B, the German Secret Service. Early in February 1916 a con- 
ference took place at which Captains Nadolny and Marguerre of 
Section III B, and Herrmann, Dilger, and Hilken were present. It is 
important to note that Nadolny was one of the heads of Section III B. 
One of his major duties was to act as liaison officer with the Foreign 
Office in order to harmonize secret service work with Germany's 
foreign policy. 

At this conference, Nadolny and Marguerre immediately brought up 
the subject of the destruction of munitions plants in the United States. 
Herrmann volunteered that it would be a difficult job, but Hilken 
claimed that it would be easy and outlined how already the work was 
being done by introducing sabotage agents as workmen into the fac- 
tories. Herrmann eventually fell into line; and, in addition to promis- 
ing to assist in the sabotage campaign in the United States, he took on 
as a special objective the firing of the Tampico oil fields. 

Marguerre and Nadolny then showed them a new incendiary device. 
This consisted of a slender glass tube drawn to capillary dimensions in 
the center. The top part of the tube contained sulphuric acid; the bot- 
tom half a mixture of chlorate of potash and sugar in the proportion of 


3 to I. They demonstrated the method of making the two halves of an 
ordinary pencil come apart by soaking it in water; also how, after the 
lead had been removed, the glass tube could be slipped into its place and 
the two halves of the pencil glued together. The incendiary pencil could 
then be brought into action by breaking off the tip. This forced the 
sulphuric acid down onto the mixture of sugar and chlorate of potash 
and caused the emission of a white-hot flame. 

After a supply of these incendiary pencils had been handed to them 
and after the necessary credits had been established for Hilken to act 
as paymaster, the three German-Americans were sent on their way. 

On his return to the United States Hilken made the required ar- 
rangements in connection with the Deutschland; and, mindful of 
Hinsch*s shipping experience, as well as of the fact that it would pro- 
vide excellent cover for Hinsch, he enrolled him as an assistant in the 
commercial U-boat service. It was Hinsch who went down Chesapeake 
Bay on a tug and guided the submarine to its berth; it was also he who 
superintended the loading and unloading. Hilken, on the other hand, 
organized the Eastern Forwarding Company, which handled the 
dyestufis and other cargo brought in by the submarine and purchased 
the nickel, tin, rubber, and other raw materials it took on board. The 
Deutschland, however, only succeeded in making two trips to America ; 
Germany's Commercial U-boat service proved only an empty dream. 

Herrmann traveled back to the United States via Copenhagen, and 
shortly after his arrival he met Dilger and Hilken, who had returned 
on another boat. In Baltimore Hilken introduced Herrmann to Hinsch. 
Hinsch was immensely impressed with the pencils and was emphatic 
in claiming that they would be a vast improvement over the "dump- 
lings," as he called them, that he had been using hitherto. 

From Baltimore Herrmann went to Washington and stayed at Dil- 
ger's home. At his laboratory they filled the tubes with the necessary 
chemicals and fitted them into pencils. Herrmann then took back a 
supply to give Hinsch in Baltimore. In subsequent conferences with the 
Captain a plan of campaign was mapped out, a number of factories 
were marked for destruction, and each of them chose the ones they 
would attend to. According to a statement made by Herrmann after 
the war. Kingsland was on his list, and Black Tom on Hinsch's. 

Chapter VIII 

At 2:08 A.M. on the night of July 30, 1916, New York City was rocked 
by the greatest explosion in her history. Over two million pounds of 
munitions stored on Black Tom Island in New York Harbor blew up 
in a series of explosions. Two of the blasts were distinctly heard in 
Camden and Philadelphia, nearly a hundred miles away. The tre- 
mendous concussion shattered practically every window in Jersey City, 
and in Manhattan and Brooklyn thousands of heavy plate-glass win- 
dows fell from office buildings and skyscrapers into the streets. Build- 
ings trembled; some of the inhabitants were thrown from their beds; 
and the population, panic-stricken, emptied itself out into the streets. 

For hours the sky was lit up by the fierce fire which raged on Black 
Tom Island; and for three hours a steady stream of high explosives 
and shrapnel shells were hurled from the conflagration as they ex- 
ploded, some of them landing as far off as Governors Island. Buildings 
on Ellis Island were wrecked, and all immigrants there had to be 
evacuated. During these terrifying hours. Black Tom and its vicinity 
might well have been part of the western front during a gigantic battle. 
The residents of Greater New York and northern New Jersey were 
shaken badly by the blast, but fortunately the Terminal was just far 
enough away to prevent the metropolitan area's being razed. 

To follow intelligently the tragic events which happened on that 
night, it is necessary to understand the layout of the terminal and also 
the conditions which prevailed there at the time of the explosion. 

Black Tom is a promontory, nearly one mile long, which juts out 
into the Upper Bay from the New Jersey shore, about opposite the 
Statue of Liberty. It was originally an island but at the time of the ex- 
plosion was joined to the shore by a fill about one hundred and fifty 
feet wide. 



On Black Tom the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company had built 
large warehouses, numerous piers, and a network of tracks. Within 
a short time after the commencement of the war, Black Tom became 
the most important point in America for the transfer of munitions and 
supplies to Allied vessels. Loaded freight cars were run into the north- 
ern part of the terminal, and from there the munitions were loaded 
into barges hired by the consignees and tied up at the adjoining piers. 

As it was not always possible for the representatives of the Allied 
Governments to determine beforehand the exact time steamers would 
be ready to receive the loads of munitions, it was quite usual for the 
munitions cars to be kept there for several days, sometimes a week, 
waiting to be unloaded. Thus, on the night of the explosion there 
were 34 carloads of munitions on Black Tom, consisting of 11 cars of 
high explosives, 17 of shells, 3 of nitro-cellulose, i of T.N.T., and 2 of 
combination fuses; in all a total of approximately 2,132,000 pounds of 

At the north pier, bordering on the tracks, ten barges were tied up, 
most of them loaded with explosives which they had taken on at other 
terminals and piers in New York Harbor. They had tied up at Black 
Tom, some to take on additional explosives, others to stay there during 
the night and over the following Sunday until their loads could be 
shifted to steamers. One of these barges, the Johnson ly, was loaded 
with 100,000 pounds of T.N.T. and 417 cases of detonating fuses— a 
veritable floating bomb. 

During July 1916 Black Tom Terminal was guarded at night by 
watchmen (Ley den, Kane, Groat, Kelly, Sloane, and Garrity) provided 
by the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, and by private detectives 
(Burns, Scott, Bryan, and Gibson) furnished by the Dougherty Detec- 
tive Agency and paid for by the Allied Governments, owners of the 
munitions. These men went on duty at 5 p.m. and remained until 

6 A.M. 

There was no gate on the tongue of land connecting Black Tom to 
the mainland; consequently it was an easy matter for a person to reach 
the Terminal; and, unless of a suspicious appearance, he would not 
have been stopped by the guards as this passageway was also com- 
monly used by the barge men whose boats were tied up at the pier. 


Furthermore, the Terminal was in an isolated spot and unlighted, thus 
making it difficult to sec a person prowling about. In addition anyone 
could reach it at night in a boat with little danger of being observed. 

On Saturday evening, July 29, at 5 o'clock, all work stopped on 
Black Tom; the workmen departed for their usual Sunday holiday; 
and all locomotive engines were sent to the mainland. The Terminal 
was a dead yard. 

A gentle wind was blowing from the southwest. The night was 
quiet, and the guards placidly made their periodical rounds. 

At 12:45 A.M. a fire was suddenly noticed in one of the munitions 
cars. At the first sight of it the guards turned in a fire alarm and fled 
in a panic. 

Five independent witnesses on Black Tom Island at the time gave 
affidavits that the fire started inside the car and that the fire burned 
for about twenty minutes before the first explosion. A witness on Bed- 
loe's Island, who had a view of the pier as well, later stated that an- 
other fire appeared almost simultaneously in a barge about three hun- 
dred yards away, presumably the Johnson 17. 

At 2:08 A.M. the first explosion occurred, and this was followed by a 
second terrific blast at 2:40. In the confusion no one was able to tell 
whether the barge or the munitions near the car blew up first. How- 
ever this fact is established: the Johnson ly was 325 feet away from the 
pier when it exploded. This was determined by the crater which sound- 
ings of the river bed disclosed. The depth of the river at that point was 
found to be twenty-one feet; whereas a geodetic survey made a few 
days before the explosion had established a depth of seven feet at the 
same spot. How the barge drifted so far away from the pier is not 
known. Only Johnson, the captain of the barge and the only man on 
board at the time, could tell whether its moorings had been burned 
away, or whether he had cast it loose. Both he and his barge had dis- 
appeared, however. Three months later his body drifted up on Bedloe's 

Another huge crater was found at a spot near where the burning 
car had stood. Thus it appeared that the two major explosions had 
been caused by the detonation of the munitions near the car and on the 
barge, the two places where the fires had been observed. 


The two explosions and the conflagration which broke loose de- 
stroyed the entire Black Tom Terminal together with all the munitions 
and rolling stock which happened to be there that night. The damage 
was estimated at $14,000,000, and 3 men and a child were killed. These 
included Leyden, one of the night watchmen, and a policeman named 
James Doherty. 

The immediate outcome of the Black Tom disaster was that several 
suits were filed against the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company by the 
Russian Government, which owned most of the munitions that had 
exploded, and by the property owners in the neighborhood. The 
plaintiffs maintained that the Railroad had been negligent in not 
providing better protection for the property in view of the fact that 
it was known that German sabotage agents were at work in this 

The Lehigh Valley based its defense on the theory that the ex- 
plosions had been caused by spontaneous combustion, a defense which 
seemed the most expedient at the time, but one which rose to plague 
it later; for this was the very defense which the Germans raised 
when, after the war, the Railroad and other American claimants in 
the Black Tom case filed their claims against Germany for damages 
with the Mixed Claims Commission. At these early trials, however, ex- 
perts proved to the satisfaction of the jury that spontaneous com- 
bustion was impossible. It was established that the smokeless powder 
contained in the shells was manufactured in accordance with the 
specifications of the United States Army and Navy; that it was all new 
powder, treated with a stabilizer known as diphenylamine which pre- 
vented spontaneous combustion. Dr. Free, United States Government 
expert, testified that he had examined nearly two billion pounds of 
powder manufactured in this way and that it was inconceivable that 
spontaneous combustion could have occurred. It was further shown 
that even untreated smokeless powder would require a temperature 
of 356° Fahrenheit before it would ignite. 

As regards T.N.T., experts testified that it was impossible for it to 
ignite spontaneously. Finally, it was pointed out that if the shells had 
gone off by spontaneous combustion, the guards would not have seen 
flames destroying the freight car for eighteen minutes before the first 


explosion at 2:08 a.m. Besides all this there was evidence to show that 
before either of the explosions occurred another fire had broken out 
almost simultaneously with the first at a point nearly three hundred 
yards away from the car— the distance between it and the barge John- 
son ly. This fact alone indicated that the origin of the explosions was 
incendiary. In most of these cases the jury found that the Lehigh Valley 
Railroad Company had been negligent in not having sufficient guards 
to protect the property. 

But there were other developments. The local police were busily 
searching for leads. A Mrs. Chapman, a resident of Bayonne, New 
Jersey, who since her childhood had known Captain John J. Rigney, 
of the Bayonne Police Department, reported to him her suspicions 
that a cousin, Michael Kristoff, was responsible for the destruction of 
Black Tom. She related that Kristoff, who had formerly lodged with 
her and at the time lodged with her mother, Mrs. Anna Rushnak, at 
76 East 25th Street, Bayonne, did not return home until 4 o'clock in 
the morning on the night of the explosion. Hearing him pace the floor, 
her mother went to his room. She found him in a state of great excite- 
ment and near nervous prostration. To her anxious query as to what 
had happened, the only reply she could get out of him was "What 
I do! What I do!" This he kept repeating over and over again as he 
ran his hands through his hair. 

According to Captain Rigney, Mrs. Chapman also told him that 
"Kristoff had been in the habit of going away from time to time and 
that everywhere he went there was an explosion." She referred to some 
place in Columbus, Ohio, where he had gone and said that whenever 
he came back from any of these trips he always had plenty of money. 
She also said that she had seen maps and charts in Kristoff's possession 
while he had been staying with her at her house at 114 Neptune Ave- 
nue, Jersey City, New Jersey. 

The result was that after shadowing KristofT for some time. Captain 
Rigney arrested him near Mrs. Rushnak's home on August 31, 1916, 
and turned him over to Lieutenant Peter Green of the Jersey City 
Police Department. 

All that was known about Kristoff was that he was born in 1893, in 


Presov, then in the Slovak region of Hungary, now a part of Czecho- 
slovakia, and had been given the surname Michael. When he v^as six 
years old, his parents emigrated to the United States, where his mother 
had several members of her family living. By 1916 he had grown into 
a tall, slimly built young man, with light reddish hair, pale blue eyes, 
fair complexion, and a weak receding chin. For some months prior to 
July he had been working for the Tidewater Oil Company at Bayonne, 
New Jersey, close to Black Tom. 

When examined by the Bayonne Police authorities, his story ran 
substantially as follows: On January 3, 19 16, he was sitting in the wait- 
ing room of the Pennsylvania Railroad Station, 33rd Street, New York 
City, when he was accosted by a man who asked him the time and then 
inquired where he was going. Kristoff informed him that he was wait- 
ing for a train to go to Cambridge, Ohio, where he intended to visit 
his sister. This man, who then gave his name as Graentnor, offered him 
a job at $20 per week, which he accepted. He went with Graentnor to 
the Hotel York, and on the next day they started off on a series of 
travels which took them in turn to Philadelphia, Bridgeport, Cleve- 
land, Akron, Columbus, Chicago, Kansas City, St. Louis, and finally 
back to New York. After arranging to meet him in the lobby of the 
Hotel McAlpin Graentnor disappeared, and he never saw him again. 
Kristoff stated that during these journeys his job was to carry Graent- 
nor's two suitcases, which contained blueprints of bridges and fac- 
tories, also money and books. He had no idea whom Graentnor saw 
in these towns, but ventured an opinion that the plans were "to show 
people how to build bridges and houses and factories." 

His whole story sounded so unintelligible to the police authorities 
that they got the impression Kristoff was half demented; and, there- 
fore, they called in an alienist to examine him. It was finally decided 
that he was not altogether sane, but not dangerously insane. Where- 
upon, in spite of the fact he had furnished several false alibis as to 
where he had been on the night of the explosion and had admitted 
working for the Eagle Oil Works, adjacent to Black Tom, and not 
returning for his pay after the explosion, he was released on September 
25, 1916, after promising to look for Graentnor. 

But the Lehigh Valley Railroad officials were not convinced. To 


them the strange story of Kristoff was not that of a crazy man but that 
of a man attempting to cover up his tracks. They felt that in his clumsy 
evasions he had admitted some truths. Factories w^ere being blown up 
all over the country, and Graentnor and his two suitcases filled with 
blueprints sounded real. 

From the payroll records of the Tidewater Oil Company in Bayonne, 
where Kristoff had been employed prior to his work at the Eagle Oil 
Works, they discovered that he had been absent for five work days in 
January 19 16. Subsequently he had left the employ of the Company 
on February 29, 1916, and had not returned to work until June 19. 
After working there for a month he had transferred his services to the 
Eagle Oil Works. In addition, Mrs. Chapman later gave them an 
affidavit to the effect that while cleaning Kristoff's room one day 
shortly before the Black Tom explosion she had found an unmailed 
letter to a man named "Grandson" or "Graentnor," in which he had 
demanded a large sum of money. The Lehigh Valley Railroad, there- 
fore, hired Alexander Kassman, an employee of the W. J. Burns De- 
tective Agency, to shadow him. 

For almost a year Kassman lived in close contact with Kristoff; they 
worked at the same chocolate factory and met nightly. Kassman posed 
as an Austrian anarchist, took Kristoff to anarchists' meetings, and 
thus won his confidence. At regular intervals Kassman reported to the 
Burns Agency. A perusal of these reports shows that Kristoff on 
numerous occasions admitted to Kassman that he had assisted in blow- 
ing up Black Tom. 

In May 1917 Kassman lost track of Kristoff. Records discovered long 
afterwards revealed, however, that he employed a well-known ruse to 
divert attention from himself: On May 22, 1917, he enlisted in the 
United States Army. A later entry in his Army records shows that he 
was discharged on September 12, 1917, because of tuberculosis and for 
having enlisted under false enlistment papers. 

Kristoff now vanished completely until the spring of 1921, when he 
was located in prison at Albany, New York, where he had been com- 
mitted for larceny under the name of "John Christie." 

Once again the Lehigh Valley attempted to get from him further 
information about Black Tom. Through the cooperation of the county 


officials of Albany County, a detective of the Washington Detective 
Bureau v^as placed in a cell next to KristofF, and together v^ith him v^as 
assigned to v^ork in the prison bake shop. The detective remained 
there nineteen days, but Kristoff was on the defensive when approached 
about Black Tom. He was well aware that a murder charge was in- 
volved. He repeated the same story about Graentnor and the blue- 
prints which he had told to the Bayonne police five years previously; 
and, although he refused to make any admission that he had blown up 
Black Tom, he did admit that he had been working with a German 
group for several weeks and that they had promised him a large sum of 

Shortly after this he was released from prison and for the time being 
disappeared. But eventually he reappeared, as we shall see later on. 

Of the various investigations which were conducted at the time by 
the Department of Justice, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the 
local authorities, and the owners, none was successful. It was not 
until after 1922, when the Mixed Claims Commission was established, 
that the American lawyers employed by the owners gradually began 
by exhaustive investigations to lift the curtain of mystery which sur- 
rounded the destruction of Black Tom, and by piecing the intricate 
clues together began to build up their case against Germany. The story 
of their dogged fight against the German Secret Service and their im- 
mense difficulties in collecting the evidence is told in Part II. Here we 
will only indicate that the evidence they collected led the American 
investigators to the conviction that Graentnor was Hinsch or at least 
that Hinsch knew a Graentnor whose name he borrowed as an alias; 
that Jahnke and Witzke rowed across to Black Tom from the New 
York side to assist Kristoff in blowing up the Terminal; and that two 
of the Dougherty guards, Burns and Scott, were paid agents of 
Koenig's. Whether they were justified in reaching this conclusion the 
reader will be able to judge for himself when he has read the evidence. 

Chapter IX 

After the Black Tom explosion the work of HInsch, Herrmann, Fel- 
ton, Koenig, Jahnke, and Dilger went on unabated. At this time also 
they received two new recruits: Wilhelm Woehst, a lieutenant in the 
German Army and Raoul Gerdts Pochet. 

In December 1916 Woehst was sent out from Germany by Section 
III B with a fresh supply of incendiary pencils and with raw cultures 
of germs. On arriving in New York he associated himself with 

Raoul Gerdts Pochet, or Gerdts, as he was known among the other 
German agents, was born in Bogota, Colombia, of a German father 
and a Colombian mother. In July 191 6 he met Herrmann in New 
York; a friendship developed between them, and soon he was enrolled 
as an agent. His chief duty was to act as Herrmann's chaufFeur and, as 
such, accompany him on his many reconnoitering trips in search of 
new objectives and assist him in making the necessary plans to carry 
out the various acts of destruction. 

The dispatch of new agents to the United States was indicative of 
continuing German determination to intensify the land sabotage cam- 
paign and to revive the marine one. On August 18, 1916, two attempts 
were made to blow up the piers of the Pacific Coast Steamship Com- 
pany. In October 1916 mysterious fires broke out in the holds of the 
S.S. Philadelphia, S.S. Antilla, and S.S. Chicago. On November 21 a 
sudden explosion took place on the American S.S. Sarnia. After she 
had been beached on the French coast near Cherbourg, twenty unex- 
ploded bombs were found in her sugar cargo. On November 27 the 
cargo of the S.S. Regina dltalia suddenly took fire. On December 9, 
1916, the Midvale Chemical Company building at Bayonne was de- 



stroyed by a fire and explosion, and in the same month the Bethlehem 
Steel Company gas plant was blown up. 

The previously mentioned agents were not alone responsible for all 
these acts of sabotage. There were other German agents abroad 
in the land, notable among whom was Charles N. Wunnenberg.'* When 
we first encounter him he was about thirty-six years old, of a stocky 
build and of typically Teutonic appearance. While of German descent, 
he was a naturalized American citizen. He was an engineer by profes- 
sion, according to his own statements, and had also been a mariner. In 
the spring of 1915 he made a visit to Germany, in the course of which 
his uncle introduced him to Dr. Posse, editor of the Cologne Gazette, 
Posse was in close contact with the German Secret Service and lost no 
time in discussing with Wunnenberg the possibility of recruiting 
American newspaper men as spies. As Wunnenberg thought the plan 
was feasible. Posse took him to see Eugene Wilhelm, Chief of the Naval 
Intelligence Bureau at Antwerp. Under Wilhelm's tutelage he was in- 
structed in the use of secret inks; and, after having been given cover 
addresses in Copenhagen to which to send his reports, he was handed 
the sum of $2,000 and ordered to return to the United States. 

On his return to New York City Wunnenberg joined forces with 
Albert A. Sanders, another German agent. As cover the two were given 
jobs with the Central Powers Film Company, which was subsidized to 
circulate German propaganda pictures in the United States. Wunnen- 
berg and Sanders recruited Rutledge Rutherford, an American news- 
paper correspondent whom Wunnenberg had met at the office of the 
German Literary Defense Committee. Rutherford was given $1,200 to 
defray his expenses to England and was instructed to report to the 
Chief of the German Naval Intelligence Bureau in Scheveningen, Hol- 
land, for further instructions. 

Rutherford was completely successful. He succeeded in enrolling 
himself as a member of the London Press Club; and he often traveled 
between London and Holland, ostensibly as a reporter for his news- 
paper but actually to transmit to the Germans his spy reports on the 
British Army and Navy. 

After successfully enlisting several other newspaper correspondents 

* His name is also spelled Wunenberg in some of the reports and affidavits. 


as spies, Wunnenberg was ordered to return to Germany. On his arrival 
there he was sent to Wilhelmshaven, where under the direction of Dr. 
Jansen of the Naval Laboratories, he was instructed in the use of 
bombs and in handling a new high explosive called "Tetra." 

Next he was sent as a spy to England via Copenhagen. While on 
one of his several trips, his steamer, the Leelanaw, was torpedoed 
by a German submarine. Together with several other survivors he 
was rescued by the submarine, and towed for some time in one of the 
Leelanaw s lifeboats. Eventually the lifeboat was picked up by a pass- 
ing steamer, and the survivors were landed at Kirkwall. When inter- 
viewed by the British authorities, he was able to establish his identity 
as an American citizen and was allowed to land. 

Shortly after this he was once again sent back to the United States. 
Wilhelm furnished him with a letter to Gustav Kremer, vice presi- 
dent of the Pass-Kremer Hat Band Manufacturing Company, of Pat- 
erson, New Jersey, instructing Kremer to honor Wunnenberg s drafts 
up to $10,000. He was also furnished with an additional $12,000, part 
of which was transferred to a New York bank in the name of Robert 

On his return to New York Wunnenberg quickly won for himself 
among the German sabotage agents the title of "Charles the Dyna- 
miter." One of his letters which fell into the hands of the American 
authorities was boastfully signed "The Dynamiter." "Son Charles" was 
the code name used in his communications with Wilhelm. 

Among the Dynamiter's best work was his recruiting of many Ger- 
man sabotage agents in the United States. He also was closely associated 
with Kurt Jahnke. The following intercepted coded telegram which 
was dispatched from Berlin to Washington on January 10, 1917, links 
their names together under ominous circumstances — it was sent the 
day before the Kingsland fire: "Intelligence Office is not to be in com- 
munication with Igel, Jahnke, Wunnenberg." 

Furthermore, at the time of the Armistice some of Wilhelm's papers 
were seized by the Belgians at the headquarters of the German Naval 
Intelligence Service in Antwerp. In a list of German Secret Service 
agents, the following entry was found, as of date October 8, 1916: 


Number Name Remarks, etc. 
A.13 Wunnenberg German-American, confidential agent in New York 
for engaging agents, etc. Very reliable and intelligent. 
Some time ago was in Europe, but has returned to 
New York, provided with fresh instructions. 

Evidence that he was in contact with both von Igel and Paul Koenig 
was furnished by von Igel's account book. In it an entry was found: 
"1916, Nov. 2 P. K. Vimmanpalf." Deciphered from the alphabetical 
code in which von Igel kept his accounts "Vimmanpalf" was found to 
stand for Wunnenberg, and opposite many payments made through 
Paul Koenig the initials P. K. were prefixed. 

In February 1917 Wunnenberg and Sanders were both arrested by 
agents of the Department of Justice on information furnished by the 
British Intelligence Service. Another of the newspaper correspondents, 
George Vaux Bacon, sent over by Wunnenberg to England, had been 
given enough rope by the British to hang himself. He had been fol- 
lov/ed on his trips to Holland and during a tour of the British Isles 
which he had made, supposedly to gather material for a series of 
articles describing wartime conditions in Scotland, Ireland, and Eng- 
land, but actually as a cover for espionage. When arrested by the 
British, Bacon admitted that the secret ink which was found on him 
had been furnished by Wunnenberg. 

This crafty spy, however, was not entirely unknown to the Depart- 
ment of Justice. As early as September 28, 191 6, Mrs. Robert Davis of 
Brooklyn, the wife of the man to whom part of the $12,000 mentioned 
above was sent, had furnished it with the following information: 

...Wuncnberg brought Freda Auerbacker from Germany on a bogus 
marriage certificate as his wife. (She told me that she had a husband at the 
front in the trenches.) And she told me that he performed a criminal opera- 
tion on her on the boat coming over [Oscar the Second] they arrived on 
August the ninth of this year. Sanders is supposed to work with Wunenberg 
in the Film business, at his office in the White Hall bldg. close to Park 
Place. Sanders is the man who got Wunenberg next to Rutlidge. Wunenberg 
came from Frisco in March, 1915. I think Wunenberg passport called for 
Freda Prestine. . . . Wunenberg ofEered Davis one thousand dollars for every 


bomb that he [Davis] would install in the coal bunkers of every ship that 
was carrying supplies for the Allies. 

...I cannot say to my knowledge that Wunenberg had anything to do 
with the Black Tom Island explosion or not, the man who owned one of 
the barges that went up in the explosion lived just across the street from 
me, Olaf Olsan was boarding with me at that time and working on this 
barge, and we supposed he went up in the explosion as we never heard 
anything from him any more, in speaking of this disaster Wunenberg said 
those barges were loaded for the Allies but that is some of the stuff that 
"the God Dam Lime Juice Sons of Bitches will never get." Freda said that 
Mrs. Sanders told her while she was over to her house that Wunenberg has 
a wife and child living in New York. Wunenberg always treated me as a 
lady. I was like a mother to him, he did the last night I staid in my house, 
after Freda and I had gone to bed, come into my room but I told him to 
get out and he did so. In order for Wunenberg to go to Germany and 
back he had to have a wife and he offered me one thousand dollars if I 
would go over and come back with him and pass off as his wife. I told him 
nothing doing. 

Wunnenberg and Sanders were sentenced on March 31, 191 7, to 
serve two years in Atlanta Penitentiary. Subsequently, in prison, he 
made a confession to a Department of Justice agent whose report, dated 
June 8, 1917, reads in part as follows: 

...Agent interviewed Wunenberg who stated that he wished a pardon 
and that he was in possession of information that might help this Govern- 
ment. That this information was mostly confined to a knowledge of chem- 
icals and instruments used by the Germans for destructive purposes. For 
instance, there is what they call a pencil, it looks Hke a pencil, has no metal 
except the tip that holds the eraser. This instrument is capable of being set 
so as to go off at a given time, and when set off causes a very intense flame 
which will last several minutes setting on fire anything within a radius of 
several feet. This is used in attempting arsons on ships, in munition plants 
and wherever an opportunity presents itself. The usual way this is used is 
to have an agent place one in his coat pocket, set it and leave his coat on a 
hook in whatever place he desires to set fire to. Then it is left on desks, etc. 

There is another preparation called thermit. It is composed of 6.45 parts 
to 1.55 parts of oxide of iron and aluminum filings pressed into the shape 
of bricks or circles [spheres] with small hollowed centers. Two of these 


thermits are used placing one on the other so that the hollowed out places 
would be above each other. Into this hollowed out place is placed what is 
called a dynometer, which is set to go off at a given time. The dynometer 
acts upon the thermit making a molten mass that will burn its way through 
steel plates or any substances with which it may come into contact. 

Wunenberg said that these instruments were given him by the German 

On another occasion he gave a more precise description of the lead 
pencil device which clearly identified it as the same one which Nadolny 
and Marguerre handed to Hilken, Dilger, and Herrmann. 

Another German agent was Maria de Victorica. She is of interest not 
only because she was one of the few female spies employed by the Ger- 
mans in the United States but because when arrested in 191 8 she stated 
on two separate occasions that she had been informed by other German 
agents that an Austrian had blown up Black Tom. This pointed a 
finger at Michael Kristoflf; for, as we already know, he was an Austrian 

Maria de Victorica was a glamorous figure. She was the youngest 
daughter of Baron Hans von Kretschmann, a general in the German 
Army. Her mother was Countess Jennie von Gustedt, daughter of a 
Prussian diplomat. She had traveled extensively in various parts of the 
world, spoke many languages, and had several university degrees. 
Shortly before the war, being of an adventuresome spirit, she used her 
high connections to secure an introduction to Colonel Nicolai, the Chief 
of the German Secret Service; and because of her special qualifications, 
he eagerly enrolled her in his service. One of the few spies who came 
up to Hollywood standards, she actually was a beautiful blonde who 
employed all the prescribed paraphernalia of her profession: secret 
inks, a dozen aliases and disguises, and above all the multiple wiles of 
her sex in enslaving men. 

Her first assignment took her to Chile, where she married a native 
by the name of de Victorica. In 191 4 she returned to Berlin with her 
husband, whom she had by then enlisted in the service of Germany. 
She was transferred to the Naval Intelligence Service and sent on a 
mission to Russia. So successful was she in this work that in December 


1916 she was sent to the United States to ally herself with those groups 
who were plotting rebellion in Ireland, to assist in the general sabotage 
scheme, and, finally, to report on the work of certain of the German 
agents who had preceded her. 

But in November 1917 the British Secret Service put the American 
authorities on her trail. They had discovered her contact address in 
Hoboken. An intercepted letter sent to this address revealed a message 
written in secret ink which, after a long hunt — chiefly trailing her from 
one fashionable hotel to another — eventually led to her arrest on April 
27, 1918. Jeremiah O'Leary, whom we have already mentioned, was 
arrested at the same time. 

In the meantime her husband had also met with misfortune. On a 
mission for the German Secret Service, he was captured in France on 
his way to Buenos Aires and sentenced on April 25, 1918, by the 
Council of War at Besangon to life imprisonment. 

Mme. de Victorica met with a worse fate. On June 7, 19 18, she was 
indicted by a Federal Grand Jury for conspiracy to commit espionage 
in wartime but was never brought to trial. Although she received every 
consideration from the American authorities, years of drug addiction 
and the long months of imprisonment broke her spirit. She died on 
August 12, 1920, a few months after her release, and was buried at 
Kensico, New York, in the Gates of Heaven Cemetery. 

Her statements with regard to Black Tom are of value; for, although 
she only arrived in the United States in December 1916, she was asso- 
ciated with spies such as Wunnenberg who were here at the time of 
the explosion. 

Chapter X 

On the afternoon of January ii, 1917, New York City once again 
heard the thunderous roar of exploding munitions. For four hours 
northern New Jersey, New York City, Westchester, and the western 
end of Long Island listened to a bombardment in which probably half 
a million three-inch, high explosive shells were discharged. This explo- 
sion took place in the shell assembling plant of the Agency of the 
Canadian Car and Foundry Company, near Kingsland, New Jersey, 
about ten miles from the docks in New York Harbor. A fire originated 
suddenly and inexplicably in one of the assembling sheds, Building 30, 
to be exact; and within a few minutes the whole plant was ablaze. As 
the flames reached each case of shells and exploded the projection 
charges, the missiles shot high up in the air and then rained down 
in the vicinity of the factory. 

Luckily, the shells were not equipped with detonating fuses; there- 
fore they fell as so much metal without exploding. Kingsland and 
Rutherford were soon filled with hundreds of refugees who had fled 
from their homes. Fortunately there were no casualties. The 1,400 
workers in the plant and all others nearby, mindful of the danger, fled 
in a mad rush at the first peal of the fire alarm, escaping only just in 
the nick of time. The entire plant was destroyed. Here the material 
damage amounted to $17,000,000. 

To understand events it ijs necessary to know something about the 
plant at Kingsland and the history of the Company. 

The war had been in progress but a few months when enormous 

munitions orders started pouring in to the Canadian Car and Foundry 

Company, Limited, in Montreal. Large contracts were signed both 

with England and Russia for the delivery of shells. The Canadian 

factory was working to capacity when, in the spring of 1915, the 



Company secured an $83,000,000 contract from the Russian Govern- 
ment for 5,000,000 shells. In order to fulfill this contract the parent 
company in Canada formed a separate agency and incorporated it 
under the laws of New York. In March 1916 the huge plant of the 
agency was erected close to Kingsland, in Bergen County, New Jersey. 
Shells, shell cases, shrapnel, and powder were shipped to Kingsland 
from over one hundred different factories and there assembled for 
shipment to Russia. At the time of the fire the plant was turning out 
3,000,000 shells per month — ^it was a worthy objective for the German 
saboteur. The company was well aware of this, and as a safeguard had 
erected around the plant a six-foot fence which was patrolled night 
and day by guards. None of the 1,400 workers were allowed to enter 
without a preparatory search, and it was strictly forbidden for any 
of them to carry matches on his person. 

Building 30, where the fire originated, was entirely devoted to clean- 
ing out shells. The building was furnished with forty-eight work 
benches, along which stood the workers. On the bench in front of 
each worker was a pan of gasoline and a small rotating machine oper- 
ated by a belt. The cleaning process consisted, first, in dusting out the 
shell with a brush; then, in order to clean out the thin coating of 
grease with which the shell had been covered on shipment from the 
factory, a cloth, moistened in the pan of gasoline, was wrapped around 
a piece of wood about a foot long and, after the shell had been fitted 
onto the rotating machine, inserted into the shell as it slowly turned; 
finally, a dry cloth was wrapped around the stick, and the shell was 
dried in a similar manner. It was in the vicinity of one of these ma- 
chines that the fire was first noticed. 

So rapidly did it spread from building to building that within a 
few minutes the whole mammoth plant was ablaze. Four hours later 
all that was left of it was a smoldering mass of ruins. 275,000 loaded 
shells, 300,000 cartridge cases, 100,086 detonators, 439,920 time fuses, 
large stores of T.N.T., and more than one million unloaded shells 
that were either in the shops, or waiting shipment to Russia, were com- 
pletely destroyed. 

Immediately after the fire, the officers of the Company commenced 
an investigation to determine the cause of the blaze. Various workmen 


were called in and examined by Mr. Cahan, one of the directors of the 
Company. It was quickly established that the fire had broken out at 
the bench of Fiodore Wozniak, one of the workers. A gang foreman, 
Morris Chester Musson, who was at the end of the building when 
the fire originated, described what he saw as follows in an affidavit: 

...One of the men at the place where the fire originated was Fiodore 
Wozniak, whose photograph I recognize and which appears below as 
follows : 

[A photograph of Wozniak appeared here in the original affidavit.] 

I noticed that this man Wozniak had quite a large collection of rags and 
that the blaze started in these rags. I also noticed that he had spilled his 
pan of alcohol all over the table just preceding that time. The fire immedi- 
ately spread very rapidly in the alcohol saturated table. I also noticed that 
someone threw a pail of liquid on the rags or the table almost immediately 
in the confusion. I am not able to state whether this was water or one of 
the pails of refuse alcohol under the tables. My recollection, however, is that 
there were no pails of water in the building, the fire buckets being filled 
with sand. Whatever the liquid was it caused the fire to spread very rapidly 
and the flames dropped down on the floor and in a few minutes the entire 
place was in a blaze. 

It was my firm conviction from what I saw, and I so stated at the time, 
that the place was set on fire purposely, and that has always been and is 
my firm belief. 

Thomas Steele, another workman, described his observations as fol- 

I was working in No. 30, No. 2265. The fire broke out in the liquid 
pan in front of an Austrian workman just after three o'clock. This Austrian 
had been there working for at least three weeks. 

I saw the fire burning up in his pan about four or five inches high. The 
Austrian said nothing but ran for his coat and taking it, ran through the 
freight car opening out into the back yard. I was the third man from the 

Mr. Cahan also gave his impressions of an interview he had with 


I told him [Wozniak] that most of his fellow workmen agreed that the 
flames had first been seen at or near his table. He admitted to me that the 
flames had originated there and he said that they had started in some cloths 
which he was using to clean one of the shells. 

Wozniak told me that several days before the fire occurred he had found 
matches deposited in one of the shells, among the cloths, "rags" he called 
them, which he used for cleaning shells. He seemed to lay singular stress 
on this fact which at the time, created suspicion in my mind that he was 

developing a story to throw suspicion on one of his fellow workers He 

said that he was taking the third step in the process of cleaning a shell, that 
is, drying the inside with a clean cloth, when a flame burst from the opening 
of the shell. . . . 

I questioned Wozniak about the man who had worked at the bench 
next to him and he said that the man working next to him, on the day of 
the fire, was a new man who came on that bench that day for the first 
time He said that he did not know his name 

I found the man who usually worked at the second table next to that of 
Wozniak. He was No. 1208, named Rodriguez, who claimed to have been 
originally from Porto Rico. He gave his residence No. 105 West 64th Street, 
New York City; and when I had him brought to the office of the company 
he declared that he had been absent from the Works on the day of the fire 
and that he had been home all day with his family. . . . 

Other workmen in Building 30 alleged that the fire started in the pan 
of gasoline mixture, which was fixed in front of Wozniak's wooden roller . . . 
others who were farther away only saw the flames shooting from the pan 
of gasoline mixture high towards the ceiling. 

... I had the impression from his [Wozniak's] nervous behavior, from 
his demeanor when led into apparent contradictions, and from other inci- 
dents in our interviews which were significant to me but difiicult to describe, 
that he knew that the fire was no accident and that he personally was 
implicated in its origin. 

G. W. A. Woodhouse, who acted as interpreter for Mr. Cahan at 
some of his interviews with Wozniak and who also interviewed 
Wozniak separately stated: 

I obtained the same impression from the interviews which are recorded 

by Mr. Cahan I also know that the Company made great efforts later 

to try to shadow Wozniak and to locate the other workman who was said 


to have been employed that day for the first time at the adjoining bench, 
but Wozniak disappeared entirely shortly after the detectives were put on 
his trail, and we never v^^ere able to locate either him or the v^^orkman v^ho 
had been at the adjoining table. 

Wozniak said that, though he had entered the Company's employ 
as a Russian, he was actually an "Austrian Galician" ; he admitted that 
he had served his time in the Austrian Army and that he had at one 
time been an Austrian gendarme. 

Wozniak was told by Mr. Cahan that he would be needed in New 
York in connection with further investigations regarding the fire 
and that he would be kept on the Company's payroll during that 
period. Detectives were then employed to watch Wozniak. He went to 
live at the Russian Immigrant Home on Third Street, New York; 
but shortly thereafter he eluded the detectives and disappeared. 

Other investigations by the owners and the police proved abortive; 
the disaster was left unexplained as yet another mystery of the war. 
The insurance companies paid out several million dollars in claims, 
and the owners had to bear the rest of the loss. 

The years rolled by, and it was not until after 1922, when the Mixed 
Claims Commission was formed and the owners of Kingsland filed 
a claim against Germany for recovery, that the mystery of the fire 
was largely dispelled. The American investigators finally produced 
the evidence which they believe proves conclusively that Hinsch pro- 
cured the services of Wozniak, and that Wozniak, acting under in- 
structions of Herrmann, fired Kingsland, either by the use of in- 
cendiary pencils or rags saturated with phosphorus dissolved in some 
solvent. On the other hand, the Germans claim it was an industrial 

Chapter XI 

Entering on the last phase of the neutrality period, we must turn once 
again to Count von Bernstorff and his Commercial Attache, Dr. Albert. 

While the agents directed by Boy-Ed and von Papen, along v^ith 
their free-lance colleagues, were destroying ships, dynamiting rail- 
ways, burning and blowing up factories, Dr. Albert was careful to 
keep his hands clean of blood and powder. However, his accounts bear 
absolute proof that he was involved in this campaign of destruction. 
Not only did he act as paymaster to the two Attaches and insist on 
their getting his authorization for all expenditures in excess of $10,000 
from the funds supplied by him, but he also paid large sums to such 
known sabotage agents as Albert Kaltschmidt. Furthermore, there is 
the evidence contained in his correspondence and in his reports. 

On April 20, 1915, he addressed the following communication to 
the German State Secretary of the Interior, Berlin: 

As is known to your Excellency, I have been supporting the authorized 
military agent, Herr von Papen, in his work on the question of munitions. 
In reply to our last proposal sent by telegraph (Cable No. 479) authorization 
came to proceed along the line of a prevention or restriction of the export 
of munitions from the United States to our enemies. The authorization is 
worded: "Fully agree with your proposal," and was interpreted by us to the 
effect that not only contracts for the purpose of tying up [munitions] in the 
narrower sense were to be concluded, but that all other measures necessary 
for the accomplishment of the purpose aimed at were to be taken. In regard 
to the latter I have . . . undertaken a number of steps, an account of which 
in writing I must decline [to give] for obvious reasons. 

Ten months later he wrote to the State Secretary of the Interior 
as follows: 



... In the question of the exportation of war materials, efforts at enlighten- 
ment were introduced in organized fashion under my direction, the effects 
of which are still felt, and which have contributed not unessentially to the 
feeling in Congress favorable to our interpretation — 

...Alongside of that the cooperation in the work of preventing and 
delaying the deliveries of munitions and explosive materials was from the 
outset an especial role. I was also expressly requested to cooperate in this 
because the Consulate General in default of diplomatic prerogative [did not 
dare to] 

... In any case I undertook and attempted to accomplish all these tasks . . . 
as I beg to be permitted to state once more, only at the express request of 
the Ambassador or his Attaches and fellow laborers . . . although I was natu- 
rally restricted in the employment of assistance by the confidential nature 
of the business, and at times my health and strength seemed to be paralyzed. 

... I devoted myself to the accomplishment of the tasks for which I was, 
in consequence of this, besought — I have never intruded myself into a single 
one — with the feeling that in war times every official must hold himself 
ready for every necessary work. 

In a letter dated July 21, 1915, from Dr. Albert to his wife, he said: 
"On the other hand Ruge and Lubbert probably underestimate what 
I am doing here, for merely the results of my collaboration with 
Herr v. P. in the field known to you, are hard to value." 

And then in a letter to his wife dated October 3, 1915, he further 
added: "I prefer not to say anything in detail about what I am doing 
here. Mr. v. P.'s experience is a warning against carelessness." 

Finally, in an undated letter from the Hotel St. Francis, San Fran- 
cisco, he wrote to von Papen, just before the Captain's departure in 
December, 1915: "Give my best wishes to Mr. Scheuch and tell him 
that the struggle on the American front is sometimes very hard. . . . 
I shall feel your departure most keenly! Our work together was ex- 
cellent, and was always a great pleasure to me." 

Not satisfied with this carefully hidden support of Boy-Ed, von 
Papen, and von Igel in their campaign of destruction, Dr. Albert also 
engaged in direct activities of his own to prevent American munitions 
and supplies reaching the Allies. But in this the smooth and shrewd 
financial expert took care to confine himself to business ventures. 

Well informed by trade investigators, by secret agents, and by the 


various financial and trade reports issued by American institutions, he 
had expert information on the rates of production and on the stocks 
on hand of those products that were urgently required by the Allies. 
He was not one to be caught in any wild and impossible scheme 
such as an attempt to buy up the entire munitions supply in the 
country; instead, he concentrated on every known device to tie up 
Allied contracts, and also on the purchase of vital products, the 
supply of which was limited. Thus we find him buying up fifty tons 
of liquid chlorine monthly, an amount sufficient seriously to embarrass 
the Allies, who had only one small chlorine factory in France and an 
even smaller one in England. Carbolic acid was another much needed 
product, stocks of which he diverted away from the Allies by the out- 
lay of a relatively small sum. But it was in tying up Allied contracts 
that he showed his greatest ingenuity. And the creation of the Bridge- 
port Projectile Company was perhaps the most ambitious of all his 
various schemes. 

On March 31, 1915, the Company was incorporated with funds 
secretly supplied by Albert. So well, however, was the German con- 
nection concealed that for a long time there was an impression in 
industrial circles that the British were backing the corporation. Build- 
ings and workshops were quickly erected, the necessary plant and 
machinery for the production of munitions on a large scale were 
ordered, and everything was set for deliveries to commence on Sep- 
tember I, 1915. 

The objects of the company were: (i) to tie up the output of 
machinery and tool manufacturers for several months to come with 
contracts, and yet word the cancellation clauses in such a way that 
acceptance could be delayed; (2) to hold up supplies for the Allies 
by accepting munitions contracts with such provisions in the agree- 
ments that no penalty would ensue if the contracts could not be ful- 
filled; (3) to pay abnormally high wages and thus unsettle labor, 
especially at the neighboring Union Metallic Cartridge Company in 
Bridgeport, which had large Allied contracts; and (4) to tie up pow- 
der supplies at certain factories by forward purchases over a long 
period of time, the orders ultimately to be cancelled or the powder 
to be sold to neutral countries. 


But the whole plan was wrecked when the United States Govern- 
ment became suspicious of Dr. Albert's activities and assigned Secret 
Service operatives to watch him. On the afternoon of July 24, as he 
was riding uptown on the Sixth Avenue Elevated from the Hamburg- 
American Line offices, he fell asleep. He suddenly awoke to find his 
train stopped in the Fiftieth Street Station, his destination. In his 
hurry to get off he forgot his brief case and was on the platform be- 
fore he noticed his loss. He rushed back into the train, only to be told 
that a young man had picked it up and left the car. He then hurried 
down from the station just in time to see the thief and the bag dis- 
appearing rapidly on an open street car. Because of this little episode 
Dr. Albert was known for many years as the "Minister without 

At the time it was thought that an Allied agent had taken the bag, 
but in reality Mr. Frank Burke of the United States Secret Service was 
the culprit. The papers were turned over to Secretary of the Treasury 
McAdoo, who discovered that contained in them were data on many 
of Germany's secret activities relating to propaganda and the tying 
up of key munitions materials. To Mr. McAdoo's regret they dis- 
closed nothing criminal in the Doctor's activities. 

The Government could not, of course, admit that one of its agents 
had stolen them; but Mr. McAdoo was anxious to expose the secret 
work of the Germans. He therefore turned the documents over to the 
New York World under a pledge of secrecy as to their origin. 

To the Doctor's mortification he soon began to see many of his 
cleverest schemes plastered over the front page — among them the 
whole story of the Bridgeport Projectile Company. The publicity was 
naturally fatal. (At a later date when the British seized von Papen's 
papers at Falmouth, they found further evidence relating to the 
Bridgeport Projectile Company which fully supported this exposure 
by the World.) 

In the face of all this evidence. Dr. Albert brazenly published the 
usual denial. His opinion of the American public and how it should 
be handled can be judged from an extract from a letter to his wife 
which was intercepted by the British: 


. . . Uncle Sam, a great, strong lout suffering from shrivelling of the brain, 
to whom you ought to talk in high language about fine principles and 
then deny everything, especially if you are in the wrong. 

In another letter, on September 25, 1915, he is no less frank when 
v^riting to his wife relative to one of von Papen's letters which the 
British had seized and transmitted to Washington: 

The effect after his letter had been intercepted has been quite devastat- 
ing. Still, I do not believe they will demand his recall, as in the case of 
Dumba, although the idiotic Yankees are not particularly friendly. 

In the field of propaganda Dr. Albert's role was no less active. 
This work he carried out on a big scale, not only through inspired 
articles in certain sections of the Press and through subsidized news- 
papers such as the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung and The Fatherland, 
but also through lecturers and even specially created film companies, 
such as the "Central Powers Film Company." 

The chief effect of this propaganda was to inflame the minds of 
German-Americans, and some of them attempted acts of violence 
without any direction from the German sabotage directors. A tragic 
example was the case of Eric Meunta, a professor of German at 
Columbia University. He decided on his own initiative to strike a 
blow for the Fatherland. On July 2, 1915, he planted a bomb in the 
Capitol Building in Washington and escaped without detection. The 
bomb exploded without doing any damage beyond breaking a few 
windows and tearing down some plaster. The next day he invaded 
the summer home of J. P. Morgan at Glen Cove, Long Island, and 
announced that he intended to hold his family as hostages until 
Morgan pledged that he would stop, or help stop, the shipment of 
supplies and munitions to the Allied Governments. In the scuffle that 
ensued, Meunta drew a pistol and fired, inflicting a slight flesh wound 
on Morgan. 

When arrested Meunta gave his name as Jack Holt, but soon ad- 
mitted his real identity. He declared that he had attempted to blow 
up the Capitol because he wanted to show the American people how 
dangerous dynamite is. He also maintained that if the United States 


Stopped sending munitions to the Allies, Germany would win the 
war and peace would be restored. 

But the expenditure of sums for propaganda, commercial ventures, 
and sabotage, vast as these enterprises were, was only a fraction of Dr. 
Albert's huge financial transactions. There must be added the German 
loans he floated, and the $500,000,000 worth of German securities he 

How at least part of the money raised in America was spent on 
sabotage can be gathered from the random records which came into 
the hands of the American authorities. One of these, a letter on the 
letterhead of the Imperial German Embassy at Washington, D. C., 
dated May 5, 1915, and signed by Count von Bernstorff, addressed to 
"His Excellency High Privy Councilor Albert," reads in part as 

I beg to place at the disposal of Captain von Papen out of the loan funds 
three credits, to wit: 

1. One in the amount up to $300,000 

2. One in the amount up to $60,000 

3. One in the approximate amount of $600 monthly 

This and many other of the Albert records were obtained after the 
entry of the United States into the war. Von Bernstorff and the other 
members of his staff destroyed all incriminating documents before they 
sailed, but Dr. Albert handed his files over to a neutral consulate in 
New York for safe keeping. Department of Justice agents learned, 
however, of their existence; and the information that they were stored 
in a wall closet proved too great a temptation. Renting an adjoining 
office, they broke through the rear wall of the closet, removed the 
documents, and restored the plaster. It was not until months after, when 
the consular seal on the closet door was broken, that the amazed neutral 
consul discovered an empty closet. The Government, of course, had no 
legal right to indulge in this polite filching. It has become a convention 
in referring to any of Dr. Albert's documents to imply that they came 
from the stolen brief case. A glance at the thousands of these docu- 
ments in the files of the Department of Justice would convince even the 
Doctor's bitterest detractor that he must have been a veritable Hercules 

Bro'iin Brothers 

Lothar Witzke 

Kurt Jahnke 

The Most Deadly Sabotage Team in History 

Colonel Walter Nicolai, Head of the 
German Secret Service. 

Keystone Studios 

Captain Rudolf Nadolny, of the 
German Secret Service. 

The Master Minds of the Sabotage Campaign 


to have carried around a brief case of a capacity adequate to contain 
them all. 

Behind the activities of the Attaches stood hidden their commander 
in chief, Count von Bernstorff. All the coded telegrams that passed 
between Berlin and its agents in the United States v^ent through his 
hands. The follow^ing report of von Bernstorffs, v^ritten on official 
Embassy stationery and addressed to the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von 
Bethmann-HolWeg, over a year and a half after Captain von Papen left 
and less than six months before the severance of diplomatic relations, 
bears witness to how little went on that he did not know: (The 
reason for this letter was that the unpleasant publicity occasioned by 
Wolf von Igel's arrest in connection with certain sabotage work had 
evidently led to criticism from Berlin and some suggested shifts in 

Rye, New York, 
26th August, 1916. 

I have already notified your Excellency that the War Intelligence Center, 
New York, has, by the direction of the Deputy General Staff, been immedi- 
ately dissolved. Thereupon doubts arose as to whether the Bureau of the 
Military Attaches should continue to be carried on by Herr von Igel and 
Herr von Skal, as arranged on the part of Herr von Papen at his departure. 
As you are aware, the lawsuit is still pending against Herr von Igel, on 
account of his participation in the expedition against the Welland Canal. 
Since the Imperial Government has taken up in regard to this the position 
that the person of Herr von Igel, as a member of the Embassy, and papers 
found in his possession, are inviolable, it is out of the question, according to 
my respectful opinion, to announce to the American authorities his dismissal 
from the service of the Embassy. Such a step would undoubtedly very much 
weaken the point of principle on which we stand. The Government here has 
not yet answered me upon my last note on the matter. The courts are waiting 
for the decision of the State Department before they pursue the matter 
further. To all appearance the intention exists to let the case rest for the time 
being. I think it lies in our interest also not to stir the matter up again till 
further notice. 

Herr von Igel and Herr von Skal have, apart from the service for the 
Military Intelligence Service Center, carried on the various commercial 
measures introduced and partly concluded by Herr von Papen. These have 


to do, among other things, with the orders placed by the Bridgeport Pro- 
jectile Company, the Aetna Powder Company, the purchase of chlorine and 
of earthenware, with the sale of arms — stored to our account in New York 
and the State of Washington — which were intended for India, the setting up 
the Benzol, Phenol and Toluol arrangements, the discharge of various law- 
suits such as those against Koenig, Schleindl, Kienzle, Breitung, Wolpert 
and Bode, as well as the arranging of assistance for various persons and their 
famiHes involved in these lawsuits. 

In all these measures, Privy Councillor Albert has been consulted by Herr 
von Igel, as directed at the time by Herr von Papen. On important questions 
my decision was called upon also.* The carrying on of these tasks by another 
man presents particular difficulties, since, to make oneself acquainted with 
the matters, very intricate in part, consequent on the destruction of all 
compromising documents ordered by Your Excellency, is almost out of the 
question. In the event of Privy Councilor Albert's returning to Germany 
within a measurable time, there is absolutely no one else at my disposal who 
is to be trusted with the materials referred to. The various parties concerned 
would soon notice this, and come forward with claims which it would be 
impossible to check. The resultant disadvantages for the finances of the 
Empire by the sums, some of them very considerable, which would thus 
have to be taken into consideration, may easily be foreseen. 

The Labor Reference Bureau, too, for German and Austrian and Hun- 
garian subjects, who have left the present munition or other factories, has, 
up to the present, been supervised by Herr von Igel. 

The connection, moreover, in New York with the India-Irish revolution- 
aries has been maintained, since the departure of Herr von Papen, either by 
Herr von Igel or Herr von Skal. Herr von Skal keeps in touch with the 
Irish, for which, owing to his wide acquaintance in these circles, he is par- 
ticularly fitted, and he also, as before, enjoys their confidence. 

I permit myself again to remark that the authorities here have since his 
release laid no difficulties whatever in the way against his security. Even with 
the present general feeling against us prevailing in Government circles, I still 
take it as out of the question that any fresh unpleasantness will arise for the 
Imperial Embassy from the further employment of Herr von Igel, provided, 
of course, that no fresh political tension arises. 

To His Excellency, the Imperial Chancellor Herr von Bedimann-HoUweg. 

* Italics are the author's. 


Among the significant points to be noted in this letter are: The 
evidence that the work of the Bureau of the MiHtary Attaches was 
carried on in full swing under von Igel and von Skal after Captain von 
Papen's departure; the reference to the assistance given by the Imperial 
German Government to the defense of the lawsuits against Koenig, 
Schleindl, Kienzle, Breitung, Wolpert, and Bode, every one of whom 
was proved beyond question to be a German sabotage agent; the ref- 
erence to consultations between Dr. Albert and von Igel; the admission 
by Count von Bernstorff of his own intimate connection with their 
work, on which he comments in the italicized sentence above; the 
protest against interruption or change in personnel for this special 
work; the reference to the "destruction of all compromising documents 
ordered by your Excellency"; and the reference to "sale of arms — stored 
to our account in New York and the State of Washington — which were 
intended for India . . ." 

In spite of all this evidence, von Bernstorff claimed after the war in 
his book My Three Years in America, pages 108 and 109, that 

Whether the illegal acts of the secret agents sent to the United States by the 
Military authorities were committed in accordance with their orders or on 
their own initiative, I had no means of knowing at the time, nor have I 
been able to discover since my return home . . . Military cipher telegrams 
formerly addressed to the Military Attache were frequently received at the 
Embassy, but were always sent forward at once by the registry to Captain 
von Papen's office in New York, as a matter of routine, and without being 
referred to me in any way.* 

If further evidence is needed to discount the above assertion, the 
following telegram which von Bernstorff personally sent to von Papen 
in New York and which was intercepted by the American authorities 
is proof that he did read instructions sent from Berlin to the Military 

Washington, D. C, March 24, 1915. 

Captain von Papen, 112 Central Park South, New York City. Berlin wire- 
less arrived today colon fully agreeing with your proposition. 


* By courtesy of Charles Scribner*s Sons. 


The meaning of this telegram is disclosed by the following extract 
from a report by Dr. Albert to the State Secretary of the Interior in 
Berlin, dated April 20, 1915, which has already been quoted more 

. . . Fully agree with your proposal and was interpreted by us to the effect 
that not only contracts for the purpose of tying up munitions in the narrower 
sense were to be concluded, but that all other measures necessary for the 
accomplishment of the purpose aimed at were to be taken. 

Reference to the second report of Dr. Albert's to the State Secretary 
of the Interior, written ten months after this one, and also previously 
quoted, will show that he assisted in carrying out the above program 
"only at express request of the Ambassador or his Attaches and fellow 

If von Bernstorff was careful to delegate to his Attaches actual contact 
with sabotage agents, and thus avoid compromising himself, he himself 
took direct charge in the political field and in propaganda. 

In Washington his efforts to promote a legislative embargo on the 
shipment of arms and munitions to the Allies was ceaseless. When 
argument failed, he used more direct methods, as is evidenced by the 
following telegram to Berlin: 

15th Dec, 1914. From Washington to Berlin. 

In the Congress and House of Representatives the Hitchcock and Volmer 
resolutions respecting the export prohibition of arms, ammunition, etc., are 
under consideration. A strong agitation is being developed by the Germans 
and Irish with a view to carrying these resolutions. In view of the great 
importance of the matter, I considered myself authorized to assist the agita- 
tion financially and so I gave as a provisional measure the five thousand 
dollars for which I was asked by a trustworthy quarter. 

(signed) Bernstorfl 

He particularly brought pressure to bear on those Senators and 
Congressmen who represented sections of the country where there was 
a large German-American vote, and in this he was specially aided by 
the National German-American Alliance, an organization which com- 
prised some 3,000,000 members and constituted a great majority of the 


adult German-American population. Apart from its influence as a 
solid voting block, it had a powerful lobby in Washington. It was also 
amply supplied with funds by Dr. Albert, besides having approximately 
$800,000 which it had collected for the German Red Cross but spent 
mostly on propaganda. How much von Bernstorff relied on the Alliance 
can be gathered from the following cable which he sent to Berlin on 
January 22, 1917: 

I request authority to pay up to fifty thousand dollars in order, as on 
former occasions, to influence Congress through the organization you know 
of, which perhaps can prevent war. I am beginning in the meantime to act 
accordingly. In the above circumstance a public official German declaration 
in favor of Ireland is highly desirable in order to gain the support of Irish 
influence here. 

In addition to his illicit activities in the United States, von Bernstorff 
also acted as a clearing house for German agents in South America and 
the Orient. Once again it was the cables between Berlin and Washing- 
ton, intercepted and decoded by the British, which betrayed him. Of 
these cables the following are chosen at random. 

On September 6, 1914, Zimmermann sent the following message to 
von Bernstorff for transmission to Military Attache Maltzan in Peking: 

The destruction of a suitable section of Siberian Railway to interfere with 
Russian and Japanese communications is extremely desirable. The destruction 
of the line could most easily be carried out from China. 

On December 11, 1914, von Bernstorff cabled Berlin: 

Almost fifty million dollars of war material bought by Russia on way to 
Vladivostok. I have notified Peking in order that the destruction of the 
railway may be attempted immediately. 

We have already described how Boy-Ed recruited many spies in the 
United States and sent them over to Europe to work against the Allies. 
At least on one occasion von Bernstorff also took an active hand in the 
European field. The occasion for this was the visit to the United States 
in 191 6 of Paul Bolo, the French defeatist agitator. The Ambassador 


advanced him $1,700,000, which enabled him to buy a string of news- 
papers on his return home and to carry on his treasonable propaganda 
for a French surrender. Bolo was caught and shot, but his plans nearly 
succeeded. Several prominent French Cabinet Ministers also were 
involved in this attempt to induce France to make a separate peace. 

The following two coded telegrams which passed between von Bern- 
storff and von Jagow, the German Foreign Minister, reveal the part the 
former played: 

Number 679, February 26th, 1916. 

I have received direct information from an entirely trustworthy source 
concerning a political action in one of the enemy countries which would 
bring about peace. One of the leading political personalities of the country 
in question is seeking a loan of $1,700,000 in New York, for which security 
will be given. I was forbidden to give his name in writing. The affair seems 
to me to be of the greatest possible importance. Can the money be provided 
at once in New York? That the intermediary will keep the matter secret is 
entirely certain. Request answer by telegram. A verbal report will follow 
as soon as a trustworthy person can be found to bring it to Germany. 


On February 29, 1916, von Jagow replied to von Bernstorfl: 

Answer to Telegram No. 679: 

Agree to the loan but only if peace action seems to you a really serious 
project, as the provision of money in New York is for us at present extraor- 
dinarily difficult. If the enemy country is Russia have nothing to do with 
the business, and the sum of money is too small to have any serious effect 
in that country. So too in the case of Italy, for it would not be worth while 
to spend so much. 


If we add to these foreign activities the events we have already de- 
scribed in previous chapters — Germany's vast sabotage and propaganda 
campaign in the United States; her attempts to foment rebellion in 
India, the West Indies, Mexico, and Ireland; her endeavors to stir up 
strikes among the ranks of American labor; and the attempts to in- 
fluence legislation in Washington — we will realize the magnitude and 
intricacy of the machine which von Bernstorff directed. 


But the cumulative effect of the whole German policy, whether 
justified or not, could only be fatal to relations between the two gov- 
ernments. Under the suasion of an innate pro-British and pro-French 
bias and the subtle pressure of Allied propaganda, the President and the 
people had been growing steadily more antagonistic to German conduct 
of the war. The unrestricted submarine warfare in particular had led 
to the strongest kind of diplomatic protest. This protest had led to the 
temporary cancellation of the campaign. But the President had warned 
Germany that any renewal of it would lead to rupture. When the Ger- 
mans announced their determination to resume it on February i, 1917, 
von Bernstorff and his staff were handed their passports. 

The actual declaration of war was held back pending the commission 
of an overt act by a submarine, but even the most optimistic knew the 
sands were running out. 

The sinking of American ships and the loss of American lives were 
not long in coming. Finally, on April 2, the President went before 
Congress and asked that a state of war be declared to exist between 
the Imperial German Government and that of the United States. Just 
four days later the die was cast. 

While sabotage was not the main issue, we need only refer to Presi- 
dent Wilson's War Message to Congress to prove it was a factor. In the 
course of it he said: 

. . . One of the things that have served to convince us that the Prussian 
autocracy was not and could never be our friend, is that from the very 
outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities and 
even our offices of Government with spies and set criminal intrigues every- 
where afoot against our national unity and counsel, our peace within and 
without, our industries and our commerce. 

Indeed, it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began; 
and it is unhappily not a matter of conjecture, but a fact proved in our courts 
of justice, that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near 
to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have 
been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under the 
personal direction of official agents of the Imperial Government accredited 
to the Government of the United States 


Again in his Flag Day address on June 14, 1917, he repeated this 

The extraordinary insults and aggressions o£ the Imperial German Govern- 
ment left us no self-respecting choice but to take up arms 

The military masters of Germany . . . filled our unsuspecting communities 
with vicious spies and conspirators . . . and some of these agents were con- 
nected with the official Embassy of the German Government itself here in 
our own capital. 

They sought by violence to destroy our industries and arrest our com- 
merce. . . . 

The Government of the United States had kept vi^ithin the letter of 
international law even if it had favored the Allies and had been an 
invaluable adjunct in supplying them with the sinews of war. Even 
Count von Bernstorff admits this, for on pages 71 and 72 of his book, 
My Three Years in America, he states: 

Our position with regard to this question was very unfavorable as we had 
no legal basis for complaint. The clause of the Hague Convention which 
permitted such traffic had been included in the second Hague Convention 

at our own suggestion The President's administration . . . took up the 

strict legal standpoint that the traffic in munitions was permissible and that 
it would therefore be a breach of neutrality in our favor if such traffic were 
forbidden after the outbreak of hostiHties. President Wilson himself even 
had an idea of nationalizing the munition factories which would have ren- 
dered traffic with the combatant powers a breach of international law. When, 
however, he sounded Congress on this matter it became evident that a 
majority could not be obtained for such a step.* 

The vi^isdom of allowing ourselves to become the supply base for one 
side and of financing the munitions purchases of that side to an extent 
which would render its victory almost an economic necessity, may well 
be questioned. Indeed, the neutrality legislation of the last several years 
would seem to indicate a growing realization of the dangers of such 
a shortsighted grasping for immediate profits at the risk of ultimate 
military involvement. 

* By courtesy of Charles Scribner's Sons. 


But in all fairness to von Bernstorff we must give him credit for 
exercising diplomatic skill and discernment of a high order. In spite of 
the compromising of several members of his diplomatic staff and the 
arrest of several of his sabotage agents, he had alv^ays managed to avoid 
an open breach with our government. If it had not been for the un- 
restricted submarine campaign, it seems highly probable that he could 
have walked the diplomatic tightrope indefinitely and prevented Amer- 
ican sympathy for the Allies from ever finding an incident sufficiently 
inflammatory to bring about our military intervention. 

It must also be said that von Bernstorff appreciated fully the Amer- 
ican predisposition to judge the German policies more harshly than 
those of the Allies and to accept the Allied view of things. Nor was he 
deluded, as were the military leaders of his government, concerning 
the overwhelming forces the country would throw into the struggle 
if once she came in. Repeatedly he warned the Foreign Office that the 
submarine campaign meant war and that war meant defeat, in spite 
of the optimism of the naval command over the decisive role they 
believed the submarine would play. All Chancellor von Bethmann- 
HoUweg and he could do, however, was not enough. The admirals 
convinced the generals, and both together convinced the Kaiser. The 
fatal decision was made on January 9, and just under three months later 
we were in the war. 

The homeward trip of von Bernstorff and his staff must have been a 
time of sad reflection for the Ambassador. As he stared out over the 
endless North Atlantic rollers, bitter realizations must have compan- 
ioned him, realizations of how pitifully small a percentage of the muni- 
tions output all the sabotage had diverted from its destination and how 
infinitesimal it would appear in contrast to the vast stream of men and 
supplies he knew would soon be pouring over that same ocean. 

Chapter XII 

No sooner did it become known that diplomatic relations had been 
broken off between the United States and Germany than there was a 
rapid exodus of German agents across the border into Mexico. Among 
these were Witzke, Jahnke, Dilger, Herrmann, Gerdts, and later 
Hinsch. So general and so immediate was this flight that it was evident 
it was carried out according to a preconceived plan. This shift to Mexico 
was not prompted out of concern for the safety of the German agents, 
for some of them returned. The sabotage objectives in the United States 
remained the same, and there was now the added necessity of securing 
information about the United States Army and Navy. The flight was 
dictated purely by the necessity of establishing fresh contact machinery 
with headquarters in Germany. With the departure of von Bernstorff, 
the duty of acting as clearing house for German agents throughout the 
North American continent was transferred to von Eckhardt, the 
German Minister to Mexico. Not only did he have means of receiving 
and transmitting coded messages by wireless, but he also had ample 
funds at his disposal to finance espionage. 

If the declaration of war between the United States and Germany 
had wrought a sudden change in the German spy and sabotage or- 
ganization, it caused an even greater change on the American side. It 
brought to life the American Military Intelligence Service under the 
direction of Colonel Ralph H. van Deman, and with it an effective 
counter-espionage organization. 

Colonel van Deman was not new to Intelligence work. He had ac- 
quired considerable experience in this branch of the service during the 
Spanish-American War, and in 1901 had organized in the Philippines 
the Military Information Division, which had covered the Islands with 

a network of secret agents. He was also a General Staff expert on the 



Far East, and probably knew more than any American officer of 
Japanese activities throughout the world, especially in the Philippines, 
Hawaii, and Samoa. The year 1915 found him in Washington, D. C, as 
a major in charge of the Intelligence Service of the United States Army. 
He, together with Major Alexander B. Coxe, and a clerk, made up the 
entire personnel. Appropriations voted in 1916 for Military Intelligence 
in the United States Army totaled only $11,000, and they included all 
expenses incurred by military attaches as well. 

All this was changed as soon as America came into the war. The 
need of a large and efficient Military Intelligence Service was imme- 
diately recognized. Colonel Dansey, in charge of the Military Section of 
the British Secret Service, was sent over to the United States by the 
British War Office; and all the secret service experience of the British 
was placed at Colonel van Deman's disposal. To this were added large 
funds and carte blanche in selecting an extensive personnel. 

In addition, almost over night, the American Protective League was 
created and placed under the direction of the Department of Justice. 
Under the able leadership of Mr. A. M. Briggs, of Chicago, a volunteer 
body of 250,000 patriotic Americans was enrolled throughout the United 
States, each member of which kept watch in his particular area. The 
duties of these volunteers were varied, ranging from keeping watch on 
I.W.W. agitators to running down draft evaders; but their chief duty 
was to guard against German spies and sabotage agents. The United 
States was now doing what it should have done in 1914. 

As a final act German agents are presumed to have blown up the 
munitions plant at Eddystone, Pennsylvania, on April 10, 1917, killing 
112 workers, most of whom were women and girls. There was also an 
attempt to dynamite the Elephant-Butte Dam on the Rio Grande, but 
the agent. Dr. Louis Kopf, was caught. After this the Germans turned 
their attention chiefly to spy activities directed against the American 
Army and Navy, and to fomenting strikes. 

Later we shall tell how the German spy and sabotage machine was 
reorganized in Mexico; we shall then meet again many of those agents 
who had carried out Germany's vast destruction campaign in the 
United States, and who had succeeded so effectively in evading the 
American law enforcement agencies during the neutrality period. Here, 


for the time being, we shall confine ourselves largely to one of them, 
Lothar Witzke,* who attempted to cross back into the United States 
and was caught. He is worthy of our attention not only because he was 
the only German spy who was condemned to death in the United 
States during the war, but also because he played a very important part 
in the destruction of both Black Tom and Kingsland. 

To understand the events which led up to Witzke's arrest, it is nec- 
essary to introduce three secret agents who are intimately connected 
with the story. 

The first of these, Paul Bernardo Altendorf, was an Austrian Pole 
born in Cracow on June i, 1875. In this city he studied medicine and 
surgery at the University of Cracow. Of a roving disposition, he traveled 
extensively in South America and throughout several of the British 
colonies, and finally settled in Mexico. There he secured an appointment 
on the staff of General Calles, Military Governor of Sonora, with the 
rank of Colonel in the Mexican Army. He was an accomplished 
linguist, speaking English, Spanish, German, and Polish fluently. In 
addition to this he was a soldier of fortune; and, like those of many 
non-German subjects of the Dual Monarchy, his sympathies were not 
with Germany. It is not surprising, therefore, that in October 191 7 we 
find him enrolled as an American Intelligence Agent by Byron S. 
Butcher, Special Agent of the United States Military Intelligence Divi- 
sion at Nogales, Arizona. The Intelligence Division quickly realized 
his special qualifications and sent him to Mexico City to report on 
German spy activities. Having already previously made contacts with 
several German agents in Mexico, Altendorf skillfully used these con- 
nections and got himself enrolled in the German Secret Service. 

Cooperating with him was the British Negro agent, William Gleaves. 
Though born a British subject in Montreal, Canada, in 1870, he had 
spent his boyhood in Pennsylvania as a laborer and in 1893 ^^^ gone to 
live in Mexico City. During the war he was first employed by Mr. 
Cummings, British Charge d' Affaires in Mexico, and later by Major 

* Lothar Witzke was a man of many aliases. In addition sometimes to spelling 
his name as Witke or Witcke he also passed under the names of Harry Waber- 
ski, Wabrechty, Cape witcke, Hugo Olson, Pablo Davis, Otto, Robert, Nachel A., 
and finally Pablo Waberski. 


Alfred Mason of the British Naval Intelligence Service for the purpose 
of obtaining information regarding German activities in Mexico. He, 
too, w^as successful in getting himself taken into the German Secret 

The last one, William Neunhofifcr, was born in Texas of German 
parentage. He studied hw, and in May 1916 wt find him, tv^enty-eight 
years of age, practicing as a lav^^yer in San Antonio, Texas. At this 
time the National Guard was mobilized; and, being a member, he was 
sent to the Mexican border. Here his command of the German and 
Spanish languages attracted the attention of R. L. Barnes, Agent in 
Charge of the Department of Justice Investigation Unit in Texas; and he 
was enrolled as an agent. In June 1917, he was instructed to proceed to 
Mexico City to investigate the activities of German agents in Mexico. 
Posing as a "slacker" who had evaded the draft and frequenting the 
better-known places of rendezvous for German agents in Mexico City, 
he soon won their confidence. So loud-mouthed was he in defaming 
everything American that he was constantly denounced to Major 
Campbell, the American Military Attache in Mexico City. Reports that 
Neunhoffer had been seen in contact with von Eckhardt, the German 
Minister, and Kurt Jahnke, then one of the chiefs of Germany's spy 
organization in Mexico, caused the Military Attache immense satis- 
faction, for that was exactly what he wanted. After the war, to their 
great discomfiture and surprise, Neunhoffer also appeared as a Federal 
witness against many a draft evader who had fled to Mexico and there 
had made him a confidant. 

In Mexico City the three ostensible German agents constantly met 
each other in the company of other German agents, and it was not 
until the final denouement that they learned to their amazement that 
each of them had been playing the same game. 

One of the first German agents Altendorf, Gleaves, and Neunhoffer 
encountered was Jahnke. He was introduced to them by Otto Paglash, 
a trusted German agent, and proprietor of the Hotel Juarez in Mexico 

On Jahnke's instructions, Gleaves enrolled himself as a member of 
the I.W.W., which at that time was working in close cooperation with 
the Germans. So ardent a disciple did he show himself that soon he 


was admitted to the inner councils. When he had thus firmly estab- 
lished himself with the I.W.W. the Germans quickly put him to work. 
To quote Gleaves: 

I was assigned first to the duty of going up to the border where the 
American troops were stationed and I was to try to work up a revolt among 
some of the American soldiers. For this purpose I was supplied with money 
by the German Consul whose office was at Calle Lopez. He gave me about 
$1500 which I was to use for expenses and also among the American troops. 
I went from Mexico City to Juarez and crossed the border at El Paso and 
and stayed in El Paso a week or two. Before going, I reported to Mr. Cum- 
mings all about what I had been assigned to do. I was reporting regularly to 
Mr. Cummings and Major Mason. 

After I returned to Mexico City, I reported to the German Consul that I 
had made some progress and thought that I would accomplish something 
through some of the American soldiers and sergeants that I had been in 
touch with, but I said that I would need some help on another trip. I stayed 
around Mexico City quite a long time after that. The German authorities 
told me that I had better wait awhile and that they would send somebody 
else with me who was familiar with things in the United States. 

In the meanwhile Witzke had been active and had made several trips 
across the border into the United States. Early in January 1918 he was 
ready to depart again on a special mission. Here was Jahnke's oppor- 
tunity to provide the help Gleaves had asked for; therefore Gleaves was 
instructed to accompany him. And since Altendorf was now well in 
the confidence of Jahnke, and the latter wanted him to introduce 
Witzke to General Calles in Sonora, he too was ordered to join the 

On January 16, 191 8, Witzke (traveling under the name of Pablo 
Waberski), Altendorf, and Gleaves left Mexico City for Manzanilla to 
catch the S.S. Josefina for Mazatlan, thence to proceed by rail to 
Nogales, Sonora. At Colima they discovered that they had missed their 
train connection. Fortunately, Witzke was well enough provided with 
money to hire an engine and tender; otherwise they would have missed 
their boat. Boarding the engine a few miles out of Colima to avoid 
being seen, they arrived in time at Manzanilla to catch the steamer. 
During this part of the trip Witzke started drinking, and growing 


confidential, boasted to Altendorf both of past exploits and of his pres- 
ent secret mission. These admissions have such an important bearing 
on the Black Tom case that it is as well to quote Byron S. Butcher, to 
whom Altendorf (American Operative A-i) subsequently made his 

"There is something terrible going to happen on the other side of the bor- 
der when I get there and I can't tell you what it is," Waberski advised A-i. "If 
I get the job done well, I will have saved Germany and after I return from 
the United States you will see it in the papers, but you must never mention 
it to anyone. You will know that it was my work." 

He also advised A-i to tell any inquirers that they were only train acquaint- 

Earlier at Guadalajara, Waberski had informed A-i that he was going to 
Nogales to kill someone and "blow up things in the United States." Efforts 
to secure more definite data failed except that A-i was led to believe that it 
was an American officer at Nogales, Arizona, booked to be assassinated, 
because the German said that this American through influence with Mexican 
officials had seriously injured German plans in Mexico. 

Waberski also informed A-i over a bottle of wine that he had blown up a 
black powder magazine of 250,000 pounds near San Francisco [Mare Island] 
one morning about five o'clock. Waberski bragged that sixteen lives had been 
lost including six children. He asserted he was working for the American 
Government as a mechanic on the Island at the time of the explosion and 
laid wires to accomplish his designs. . . . 

At A-i's exclamation that he had a lot of nerve, Waberski replied that he 
was a sworn member of the German Secret Service and that he must do the 
work "life or death " 

"I do not know whether I am coming back alive from this trip or not, as 
I may be killed," the German asserted. 

"... I also did the work in New Jersey with Yenky [ Jahnke], when the 
munition barges were blown up and piers wrecked," asserted Waberski to 
A-I. "We were out in a small boat and the waves nearly swamped us and we 
came near drowning. The hardships on this piece of work were many but 
it was all for 'The Fatherland.' The German Ambassador and Yenky 
think very highly of me for my work and I am very proud to have done it. 
I am a man they know they can depend upon," said Waberski. 

"I have many lives on my conscience and I have killed many people and 
will now kill more," added the German to A-i. 


Waberski also claimed to have caused the fires in the Oregon logging 
camps last Fall. His Alien head tax receipt shows that his destination on 
arrival at Laredo, June 5th, 1917, was Portland, Oregon. 

The Josefina docked at Mazatlan on January 24. There Witzke called 
briefly on the German Consul and then retired to a bav^dy house. This 
gave Altendorf an opportunity secretly to visit Mr. Chapman, the Amer- 
ican Consul, identify himself, and hand him a message for coding and 
telegraphic dispatch to Byron S. Butcher, at Nogales, Arizona. As sent 
by Chapman it read: 


January 26th, 10 a.m. to Butcher from A-i: I arrived from Mexico City 
last Thursday, leaving for Hermosillo on Saturday 26th with two German 
spies, one A. Nuding.* 

Both are plotting assassination some officials in Nogales, where they are to 
arrive next Monday, catch Nuding if possible. Use care as he is dangerous. I 
will be in Hermosillo one day. Would you not have Joe Bru meet me at 
Cohen Hotel there at once. Got news for you. Unquote. I have corroborated 
evidence as to danger of Nuding. 


From Mazatlan Witzke, Cleaves, and Altendorf took a train to 
Hermosillo via Guaymas. After the train left Guaymas, Witzke v^alked 
through the coaches and on his return told Altendorf, "I have gotten 
rid of over one hundred dollars. I have six men going north with me. 
The v7ork is moving splendidly." One of these men v^as later identi- 
fied by Cleaves as Dietz, a German agent, w^ho intended crossing 
the border to the Nev^ Mexico coal fields, v^here the Germans had a 
large follov^ing among miners who belonged to the I.W.W. 

On their arrival in Hermosillo, Altendorf accompanied Witzke to 
call on General Calles. Witzke instructed Altendorf just to introduce 
him, as Calles would know who he was. According to Altendorf, it 
was evident from the conversation which took place between Witzke 
and Calles that the General had been informed in some manner of 

* The name "Nuding" in this message was garbled, and was probably in- 
tended for some other name. 


Witzke's proposed trip to Sonora. Witzke asked Calles to protect him 
against American agents in Sonora and requested him to forward to 
the German Legation in Mexico City, over his private telegraph line, 
any coded telegrams he sent to him from the United States or else- 
v^here. Calles, like President Carranza and the whole Mexican Govern- 
ment, was pro-German and agreed to do this. At Witzke's request, 
Calles further supplied him with a revolver and a permit to carry it in 

Having introduced him to Calles, Altendorf s mission was com- 
pleted in the eyes of Witzke, and therefore Altendorf took leave of 
him. Here we must allow Byron S. Butcher, to take up the story: 

Waberski and Cleaves left Hermosillo, January 30th, on the regular 
passenger train for the border, while A-i remained behind in order not to 
arouse suspicion. A-i left Hermosillo the same night, however, by freight 
arriving at Nogales, Sonora, the following night. 

In the meantime, an informant, who will be called M-2, was located in 
the Central Hotel, Nogales, Sonora, as the most likely place where the Ger- 
man would stop. M-2 located Waberski the night of his arrival and remained 
with him until his arrest. 

I found Waberski at the American Consulate, Nogales, Sonora, the follow- 
ing morning. He told a story of having to come to the border to answer his 
questionnaire and probably to go to San Francisco. Even though his story 
was unlikely, his passport was worse, being the Russian type, always re- 
garded with suspicion. Consul Lawton and I agreed to cross the German 
across the border. Waberski had his passport "passed" at the U. S. Immigra- 
tion Office without question He returned to Mexico and made two trips 

across the border during the day. In view of the fact that he left his baggage 
on the Mexican side, I did not molest him, awaiting the opportunity to 
secure his baggage and him together. 

After two days on the road from Hermosillo, by freight, A-i presented 
himself at the American Consulate on the night of January 31st, was crossed 
to the American side of the border and quartered with me. 

He then oudined his trip to Sonora with Waberski as set forth in the 
foregoing. He added that the German always carried his papers on his person. 

As M-2 had reported that Waberski expected to cross over to the American 
side the following morning to do some banking business, S-2 was properly 
instructed, an auto was secured and after an hour's wait Waberski appeared. 


He had two revolvers shoved against him by S-2 and the writer, was hand- 
cuffed and taken to camp and searched. 

On his person was found approximately $i,ooo in American cur- 
rency and Mexican gold. The gold was in a money belt, and the 
currency was tied in handkerchiefs bound around the calves of his 

He had a Russian passport, Number 435, issued in Mexico City to 
"Paul Waberski, 22 years of age, mechanic and automobile engineer, 
resident of New York City and San Francisco for the last seventeen 
years, returning to the United States." The passport was "seen," 
Number 630, by the American Vice Consul in Mexico City and 
stamped December 10, 1917. It was "passed" by the U. S. Immigration 
Office, Nogales, Arizona, January 31, 1918. 

In the "Declaration of Alien about to Depart for the United States" 
Waberski declared he was born in Winski, Dziatozin, Russia, May 5, 
1895, and had lived in San Francisco from January 1905 to November 
1917, and in Mexico City from November 1917 to the date of the 
passport. References given included the name of Wladimir Wend- 
hausen, Russian Consul General at Mexico City. 

Witzke also had a Mexican passport. Number 396, issued at Laredo, 
Texas, on November 15, 1917, in the name of Pablo Waberski, Rus- 
sian, age 22, en route to Mexico. Opposite the heading, "Estado," he 
was described as a bachelor; and opposite "persons who accompany 
him," there appeared the notation: "He is accompanied by his wife." 
This certainly speaks highly for the efficiency, or perhaps the sense 
of humor, of the Mexican passport officials. 

He also had in his possession a "Selective Draft" registration cer- 
tificate No. C. H. 171, issued at Precinct 1/21, San Francisco, Cali- 
fornia, June 9, 1917; a "Certificate of Service to Able Seaman" issued 
in San Francisco, June 27, 19 17, to Pablo Waberski, for service on the 
high seas and inland waters; a motor-car operator's license Number 
332987, San Francisco, issued to Paul Waberski, on October 17, 1917; 
and an official permission from the Presidente Municipal of Hermo- 
sillo, Sonora, dated January 29, 1918, authorizing Pablo Waberski to 
carry a pistol. 


There was also a memorandum book showing traveHng expenses 
from Mexico City to Nogales, the names and addresses of several girls 
in towns along the way, an amorous letter addressed to one of his 
conquests in Berkeley, California, and several snapshots of other mem- 
bers of his harem. 

The biggest find, however, was still to come. That afternoon. Cap- 
tain Joel A. Lipscomb, Army Intelligence Officer, and his assistant, 
Byron S. Butcher, crossed the border into Nogales, Sonora. They pro- 
ceeded to the Central Hotel where by a little bluffing and greasing of 
palms they managed to take possession of Witzke's baggage. In it, 
along with his personal effects, was found a letter in code, and a cipher 
table of words and phrases for sending telegrams. 

Captain Lipscomb's satisfaction at finding this cipher table was 
short-lived. A comparison of it with the coded letter revealed, to his 
disappointment, that there was no connection. The coded letter, there- 
fore, was sent to Colonel van Deman in Washington, D. C, for expert 
examination by the Cryptographic Bureau, then directed by Captain 

In the meantime Cleaves was completely at sea. He had lost track 
of Altendorf (A-i) at Hermosillo, Witzke had mysteriously disap- 
peared at Nogales, and he had no way in which to communicate with 
Jahnke in Mexico City to ask for instructions. His plans were com- 
pletely disrupted; for his mission was to contact the American 
authorities in Nogales, Arizona, and hand over not only Witzke but 
Altendorf as well. To facilitate this, he had arranged a means of 
identification with the British Consul in Mazatlan: A piece of paper 
on which the word "NOVIA" was written was torn jaggedly in half. 
Cleaves retained the portion with the letters "NO" on it, and the 
other half with "VIA" on it was sent to Mr. Lawton, the American 
Consul in Nogales, Sonora. 

After wandering around for a couple of days, Cleaves eventually 
decided to call on Mr. Lawton, and it was there that he met Byron S. 
Butcher and told him his story. 

Butcher's report of the conversation stated: 

Cleaves' account of the journey of Waberski, the Doctor [Altendorf], and 
himself from Mexico City to Sonora checks in almost every detail with the 


statement of A-i [Altendorf], both of whom were unaware of each other's 

Gleaves further informed Butcher that he was retained by the 
Germans to accompany Waberski to Nogales, Sonora, to meet dele- 
gates of the I.W.W. from New Mexico, Arizona, and California to 
arrange with them the plans whereby "Hell would break loose in the 
United States" some time in April or May. Of the four or five I.W.W. 
delegates who were to meet Waberski at Nogales, two were to have 
been Negroes; and Gleaves was to have given them their instructions. 
Gleaves stated that Waberski explained to him, in part, his plan to 
cause disorder in the United States. This scheme embraced the organ- 
ization of the I.W.W. "to carry out a resolution calling for an uprising 
of the Negroes, strikes, the blowing up of mines, industrial plants, 
railroads, bridges, and telegraph and telephone systems." 

Gleaves further informed Butcher that Dietz and the five other 
German agents who had boarded the train at Guaymas had gone off 
in the direction of Naco, Sonora, with the intention of crossing into 
the United States at some point on the Arizona line. Whether or not 
they were successful is not known — Captain Lipscomb and his agents 
lost track of them completely. 

Several months were to intervene before Witzke was brought to 
trial. In his prison at Fort Sam Houston he was continuously ques- 
tioned by Intelligence Officers, who in the meantime had received 
back, decoded, the letter he had carried and thus knew he was a 
German agent. They were able to show him that they had strong 
evidence against him, but he adamantly refused to give any informa- 
tion. The following stenographic notes of a conversation during this 
period between him and Byron S. Butcher reflect his attitude; but 
they are also important because they contain an admission by Witzke 
that he had confided in Altendorf. 

W. Well, I am in a pretty hard position. What do you think they will do 

with me? 

B. Pablo, I tried to tell you the other day that the best thing for you would 

be to tell the whole thing. If you keep on the way you are now and do 

not tell the truth and all you know, you have no chance at all. As you 


have already guessed, we know nearly all about you. We are in war now, 

and also as you know spies are hung. Americans are sometimes strange 

in their actions, and I would tell you again the only possible chance you 

have is after a week or ten days in San Antonio, and after you have 

thought it over, tell them all you know. 
W. No, I can't do that. I am very young to die, 22 years. But I have done 

my duty. If I told you I would be a traitor and that I will never be. 
B. Pablo, that is the chance we all take who do this work. It is legitimate as 

long as you do not get caught, but when caught you have to pay the 

W. Yes, I know it. I will probably be the first man to die in the United 

States for my country, won't I ? 
B. Yes, probably the first, though I hear that one or two more have been 

caught since you were. You think it over, for the way I see it, your 

only chance now is to tell all. 
W. No, I think I will go through with it. I had planned to live in Mexico 

after the War, but now I can never do that Will it [the trial] be 

published in the papers ? 
B. I don't know, probably not. 
W. You know all the details all right, and I think it was that Dr. Altendorf 

who told you, as I told him a lot of things in conversation. 

Witzke was a gallant patriot, and to the end he refused to betray 
anyone vv^ho was connected with him. 

On Friday, August 16, 1918, Lothar Witzke, handcuffed and under 
military escort, was brought to Military Headquarters, Fort Sam 
Houston, San Antonio, Texas, to face a Military Commission. 

Seated behind a long board table in a large, severe room were 
two brigadier generals and three colonels, the Court which was to 
decide the young German's fate. Major A. P. Burgwin, Judge Advo- 
cate, and Captain T. A. Brown, his assistant, conducted the prosecu- 
tion, and Colonel W. J. Glasgow of the Fourteenth Cavalry was 
assigned to defend Witzke. 

The order appointing the Commission was read to the accused, and 
on his signifying that he did not object to any of the members named 
therein, the members of the Court were sworn, and the accused was 
arraigned on the following Charge and Specification: 


Violation of the eighty-second Article o£ War. In that Lather Witckc, alias 
Pablo Waberski, did, at or near Nogales, Arizona, United States of America, 
on or about the 31st day of January, 191 8, act as a spy in and about an 
encampment there situated, of the Army of the United States, and did, then 
and there attempt to collect material information in regard to the numbers, 
resources, and operations of the military forces of the United States, with 
intent to communicate the same to the enemy. 

Witzke pleaded not guilty to the charge, and the first witness was 
called by Major Burgwin. The list of witnesses was formidable, in- 
cluding as it did Dr. Paul B. Altendorf ; William Cleaves; Major R. R. 
Campbell, American Military Attache in Mexico City; Charles L. 
Beatty, Immigration Inspection at Nogales; Byron S. Butcher; E. M. 
Lawton, American Consul at Nogales, Sonora; Captain Joel A. Lips- 
comb; Major Robert L. Barnes, U. S. Military Intelligence Service, 
Fort Sam Houston; William Neunhoifer; and, finally. Captain John 
M. Manley of the U. S. Cryptographic Bureau, Washington, D. C. The 
evidence of all of these witnesses, with the exception of the last one, 
has already been outlined. 

As Captain Manley was sworn, a hush fell over the court room, for 
it was known that he had testimony of the most vital import to give. 
He started out by narrating that he had been head of the English 
Department of the University of Chicago from July 1898 to October 
1917, when he was appointed as an assistant to Captain Yardley, Chief 
of the Cryptographic Bureau, Sub-section M.I.8 of the Military Intelli- 
gence Division of the General Staff in Washington, D. C. He went on 
to explain how he had been interested in codes and ciphers since boy- 
hood and had studied them for thirty-five years as a hobby. He also 
stated that he was a fluent German scholar and had been exchange 
professor at the University of Gottingen in 1909. 

In the spring of 191 8, Manley continued, the coded letter carried 
by Witzke came into the Cryptographic Bureau. After several others 
had tried to decipher it without success, he eventually took it up, and 
after spending a great deal of time on it, succeeded in deciphering it. 
He explained that it was a transposition cipher. The text was first writ- 
ten in German and then by a prearranged diagram the letters were 
mixed up. The problem which he had had to solve was to discover 


the formula by which the letters were disarranged. On the instructions 
of the Court he now read aloud the decoded message: 

15-1-18. To the Imperial Consular Authorities in the Republic of Mexico. 
Strictly Secret! The bearer of this is a subject of the Empire who travels as a 
Russian under the name of Pablo Waberski. He is a German secret agent. 
Please furnish him on request protection and assistance, also advance him on 
demand up to one thousand pesos Mexican gold, and send his code telegrams 
to this Embassy as official Consular dispatches. 

Von Eckhardt 

The effect on the court room was electric. Everyone realized that it 
would require extraordinary evidence on the part of Witzke to dis- 
credit the quiet but convincing testimony of the Professor of English 
and his damning message. 

Witzke followed next as the only witness for the defense. After 
being duly sworn, he launched out on an amazing story which only 
a desperate man could have thought up — it was so fantastic that even 
a child would have recognized it as a tissue of invention. Later, as we 
shall see, he was to admit this himself. 

He testified that his parents were of Russian nationality and that 
they had immigrated to the United States when he was five years old. 
His father died a few years later; thereupon, at the age of ten, he went 
to sea and continued working as a seaman on various coastal steamers 
until, at the age of nineteen, he landed in Peru and took up mining 
there. Later he went to Mexico. There he became acquainted with a 
young Mexican by the name of Ramirez, a member of a group of ban- 
dits who were robbing the gold and silver mines in the mountains 
some thirty miles out of Mexico City. Ramirez hired him to bring the 
bullion into the city. 

After he had done this for three or four months, Ramirez had to 
go into hiding. Thereupon, in July 1917, Witzke took $1,000 he had 
saved, entrusted the remainder to Otto Paglash, the proprietor of the 
Juarez Hotel, and fled to San Francisco, where he registered for the 
draft. After staying there some time, he was robbed of his money 
while on a drunken bout and so returned to Mexico City, where once 
again he lodged at the Juarez Hotel. Here he was constantly annoyed 


by German agents who tried to enlist his services, but he refused, as 
he did not wish to do anything against the United States. 

One day, however, a Mexican, Ramon Alderate, solicited him to 
go to Sonora to spy on some Mexican rebels there. On his agreeing 
to do this, Alderate gave him a cipher group of words to enable him 
to send him messages and a coded letter as a means of identification 
which he was to present to the owner of a big merchandise house, 
La Voista de Puebla, in Mazatlan, whenever he needed money. 

On his way north he decided to continue to San Francisco to 
arrange about the draft. He did not want to be posted as a deserter, 
and he wanted to explain to the American authorities in San Francisco, 
where he had registered, that he was a Russian and not an American. 
He stopped off at Mazatlan and there met the beautiful daughter of a 
rich Mexican mining man, the owner of two mines. He became en- 
gaged to the girl and promised to marry her immediately on his re- 
turn from San Francisco. 

While en route he met Altendorf, who was down and out and for 
whom he felt sorry, and took Altendorf along with him. He regretted 
this now, for several people had warned him that his companion was a 
German agent and that he would get himself into trouble in the United 
States if any American agent saw him in his company. 

After cross-examination by the Judge Advocate, Witzke further 
added that he had left $2,000 in gold in the safe of Otto Paglash's; and 
that, because he knew of Otto Paglash's association with German spies, 
he figured that Paglash had framed him with the American authorities. 

The Judge Advocate reviewed the evidence as covered by the wit- 
nesses and by the exhibits. Colonel Glasgow's reply was brief. He called 
the attention of the Court to the difficulty of the defense in that it had 
been impossible to bring any witnesses from Mexico. He argued that it 
was up to the Court to decide whether it would believe Witzke or 
Altendorf and Gleaves, who, he tried to maintain, had taken money 
from both sides. Needless to say, this line of defense made no impression 
on the Court. 

The Court then adjourned for its deliberations. When it resumed, it 
found that the accused, Lather Witcke (Lothar Witzke), alias Waber- 


ski, was guilty, and sentenced him to be hanged by the neck until dead, 
"two-thirds of the members concurring in the finding." 

Witzke was returned to his cell in Fort Sam Houston and was kept 
there awaiting a review of his case. While confined there he made two 
attempts at escape, and in one of them actually succeeded in getting 
out of the prison. He was arrested, however, the same day, as he was 
emerging from a Mexican shack. On his return to the cell. Private 
Henry Brackett, one of the guards, noticed that he glanced up at a 
corner. The place was searched, and behind the steel sheeting they 
found a razor blade and a small ball of brown paper. On opening it up, 
it was found to be a cigarette paper on which was written in German 
in Witzke's handwriting a message, which translated into English 
read as follows: 

My right name is Latar Witzke. Born in Poznen and for that reason I only 
understand Polish and not Russian. I was lieutenant on Cruiser Dresden that 
was sunk near Valparaiso, Chile. I lay two months in the hospital, which 
is the reason I escaped internment. The rest of the crew is interned. 

After this, his guard was doubled, his top clothes were removed, and 
he was kept confined in his underwear. 

On November 2, 191 8, nine days before the Armistice, Witzke's 
sentence was approved by Major General de R. C. Cabell, Commanding 
Officer at Fort Houston. 

On May 27, 1920, President Wilson confirmed Witzke's sentence 
but commuted it to "Confinement at hard labor for the rest of his 
natural life." He was then transferred to Leavenworth Prison. 

Immediately after the war, Germany started exerting every possible 
pressure to secure his release. Finally, on April 30, 1923, the German 
Ambassador, Dr. Wiedfeldt, called personally on General Bethel, Judge 
Advocate General of the Army, urging the release of Witzke. On the 
following day the German Ambassador wrote him again and we quote 
the following section from that letter: 

Other countries, including Germany, have since released all their prisoners 
of war and among them those who were sentenced for offenses of espionage. 
It would, therefore, do much to pacify public opinion in my country and 


would be considered a special act of grace by my Government, if the United 
States of America, as France did a few months ago, were now also to set 
free their last prisoner of war. I know this would be much appreciated in my 
country, for the case of Lothar Witcke . . . has not only attracted the attention 
of public opinion but has also frequently been discussed in the German 

A report was also before the Judge Advocate General from the 
warden of the prison at Leavenworth, showing that Witzke in July 
192 1 had performed an act of heroism and had prevented a disaster by 
entering a prison boiler room after an explosion. 

On the basis of the above facts — and not because of any doubt as to 
the evidence — the Judge Advocate General recommended Witzke's re- 
lease on September 26, 1923, in a letter to the Adjutant General reading 
in part as follows: 

The sentence of death was the proper, and has been in all countries the 
customary, sentence for the offense. . . . The question as I see it is one of 

policy France released her last enemy prisoner in January, 1923, and 

England is said to have done likewise 

Witzke was released, but in the subsequent chapters we shall hear 
a great deal more about him. 


Chapter XIII 

The war was over, but its heritage had still to be liquidated. The re- 
turn to normalcy was a slow process: Millions of combatants had to be 
demobilized, and means provided to enable them to return to normal 
life; arrangements had to be made for the return of prisoners of war; 
armies of occupation had to be organized; the disarmament of Germany 
had to be supervised; treaties of peace had to be negotiated; the map of 
Europe had to be remade; Germany's colonies had to be divided up; 
pensions had to be provided for disabled soldiers and for the dependents 
of those who had been killed; devastated areas had to be rebuilt; 
machinery had to be set up for the collection of reparations; and not 
least the dead had to be identified and tombstones erected over their 

The Treaty of Versailles attempted to provide a world-wide and de- 
finitive settlement between Germany and all the Allied and Associated 
Powers. In spite of the prominent part played by President Wilson in 
the framing of the treaty, it was rejected by the United States Senate on 
November 19, 1919. An entire new agreement had to be negotiated 
between Germany and the United States minus the unacceptable sec- 
tions of the former one; and this instrument, known as the Treaty of 
Berlin, was not ratified by the Senate until October 18, 1921. 

Among its terms was a provision for setting up a Mixed Claims Com- 
mission to adjudicate all claims for damages growing out of the war 
presented by the nationals of either country through their respective 

According to the terms of the treaty, each country was to appoint 
one Commissioner, and these two were to select a neutral Umpire. 
These three officers constituted the Commission. 

Germany named Dr. Wilhelm Kiesselbach as her Commissioner; the 



United States chose Chandler P. Anderson. Either because she wished 
to make a gesture, or because she was being shrewd, Germany asked 
that the Umpire be an American citizen. The American Commissioner 
unwisely acceded to this request. The reason for the unwisdom of this 
decision lay in the fact that an American of high impartiality could 
hardly avoid leaning over backward to avoid any appearance of favor- 
ing his own country in any question in which he had to render the 
final judgment. But, in any event, the two Commissioners agreed upon 
former Supreme Court Justice Day for the post. 

Also contained in the section of the treaty dealing with the Commis- 
sion was a clause stipulating that each government would present the 
cases of its nationals through its own officially appointed representative 
to be known as the American Agent and the German Agent. Robert 
W. Bonynge was selected as the American Agent to represent the 
United States Government in pleading those cases in which he had 
satisfied himself as to Germany's guilt and the valuation of the claims. 
Dr. Karl von Lewinski was appointed German Agent to combat 
American claims. H. H. Martin was chosen as Counsel to Bonynge, 
and Dr. Wilhelm Tannenberg was designated as Counsel to the Ger- 
man Agent. 

In case of a disagreement between the two Commissioners, the Um- 
pire was to cast the deciding vote. The decisions of the Commission 
were to be final in every instance. As the hearings proceeded, three 
Umpires in succession died : Justice Day, Edwin B. Parker, and Roland 
Boyden. Today, Supreme Court Justice Roberts is filling the position. 
Recently, too. Chandler P. Anderson died, and his place as Commis- 
sioner has been taken by Christopher B. Garnett. On the German side 
there have also been changes. Dr. Paulig is the German Agent today, 
and Commissioner Kiesselbach recently resigned and Dr. Victor 
Huecking has taken his place. 

During the last fifteen years over twenty thousand separate claims, 
ranging from the illegal use of German patents to the confiscation of 
American deposits in German banks, have been heard and disposed of 
by the Commission; and, when a verdict on the Black Tom and Kings- 
land cases is handed down, its work will be practically completed. 

Since a sovereign government is the only party recognized before an 


international tribunal such as the Mixed Claims Commission, the 
American Agent is the only American who can appear before the Com- 
mission. But it is the practice in all such international cases for the 
private counsel of the claimants on whose behalf the claims are filed 
to prepare the cases for trial, assemble the evidence, write the briefs, 
and otherwise assist the official government Agent. 

Accordingly, the firm of Peaslee and Brigham was chosen as special 
counsel for the Lehigh Valley Railroad, the owners of Black Tom; 
H. N. Arnold, of the firm of Rumsey and Morgan, for the Black Tom 
underwriters. Coudert Brothers, the well-known international lawyers, 
represented both the underwriters and the Agency of the Canadian Car 
and Foundry Company, Limited, the owners of Kingsland; Cravath, 
de Gersdorff, Swaine and Wood acted for the Bethlehem Steel Com- 
pany, which had suffered a loss of approximately $2,000,000 at Black 
Tom by the destruction of shells belonging to it and awaiting shipment 
there. Lansing and Woolsey were retained in an advisory capacity by 
all the corporations involved. Since Mr. Lansing had been Secretary of 
State in President Wilson's Cabinet, it was thought that he would be 
specially useful for his knowledge of wartime records on file in Wash- 
ington. Of these law firms, Coudert Brothers were not active after 
1924; whereas Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine and Wood did not come 
in until 1929; and Lansing and Woolsey were not retained until 1927, 
and are now no longer associated. 

According to the spirit of the agreement between the United States 
and Germany which led to the creation of the Mixed Claims Com- 
mission, both governments were to cooperate in a friendly way and 
make available to each other all records and sources of information. All 
the evidence was to be laid before the Commission in an open and 
impartial way, both governments being supposedly more interested 
in seeing justice done than in winning legal victories by suppressing or 
distorting the true facts. 

But if this was the wish and the spirit of the United States Govern- 
ment, it was quickly discovered that in the Black Tom and Kingsland 
cases the Germans did not intend to abide by this unwritten under- 
standing. They immediately made the issue one of national honor and 
prestige. As soon as the American plaintiffs began probing into things, 


they found that the policy of denial, so ably followed out by von 
Bernstorff and his Attaches during the war, was to be continued. 
Furthermore, no German record pertinent to the two cases and 
detrimental to the German defense was to be made available, even 
when the particular document was specified and described by the 
American lawyers. Nor were the Americans to be allowed to examine 
any witnesses in Germany. Soon the Germans went beyond this and 
made it plain to all former German agents resident in any part of the 
world that they would be traitors to their country if they disclosed any 
information relative to German sabotage or spy activities in the United 
States. The American Agent found himself up against a stone wall 
erected by the German Government and its secret service. 

So colossal was the task involved that the owners of Black Tom 
and Kingsland, together with certain claimants affected by the blowing 
up of the powder barge in Tacoma harbor in 1915, were the only ones 
who had both the courage and the financial resources to file sabotage 
claims with the Mixed Claims Commission. The hundreds of other 
owners and insurance companies who suffered losses, many of them 
amounting to millions of dollars, from acts of German sabotage were 
appalled at the magnitude of the task and the enormous expense of 
fighting the entire forces of a powerful nation. Since the powder barge 
claim only amounted to $500 for windows broken in the vicinity of the 
explosion, Germany immediately paid it. But in the Black Tom and 
Kingsland cases, she was determined from the beginning to make a 
fight to the finish. 

Perhaps she thought it incumbent on her to support von Bernstorff 
and other wartime German officials in their denials, or perhaps she was 
following the age-old principle that a country always disavows the acts 
of its secret service. On the other hand, she may have been afraid that 
the admission of guilt in a few cases at the outset would let loose a flood 
of sabotage claims. It is not inconceivable that, before the American 
lawyers began to produce masses of evidence, she may have been ig- 
norant of the acts of some of her agents and have sincerely believed she 
was not responsible for the destruction of Black Tom and Kingsland. 
In any event, for fifteen years she has never admitted her guilt and has 

iformation as to the whereabouts of 

«KE CRl&TOFf . MIKK CKtSllK, sm) FKIJX KRihlY 


TS.» m»n „ ,lU.gfd w h«»c hv 

m^H!H A\f SI f 



f- fi^ ^ M 

Charles Wunnenberg, alias "Charles the Dynamiter" 

German Bombs Seized in Hoboken. 


fought the cases by every means the greatest minds of her legal, 
diplomatic, and espionage services could devise. 

The different lav7 firms representing the several companies having 
interests in the Black Tom and Kingsland cases were inexperienced in 
secret service work and consequently began by wasting much time and 
money and at the end of several years had but little in the way of 
results to show for it. Eventually the claimants began to reaUze that 
without cooperation they would never get anywhere and that it was to 
the best interests of all concerned to join forces. Therefore, in 1924, on 
the recommendation of Judge Barrett of the Lehigh Valley Railroad 
Company, who was on friendly terms with Senator Curry, then Chair- 
man of the Board of the Canadian Car and Foundry Company, Amos 
J. Peaslee, of the law firm of Peaslee and Brigham, was selected to lead 
the American interests in their fight. 

Peaslee was extraordinarily fitted to carry on this battle and to 
organize and search for clues. For fifteen years he has labored tirelessly 
and patiently to amass the overwhelming evidence which today sheds 
light on the mysteries of Black Tom and Kingsland. He had had con- 
siderable wartime experience as a major in the American Expeditionary 
Force, both as Judge Advocate of the General Court-Martial at the 
headquarters of General Harbord and in organizing a trusted band 
of officers to act as confidential couriers at General Pershing's head- 
quarters. After the Armistice he had been attached to the American 
Commission to Negotiate Peace and had proposed several important 
amendments to the Covenant of the League of Nations. For a number 
of years he had specialized in cases involving quertions of international 
law, and was Honorary Secretary of the International Law Association 
in America. Above all, however, he had had considerable experience 
in handling cases involving German interests. He is short, slight of 
build, mild-mannered, and a Quaker to boot; but behind all these dis- 
arming appearances is the shrewd lawyer and skilled negotiator with 
an iron determination. Tireless and patient, he has refused to be dis- 
couraged by Germany's campaign of delay and obstruction. Ever ready 
at a moment's notice to travel to the most distant countries to collect 
evidence and follow up clues, he has crossed the ocean more than 
thirty times in this contest of endurance and wits. 


Indefatigable in his efforts has been }. J. McCloy, of Cravath, de 
Gersdorff, Swaine and Wood. McCloy, heavy-set, large of head, de- 
liberate of movement, and usually with a pipe in his mouth, has been 
working on the cases steadily since 1930 and has kept the records which 
today amount to thousands of exhibits running to over 10,000,000 
words. He has coordinated the evidence and has tirelessly fitted the vast 
mosaic together. During the latter part of the investigation the prepara- 
tion of the briefs has largely devolved on his shoulders. Skilled in in- 
terviewing witnesses, he has adroitly and patiently sat hours with them, 
slowly leading them back over the years to lift the veil here and there 
from events which happened twenty years ago. He, too, is a skilled 
international lawyer, having had several years' experience in the Paris 
office of his law firm. 

But perhaps the fiercest and most determined of all Peaslee's col- 
laborators has been Leonard A. Peto, vice president of the Canadian 
Car and Foundry Company, who might be called the bulldog of the 
investigation. An American by birth and a Canadian by natural- 
ization, he is sandy-haired, ruddy, athletic in build, dynamic in char- 
acter. A fighter by nature and ever ready to take a risk, he has led the 
way where sometimes his lawyer associates have hesitated to tread. 
He was one of the first to realize that the German Secret Service and 
the government controlling it were determined to conceal the facts in 
every possible way and that only by outwitting them at their own game 
could the evidence be unearthed. In an investigation which has already 
cost the American interests over $1,000,000, his company has often 
supplied the funds without which the Germans might easily have won 
the war of financial attrition they have been waging in an attempt to 
exhaust the resources of the claimants. 

Peaslee, Peto and McCloy for the claimants; Bonynge and Martin 
for the United States Government — these then are the five against 

Peaslee and his associates, as they surveyed the situation, grasped at 
the outset that their task was one where it would be necessary to re- 
construct the whole German sabotage organization, a task all the more 
formidable because no evidence was of value to them unless they could 


prove it in a court of law. The only way they could hope to do this was 
by employing a corps of investigators who could comb the world seek- 
ing former German agents and searching for evidence. 

Their first step, naturally, was to turn to the wartime records of the 
Department of Justice, of the Military Intelligence Service, and of the 
various law enforcement agencies throughout the country to familiarize 
themselves with the German activities that had come to light before we 
entered the war. In this they were greatly aided by Peaslee because of 
his friendly relations with A. Bruce Bielaski and General van Deman, 
heads of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and of the Military In- 
telligence Service, respectively, at the time of the war. 

This search was extremely difficult, because most of the records had 
never been coordinated. Many of them were scattered and often hidden 
away and long forgotten in some file in a tiny precinct poUce station; 
and sometimes the most vital information they wanted had been passed 
up as unimportant at the time of the police investigation. And yet, as 
we shall see, they picked up a thread here and a thread there, and with 
this as a basis they and their operatives launched their campaign. 

That part of the general German Secret Service sabotage organization 
which Peaslee and his associates reconstructed from the above records 
has been covered for the most part in the preceding chapters. Those 
cogs in Germany's sabotage machine which escaped detection during 
the war will be filled in as we proceed; but from now on our attention 
will be focused chiefly on Black Tom and Kingsland. 

Chapter XIV 

The investigation of the police records and especially a study of the 
Lehigh Valley Company's dossier on Kristoff immediately set Peaslee 
and his investigators on his trail. He had disappeared. He had not been 
heard of since his release from the Albany prison in 1921. The in- 
vestigators v^ere anxious to interrogate him. The country v^as combed 
from coast to coast. His knov^n relations and former hang-outs v^ere 
visited, but there was no trace of him. Finally, how^ever, he was located 
in 1927, once again in jail. He had been committed to the Welfare 
Island prison on a charge of larceny. 

When he was released in the same summer, Albert M. Dickman, 
an investigator for the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, met him 
outside the prison gates. Dickman tried to persuade him then and 
there to accompany him to Peaslee's office, but Kristoff was unwilling. 
He first wanted to visit his uncle in Yonkers, and promised to call on 
Peaslee the next afternoon. Dickman immediately got on the telephone 
to Peaslee and informed him of the arrangement. 

Peaslee went down to the country that night, and on the next day, 
a sweltering hot Saturday, returned specially to New York for the in- 
terview. Throughout the afternoon Peaslee sat in his office waiting in 
vain. Kristoff never showed up, and from then on was never heard of 
again until in 1928 the Germans informed the Commission that 
he had died of tuberculosis on Staten Island, on April 3, 1928, 
and had been buried in the potter's field there. The fact that the Ger- 
mans were the ones to report this would seem to indicate that they 
had been keeping in close contact with him. 

An immediate investigation was made. According to the identifica- 
tion papers found on him, the man who had died was indeed Michael 
Kristoff. The teeth, however, differed from the teeth records shown in 



Kristoff's Army file. The American claimants have accepted this ac- 
count of Kristoif's death, but there are some of the investigators who 
firmly believe that he is still alive. 

After his failure to meet Peaslee and his subsequent disappearance, 
all that the American investigators had left were the Bayonne police 
reports and those of Kassman, and the statement of Maria de Victorica 
that an Austrian had blown up Black Tom. This evidence indicated 
that Kristoff had taken part in the destruction of Black Tom; but, 
even if this were proved, he still had to be linked up to a recognized 
German agent before the blame could be pinned on Germany. The 
problem was to find or identify Graentnor, and none of the records 
revealed any clues. The investigators therefore turned to Witzke, who, 
as we have already shown, had boasted to Altendorf that he and 
Jahnke had blown up Black Tom, adding, "We were out in a small 
boat and the waves nearly swamped us and we came near drowning." 

Witzke's court-martial record was gone through with a fine-tooth 
comb, but with no success. The Judge Advocate had had sufficient evi- 
dence to secure a conviction on the coded message found on Witzke 
and on the testimony furnished by the witnesses. In consequence no 
particular attention had been given to his reported statements about 
Black Tom. 

It was from an entirely different source that corroborative evidence 
came. Hidden in a stack of dusty files, a series of reports from Fort 
Sam Houston were found; and among them was an affidavit dated 
September 19, 1919, from Corporal John Shores, a guard at the prison, 
in which he testified to Captain A. H. J. Voelker, Adjutant: 

John Shores, age 22 years, Corporal, Company F, 3rd Infantry United 
States Army; home address, Benton, Ky., being duly sworn deposes and says: 

That about two months ago he heard Lothar Witzke, alias Pablo Waberski, 
say, while in the guardhouse at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, that he and 
another fellow blew up Black Tom Island in New York. 

(signed) John Shores 

When interviewed by the American investigators on December 11, 
1926, Captain Voelker stated that he had taken the affidavit from 
Corporal Shores as a matter of record, but that no action had been 


taken on it as Witzke had already been tried and convicted as a spy. 

Peaslee and his associates had, however, been set on a new track; 
and in 1926 they located another guard, Sergeant Haslam, who had 
been at Fort Sam Houston during Witzke's detention there and to 
whom Witzke had also confessed that he had participated in the 
destruction of Black Tom. Corporal Shores was then reexamined; and 
he furnished an additional affidavit to the effect that Witzke had not 
only told him that he and a companion had blown up Black Tom 
but also had said that they were in a rowboat which was overturned by 
the explosion of a drifting ammunition barge. 

The intercepted coded telegram of January 10, 1917, which we have 
already quoted in connection with Wunnenberg, placed Jahnke defi- 
nitely in New York on this date. Peaslee and his investigators, how- 
ever, found proof that both he and Witzke were there prior to this 

In 1919 Witzke had been examined by Captain''^ Tunney, then of 
the Military Intelligence, in connection with an application made 
by him for commutation of his court-martial sentence. Scrutiny of the 
transcript of this examination revealed that Witzke had been careful 
to deny that he had told anyone that he had blown up Black Tom or 
that he had been in New York at the time of the explosion. He had ad- 
mitted, however, that he and Jahnke had been in New York during the 
fall of 1916, and had roomed together at 100 West 56th Street. 

Witzke further went on to admit at this examination that, from 
this period up to the time of the entry of the United States into the 
war, he was carrying "secret messages" between the German Consuls 
in New York, San Francisco, and Chicago. It was an admission that 
he was being employed all over the United States; and in the light 
of his admissions to Altendorf and his known record in Mexico it is 
reasonable to assume that a German agent of his importance would 
not be employed as a simple messenger but that his travels were in 
connection with sabotage activities. 

As for Jahnke, apart from the proof furnished by intercepted cables 
which will be quoted later, the following report, dated January 25, 
191 8, submitted by H. M. Moffett, a Secret Service operative, who 

* Inspector was his police rank. 


interviewed Von Brincken in prison, clearly shows that Jahnke was 
engaged in sabotage activities in the United States: 

Von Brincken then states that on or about November 15, 1915, which is 
supposed to be the birthday of Consul Bopp, the latter had Jahnke blow up a 
concern which was supposed to be secretly making munidons for the AlUes. 
It later developed that this place, which is located at Twelfth and Howard 
Streets, this city [San Francisco], was engaged in casting window weights. 
The press published an interview with the proprietor in which he states that 
he thought it was an accident, as he could see no reason why the place should 
be dynamited inasmuch as they had no known enemies. Bopp was supposed 
to pay Jahnke a thousand dollars for this job, and had paid him $500.00 in 
advance. He refused, however, to pay him the balance of $500.00, as he 
claimed the place was not manufacturing munitions and also in view of the 
statement of the proprietor, as published in the papers. Bopp then sent C. C. 
Crowley, now doing time at McNeil Island, to investigate the concern before 
he would pay the balance. Crowley has since verified von Brincken's state- 
ment regarding the blowing up of this concern 

A further report, written early in 1918 by an American agent sta- 
tioned in Mexico City, reveals the importance of Jahnke as a German 

Intelligence Officers will be interested to know that the present task of 
promoting a mutiny in the U. S. Army has been entrusted by BerUn to one 
of their star agents, one K. A. Jahnke of Mexico City. This event is scheduled 
for the Autumn. Jahnke also has taken under his wing the general super- 
vision of sabotage in the U. S., the Panama Canal, and American possessions 
generally, including especially sabotage of ships transporting War material 
and material for ship construction. His program covering the foregoing am- 
bitions has been approved by the German Government, with an available 
credit of 100,000 marks per month, and an additional large commission on 
results accomplished. . . . He has already had some experience in the control 
of German agitators, defeatists and I.W.W. agitators in this country, and is 
regarded as an ideal man for the job. 

Jahnke's official appointment seems to be that of sole naval confidential 

agent in Mexico Intelligence Officers will probably never have the pleasure 

of meeting Mr. Jahnke personally, but it is not at all unHkely that he will give 
them something to think about. Hence this note in advance. 


From these records Peaslee turned to Koenig's notebook. In looking 
through the thirty-four secret service agents listed under the heading 
"D-Cases," his attention was arrested by two names: Scott and Burns 
(spelled Berns once and Burns twice in other sections of the notebook). 
Scott and Burns were the names of two of the Dougherty guards who 
were on duty at Black Tom on the night of the explosion. 

Both Scott and Burns were located by W. H. Russel, a member of 
the Greeley Detective Bureau. Scott was then on the New York police 
force and Burns was living in Huntington, L. I. Under date of March 
30, 1929, Russel in an affidavit covered the statements which Burns and 
Scott made to him separately in interviews at which Peaslee was also 
present. According to this affidavit both Scott and Burns denied that 
they knew Paul Koenig. Burns stated that he was the "Captain" in 
charge of the Dougherty detectives at Black Tom and that he took over 
his duties on June i, 1916. After he had been on duty for about two or 
three weeks, Burns said, he was approached one night in the Jersey 
Central Station at Communipaw Avenue by a man whom he did not 
know and who gave him some money and asked him to relax the 
guard of the detectives working under him. He admitted that from 
time to time this man gave him similar sums but added "I didn't see 
no particular harm in taking some money which was being handed 
about and I think I would have been a fool if I hadn't. It wasn't much 
of anything — only small pieces of change from time to time." 

Scott admitted that Burns had given him small amounts of money 
now and again but claimed that he did not know for what purpose. 
He further stated that Burns sometimes gave him money to buy liquor 
for the guards. He also added that Burns disappeared from New York 
shortly after the Black Tom explosion and was later located at Oak- 
land, California. On further interrogation, Scott admitted that he knew 
Kristoff, as he had often seen him hanging around the White House 
saloon at Communipaw Avenue. 

Both Burns and Scott declined, in the course of the interview, to 
sign any written statements in support of what they had said as 
described above. Later, when Grover Whalen was Commissioner of 
Police in New York City, Peaslee appealed to him for help in getting 
a written statement from Scott. Scott first agreed to write out a state- 


ment; but, after he had done this, he wished to make so many changes 
that the attempt was given up. 

Having been unable to get any aid from Scott and Burns, an appeal 
was made to von Lewinski, the German Agent, either to produce 
Koenig as a witness, or failing this, to produce or indicate who the 
Scott and Burns were who were mentioned in his notebook. Germany 
refused to produce Koenig. But later he was discovered in the United 
States. He had been in Jersey City all the time. However, when ap- 
proached by the American claimants, he refused to give any informa- 
tion, and when later examined under subpoena in 1933, he successfully 
resisted the cross-examination of Mr. Bonynge. 

An interesting note from Koenig, found among papers seized by the 
American authorities during the raid on von Igel's office reads as 

W. von Igel, Esq., New York City, 

New York, August 10, 1916. 
Dear Sir: 

I am forwarding under separate cover a certain part of a shell which was 
found on Governor's Island shortly after the recent explosion which took 
place on Black Tom Island. 
If you find it to be of any interest to you or others, you may retain same. 

Faithfully yours, 

Paul Koenig 

Koenig claimed in the course of this examination that the sending of 
the shell fragment had no special significance. 

The possibility that two common names such as Burns and Scott 
could have appeared purely by chance in Koenig's list of thirty-four 
secret agents was also investigated. On the basis of scrambling up all 
the names in the Manhattan telephone book, and then choosing 34 of 
them at random, it was found by actuarial computation that the 
chance of Burns's and Scott's being drawn in succession (the two 
names followed each other in Koenig's list) was i in 2,000,000. 

That the Germans did make a practice of bribing guards is proved 
by an admission to this effect made by Wilhelm Woehst, a confessed 
German agent, of whom we shall hear more later. Von Rintelen also 


confessed to the same practice and further confirmed that Black Tom 
was a German sabotage objective by admitting that as far back as 
1915 he visited it secretly one night v^ith a viev^ to mapping plans for 
its destruction. 

KristofI, Witzke, Jahnke, Koenig, Scott and Burns, — w^hat, if any, 
was the connecting link between them as related to Black Tom, and 
who and where was Graentnor? 

Chapter XV 

A REVIEW of the evidence furnished by Horst von der Goltz and by 
the German agents who were convicted in the Welland Canal case 
revealed that they had stored the dynamite in a house in New York 
at 123 West 15th Street. The owner of this house, Martha Held, was a 
buxom, handsome woman whose dark blue eyes and black glossy hair 
were usually set off by sparkling earrings. She was a prewar German 
Secret Service recruit but never did any actual spying. Instead, she 
ran a rendezvous house for German spies, a safe retreat for their secret 
meetings. She was a German baroness by marriage (what happened 
to the baron we do not know) a genial, middle-aged woman at the 
time she was in New York. She was accustomed to entertaining men 
from every walk of life. 

As far back as 1912 she rented the house at 123 West 15th Street, 
New York City, from J. Irving Walsh, former president of the New 
York City Real Estate Board, to whom she confided that she had 
chosen the number specially as an easy aid to memory. 

It is from Mrs. Mena Edwards Reiss, who was brought forward 
early in 1925 by her husband, a Lehigh Valley employee, that we have 
a detailed account of Martha Held and the clandestine activities which 
took place in her establishment. For a fee she gladly set down her 
experiences in an affidavit. 

During the years 1914, 1915, and 1916, Mena Edwards, then un- 
married, was employed by the Eastman Kodak Company and was 
known as "The Eastman Girl." She posed for photographs for use in 
advertisements and displays on magazine covers. A pretty, vivacious, 
athletic girl, pleasure-loving and fond of sports, she was well liked 
and had a wide circle of friends. For a time during this period she 
lived at a hotel at 86th Street and Broadway with a motion picture 



actress named Marie Wells; later she shared an apartment on West 
87th Street with Lucille Rogers, an actress. 

Late in 1914, or early in 1915, she became acquainted with a French 
girl named "Vera," whose last name she had forgotten, who lived in 
the Pasadena Apartments at 61 st Street and Broadway. 

Vera, who spoke German fluently, later confided to her that she 
was a German agent, and as such had made several trips to Europe. 
Through this French girl Miss Edwards met a German named Eugene 
Schwerdt, an immensely wealthy broker, who at one time had cor- 
nered the South American wool market. One evening at the Plaza 
Hotel, Schwerdt introduced her to Captain von Papen. 

Thereafter Vera and Miss Edwards were frequently the guests of 
Schwerdt and von Papen, often dining together at the Plaza, the 
Ritz, or at Delmonico's, and frequently going for horseback rides in 
Central Park. 

At one of these dinners von Papen introduced her to Captain Boy-Ed. 
After they had dined, they took her to 123 West 15th Street and pre- 
sented her to Martha Held, who. Miss Edwards later discovered, also 
used the name, "Martha Gordon." 

During the rest of the neutrality period Miss Edwards was a fre- 
quent guest in that house. It was an old-fashioned dwelling with a 
brown-stone stoop. There was a well-equipped kitchen and a wine 
cellar in the basement, and on the first floor a large dining room whose 
walls were lined with photographs of Martha Held and other stars in 
opera costumes. Mme. Held occupied the whole four floors of the 
dwelling. There were two servants: Janushka, a Hungarian maid, and 
Rose, a colored woman. 

Miss Edwards and Vera dined in the house about once a week either 
with von Papen or Boy-Ed or other of the Germans whom they 
met through the two Attaches. Miss Edv^rds soon discovered that it 
was a meeting place for German agents, captains and officers from 
the interned German ships, reservists, and spies who had been sent 
over from Germany. Many of them came disguised in all sorts of 
garb. All of them entered through the basement. Among the many 
she met she recalls the names of von Rintelen, Horst von der Goltz, 
Hans Tauscher, Ludwig Meyer, J. von Bruck, Martin Lange of the 


Cafe Bismarck, and a curious character, known to her only as "Mox," 
who was said to be a printer by day and a saboteur by night. 

The destruction of munitions and factories and other equipment 
which was of service to the AlUed Governments was a constant topic 
of conversation. Sometimes English was spoken; but even when Ger- 
man was used, which was generally the case. Miss Edwards, although 
she could not talk the language fluently, understood enough German to 
follow what was said. Black Tom and the Welland Canal were often 
mentioned, as well as factories in various parts of the United States. 

At these conferences bombs were often carefully handed around. 
Men brought them in satchels from Hoboken, and Mme. Held stored 
them in a cupboard in readiness to be given later to others who carried 
them away. Often, too, great rolls of blue prints were spread on the 
table; and photographs were closely examined. 

After von Papen and Boy-Ed were sent out of the country, she met 
Wolf von Igel several times. She remembered that on two occasions 
Count von Bernstorff also came to the house. 

On several occasions, just prior to the Black Tom explosion, she 
overheard plans for the destruction of the Terminal. For the coup the 
night of Saturday to Sunday, just after midnight, was considered to 
be the most propitious moment. The printer, "Mox," was chosen to 
carry the bombs over to the Jersey side; and, according to the con- 
versation, she gathered that they had several inside men actually in 
the employ of the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company to assist them. 

Alarmed at what she had heard, she decided to spend the next week- 
end out of the city and therefore went down to stay with a friend at 
Atlantic Highlands on the New Jersey coast. She and her hostess 
were asleep when they were awakened by what sounded at first like 
a clap of thunder. As their bedroom led onto a verandah, they 
rushed out to bring in their bathing suits, which had been hung out 
there to dry. Against the sky they could see the ruddy glare of a great 
conflagration; and from time to time they heard popping sounds, 
which they later learned were made by exploding shells. 

Miss Edwards returned to New York Monday, July 31, and on 
Tuesday morning Martha Held telephoned her inviting her to dinner 
that night. There was a large crowd at Number 123 when she arrived. 


Everyone was talking about the success of the Black Tom explosion. 
Toasts were drunk to the Kaiser and the Fatherland, and there was 
also a good deal of handshaking. 

After this Miss Edwards began to get more frightened about the 
activities of the group; and, as at the same time, one of the employees 
of the Eastman Kodak Company informed her that the company was 
getting suspicious of her and was inclined to believe that she was too 
pro-German, she decided to return to her mother's home at Walling- 
ton, about thirty miles from Rochester. There she remained for sev- 
eral months without returning to New York City. 

In defending Germany before the Mixed Claims Commission, von 
Lewinski, the German Agent, denounced Mena Edwards Reiss's affi- 
davit on the grounds that the American lawyers had paid her $2,500 
for her statement and had promised her a further $5,000 if the Com- 
mission handed down a favorable decision. 

But this payment was no discovery on the part of the Germans; the 
American lawyers at the time of the filing of the affidavit had loyally 
notified the Commission of the fact. Miss Edwards had insisted on a 
fee; and, although Peaslee was loathe to pay it, realizing that it would 
detract from the value of her statement, yet there was no alternative as 
she obviously had information to impart. Her affidavit was not worth 
the money he paid for it, as he afterwards saw. 

It seems likely that she drew somewhat on her imagination. In any 
case her affidavit was merely filed as supporting evidence, though later 
it proved more of a handicap than a help. From other sources it had 
been established beyond the shadow of a doubt that Martha Held did 
conduct a spy rendezvous at 123 West 15th Street, that explosives 
were stored there, and that Mena Edwards had frequented the estab- 

J. Irving Walsh gave an affidavit that he rented 123 West 15th Street 
to a German woman, Martha Held, in 1912; that he visited the house 
from time to time and "had noticed that there was a great deal of wine 
and liquor about, and that it always had quite a German atmosphere"; 
that Martha Held further told him that "on several occasions the sea 
captains on the German boats were accustomed to coming there and 
she said that she would give them little dinners at night." He further 

<< _. . _ )5 


added that there was something strange in connection with the dis- 
continuance of the tenancy, on June 6, 1918: 

My recollection is that I received a telephone call stating that the house 
was vacant and that Martha Held and everybody had disappeared, and that 
we sent down there and found that the keys had been left next door, and 
that no one knew where Martha Held had gone. 

Apart from the names of known German agents mentioned by Miss 
Edwards, the names of von Bruck and Ludwig Meyer appeared in Dr. 
Albert's private book of addresses, and that of Martin Lange, the pro- 
prietor of the Cafe Bismarck, in Koenig's notebook. 

Investigation of some of the neighbors in the same block corroborated 
the fact that Martha Held sometimes used the name of "Martha 
Gordon." One of them recalled that because of the number of men who 
frequented the establishment, the neighbors whispered that it was a 
bawdy house. Martha Held probably encouraged this belief to cloak 
her real activities. But all this brought Peaslee and his investigators no 
nearer to the solution of their problem. They therefore turned to new 

Chapter XVI 

Having searched the American records, Peaslee and his associates 
naturally directed their attention to those of the Allies. There had been 
two independent British Intelligence sections operating in the United 
States during the war: one a unit of the British Secret Service under the 
direction of Sir William Wiseman, who moved about New York as 
Walter Wisdom, director of W. Wisdom Films, Incorporated; the 
other, a section of the British Military Intelligence Service commanded 
by Colonel Thwaites. Both services had kept a watchful eye on the 
activities of Boy-Ed, von Papen, and their successors in the recruiting 
of spies of neutral nationality in the United States for dispatch to the 
Allied countries. Several of these spies, such as George Vaux Bacon, had 
been caught in England as a result of this alertness. Some attention had 
also been given to German sabotage activities in the United States, since 
the British had an obvious and vital interest in the munitions shipments 
which were being made to Europe. And, although it was impossible for 
the British to interfere in the United States during the neutrality period, 
they were able, on occasions, to pass on information to the American 
authorities. When this failed to bring action, they communicated it to 
the press. Some of the sensational disclosures made by the Providence 
Journal during the war were of British origin. 

Peaslee was well aware of these facts, and consequently he sailed for 
Europe in 1925. But secret service records are what their name implies. 
Because of his appearing as a private citizen without any official back- 
ing, he was courteously received by Sir Basil Thompson, head of 
Scotland Yard, and just as politely informed that the British had no 
information to impart. In any case, he applied to the wrong depart- 
ment; for, although Scotland Yard effected spy arrests in England 

during the war, it relied on the British Secret Service and on the In- 



telligence Services of the Army and Navy for its espionage information. 

Peaslee vi^as quick to realize the cause of his failure; and, as soon as 
he returned to the United States, he got in touch with former Secretary 
Robert Lansing, v^ith whom he was well acquainted. 

Peaslee met him at Watertown, New York, on August 5, 1925, and 
there explained to him his needs. It was natural that Lansing, who 
knew the inside story of the Zimmermann telegram * should have fired 
Peaslee with enthusiasm for Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, the man who, 
as Director of Naval Intelligence Service of the British Admiralty, had 
been responsible for the interception and decoding of this telegram. 
Lansing gave Peaslee a letter of introduction to Admiral William E. 
Sims, former commander of the American naval forces in Europe. "Hall 
and Sims are great personal friends," said Lansing. "Get Sims to give 
you a letter of introduction to him. Hall intercepted and decoded every 
German cable and wireless message that passed between von Bernstorff 
and Berlin. Get a copy of these messages, and I am sure you will find 
all the information you want." 

Peaslee wrote posthaste to Admiral Sims at Newport, and also to a 
cousin of the Admiral's, Joseph P. Sims, with whom Peaslee had been 
associated in France during the war. 

On August 18, 1925, Peaslee sailed once more for England, armed 
this time with a precious letter of introduction from Sims to Hall. The 
information which Peaslee obtained from Sir Reginald Hall immedi- 
ately set the American investigators on the right track and supplied 
such valuable clues that even at the risk of digressing we must describe 
at some length how the British Cryptographic Service intercepted and 
decoded German cables and telegrams. 

War had been declared between Germany and England but a few 
hours when a group of trawlers sailed from the east coast of England in 
the direction of Emden, the German port at the mouth of the Ems 
River where the Dutch coast joins that of Germany. To any German 
coastal patrol boat which might have spotted them, they were just some 

* Sent in January, 1917, by Zimmermann, German Foreign Minister, to von 
Eckhardt, German Minister to Mexico, instructing him to promise Mexico Ger- 
man aid in securing a return of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona, in the event 
that the United States should enter the war on the side of the Allies and Mexico 
should ally herself with Germany. 


of the many fishing boats operating in the area. A boarding party would 
have revealed that they were manned chiefly by cable experts. Under 
the cover of darkness and mist, slipping silently between the Dutch 
islands in the vicinity, they grappled for the German deep-sea cables. 
Covered with mud and seaweed, these cables were eventually hauled up 
on deck; and one after another they were cut and allowed to sink back 
into the depths. It was a brilliant coup, conceived and executed by a 
young naval officer who, disguised as a fisherman, had mapped out the 
area several months before the war and had planned every step which 
had now been so successfully carried out. 

After fruitlessly trying to get through on their cables, the Germans 
at length realized what had happened. To communicate with the out- 
side world only two channels were now left open to them : cables owned 
by neutral countries, and wireless communication through the air. The 
ether soon buzzed with German coded wireless messages, not only to 
their diplomatic representatives in neutral countries but also to those 
of their warships cut off in distant parts of the globe by the outbreak of 

The French immediately suggested jamming the German wireless, 
but the British had a craftier plan. They decided instead to intercept the 
messages and to use them to their own advantage. The idea was excel- 
lent. But how was this to be done? It was obvious that somehow or 
other the German codes had to be stolen or acquired, or some master 
mind had to be found who, by methods of cryptography, could break the 
multiple and intricate ciphers which were being used. The Director of 
Naval Intelligence at the Admiralty, to whom the task was assigned, 
quickly realized that both methods had to be used. 

It is true that the art of cryptography can be developed by constant 
practice, but it also requires a special flair. Whence, at short notice, was 
the British Admiralty going to recruit the necessary personnel, and 
above all where was the man to be found who had sufficient experi- 
ence to direct such a service ? Chance favored the British. In the Ad- 
miralty itself was a man who, as a hobby, had made a life study of 
cryptography. This man was Sir Alfred Ewing, Director of Naval 
Education, a noted scientist; and it was to him that Admiral Sir Henry 

c c 


Oliver, Director of Naval Intelligence at the outbreak of the war, 

Sir Alfred eagerly accepted the assignment. Starting v^ith a staff of 
Rwc men, he patiently trained them and then added to their number 
until eventually he had a band of fifty assistants — mathematicians, 
linguists, and, later, secret ink chemists. Space for Sir Alfred and his 
staff was found in the Old Admiralty Building in Room 40, and to 
keep the nature of the organization secret it was always referred to as 
"40 O.B." (Old Building). 

Ewing's appointment was one of the most judicious ever made at the 
Admiralty. While battles raged at the front and at sea, this frail, 
slightly-built man, with his enormous head, bushy eyebrows, and dark 
piercing eyes, tranquilly seated in his peaceful office at the Admiralty 
listening attentively, learned through intercepted and decoded messages 
what the next moves of the enemy would be. Even though the Germans 
constantly invented new codes or scrambled up and combined existing 
ones, he and the men working under him were always able to solve their 

The existence of the British Cryptographic Service was one of the 
most jealously guarded secrets of the war. Even some of the British 
Cabinet Ministers did not know of its existence, and many a member 
of the Admiralty never heard of it until long afterwards. But those who 
were in the know realized that it contributed largely to the ultimate 
victory of the Allies. The public for the first time heard of it in 1925 
when Sir Alfred Ewing caused a sensation by referring to it in an 
address which he gave at the University of Edinburgh. Shortly after- 
wards. Lord Balfour made the following declaration: "The country 
owes *40 O.B.' an immense debt of gratitude, a debt which, for the 
moment at least, cannot be paid. Secrecy was an essential part of the 
work, and never was a secret better guarded." 

There are hundreds of code and cipher systems, some of which arc 
simple, others so complex as to tax the uttermost ingenuity of the 
cryptographer. Some are based on a verse or prose passage, or on an 
intricate combination of numbers, others are as elementary as the 
prearranged interchange of the letters of the alphabet. Some require the 
use of ponderous code books; others, in order to prevent their falling 


into the hands of the enemy, can be committed to memory. The skilled 
cryptographer must take most of these in his stride. 

Cryptography alone, however, could not possibly unravel the secrets 
of all the German coded messages w^hich crov^ded both the air and 
other channels of communication. The larger codes are in the form of a 
dictionary, with a group of five or six numbers to represent each word 
or phrase. As each group of figures is chosen arbitrarily, there is no 
means of deciphering such a code unless the actual code book or a copy 
of it is used. As many of the German coded messages were based on the 
larger codes, "40 O.B.'* could therefore never have achieved its bril- 
liant success had not many of these codes, by some means or other, 
fallen into the hands of the British. The difficult task of acquiring them 
devolved on the British Naval Intelligence Service. 

In October 1914 Captain W. R. Hall, who later was knighted and 
promoted to the rank of admiral, took over from Admiral Sir Henry 
Oliver the direction of the Naval Intelligence Service. Sir Reginald, or 
"Blinker" Hall, as he was affectionately known to his intimates, was 
splendidly endowed for this work. The following estimate of him 
made by Walter Hines Page, the American Ambassador in London, in 
a confidential letter to President Wilson in 1917, was no exaggeration: 

Hall is one genius that the War has developed. Neither in fiction nor in 
fact can you find any such man to match him. Of the wonderful things that 
I know he has done there are several that it would take an exciting volume 
to tell. The man is a genius — a clear case of genius. All other Secret Service 

men are amateurs by comparison 1 shall never meet another man like 

him : that were too much to expect. 

Apart from Hall's intimate experience and knowledge of everything 
pertaining to secret service, he was an uncanny judge of character. One 
glance was sufficient for him to sum a man up. It was thus that he 
immediately gauged the qualities of Ewing, chosen by his predecessor, 
and promptly gave him carte blanche in the running of "40 O.B." The 
rest of his staff was chosen and handled with equal perception. He 
also had a remarkable ability in cross-examination, which proved the 
downfall of many a suspected German spy who was snared in the net 
he laid for him. However watertight their story, as Horst von der Goltz 


and von Rintelen found when they had to face him in 191 5, he in- 
tuitively picked out the flaws in their aHbis or defenses. "He can see 
through your very immortal soul. What eyes the man has got!" was 
the despairing remark of one of his victims. But it was the acquiring 
of German codes which was Sir Reginald's special vocation. Under his 
expert guidance and planning some were stolen by his daring agents; 
some were recovered from sunken German submarines and warships; 
others were captured by the British forces in various parts of the world. 
Although the British diplomatic and fighting services knew nothing 
about "40 O.B.," yet, as if attracted by a magnet, all information ac- 
quired by them pertaining to German codes found its way to Hall. 
His net was spun so finely that nothing missed him. To illustrate his 
methods we will tell how three of the many codes which fell into his 
hands were obtained. 

A few hours after the German occupation of Brussels, the powerful 
wireless station at the Belgian capital had been converted to German 
use. As the intercepted messages started coming in to "40 O.B.," it be- 
came immediately evident to Sir Alfred Ewing that the Germans at the 
Brussels station were making extensive use of one of their large diplo- 
matic codes. Many of the messages defied the efforts of some of his best 

British agents, recruited from amongst the Belgians who remained 
behind in the occupied territory, were sending a steady stream of spy 
reports through to Holland. Here, then, was as good a field as any in 
which to attempt to secure possession of one of the larger German 
codes. H.523, one of the best of the British agents, was charged with the 
mission. Careful observation and inquiry by him yielded results. He 
discovered that the German coding staff was located in the Kom- 
mandantur in Brussels and that it was composed of four coding clerks, 
one of whom was an Austrian, Alexander Szek, a brilliant young en- 
gineer, born in Croydon, a suburb of London, whose father had moved 
with him to Brussels several years before the war. Immediately after 
the occupation of Belgium, the German and Austrian authorities had 
called to the colors all their nationals of military age residing in the 
territory, and young Szek had been one of them. His knowledge of 
the French language and of Brussels had won for him an assignment 


in the German counter-espionage service, and from there, in the course 
of time, he had been transferred as a coding clerk to the Komman- 

On receipt of agent H.523's report, the British Secret Service was 
quick to seize on the point that Szek was born in London. A check-up 
of aHens registered in Croydon revealed that Szek had a sister still 
living there, that she was employed as a governess in an English family, 
and that, as in the case of so many Austrians, she was violently anti- 
German. It was not difficult, therefore, to persuade her to write a letter 
to her brother on fine tissue paper urging him to aid the British by 
securing for them the code. Her letter was handed to H.523 on one of 
his periodical trips across the frontier into Holland. 

To approach Szek directly was a dangerous and delicate undertak- 
ing, but H.523 was skilled in the right methods of approach. After 
winning Szek's confidence by giving him news of his sister, H.523 
finally handed him her letter. At first Szek was afraid, but after 
considerable persuasion he eventually fell in with H.523's plans. Szek's 
first thought was to steal the code, but H.523 quickly pointed out to 
him that this would defeat their object, as the Germans would im- 
mediately change it. And so Szek set about the laborious task of secretly 
copying the code during his hours of service. This took him several 
months, since he could only do the copying during the odd moments 
he was left alone in the coding room during the luncheon hour. Finally, 
however, in April 1915 the task was completed. But to H.523's dismay 
Szek refused to give him the code. He insisted instead on escaping 
across the frontier with it to Holland. In vain H.523 pleaded with him 
that his flight would arouse the suspicion of the Germans that the code 
had been copied. But Szek was adamant; he had just received confi- 
dential information that he was about to be transferred to the front; 
and from the firing line, above all, he wished to escape. Therefore, 
early in April 1915 on a moonless night, the two of them set out for the 
Belgian-Dutch, frontier. 

It was the period just after the Germans had completed their for- 
midable barrier along the Belgian-Dutch border to prevent the pas- 
sage of spy reports and to put a stop to the flow of refugees escaping 
across the border to join the Belgian Army. A high-voltage electric 

> > 


fence, eight feet high, sentries every hundred yards, searchlights, police 
dogs, a horde of secret service police, and mounted patrols covered the 
length of the frontier. Arriving near the border, Szek began to regret 
his decision. The danger v^as as real as being in the trenches. He was 
now glad to get rid of the compromising copy of the code by handing 
it to H.523. 

Equipped with India rubber gloves and socks to enable them to cross 
the high-tension electric fence, the two men, crouched in the long 
grass, awaiting the moment when the sentry near them would reach 
the point on his beat farthest away from them. But their wait was cut 
short, a police dog started barking, the alarm was given, the search- 
lights were switched on, and the sentry started shooting. H.523, ex- 
perienced in crossing the high-voltage electric fence, made a dash for 
the border and succeeded in getting across, but Szek turned back and 
tried to escape. H.523 brought the code to Colonel Oppenheim, the 
British Military Attache at The Hague; and in due course it was for- 
warded to Sir Reginald Hall. What happened to Szek will ever remain 
one of the mysteries of the war. 

Szek's father, who lived with him in the rue du Lombard, in Brus- 
sels, never heard of his son again. He was convinced that his son got 
across the frontier; and when after the Armistice he failed to return 
home, he accused the British of making away with him to prevent the 
Germans' finding out that the British had a copy of the code. 

After the war the author of this book was in charge of the British 
Intelligence Commission, whose function it was to liquidate all the 
British spy services which had operated behind the German western 
front in occupied Belgium and northeastern France. In the course of 
his investigation he came across some evidence to show that Alexander 
Szek had been kept in solitary confinement in the Namur prison, that 
he v/as tried by court-martial, found guilty of being a deserter from 
military service, and shot. The author's informant was a former Ger- 
man soldier who had served during the war as a warder at the prison. 
This man, born in Silesia, acquired Polish nationality by the Peace 
Treaty, and remained in Belgium after the Armistice. The author is 
inclined to believe the warder's story — he had no reason to invent it — 
but Szek's father refused to accept it. To him it was just another ruse 


of the British to keep the truth away from him. On the other hand, if 
the Germans did shoot Alexander Szek, why did they not notify his 
father? And why after the war, when the father made inquiry in 
BerUn, did the German authorities inform him that they had no record 
of his son's execution ? 

Whatever the solution to the mystery, and whatever suspicions the 
Germans may have had, it is evident that they were not aware that the 
British had secured a copy of the code, for, except for a few minor 
variations, it remained unchanged and in active use until the end of 
the war. 

For the story of the second code we must now switch to another part 
of the world. One of the principal sources of oil supply for the British 
fleet was the oil wells of the Anglo-Persian Company in Persia. These 
oil wells, situated several hundred miles inland, were connected to the 
Persian Gulf by a pipeline. The protection of this vital artery of supply 
became a supreme necessity. The task was a difficult one, owing to the 
length of the pipeline and the barren nature of the country through 
which it ran. The whole length of it could not be guarded at the same 
time, and the surveillance had to be entrusted to mounted patrols. Not 
only had these patrols to watch out for marauding bands of Turks 
and Kurds, who knew the terrain much better than the British, but 
Persia itself was a hotbed of German intrigue; and, as was the case in 
other neutral countries, it was overrun by German agents, who, in most 
cases, were directed by some German official enjoying diplomatic im- 

Wasmuss, the German Consul at Shiraz, was specially active, and 
of this fact the British Intelligence Service was fully aware. In fact, so 
well were they posted as to his activities, and so closely was he watched, 
that the British knew several days ahead of time of a raid on the pipe- 
line he planned to carry out with the help of Kurdish irregulars. 

The date and the locality of the raid being known, an ambush was 
laid for Wasmuss and his band of Kurds. It was a surprised German 
Consul who found himself surrounded and forced to surrender before 
more than a shot or two had been fired. Pleased as the British were 
with their haul, they were even more delighted and surprised when 
they discovered an important German code in the possession of Was- 


muss. So sure had he been of success that, with characteristic German 
thoroughness, he had brought the code along with him. He had wished 
to lose no time in sending through to the Turkish lines, for wireless 
transmission to Berlin, a coded message announcing the details of his 

The code was promptly forwarded to Sir Reginald Hall. It was the 
German code number 13040. It proved later to be one of the biggest 
scoops of the war, for it was possession of it which enabled "40 O.B." 
to decipher the Zimmermann telegram. 

Even though the Germans heard of the capture of Wasmuss, it never 
dawned on them that he could have been so foolish and indiscreet as 
to have permitted the code to fall into the hands of the British. Today 
the code is still in the possession of Sir Reginald and is one of his most 
prized souvenirs. 

Several codes were also recovered from German warships sunk by 
the British Navy. Of these the code from the cruiser Magdeburg was 
one of the most important. Within a few minutes after a British tor- 
pedo struck her, she went to the bottom, and only a handful of the 
crew were saved. Days afterwards a British torpedo boat patrolling the 
area sighted a floating body. It turned out to be the commander of 
the Magdeburg. Buttoned securely in his tunic was the code book. 
Some of the survivors later testified that when last they saw their 
commander, he was standing on deck with the code book clasped in 
his hands. 

Such, then, was the organization which he had brought to per- 
fection. Not only was there "40 O.B.," which was capable of mastering 
every German cipher, but also Sir Reginald's network spread through- 
out the world, which was able to acquire by theft or capture every 
important German code. This combination of skilled cryptographers 
and the actual possession of the large German codes enabled Sir 
Reginald and his organization to decipher every German coded message 
which came into their possession. 

To pick up the German wireless messages, receiving stations were 
erected at Lowestoft, Lerwick, Murcar, and York. These stations not 
only sufficed to intercept the messages for dispatch to "40 O.B.," but 
they served also as radio goniometric stations to furnish bearings 


for triangulating the position of any German vessel using its wireless. 

Not satisfied with intercepting every German wireless message which 
flashed through the air, agents were actively employed in all neutral 
countries to secure copies of coded telegrams and cables sent out by 
German diplomatic representatives over neutral telegraph and cable 
lines. This was specially necessary in the case of the messages which 
passed back and forth between von Bernstorff and Berlin; for, as we 
shall see, not all of them by any means were sent through radio stations. 

Long before the war Germany had seen the necessity of establishing 
a complete wireless system throughout the world. In accordance with 
this plan she had in 1911 erected a wireless station at Sayville, Long 
Island. This foresight had permitted her throughout the first two 
months of the war to have untrammeled wireless communication with 
her representatives in the United States. But in September 1914 the 
United States Government seized the station, realizing that it was be- 
ing used to direct movements of German commerce raiders still at sea 
and was thereby infringing American neutrality. At the same time a 
censorship was enforced and the sending of coded messages was pro- 

German ingenuity, hov/ever, soon found a means of evasion. Receiv- 
ing the incoming messages sent out every morning at 3 a.m. from the 
powerful German station at Nauen, near Berlin, was simple. Many of 
the interned German ships, although forced to take down their regular 
antennae, rerigged them in funnels or other places of concealment. 
Several secret receiving stations were also erected in private homes. 
The sending of messages, however, was more difficult. One method was 
to use prearranged key phrases embedded in apparently innocent com- 
mercial telegrams; but for messages important enough to demand the 
use of one of their large codes they availed themselves chiefly of neutral 
channels, especially those provided by Sweden. The Sv/edish Foreign 
Office was notoriously pro-German, and German messages were fre- 
quently put in Swedish cipher and sent to Swedish Ministers in other 
countries for delivery to their German colleagues. Incredible though it 
may seem, Germany also occasionally beguiled the State Department 
on one pretext or another into forwarding her messages. 

The British network of agents in the neutral countries picked up 

THE SECRETS OF '*40 O.B." l6l 

most of these cables, however; and even those forv^arded through the 
State Department w^ere intercepted in London, as the cable lines from 
the United States to Europe passed through the British Isles. In Hol- 
land where the author was in charge of the Military Section of the 
British Secret Service during the war, one of the British agents was 
specially assigned to procure, through secret connections of his in the 
Dutch telegraph office, copies of all telegrams sent to Berlin by the 
German Minister at The Hague. Such a telegram, intercepted by a 
British agent in neutral Chile and decoded by "40 O.B.," gave the 
British Admiralty the information that Admiral von Spee and his 
squadron were about to sail from Valparaiso for the Falkland Islands. 
This permitted the Admiralty to draft the plan which led to the sink- 
ing of von Spec's ships by Admiral Sturdee. Proof of the efficiency of 
the British network was that the Zimmermann telegram was sent 
through four different routes to von Eckhardt, the German Minister 
to Mexico, and that the British picked it up in each case. 

One of the routes was via the State Department and von Bernstorfl. 
It happened that at this time the Germans were discussing with Presi- 
dent Wilson the possibility of ending the war by a negotiated peace. As 
these conversations were initiated by the President, he was anxious to 
provide every facility for communications to pass to and fro between 
Berlin and von Bernstorff. Therefore, he had instructed Ambassador 
Gerard to forward German diplomatic cipher cables through the 
American Embassy instead of insisting on their being presented in 
clear for transmission in the American code. The Germans had taken 
advantage of this situation and had merely tacked the Zimmermann 
telegram onto the end of one dealing with the peace negotiations. 

By 1916 over 2,000 coded messages were coming into "40 O.B." daily, 
and not one failed to be decoded. Relying upon the secrecy of their 
codes, the Germans were amazingly loquacious. They filled the air 
with the most secret information concerning their army, navy and 
diplomatic service, and all this "40 O.B." grasped out of the ether. 
In addition most of the German messages sent over neutral cables were 
also intercepted. The result was that the British had as accurate in- 
formation about German affairs as the Germans themselves. To cite a 
few instances: The movements of German warships were known in 


the cases of each of the principal naval engagements; and in the case 
of the Battle of the Dogger Bank, the British knew twenty-four hours 
ahead of time which German warships had left port and the times of 
their departures ; track was kept of all German submarines, and a map 
was kept on the wall in "40 O.B." showing the position of each one as 
revealed by its wireless messages; the Admiralty was warned well in 
advance about each Zeppelin raid; the activities of Sir Roger Casement 
in Germany were flashed freely back and forth between Berlin and 
von Bernstorff in Washington, and the British knew the exact day he 
embarked by submarine for the west coast of Ireland, and thus were 
able to lie in wait for him. The German confidence in their codes also 
cost their Intelligence Services dear: the names and activities of dozens 
of their spies were revealed in their messages, and this was the cause 
of many a sensational arrest. 

Not until after the war did the Germans realize that all their coded 
messages had been an open book to the British and consequently to all 
the Allies. They continued to use most of their larger codes throughout 
the war, and even when changes were made, these were transmitted by 
wireless in the old code; consequently "40 O.B." was able to listen in 
and make note of these changes. Even the precautionary measures they 
adopted were exploited by "40 O.B." For example, whenever a Zeppelin 
started out on a raid over England, it left the regular naval code behind, 
and instead took along with it a special code, prefixed "H.V.B." This 
was in case it was shot down. Preliminary to a raid, each Zeppelin tak- 
ing part in it radioed "H.V.B. alone on board"; this was sufficient in- 
dication to "40 O.B." that a raid was about to take place. 

But it would be unfair to Sir Reginald Hall if we blamed the Ger- 
mans entirely for their blind confidence in their codes. Great credit is 
due him for the tricks he invented to keep the Germans in the dark. 
Again and again during the war he was puzzled how to make use of 
his information without betraying the existence of "40 O.B." His in- 
genuity in this was almost as great as the skill of his organization in 
intercepting and decoding the messages. Even in communicating in- 
formation to British staff oflScers of the Army and Navy, the source 
was always carefully camouflaged. 

The publication of the Zimmermann telegram by President Wilson 


gave Sir Reginald many anxious moments. The danger of publication 
was foreseen; and strange as it may seem, the British kept the telegram 
almost a month before they could bring themselves to communicate it. 
Hall was prepared, however, when publication took place. He called 
in a representative of the London Daily Mail, and when the interview 
was well started asked, "Don't you think we have been slow to let the 
Americans get a jump on us?" 

"What do you mean?" the journalist queried. 

"Why, the Zimmermann telegram," Hall replied. "Here we have 
been trying in vain since the commencement of the war to secure de- 
coded copies of German wireless messages, and apparently the Ameri- 
cans have had no difficulty in procuring them." 

The journalist looked at Sir Reginald with surprise, and demanded, 
"What do you want me to do about it?" 

"Publish it." 

Still more dumbfounded, the representative of the Daily Mail 
pointed out the impossibility of doing this because of the censor. 

"Leave the censor to me," Hall replied. 

It was only then that the journalist grasped Sir Reginald's strategy 
and what was expected of him. 

On the following day, under large headlines, a sensational article 
appeared in the Daily Mail praising the ingenuity of the Americans in 
securing a copy of the decoded telegram and criticizing the British 
Intelligence Services for failing to do so. 

At the same time. Sir Reginald's agents in New York skillfully cir- 
culated a rumor that American agents had succeeded in securing a 
copy of the telegram in Mexico City. 

The German reaction was immediate. Hall was able to smile with 
satisfaction when "40 O.B." brought him the following decoded mes- 
sages addressed to von Eckhardt, the German Minister in Mexico City: 

To: Mexico No. 20 21st March, 1917 

Most Secret. Decipher personally. 
Please cable in same cipher who deciphered Cable Dispatches I and II, 
how the originals and decodes were kept, and, in particular, whether both 
dispatches were kept in the same place. 



From: Berlin No. 22 27th March, 1917 

To: Mexico 

Various indications suggest that the treachery was committed in Mexico. 

The greatest caution is indicated. 

Burn all compromising material. 

These messages evidently greatly disturbed von Eckhardt, for he re- 
plied in great detail and furnished evidence that von Bernstorff's office 
in Washington was to blame: 

From: Mexico No. 14 30/3/17 

To: Berlin 

Reply to telegram No. 22. Greater caution than is always exercised here 
would be impossible. The text of telegrams which have arrived is read to 
me at night in my dwelling house by Magnus, in a low voice. My servant, 
who does not understand German, sleeps' in an annex. Apart from this, 
the text is never anywhere but in Magnus' hand or in the steel safe, the 
method of opening which is only known to him and myself. 

According to Kinkel, in Washington even secret telegrams were known 
to the whole chancery. Two copies were regularly made for the Embassy 
records. Here there can be no question of carbon copies or waste paper. 

Having set von Eckhardt and von Bernstorff about each other's ears, 
Hall was satisfied. The more so since Zimmermann supinely continued 
to use the same code. From the contents of the above cables it is clear 
that the Germans had swallowed Hall's insinuated explanation that it 
was a copy of the telegram in clear which had been stolen and that the 
code itself was not compromised. 

Many other ingenious ruses were employed by Sir Reginald to mis- 
lead the Germans. From action taken by the British on information 
contained in the German coded messages, it eventually became obvious 
to the Germans that there was a serious leak somewhere. At all costs 
Hall had to dispel any suspicion among the Germans that their codes 
were compromised, or could be deciphered by an organization such as 
"40 O.B." Two of his agents, both of French nationality, played an 
important role in this work of deception. One of them was an Attache 
at the French Embassy in a neutral country, the other was a member 
of the French Secret Service. Both of them posed as traitors and sue- 

THE SECRETS OF ''4O O.B. ' 165 

ceeded in winning the confidence of the Germans. Apart from giving 
the Germans information which the AHies could afford to let them 
know, they would occasionally startle the Germans by giving them in- 
formation about the most secret German plans gleaned by Hall either 
through "40 O.B." or from one of his spies in Germany. On one oc- 
casion the bogus traitors informed the Germans that Sir Roger Case- 
ment had embarked on a German submarine and was on his way to 
the West Coast of Ireland. (Hall knew that the submarine was at sea 
and could not be stopped.) In reply to the frantic demands of the Ger- 
mans as to the source of the information, all the two informants could 
offer was that it was a most jealously guarded secret but that they had 
been able to discover that the information came from a high official 
in Germany who was in the pay of one of the Allies. Since HalFs two 
agents were located in two different neutral countries and played their 
parts with infinite astuteness, the Germans considered the information 
supplied by the one as a a corroboration of that of the other. Des- 
perately the German counter-espionage service attempted to locate the 
arch-traitor, and as time went on offered a fabulous reward for infor- 
mation which would lead to his arrest. In the meantime. Hall and 
"40 O.B." calmly continued to extract Germany's most intimate and 
vital secrets from her coded messages which flowed back and forth 
between Berlin and the outside world. 

No wonder Peaslee was speeding across the ocean to meet Admiral 

Chapter XVII 

After exchanging several telegrams with Admiral Hall, Peaslee even- 
tually met him on August 27, 1925, at his London residence at 53 
Cadogan Gardens. Sir Reginald had arranged to leave that night for 
some grouse shooting in Scotland, and Peaslee therefore lost no time 
in plunging into the object of his mission. He found Hall in full 
sympathy vv^ith the American claimants, and so commendatory v^as 
Admiral Sims's letter that he ended up their conference by saying: 
"Copies of the decoded German cables are stored avi^ay in several tin 
boxes in the basement. I sealed up these boxes w^ith instructions that 
they w^ere not to be opened up for twenty years. You have caused me 
to change my mind, however. I will open up the boxes for you. Copy 
such of the cables as you think will be useful to you. Make yourself at 
home. The servants will look after you." His rapid and sweeping de- 
cision was typical of the man. Fortunately he was retired from the 
Navy and was, therefore, his own master. 

Hall took Peaslee down to the basement, spread the cables before 
him, and took his leave to catch the train for Scotland. Peaslee found 
over 10,000 cables, radio messages, and letters which Hall had inter- 
cepted and decoded. Twenty-six different codes had been used in 
sending these messages. Attached to the originals was a translation 
in clear, also the "recognition group," or number of the code used. 

Some of these cables have already been incorporated throughout this 
book; and as Peaslee read them here for the first time he saw proof of 
the existence in the United States of that vast sabotage organization 
described in the preceding chapters and also irrefutable evidence con- 
necting von BernstorfiF and his staff with these activities. 

In addition it became clear to him that even if the sabotage cam- 


A sketch by Fred Herrmann, a former 
German sabotage agent, of the design 
used in the German incendiary pen- 
cils. The black section at the top 
represents the lead at the point. When 
this is broken the tip of the glass 
tube is shattered and sulphuric acid 
is allowed to mix with chlorate of 
potash and sugar in the lower con^ 
tainer through a capillary tube. This 
results in a white-hot flame's being re- 
leased through the top. A pencil like 
this may have been used in firing the 
plant at Kingsland, New Jersey 

Fiodore Wozniak—the Fire Bug 


paign had reached its peak in the United States, it had been directed 
against every neutral country in the world — a campaign the magni- 
tude of which was beyond anything ever before recorded in the annals 
of international relations. 

The following telegram, dated December 22, 1914, from the German 
Charge d'Afifaires in Peking, and relayed by von Bernstorff to Berlin, 
is indicative of activities in China: 

Military Attache is leaving the day after tomorrow to undertake operations 
against the [Siberian] Railway in person. He has furnished me with the 
following report: 

I. Traffic having been interrupted for fourteen days at the end of Sep- 
tember and for eighteen days at the end of October by explosions on certain 
sections of the railway, it is now necessary to have recourse to force, as the 
line is closely guarded. I am proceeding with eight hundred [Chungchueses?] 
through Eastern Mongolia in order to operate against the Nonni section 
and the Hailar Tunnel, which will be destroyed about the middle of 
January. . . . 


3. I have entered into relations with the representative of the Russian 
Revolutionary Committee for the Maritime Province, who states that all 
preparations have been made for an insurrection, and that the prospects of 
success are excellent.... 

Argentina, like the United States, was an important source of supply 
for the Allies, and here German agents were especially active. On April 
24, 1915, Zimmermann cabled Buenos Aires: 

It would be desirable to render useless certain particular cargoes of 
corn, an operation which can be effected, without danger to human beings, 
by means of doses of Kokodyl, or Merkaptan contained in Gelodorat cap- 
sules. Experiments made here have demonstrated that the capsules can be 
made to look like grains of corn. They should for this purpose be mixed up 
with the corn when the latter is being shipped from the silos. Two or three 
capsules would suffice to render a hundred kilograms of corn offensive to 
the smell. There is no result until the corn is ground in a mill. You should 
report whether it is possible to get supplies of the above and to carry out 
the project. 


Not satisfied with destroying corn, German agents, under the direc- 
tion of an agent known as Arnold, also inoculated mules and cattle 
with disease germs. On January 19, 1918, the following telegram was 
sent to Berlin via the Military Attache in Madrid: "Most Secret: 
Arnold reports a constant transport of mules to Mesopotamia some of 
which have been treated by him " 

Then apparently the germ campaign was halted for a time, for on 
February 2, 1918, Arnold telegraphed to Berlin, through the Military 
Attache in Madrid, asking for permission to recommence operations: 

For the Supreme Command. 

Berlin Tel. 19177 of September 12: Decision for Arnold as to cattle and corn. 

As this decision was not made, and a female agent of the Naval Attache, 
who had brought the cultures to Buenos Aires had fallen under suspicion 
in the meantime, I instructed the person in question to abandon this line 
of work, which has hitherto been very successful, and which he regards as 
relatively free from risk. 

I request a decision. 

He asks for the Iron Cross for his most valuable collaborator, Dr. 
Herman Fischer. 

Military Attache 

To this there was a reply from Berlin on February 11, 1918: 

Please instruct Arnold to continue his successful activity against cattle. 

His work directed against grain is to be suppressed as it promises little 

If it is possible to do so without attracting attention, please send personal 
details as to Fischer. 

General Staff 

On February 14, 1918, the Military Attache in Madrid telegraphed 

Instructions in accordance with Tel. 23357 of February loth were sent 
telegraphically. The person in question reports that owing to his work 
the export of horses to France and Italy has for the time being completely 
ceased. Since September four ships with 5,400 mules started for Meso- 
potamia; all were thoroughly treated 


Towards the end of February 1918, Arnold, as is evidenced by the 
following telegram, sent one of his agents to the United States: 

From: Madrid 

To: Berlin February 28, 1918 

Arnold has dispatched a confidential agent Julio Rico * to the States and 
requests that the Military Attache at Stockholm should be informed that 
this confidential agent will perhaps announce himself as dispatched by 
Miller of Buenos Aires. 

This was six weeks before the mysterious influenza epidemic which 
carried off thousands of American soldiers broke out in the military 
camps in the United States. Although there is no evidence that Ger- 
many was responsible, yet in view of the above telegram and the one 
which follows there is room for conjecture: 

Most Secret 

From: Madrid 

To: Berlin August 22, 1918 

Donhoff has sent some remarks of the Director of the Bacteriological 
Institute at Buenos Aires, Dr. Kraus, concerning the prevention of serum 
diseases by the substitution or admixture of horse serum with bovine serum. 

Kraus comes to the following conclusions which have been tested in 
practice : 

1. If bovine serum is heated twice 56° (half an hour) it causes hardly 
any serum disease even if administered in very large quantities (300 cases 
of anthrax, 40 of typhus). 

2. The diphtheria and tetanus serum obtained from cattle causes hardly 
any serum disease in cases of diphtheria and tetanus in man. 

3. If a preliminary injection of diphtheria bovine serum is made, a sub- 
cutaneous injection without running any risk of producing serum disease. 
If the procedure is reversed serum disease occurs. 

The names of the other agents who carried on in the United States 
an extensive campaign of inoculating livestock with glanders and 
anthrax have already been revealed. Although these particular agents 
confined their activities to animals, there is a cryptic entry in von 

* Julio Rico was subsequendy arrested in the United States for poisoning 


IgePs account book which needs explaining — it showed an expenditure 
up to November 30, 1915, of $82,109.08 for a consignment of tetanus 
germs. No explanation has ever been forthcoming. 

Other neutral South American nations were not exempted from Ger- 
many's activities. On January 27, 1918, Madrid telegraphed Berlin: 

I have received a cipher message dated December 17th [1917] from the 
Legation, Caracas [Venezuela], with contents as follows: 

The agent at Curasao resigned his appointment in April, 1917, on account 
of the sharp watch kept on his activities . . . could not be made use of. As 
it was impossible to replace him by a suitable person, the secret material 
including that which has lately arrived will be kept here. 

Two other points of interest were brought to light : There were sev- 
eral telegrams to show that during the neutrality period the Germans 
had shipped bomb and incendiary devices to their agents in the United 
States in consignments of Swiss toys. There was also the following tele- 
gram to show that the Military Intelligence Center in New York was 
moved to Havana, Cuba, shortly before the United States entered the 

From: Havana 

To: Rio de Janeiro 31st [ ?] February, 1917. 

...New York Intelligence Center has been transferred to Havana. Send 
next telegram via Buenos Aires. 

Naval Representative 

As interesting as these telegrams were to Peaslee, there were others 
that riveted his attention even more closely. They contained not only the 
names of German sabotage agents already known to him; but what 
was still more important those of dozens hitherto unmentioned, who 
had operated with impunity in the United States during the neutrality 
period, and had later escaped to Mexico. He also noted innumerable 
clues which, he realized, would solve the mysteries of Black Tom and 
Kingsland if followed up. These radiograms and cables he copied care- 

By August 31, 1925, he had completed his work. It had taken him 5 
days to read through the deciphered messages and copy nearly 300 of 


the more revealing ones. Worn out, he returned to his hotel. He then 
wrote a letter to Hall expressing his heartfelt thanks and sent him a 
copy of the cables and radiograms he had copied. A few days later he 
was on his way back to the United States on the Leviathan, 

Jahnke's was one of the first names which had caught Peaslee's eye 
in reading through the cables. 

The following cable, dated November 12, 1917, sent from Mexico to 
Berlin via Madrid and marked "For Antwerp," establishes Jahnke's 
connection with Wunnenberg, and through him with Wilhelm, the 
director of the Antwerp branch of the German Naval Intelligence 

Kurt Jahnke, who states that he has been appointed by Wunnenberg, 
alias Son Charles,* for secret service in U.S.A., reports as follows from 
Mexico. Charles and Sanders are in prison in New York. With the re- 
mainder of the money Kurt has established S. Service in accordance with 
instructions which were brought by a drunken Danish Captain from 
Switzerland. He cannot be responsible for the service in Mexico because he 
cannot receive money from U.SA. Kurt asks for further instructions in 
order to have a basis for Mexico, and asks to be informed in what manner 
he is to expect his instructions. He proposes that a naval expert should be 
sent to Mexico, as hitherto nothing has been done there in the naval line. 

Von Eckhardt 

Berlin was apparently waiting for the departure of a confidential 
messenger from Spain for Mexico, for on December 8, 1917, Berlin 
telegraphed Madrid: 

If your messenger of December 21st is trustworthy please give him the 
following instructions for Jahnke and the Legation. Jahnke is to get into 
communication with the Military Representative at the Legation in Mexico 
in order to operate principally against ships with S. undertakings. He is to 
try and send an agent from Mexico to U.S.A. The messenger must if possible 
take the [?W/T] Code as well as the Spanish covering addresses for letters 
and telegraphic communication with Jahnke. As soon as a messenger arrives 
in Mexico he should discuss the Mexican matter with the M.A. there. 

* The code name of Wunnenberg. 


This telegram is of special interest, for it was on receipt of these in- 
structions that Jahnke sent Witzke off on the mission which cul- 
minated in his arrest. 
A new leader then turned up on the Mexican scene, for on December 

27, 1917, Madrid radioed Berlin: 

From a conversation Delmar has received the impression that not alone 
Jahnke is not self-reliant but that he is not entirely reUable. Therefore ... I 
have handed the contents of No. 196 to the messenger for Captain Hinsch 
especially as he is a German and also because he enjoys the confidence of 
the Minister. I have also given him the new method of ciphering. A safe 
opportunity of sending by post to Mexico only occurs once a month by a 
Spanish steamer, leaving Coruna every 21st either by a special messenger 
or a man belonging to the crew. 

In a telegram dated January 4, 1918, Berlin concurred and wirelessed 
Delmar via Madrid as follows: 

The Admiralty has withdrawn the commission to Jahnke for sabotage 
undertakings, and contemplates appointing Hinsch instead. As the latter 
is already in service with you, The Admiralty agree that Hinsch shall remain 
under your orders and shall be occupied in naval business in January. His 
activities, however, must be under your control in agreement with the 

Jahnke, however, had no intention of accepting Berlin's decision, for 
he promptly took steps to enlist the support of von Eckhardt, the Ger- 
man Minister to Mexico. How successful he was in this is evidenced 
by the following message dispatched from Madrid to Berlin on March 

28, 1918: 

A messenger from Mexico has handed in a long report from Jahnke to 
the Admiralty Staff, which represents Delmar and Captain Hinsch as [a 
word is here apparently omitted] and as actually criminal and claims for 
himself sole direction. He demands telegraphic instructions to this effect 
from Nauen to the Minister. I leave to the Naval Attache who is at this 
moment absent from Madrid the task of sending a more detailed report as 
to the dispatch which in my opinion is absolutely shameless both in form 
and matter. The dispatch was accompanied by a telegram for the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs which the Ambassador will forward and which un- 


fortunately proves that the Minister who according to Delmar's previous 
statements is easily swayed is at present entirely under the influence of 

Military Attache 

The announced telegram from von Eckhardt, then followed: * 

Cooperation between Jahnke and Hinsch is in consequence of their mutual 
distrust impossible. 

Jahnke's work must not be interrupted and he is therefore receiving 
financial support through me. 

In consequence of very grave discoveries I request permission to [dismiss] 
Delmar, Hinsch . . . from my [Intelligence Service], approval to be indicated 
by telegraphing the word "dismiss." 

In addition, on April 3, 191 8, Jahnke cabled via Madrid to Wilhelm, 
his chief, in Antwerp; and at the same time he stressed his former 
success in the United States: 

The instructions given by Lieut. Stephan to Captain Hinsch placing me 
under his orders was a painful surprise to me. Acording to my instructions 
from Son Charles, I was to work independently in the U.S.A. and Mexico. 
I am accustomed to doing this. My successes justify the confidence which 
has been placed in me. Dr. Delmar neither knows anything of my activities 
nor is he in a position to judge. Hinsch has absolutely no organization; it is 
out of the question placing my services at his disposal; and besides, Hinsch 
has no experience, is incapable and tactless and works with characteristic 
pettiness and personal spite. 

The destruction of war factories and provisions in the U. S. A. is working 
satisfactorily. Since May 1917 my people report as destroyed, the English 
S.S. Clar\, Japanese S.S. Itfh [?]. 

I am now occupied in causing strikes and mutinies in the Army. Shall 
I counter-order the steps proposed against Japanese steamers? Am I to 
undertake anything against Japanese Colony in CaHfornia? The American 
Pacific [Canadian Pacific] Fleet has now been organized ... and the service 
is carried out by cruisers out of commission. They forward by sea thirty 
thousand men who proceed to France every third week alternately via 
Pensacola and Long Island Bay. I recommend submarine attacks on the 

* The latter part of the message is mutilated, but the general sense is clear. 


American coast with a possible base in Mexico. In this event may I employ 
naval officers in Chile? 

Berlin now decided to retain Jahnke's services, and at the same time 
corroborated the account of his successes. Accordingly, a fev^ days later, 
Berlin informed Madrid: 

According to Jahnke, detailed accounts of the successes mentioned appear 
credible. His cooperation for the Admiralty Staff must therefore unquestion- 
ably remain. A direct telegram from Jahnke has arrived saying that he 
cannot work in company but must be independent 

...Nothing is to be undertaken in Mexico by us until the arrival of 
further instructions, in order to avoid disturbing political relations. Jahnke 
should therefore only operate against the U. S. A. and Canada. With refer- 
ence to his further questions and proposals, a decision will soon follow. 

Jahnke finally v^on a complete victory over Hinsch and Delmar, for 
on April 29, 1918, Berlin radioed Madrid: 

Please inform Delmar in reply to your telegrams 1073 and 1357 of March 
26 and April 13 respectively that Jahnke has been made sole Naval Con- 
fidential Agent in Mexico. 

General Staff 

Although Peaslee had never heard of either Hinsch or Delmar, it was 
obvious to him from the context of the preceding messages that they 
were sabotage agents who had operated in the United States during the 
neutrality period and had performed work of suflEcient importance 
there to have warranted disputing with Jahnke the leadership of the 
sabotage organization later directed from Mexico. He made a mental 
note of the two names and then turned to two radiograms which he 
had laid aside at the commencement of his examination of the mes- 
sages, in the hopes that he would receive further enlightenment from 
those which still remained to be read. In this he had been disappointed, 
and therefore he slowly read through these two messages again. 

The first one, dated April 12, 1917, from von Eckhardt, marked "For 
Captain Marguerre or Nadolny, Great General Staff," read as follows: 

Mexico i2th April: Where is Lieut. Wohst stationed? Has he sent about 
$25,000 to Paul Hilken.'* He or somebody else is to send me money F... 


86793 Quartalisen Hermann. ... With reference to the previous paragraph, 
Hermann (a smart fair haired German with an Anglo-Saxon accent) professes 
to have received from General Staff a year ago, and renewed in January 
by Hilken, a commission to set fire to the Tampico Oil Field, and proposes 
now to carry it out. He asks me whether he is to do it. Would it not be 
well for me to answer that I am not in communication with Berlin ? Verdy 
believes him and his companion ..,51158 Gerds to be English or American 
spies. Request immediate answer. Most immediate! 

To this cable, Berlin replied on May 13, 1917: 

Hermann's statements are correct. Nothing is known of Gerds. Wohst 
has been retired. 

The firing of Tampico would be valuable from a military point of view, 
but the General Staff leaves to you to decide. 

Please do not sanction anything which would endanger our relations 
with Mexico or, if the question arises, give Hermann any open support. 

Peaslee was thus faced with the names of six German agents whom 
he had never heard of before, at least five of whom had operated in 
the United States and were known to the General Staff in Germany. 
Who were Hinsch, Delmar, Wohst, or Woehst, Paul Hilken, Her- 
mann, or Herrmann, and Gerds, or Gerdts ? The American investiga- 
tors were determined to find out. They were on the point of launching 
an intensive search for them when Germany made a move which com- 
pletely halted their plans. 

As far back as April 1924, Dr. von Lewinski, the German Agent, 
had indicated to the American claimants that Germany would be 
favorably inclined towards a compromise settlement of the claims if 
sufficient evidence was produced to indicate that they were well 
founded. Thereafter, a considerable amount of evidence in support of 
the claims was submitted to the German Agent from time to time, and 
in the course of this he also received copies of the Hall cables. 

Shortly after receipt of these cables. Dr. von Lewinski suddenly 
broached the subject of a settlement; and, although at the time he 
would not admit their authenticity, it was apparent that he considered 
the cables the prima-facie proof he had demanded. Accordingly, a num- 
ber of conferences were held both in Berlin and in the United States 


at which active negotiations were carried on between von Lewinski, 
Peaslee, and Bonynge, the American Agent. The basis of the settlement 
proposed by von Lewinski was $18,000,000 in full payment of the 
claims, an amount which at that time represented about 50 per cent 
of the Black Tom and Kingsland claims. He also stipulated that such a 
settlement was not to be interpreted in any way as an admission of 
guilt on the part of Germany. 

For no valid reason, other than that von Lewinski was always wait- 
ing for instructions from Berlin, the negotiations dragged on through 
1926. It finally became apparent to the American claimants that Ger- 
many's real purpose was not to settle the sabotage cases but chiefly to 
create a favorable atmosphere for the passage of the Settlement of War 
Claims Act. The plans for the enactment of this act were launched in 
December 1925. The Act was to provide for the release of a certain por- 
tion of the German property seized in the United States during the 
war and for the creation out of the remainder of a fund for the pay- 
ment of American claims against Germany. Germany's interest in the 
passage of this Act was borne out by the fact that von Lewinski now 
produced a draft agreement for the consideration of the American 
Agent, one of the conditions of which was that the compromise settle- 
ment should be conditional upon the release by the United States of 
German sequestrated property. Needless to say, the United States took 
the unequivocal position that it could make no such agreement until 
action had been taken by Congress. 

In the meantime, considerable pressure was being put on Congress 
by those American companies and citizens who had already received 
awards on their claims. Decisions had already been handed down on 
more than 90 per cent of the claims filed with the Mixed Claims Com- 
mission, and no payment could be made on these awards until Con- 
gress had agreed on a plan for the establishment of a fund out of the 
sequestrated German property. Germany was also exerting every form 
of influence, since the value of the seized property was far in excess of 
the total amount of the claims. Dr. Kiesselbach, the German Commis- 
sioner on the Mixed Claims Commission, even went so far as to appear 
in person before the Ways and Means Committee to state his point of 
view. How much the passage of the Act meant to Germany can be 


gauged from the fact that, although Dr. Kiesselbach was careful to ex- 
plain to the Committee that he was appearing before it unofficially 
and without fee, later certain German private companies which had 
benefited by the Act presented him with 500,000 reichsmarks (about 
$100,000) after the passage of the Act in March 1928. 

By the Settlement of War Claims Act the German Special Deposit 
Account of $180,000,000 was created partly out of German funds and 
property sequestrated here during the war and partly from a special 
appropriation voted by Congress. Of this, all but $20,000,000 has been 
paid out in awards. And as the Black Tom and Kingsland claims, prin- 
cipal plus interest, calculated to September 17, 1936, amount to $50,- 
145,145.55,'^ the balance, in the event of a verdict's being handed down 
in favor of the American claimants, will have to be settled out of the 
remainder of the Special Deposit Account, and for any deficiency the 
American claimants must look to the German bonds, which the United 
States Government accepted as a guarantee deposit when 80 per cent 
of the confiscated German property was released by the Alien Property 
Custodian under the provisions of the above Act. Germany, however, 
has defaulted on her payments on these bonds. 

When the eventual passage of the Act seemed assured, the German 
Agent wrote, on January 19, 1927, to Mr. Bonynge stating that the 
German authorities had reached the conclusion that the destruction 
of the Black Tom terminal and the Kingsland plant was not caused by 
the acts of the German Government or its agents. 

The American claimants immediately realized that they had been 
tricked. Nearly two valuable years had been lost, and Germany had not 
only seen all the evidence which was to be used against her, but she 


Docket Principal Claim in Full to 
Claimant No. o£ Claim Sept. 17, 1936 

1. Lehigh Valley Railroad Company . . . 8103 $9,921,730.15 $22,378,157.16 

2. Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry 

Company, Limited 81 17 6,956,865.81 15,465,303.25 

3. Bethlehem Steel Company 14901 2,070,764.53 4,670,545.70 

4. D. L. & W. R. R. Co 8296 32,678.62 72,645.46 

5. Black Tom Underwriters 2,095,903.26 4,663,372.17 

6. Kingsland Underwriters 1,311,618.13 2,895,121.81 


had also won a breathing spell in which she could prepare her defense. 
A lesson had, however, been learned. From now on the American 
claimants and their investigators would be on their guard. 

Following the receipt of the letter, the American claimants imme- 
diately commenced the preparation of the memorials, or formal com- 
plaints, against Germany, which they filed with the Mixed Claims 
Commission on April 16, 1927, and April 26, 1927, respectively, on 
behalf of the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company and the Agency of 
the Canadian Car and Foundry Company. To these Germany filed an 
answer shortly after; and, ironical as it may seem, in the answer she 
acknowledged the authenticity of the Hall cables. 

The American investigators on their part took up the fight with 
redoubled vigor. A search was immediately set on foot to locate the 
six German agents mentioned in the Hall cables, although not without 
the realization that by now they had probably scattered to the four 
corners of the earth. 

Luck, however, was with the American operatives. One of the six, 
Paul Hilken, was still in the United States, and he was not difficult 
to locate — his father was the German Consul in Baltimore. 

When first approached by Peaslee, Hilken was reluctant to give any 
information. But the passage of time had weakened his ties with Ger- 
many, and also he now had a son in Princeton and a daughter in 
Smith, both of whom were thoroughly Americanized. Peaslee persisted 
in his efforts to induce him to talk and eventually succeeded. In a series 
of interviews three affidavits were obtained from him which, pieced 
together, outlined the role he had played. 

Hilken told how first he had been employed by von Rintelen to act 
as paymaster in Baltimore for Hinsch and Anton Dilger; he then 
graphically went on to describe in detail the interview which he, 
Dilger, and Herrmann subsequently had had with Nadolny and Mar- 
guerre in Berlin, in February 1916. He stated clearly that instructions 
were given to them to start in on their sabotage activities immediately, 
and not after America had entered the war, as Germany later was to 
maintain in her defense before the Mixed Claims Commission. He 
also related how, on his return to the United States, he had acted as 
paymaster for this group up to the time the United States entered the 


war. He revealed also that Anton Dilger and Delmar were one and the 
same person, and he gave a clue which enabled the American investi- 
gators to locate Edward Felton. He was either unable or unwilling to 
furnish any specific information about Kingsland, but he definitely 
indicated that Hinsch had directed the plot which had led to the 
blowing up of Black Tom. 

According to Hilken's own admission, in addition to $10,000 which 
he gave Hinsch out of funds provided by von Rintelen he had paid 
out to Hinsch and Fred Herrmann for sabotage purposes close to 
$60,000 out of the credits which had been arranged for him while he 
was in Germany. 

There was one payment of $2,000 which he specifically called atten- 
tion to. As this payment has an important bearing on the Black Tom 
case in that it was paid a few days after the explosion, it is as well to 
quote verbatim the questions in connection with it that were put to 
Hilken by the American lawyers and the answers he gave: 

Q. Do you recall any payment made to Hinsch at about the time of the 
Black Tom explosion? 

A. Well, shortly after Black Tom explosion we met here in New York 
before going to New London. 

Q. When you say "we met in New York," who do you mean? 

A. Hinsch, Herrmann and myself, and I remember of a dinnei: that we 
had at the Astor at that time with Mr. Benjamin Loewenstein of 
the Nassau Smelting and Refining Company, and Sir John Hamer, 
who lived at the Astor, and through whom I bought much of the 
nickel and tin which was shipped on the Deutschland, and I remem- 
ber giving Hinsch a payment which I think was two thousand dollars 
at that time. 

Q. That was about what date? 

A. That was early in August, 1916. 

Q. What did Hinsch say he wanted the money for? 

A. Well, Hinsch told me at that time that he had hired the men that 
set fire to Black Tom. 

Q. He told you that at that time? 

A. He told me that at that time. 

Q. Yes? 

A. I remember perfectly asking Hinsch about Black Tom and his saying, 


when I wanted the details of how it was done, "Oh, it is better, much 

better, for you to know nothing about that." I remember that perfectly. 
Q. And that was at this dinner a few days after the Black Tom explosion ? 
A. I won't say at this dinner; I don't think it was, but it was right after 

the Black Tom, within a few days after the Black Tom disaster. 
Q. And that was in connection with a payment that you made of two 

thousand dollars to him.? 
A. That is my recollection. 

Edward Felton was next located still living in Baltimore. Now, 43 
years of age, he recalled his adventures clearly and seemed glad to find 
attentive listeners. He freely confessed the part he had played in in- 
oculating horses and mules under the direction of Hinsch, stating that 
most of this work was done near Van Cortlandt Park, New York City, 
and at Norfolk and Newport News, Virginia. He went on to say that 
in addition to these activities he had also distributed circulars in Norfolk 
among the stevedores there urging them to go on strike, that Hinsch 
had also empowered him to place bombs on ships loading at Baltimore, 
and that he and his men had set fire to pier Number 9 at Baltimore, 
and to grain elevators at Canton, Baltimore, and Norfolk. Finally he 
added that Hinsch traveled round the country a great deal, and that 
he had seen him in New York a good many times. He also put the 
American investigators in touch with another colored man named 
Young, one of the band who had assisted him in his inoculation activi- 
ties. On interrogation, Young corroborated the statement of Felton. 

Chapter XVIII 

In the meantime, In November 1928, Peaslee and Peto picked up the 
trail of Raoul Gerdts. Hidden away in a long forgotten file in the State 
Department, a dispatch was found reporting that on July 29, 19 17, 
Gerdts had confessed to S. Le Roy Layton, American Vice Consul, at 
Barranquilla, Colombia, full details of his association with Fred 
Herrmann and had also furnished a description of the incendiary pen- 
cils. The report was annoyingly incomplete, but it was evident that 
Gerdts was in possession of valuable information concerning the 
Black Tom and Kingsland cases. Peaslee and Peto took immediate 
action; within twenty-four hours of receiving information that he was 
still in Barranquilla, they were on their way to Colombia; on January 
II, 1929, they met Gerdts. 

Gerdts refused to give any information unless he was paid a fee of 
$10,000, and as Peto and Peaslee knew he had been closely associated 
with Herrmann they were in a quandary. Much as they disliked to pay 
for a pig in a poke, there was no alternative. They deposited the 
amount in escrow, and the bank paid the money over to Gerdts on re- 
ceipt of his affidavit. Peto and Peaslee reported the matter to Mr. 
Bonynge as soon as the money had been paid. 

Gerdts then took up the story of the events that had happened 
from the time of his flight from the United States. In February 1917, 
when it was obvious that the United States was about to enter the 
war, he and Herrmann fled to Mexico via Cuba. Hilken supplied them 
with funds, and at the same time reminded Herrmann that he had 
promised Nadolny and Marguerre the year before that he would de- 
stroy the oil fields at Tampico, Mexico. 

In Havana he and Herrmann had some trouble with their false 

Mexican passports on which they were traveling, but eventually, with 



the aid of a few judicious bribes, they succeeded in entering Mexico 
by way of Vera Cruz. 

On their arrival in Mexico Herrmann ran short of money; and as 
von Eckhardt was incHned to be distrustful of him, he decided to send 
Gerdts on a mission across the border to raise funds * The rest of the 
information furnished by Gerdts was subsequently to prove of such 
importance that it is as well to quote it in the affidavit form in which 
he gave it to Peaslee and Peto: 

I was ordered by Herrmann to go from Mexico to New York with an 
order to collect $25,000 from Hoppenbergt and to bring the money back 
personally to him [Herrmann] in Mexico City. I remember that the order 
and instructions given to me by Herrmann were written in lemon juice on 
a page in a book of poetry. The lemon juice made the writing invisible and 
for that reason I did not know the exact contents of the order. The address 
of Hoppenberg which Herrmann gave me was "Pearl Street, New York." 
When I arrived there I was told that Hoppenberg had died the previous 
day. In the same book of poetry there was another order, also written in 
lemon juice, to the effect that in the event that I should not find Hoppen- 
berg in New York I was to deliver the order to Paul Hilken, in Baltimore, 
where I went that day. I remember that when I arrived at Mr. Hilken's 
home and asked for him, a woman, probably thinking that I had some 
business of interest to Mr. Hilken told me to leave the house immediately 
and come back in about a half hour because at that time special investigators 
were inspecting the house. I returned some time later and found Mr. Hilken 
to whom I gave the page from the book of poetry. He went to the cellar of 
the house to decipher the order and then told me that he did not have that 
amount of money, but that I should stay at his home while he went to 
New York to procure the money. Three days later he returned and told 
me that he was going to send the money, but that another friend of his 
who he expected in a few months was going to take the money to Mexico. 
Shortly afterwards, a man was introduced to me as Captain Hinsch. He 
told me that he was a Captain of the North German Lloyd that towed the 
Deutschland to the harbor at Baltimore. He told me to go back to Mexico 
and gave me a thousand dollars. The balance of $24,000 he told me he was 
going to take himself. He asked me to tell Herrmann that he [Hinsch] 

♦ See von Eckhardt's cable to Berlin, dated April 12, 19 17, pp. 174-5. 
t Employed by Hilken in New York City as manager of the Eastern Forward- 
ing Company. 


was busily engaged in getting guns of 7.05 millimeters across the border into 
Mexico which were to be used to equip a destroyer in Mazatlan, intercepting 

ships carrying cargoes from San Francisco This was how I met Captain 

Hinsch and this was the nature of my relationship with him. I have not 

seen him since On my return on different occasions Herrmann spoke 

about the desirability of setting fire to the tanks of petroleum at Tampico. . . . 
One day Herrmann said he would give me $25,000 to do it. I refused this 
offer and a few days later he discharged me, telling me that I was not the 
man they wanted — My relations with Herrmann at the end were very 
disagreeable because when I did not have enough money to go back to 
Colombia he answered "Go to the devil." 

Hilken later verified in full the part of Gerdt's statement which 
dealt with himself. 

Gerdts then returned to Bogota via Havana and eventually became 
agent for the Sun Life Insurance Company, which job he held when 
Peaslee and Peto examined him. 

Gerdts's statement comprised some 10,000 words; but, as most of it 
outlined activities which, with the exception of the above extract, have 
already been covered, it is not included here. 

As most of the information contained in Gerdts's statement was sub- 
sequently obtained from Hilken and Herrmann, for a long time Peto 
and Peaslee felt that they had paid dearly for it. Two years later, 
however, long after the Mixed Claims Commission had rendered its 
first adverse decision in the Black Tom and Kingsland cases, a new 
piece of evidence suddenly came to light which, as we shall see later, 
gave this extract from Gerdts's statement an entirely new importance. 

While Peto and Peaslee were busy interviewing Gerdts at Barran- 
quilla, they suddenly heard through Neunhoffer that Witzke was in 
the employ of the Lagopetroleum Company in Maracaibo, Venezuela. 
Neunhoffer's brother was a member of the Company, and it was 
through him that Neunhoffer got the information. 

All the evidence that Peto and Peaslee had had about Witzke up to 
this point was either that obtained from other witnesses or what they 
had been able to glean from the records of his court-martial or from 
Captain Tunney's examination of him while in prison. At the interro- 


gations on which these records were based, Witzke had only been 
superficially examined as to Black Tom. Attention had been focussed 
on his general spy and sabotage activities and not specifically on any 
one act of destruction. There were a thousand and one questions which 
Peaslee and Peto wanted to ask Witzke. So eager were they to meet 
him that they left Barranquilla before the examination of Gerdts had 
been completed; and promising to return later, they chartered a plane 
to take them to Maracaibo. 

Fast as they had sped, and as secretively as their operatives had 
worked, the news of their intended arrival had traveled ahead of them 
— apparently the chartering of the plane was news in itself. To their 
surprise, they found on landing that the whole town of Maracaibo had 
turned out to meet them. 

Witzke was easily found at the oflSces of the Company; and at 
the home of J. Oswald Boyd, Director, to which they adjourned for 
privacy, the interview was quickly gotten under way. It needed but a 
few minutes of conversation, however, for Peto and Peaslee to realize 
that Witzke's lips were sealed. He informed them that he had recently 
returned from Germany and there had given a sworn statement to 
Herr Hossenfelder of the German Foreign Office denying any connec- 
tion with the destruction either of Black Tom or Kingsland. He 
categorically announced: 

That statement stands as far as Fm concerned to the end. Furthermore, 
to say anything different would embarrass me in Germany. I have convinced 
the Foreign Office that I have told the truth and the whole truth and if I 
should swear to anything different they could charge and convict me of 
perjury, and they would be only too glad to do so; and bear in mind that 
this is a crime for which they could extradite me from any country and 
condemn me to jail for five years. 

On Peto's and Peaslee's remarking that any cross-examination before 
the American Consul would be useless under these circumstances, as 
his answers would not necessarily represent the truth, Witzke replied, 
"Well, I've told you this much freely, so you can see how futile it 
would be." He further added that he believed fully in the code of 
honor of the German Army and Navy officers of the old regime and 


intended to stick by it. He also spoke in terms of the greatest contempt 
of all those witnesses who, as he termed it, had "squealed" on 

Although he refused to give any information about his sabotage 
activities, he was affable and spoke freely about other events not 
directly related. He showed Peaslee and Peto two decorations, the 
Iron Cross First and Second Class, which he had received personally 
from Admiral Behncke on his return to Germany. 

With eyes flashing fire, he referred to Altendorf, stating that he had 
once had him at the point of a pistol and regretted that he had not put 
him out of the way then. In talking alone with Peto and "off the 
record" he insisted that he knew nothing of who did the job at Kings- 
land or how it was done; but he said Black Tom "was another matter." 
He would say no more. 

One point of interest, however, came out of the interview: he let 
slip that he had handed Herr Hossenfelder, of the German Foreign 
OflSce, the diary which he had kept during the war. Realizing at 
once that this diary must contain valuable information, Peto and 
Peaslee lost no time in reporting its existence to the American Agent. 

Mr. Bonynge immediately, through the Mixed Claims Commission, 
asked Germany to produce it; but once again he met with a blank 
refusal. Germany declined to allow the American Agent to examine 
the diary, claiming that Witzke objected to the production of the docu- 
ment because it contained information relative to some of his friends 
who might get into trouble if the diary were to come into the possession 
of the American Government. In order to prove an alibi for Witzke, 
Germany nevertheless filed as evidence a photostatic copy of two pages 
of the diary bearing entries which showed that he had not been in New 
York at the time of the Black Tom explosion. Examination of this 
photostatic copy showed conclusively, however, both that the notes 
made in the diary were not contemporaneous with the dates in the diary 
and that some of the entries differed in respect to the handwriting in 
which they were written. 

In addition to this refusal to produce important evidence, Germany 
also declined to make available for interrogation witnesses whom the 
American investigators had now definitely located in Germany. 


Hinsch * was being well looked after in Bremen by the North German 
Lloyd. Willie Woehst,* a lieutenant in the German Army, whose name 
had figured several times in the intercepted cables, and who was a 
free-lance agent sent out by Section III B to assist Herrmann, Hilken, 
and Hinsch, was located in Hamburg. Jahnke, then a member of 
the Prussian Diet, had apparently come into money and was living 
in a villa on the outskirts of Berlin. Von Igel had retired and was 
living in an apartment on the Kurfuerstendamn in Berlin. Wunnenberg 
was running a milk evaporating plant in Germany; Marguerre, now 
residing in Berlin, had secured a divorce from his wife, and either of 
them could have furnished valuable information. And finally, Nadolny, 
who for some time had been German Minister to Turkey, was at the 
beck and call of Germany. But not one of these would she ever ask 
to testify or to produce his records. 

Furthermore, although the German Agent at any examination con- 
ducted by the American Agent had been freely permitted in whatso- 
ever way he chose to interview witnesses produced by the American 
interests, yet when the American Agent requested that these key wit- 
nesses be made accessible for examination either by him or by the 
American lawyers, the Germans refused to allow them to be inter- 
viewed except before a German court and through either a German 
attorney agreeable to Germany or through Mr. Bonynge, who was 
unfamiliar with the German language. Germany's attitude in the 
matter was summed up by the American Agent in his argument 
before the Mixed Claims Commission at The Hague hearing in 1930: 

Subsequently I received from the German Agent a notice setting forth the 
procedure that would be adopted. Of course, it was apparent that if Captain 
Hinsch, Marguerre and Wohst were to be examined in a German court, 
the evidence would be taken in the German language. Unfortunately, neither 
myself nor my assistant, Mr. Martin, is familiar with the German language; 
nor could either of us conduct a cross examination in German. Realizing 
that an examination of a witness through an interpreter is always unsatis- 
factory, and is always avoided by the court, if it can possibly be avoided, 
and especially that the cross examination of a witness through an interpreter 
is exceedingly unsatisfactory, I endeavored to secure the services of German 

* Both Hinsch and Woehst died recentl)'. 


counsel, necessarily one who knew something about the facts in the case, 
or otherwise he would be absolutely useless. I found that Mr. Ohse, who 
was employed by some of these claimants on a per diem basis, was at liberty. 
I first cabled to him to ascertain whether or not he was at liberty to act 
for me in this matter. Upon receiving advice from him that he was, I made 
arrangements with him to appoint him, as I have authority to do from my 
Government, a special counsel for me in these cases for the purpose of con- 
ducting that cross examination and solely for that purpose. The German 
Government objected to having Mr. Ohse appear because he had represented 
some of the claimants. If I thought it material, I think I could satisfy this 
Commission beyond any doubt that it is not contrary to any procedure 
before International Tribunals, and certainly not contrary to what has been 
done in these very cases before this Commission. . . . 

The purpose of the cross examination of a witness is simply to extract 
from him, if possible, the truth, and I wanted to have the cross examination 

made in a very searching and thorough manner That could only be 

done, it seems to me, if counsel famiHar with the case and speaking the 
language of the witness cross examined the witness. Germany, however, 
objected to having the cross examination conducted by Mr. Ohse, and as I 
could not, as the American Agent, permit the German Government to 
exercise the power of veto over my appointment of a special counsel, I 
declined to have anything to do with the examination of Captain Hinsch 
or these other witnesses, and the result was that we have here only the 
ex parte examination of Captain Hinsch and of Wohst and of Marguerre. 

The almost beautiful coordination of the replies of these three wit- 
nesses in denial of facts since established by contemporaneous docu- 
ments to have been true is an example of the value of such an 

The American lawyers had now located and questioned Paul Hilken, 
Edward Felton, Gerdts, and Witzke. They also eventually discovered 
Carl Dilger on a cattle ranch in Montana and obtained a confirmatory 
affidavit from him concerning his brother's activities. 

Their investigators in the meantime had been busy hunting for 
Fred Herrmann. Two of his brothers, Edwin and Carl, were finally 
found at Roselle Park, New Jersey; and from them it was learned 


that Fred had fled to South America after the war and was now located 
at Talcahuana, Chile. 

As Hilken had overcome his original reluctance and was now, at 
least to a limited extent, cooperating with the American investigators 
in their efforts to collect evidence, it was thought advisable to send him 
to Chile to persuade Fred Herrmann to return to the United States to 
testify. Both Hilken and Herrmann were American citizens, and it was 
thought that Hilken would be able to convince Herrmann that there 
would be no danger in returning. (The United States Government had 
given assurances early in the proceedings that it was not interested in 
criminal prosecutions based on any evidence given to the Mixed Claims 
Commission or to the American lawyers.) 

Hilken accepted the mission and sailed for Valparaiso. His con- 
ference with Herrmann is best described in his own words: 

My ship arrived in Valparaiso on Thursday, January loth, 1929. At about 
eight A.M., a man who gave his name as "Lemberg" came to my stateroom 
and said that he had been asked by Fred Herrmann to meet me. [Herrmann 
had been advised by Hilken of his arrival.] 

Herrmann and "Lemberg" came to my room at the Hotel Astor in 
Valparaiso between nine and ten o'clock that morning. Herrmann appeared 
to be extremely suspicious and before engaging in any conversation with 
me he searched my room, the closet, the bathroom and all possible places 
where a dictaphone or where some witness might have been concealed, and 
inquired as to who was occupying the room next to us. I assured him that 
no effort was being made to trick him and that I merely wanted to discuss 
matters with him relative to our previous association in the United States 
during 1916 and 1917. Herrmann knew that I was coming and knew 
generally the purpose of my visit, and I asked him why he had not met the 
steamer. He said substantially the following: "Do you think that I am a 
damn fool? That was an American steamer and who knows but that even 
without your knowing it, someone may have had some strong arm men 
ready to throw me in a cell to take me back to the United States and that 
would be the end of it." 

During that day, that is Thursday, January 10, 1929, I asked Herrmann 
whether he would be prepared to go before the American Consul and make 
his statement respecting his operations during the War. That he immediately 
refused to do. I told him that I had been advised before leaving New York 


that the question of his immunity from criminal prosecution by the United 
States had been taken up with the Assistant Attorney General and asked 
him whether, if he had full assurance that no such prosecutions were con- 
templated, he would make a full confession and statement for use by the 
United States Government before the Mixed Claims Commission. 

Herrmann's replies to these requests were substantially as follows: "What 
possible advantage is it to me to testify? I have only your statement that I 
would be given immunity. My wife and I are Chileans and I never intend 

to return to the United States "He continued that he had taken up a 

thousand acres of land in Chile in connection with applying for Chilean 
citizenship and in connection with the birth of his two children 

In taking this position Herrmann was heartily seconded by Mr. "Lemberg" 
who seemed to a large extent to be spurring Herrmann on to take that 
position. . . . 

I showed Herrmann the two briefs filed by the United States with the 
Mixed Claims Commission in the Black Tom case and in that of Kingsland. 
Herrmann read the briefs with apparently a great deal of interest. 

After completing the Black Tom brief, he said, "Well, they've got the 
right man, Michael Kristoff. Why don't they go after him? Why do they 
bother me?" I tried to follow this up and obtain further information from 
him about his relations with Kristoif. He declined to give me any further 
information as to his own relations, if any, with Kristoff. 

Herrmann also stated that he had nothing to do with the destruction of 

the Kingsland property Herrmann admitted that he was in the service 

of Germany during 1915, 1916, and 1917. He admitted that he had first 
met me at the offices of Nadolny and Marguerre in Berlin in February, 
1916, as I have testified; he also admitted that Nadolny and Marguerre gave 
him instructions at the time of our meeting in Berlin in February, 1916, to 
destroy munition plants in the United States, as I have previously testified. 
Herrmann said — "Of course, I can always deny that." He also claimed that 
he never carried out any of the orders. Herrmann admitted that he had 
received various funds from me in the United States after his return to the 
United States from BerUn in 1916. . . . 

Herrmann later explained why he had both refused to return with 
Hilken to the United States and to give him a statement admitting 
his sabotage activities. His reason was that at the time he was em- 
ployed in Chile by the National City Bank and he was afraid that, if his 
participation in German sabotage came out, he would lose his job. 


Therefore he consulted the German Consul in Valparaiso and outlined 
to him fully his sabotage activities in the United States and later 
in Mexico. The German Consul, thereupon, advised him to see the 
German Minister in Santiago. 

On his arrival at the Legation, von Olshausen, the German Minister, 
explained to Herrmann that he had already been in touch with the 
Consul and that it w^ould be best to av^^ait developments. 

A few days later von Olshausen sent for him and told him that he 
had received a cable from Berlin concerning his case. When he was 
finally persuaded to tell Peaslee his story, Herrmann claimed that, 
after he had fully admitted to the Minister exactly what his sabotage 
role had been, von Olshausen drew up for him a statement denying 
everything and asked him to sign it. According to his affidavits, he told 
the Minister that the statement was not true. To this the Minister re- 
plied, "Never mind. Sign it." Herrmann therefore signed the statement, 
though not in affidavit form. He also admitted that he later signed 
several other statements drawn up at the Legation and that, although 
on each occasion he informed the Minister that they did not contain 
the truth, he was instructed to sign them. The Minister also promised to 
finance him if he lost his job on account of the discovery of his 

Just as he feared, a couple of months later the National City Bank 
found out about his past and dismissed him. He then returned to the 
Legation and reminded the Minister of his promise. Von Olshausen 
lived up to his agreement, promised to try and find him a job and in 
the meantime to pay him 1,000 pesos (about $120) per month to cover 
his living expenses and those of his family. 

But Peaslee and Peto were not to be put off by one refusal. Imme- 
diately on Hilken's return, they got in touch with Herrmann's two 
brothers, Edwin and Carl, and after a considerable lapse of time were 
finally successful in persuading them to go to Chile to advise Fred to 
tell the truth and return with them to the United States. 

Fred was still afraid, however, but finally compromised by agreeing 
to meet Peto and Peaslee in Havana. He sailed with his brother-in-law, 
Mr. Aguayo, and arrived in Havana on March 27, 1930. 

There Peto and Peaslee were successful in convincing him that he 


would not be molested by the American authorities; and without dis- 
cussing his sabotage activities the whole party left for the United 

Immediately on reaching Washington, on March 31, 1930, Peaslee 
advised Mr. Bonynge of his arrival with Herrmann. Before seeing 
either, Mr. Bonynge also notified Dr. Lewinski and suggested a joint 
conference of the two Agents with the witness. This the German 
Agent said was agreeable to him. The conference was accordingly fixed 
for 3:30 P.M., March 31, 1930, in the office of the American Agent; 
and Peaslee was so advised. 

The first thing that Herrmann said after the American Agent had 
asked him if he knew anything about the Kingsland fire was, "May I 
first have an interview with the German Agent privately?" To which 
Mr. Bonynge replied, "Certainly. Dr. von Lewinski, take him to your 
office and examine him if you want to, and let him say what he 
pleases." Herrmann was to say later that he asked the German Agent 
when alone with him, whether he wished him to tell the truth and 
that von Lewinski replied in the affirmative. 

The outcome of the conference, which was resumed on Dr. von 
Lewinski's and Herrmann's return to the room, was that a direct 
examination of Fred Herrmann was arranged for April 30, 1930, in 
the presence of the American and German Agents and their counsel. 

During the course of the examination Mr. Bonynge's main purpose 
was to establish the identity of "Graentnor" or "Grandson," the man 
with whom Kristoff had traveled around the country and whose name 
Mrs. Rushnak's daughter had seen on an envelope in his room. For the 
American Agent realized that finding him would supply a vital 
missing link in the chain of evidence connecting Germany with the 
Black Tom explosion. 

The identity of this man of mystery was dramatically disclosed by 
Herrmann in one of his replies. Mindful of the fact that, when Witzke 
had been questioned by Captain Tunney of the Military Intelligence 
about the German agents whom he knew in Mexico, he had given a 
description of a man called Rodriguez which exactly fitted Herrmann, 
Mr. Bonynge suddenly shot at him: "Have you not been known under 
the name of Rodriguez.?" 


To which Herrmann replied: "Afterwards, I think it was three or 
four days afterwards, I saw Captain Hinsch. That was up in New 

"Up where?" queried Mr. Bonynge. 

"At New London," Herrmann answered. "I met him and he said, 
*Hello, Rodriguez'; and I said to him, Tou are a fine guy.' What the 
hell was it I said to him? I said that because he made a sort of joke 
about it; and I said, 'Hello, Grantnor,' because he called himself by 
that name; and that is a rather English name, and with the German 
face on him, he could not very well get away with it." 

To Bonynge's next question, demanding again to know what he had 
called Hinsch, Herrmann added the explanation: "I called him 
'Graentnor' or 'Grantner' or something like that. I told him he ought 
to take some other name instead of an English name." 

When cross-examined on this point, Herrmann explained that most 
of the German agents had used aliases; that he himself had used the 
names of Lewis, March, Larsen, and many others; and that Hinsch 
had the peculiar habit of using the names of people he knew. He 
recalled that Hinsch had turned up in Mexico under the name of 
Harry Imwold and had also called himself Johannsen, both names of 
men whom he had known in the United States. Herrmann further 
added that on one occasion Hinsch had registered at a hotel with a girl 
under the name of Fred L. Herrmann and that he had had a serious 
row with Hinsch about it. 

In endeavoring to find out whether Hinsch had been following out 
the same practice in using the name of "Graentnor," or "Grandson," 
the American investigators discovered that one of the witnesses in the 
von Rintelen trial was a man called Grandson, who had been asso- 
ciated with the manufacture of bombs on the Friedrich der Grosse. 

When Paul Hilken was questioned on the matter, he, too, confirmed 
Herrmann's statement that Hinsch had sometimes used the alias of 
"Graentnor." A more valuable corroboration was to come, however, 
from a former German agent with whom the American lawyers had 
no direct contact. 

In various talks with Herrmann, Peto asked him whether he knew 
any of the other German agents who were still alive. Herrmann men- 


tioned a man named Hadler, who, he thought, was still living in 
Mexico. Investigations were made, and it was found that Hadler had 
moved to California in 1922. After considerable search Hadler was 
eventually located in Los Angeles. Thereupon a message was sent to 
him requesting him to come to New York and offering to pay his 

On his arrival, without having been seen or interrogated by any 
of the American lawyers or their operatives, he was interviewed by 
Mr. Martin, Mr. Bonynge's counsel. At this interview, Hadler furnished 
an affidavit in which, he testified that from February 1917 until the 
end of the war he was employed in Mexico as a German agent, and 
that on several occasions he had heard Herrmann call Hinsch by a 
name that sounded like "Graentnor." 

In his own evidence, given during his examination before the Amer- 
ican and German Agents of the Mixed Claims Commission, Herrmann 
also testified that both in New York and down in Mexico Hinsch had 
boasted to him that his agents had been responsible for the blowing 
up of Black Tom. Herrmann stated that he believed him because, when 
he and Hinsch had mapped out their sabotage campaign. Black Tom 
had been on a list of places, the destruction of which Hinsch had re- 
served for himself. 

This discovery of Hinsch's use of the name Graentnor was the single 
greatest step forward the investigation had yet taken in solving the 
mystery of Black Tom. Victory seemed within the grasp of the claim- 
ants, and they began the old game of counting their chickens before 
they were hatched. 

But there were still a few available witnesses left for the American 
lawyers to interview, and von Rintelen was one of them. Some time 
previously they had received a letter from him offering to come to the 
United States to testify on condition diat: (i) no charge of any kind 
would be brought against him in Canada or the United States; (2) his 
expenses would be paid; (3) his life and accident insurance policies 
now totaling $300,000, which at that time only provided for emer- 
gencies as far as 15° west of Greenwich, would be reinsured: (4) 
they would pay $10,000 "as forfeit fund to put me in a positon to wind 
up pending matters and provide for some similar requirements." How- 


ever, on his being informed that any paymeiits to him would have 
to be disclosed to the Commission, he refused to testify. In any case, 
it is doubtful v^hether the American interests v^ould have disbursed 
the sums he demanded ; for, although he had enrolled Hinsch, it is im- 
probable that he could have throv^n much light on Black Tom and 
Kingsland, as he left the United States more than a year before the 
former v^as blov^^n up. 

All of the sabotage funds which von Rintelen had left behind him 
in the United States had been seized by the Alien Property Custodian 
in 1917. Von Rintelen claimed that several thousand dollars of this 
belonged to him personally. For years after the war he tried to recover 
this amount from the German Government. It is also of interest to note 
that it was only when Germany heard that von Rintelen was in touch 
with the American claimants that she suddenly paid him $12,000, a 
sum in excess of his original claim. It was Dr. Albert, who, as his at- 
torney, secured the payment for him. In pressing his client's claim, the 
Doctor made a statement that everything von Rintelen had done in the 
United States during the neutrality period had been done with the full 
knowledge of the German military authorities. Whatever may be his 
reason, von Rintelen has kept away from Germany and has resided in 
England during the last few years. And for reasons best known to her- 
self Germany has never called on him to testify for her in the Black 
Tom and Kingsland cases. 

There was one person whom the American investigators would have 
liked to examine and that was Anton Dilger. However, he was out of 
their reach. He had met a sudden death in Spain during the last 
months of the war. A week before he died he sent a message to Berlin 
refusing to carry out certain orders issued to him by Germany and 
marked "very urgent." Eight days afterwards a telegram was sent from 
Spain to Germany: 

Delmar [Anton Dilger] died yesterday. The expenses for his hospital treat- 
ment and burial are being borne by the Political Section. 

Military Attache 

It was whispered that he knew too much. It was a deadly poison that 
removed him— at least so it was later intimated by a former German 

Chapter XIX 


We must now revert to the Kingsland case. Peto and Peaslee had 
before them the reports of Mr. Cahan, one of the directors of the 
Agency of the Canadian Car and Foundry Company, who, as the 
reader may recall, had conducted an investigation immediately after 
the fire. The finger of suspicion pointed to Wozniak, but suspicion was 
not enough to collect damages on; his actual commission of the crime 
had first to be proved in a court of law, then that he had done it at 
the behest of some recognized German agent. 

And so, once again, the American lawyers and their operatives 
started off by searching the records. In the process of doing this it was 
natural that they should turn to the archives of the Russian Supply 
Committee, as Kingsland had been working exclusively for the Russian 
Government at the time of the explosion. Fortunately these records 
were still intact and were stored in Washington, D. C. In this study 
they were ably assisted by Boris Brasol, a former Russian lawyer, who 
was in charge of confidential investigations for the Supply Committee. 
Their search was soon productive of results. 

Two letters were found from Wozniak, written in December 1916 to 
General Khrabroff, President of the Artillery Commission of the 
Russian Supply Committee, warning him that great negligence was 
being shown in the manufacture of shells at Kingsland. 

Further investigation showed that a few weeks before he wrote 
these letters he had made application to the Russian Embassy for Rus- 
sian citizenship. 

Through Brasol General Khrabroff was located in Vermont; and on 
October 17, 1929, he gave Peaslee and Martin a statement of which 
the following is an extract: 



A few days after receiving the letter and before the fire at Kingsland— to 
the best of my recollection it was the day before the fire, i.e., on January 10, 
1917 — I received a further communication from Fiodore Wozniak in the 

form of a postcard An English translation of the postcard, which was 

also in Russian, read as I recall its wording, about as follows: "Things are 
getting worse and worse with us. There will be a catastrophe." 

About two days after the fire ... it was announced that a man wished to 
see me. When this man appeared in my office he stated that his name was 
Wozniak and that he wished to talk to me about the Kingsland fire. The 
photograph attached to this statement, initialed by me, is a photograph of 
the same man who called upon me at that time. Wozniak stated that he had 
been under surveillance by the Police and that he wished to have the advice 
of the Russian officials as to what he should do and say in order not to hurt 
the Russian interests. We discussed with Wozniak the circumstances of the 
fire and asked him various questions relative to the details of it. Wozniak 
admitted at that time to us that he had written to me the letter and postcard 
above mentioned. His explanations of the circumstances immediately before 
and after the fire were not satisfactory to us and led us to beUeve that 
Wozniak caused the fire. 

We ascertained that Wozniak had made remittances of some substantial 
sums of money amounting to several thousand dollars to his own order in 
Russia shortly after the fire occurred. I remember that we questioned him 
in our interview as to why he was sending these sums to Russia to his own 
order. Wozniak said that he had no relations in Russia and that he was 
sending money there to use himself later. 

Among the records of the Russian Supply Committee a report was 
discovered written by General KhrabrofI to the Russian Government 
reporting the Wozniak incident. This report, written shortly after the 
Kingsland fire, corroborated in every detail the above statement of the 

Wozniak's application for Russian citizenship and his warnings to 
the Russian Supply Committee prior to the fire were exactly like 
Witzke's maneuver in applying for American citizenship and like 
Jahnke's in warning the American authorities in San Francisco about 
the navy yard explosion on Mare Island. In the minds of the American 
investigators, it was clear that this was a clumsy attempt on Wozniak's 
part at throwing up a smoke screen to conceal his real proclivities. 


A further startling discovery was made in searching through the rec- 
ords of the Russian Supply Committee. It was found that Wozniak 
got his job at Kingsland through the Russian Vice Consul Florinsky, 
who was later dismissed from the Consulate for pro-German activities. 
It was also established that Florinsky had been in contact with von 
Rintelen and, therefore, presumably with Hinsch. Germany herself 
furnished proof of Florinsky's interest in Wozniak by filing as evidence 
a permit issued by the Russian Consulate in New York on April 26, 
1916, permitting Wozniak to return to his home in Galicia, which at 
that time was occupied by the Russians. On the back of this permit 
was written in Florinsky's own handwriting: 

No. 1719. 

The Russian Imperial Consulate at New York hereby certifies over its 
official seal, that Mr. Theodore Vozniak is personally known to this Consulate 
General. New York — April 26, 191 6. 

Imperial Russian Consul General, 
By D. Florinsky, Acting Vice Consul. 

Florinsky was also one of the many dupes of the Baroness Ida Leonie 
von Seidlitz. Before her arrival in New York, on June i, 1915, she had 
already had several years of experience in Russia in the employ of the 
German Secret Service. Her passport showed that she was fifty-three 
years of age, an Austrian by birth, that she had lived in Russia, Bul- 
garia, and Germany, and that she was a widow visiting friends in the 
United States. A brilliant woman with a flair for intrigue, she readily 
fitted into the schemes of the Germans. Her arrival in the United 
States was preceded by a warning from the United States Minister 
to Denmark, Mr. Egan, to the effect that she would bear watching. 
She was accompanied by a musician named Varase, who acted as 
intermediary between her and von Bernstorff. 

Her duties were to foster Irish plots against England, initiate peace 
propaganda, keep Germany informed ahead of time of the plans of 
official Washington, and not least to corrupt certain members of the 
Russian Supply Committee. 

She gained an entree among the Russians through her book, Russia 
Yesterday and Tomorrow, the preparation of which brought her de- 


signedly into contact with them. Her attention was specially focused 
on Florinsky, whose services she cleverly enlisted through one of her 
agents, Tamara Swirskaya, a Russian ballet dancer. From Florinsky 
she learned the quantity and nature of all munitions purchases made 
in the United States by the Russians during the earlier years of the 
war. Above all, she made his mind receptive to the plots of other 
German agents. 

During this period the Baroness was living in luxury at the most 
expensive New York hotels, but with the departure of von Bernstorff 
she lost her source of financial support and was soon in difficulties. She 
was compelled to give up her quarters at the Waldorf-Astoria; various 
judgments were obtained against her; and on May ii, 1918, the immi- 
gration authorities took a hand and transferred her to Ellis Island. 
After being confronted with her, Maria de Victorica later stated that 
she had met her in Bulgaria in 1912 and "at that time she asked me 
to operate under her for the Bulgarian Government." 

The records of the British Secret Service produced further corrobora- 
tive evidence of Wozniak's connections both with the Germans and 
with Florinsky. A report turned up from one of the British agents, 
Pilenas, or Palmer, dated January 9, 191 7, two days he j ore the fire. It is 
perhaps worth noting that today Palmer is the director of a detective 
agency in New York City and runs advertisements containing the 
interesting phrase "the man who *broke' the 17-year-old Kingsland 
Mysteries." This report was addressed to Colonel Thwaites of the Brit- 
ish Military Intelligence Service and stated: 

An informant whose information has heretofore been usually found reliable 
states that Wozniak is in the pay of the Austrian or German secret service, 
and is acting under orders to make friendly contacts with Russians in New 
York, especially among the members of the Russian Commission, with a view 
to finding out about munition plants. My informant further tells me that 
Wozniak has succeeded in obtaining employment in the Kingsland, N. J., 
plant of the Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry where ammunition for 
Russian Government is being made and stored. My informant states that 
Wozniak got the job through the Russian Vice Consul, whose name he is 
not quite sure of, but thinks it is Floretsky. As a blind, Wozniak has written 

Paul Hilken, a Paymaster for Ger- 
man Spies in the United States 

Captain Frederick Hinsch: Was He 
Graentnor, Kristoff's Brains? 

Keystone Studios 

Dr Paul Altendorf, American Secret 
Agent in Mexico 

The Spies, Fred Herrmann {at left) 

and Adam Siegel {at right) in 

Mexico — 1 91 7. 


two letters to the President of the Russian Supply Committee in New York 
about so-called irregularities at the plant. 

We must now, for the time being, turn away from Wozniak to ex- 
amine some other evidence which the American investigators again 
uncovered among the records of the Department of Justice. 

After the Black Tom Terminal had been rebuilt a man named Kolb 
was arrested in an attempt to blow it up a second time. It was found 
that he had been closely associated with one Charles E. Thorne, an 
assistant employment agent at Kingsland at the time of the fire. This 
directed the attention of Department of Justice agents to him. But 
when they arrived to search his rooms they found that Thorne had 
fled. But several letters were uncovered among his belongings. Three of 
them were written by an actor friend of his, Carrol Clucas, who was 
then playing in The Thoroughbreds, a burlesque musical comedy. 

The first of them, dated December 27, 191 6, was addressed to "My 
dear Thorne of Thistle Fame," and read as follows: 

Thanks so much for yours of recent date. 'Smatter Pop, why the poisoning? 
Only the Ententes are to be poisoned. How comes it a Deutscher gets 
poisoned on Guinness Stout? Lay off that stufiF. I am a spy too. Now see! . . . 
To have made the jamboree a complete success one "C. Williams" should 
have been along! ! Mr. Fisher says he never can think of your last name. I 
wonder if he suspects anything? Sorry submarine boat went down. I ask you, 
where would you expect a submarine boat to go ? Up in the air ? Same thing. 
Better luck next time. — 

P. S. About what date will you be ready to sail on board the S.S. St. Paul 
or other liner ? Important. 

The second letter, dated January 8, 1917, written by Clucas from 
Canada, contained the following excerpt: 

Now I want to caution you about the contents of your letters to me when I 
am in Canada. As you are aware, they are all censored, and don*t sign "Kron 
Prinz" because I will never get them if you do. 

A third letter, written seven days after the Kingsland fire is sig- 


It was my firm belief that you were a victim of your own hand. Needless 
to say I was surprised and deHghted to receive your letter this morning. I 
cannot here tell you how concerned I was when the glaring headlines told 
of the Kingsland disaster, nor can I tell you what my first impressions were, 
but you can surely guess. I will be more anxious than you know to hear full 
particulars and just how much your "Father" had to do with it! Seems very 
strange to me that perhaps your little red book would impart valuable knowl- 
edge! 'No? Oh! and by the way, where is the Deutschland? . . . 

In addition to these letters there was also a sealed letter, undated, ad- 
dressed to "Sergt. Braum, 59th Street Circle" and signed "Sergt. 
Ehrhart." It read: "Bearer is a prospective recruit for regular service, 
having served three years (3) in Prussia's (?) service. He is looking for 
a special assignment." 

Thorne disappeared from circulation. There v^ere conjectures as to 
v^hat had happened to him, and for a long time a rumor circulated 
that under one of his many aHases he was later shot in England as a 

In April 1930 Carrol Clucas was uncovered in Mount Vernon, Ohio. 
When interviewed by Peaslee, he admitted having written the above 
letters and also stated that between June 3 and some time in September 
1916, he and Thorne, who was then passing under the name of Chester 
Williams, made four trips between the United States and Liverpool as 
stewards on the St, Paul, On their last trip, Clucas recalled that Thorne 
was ill on their arrival in New York and was carried down the ship's 
gangway on a stretcher and placed in a conveyance waiting for him 
on the wharf. 

Clucas further testified that Thorne often intimated to him that he 
was a German spy; and that, in a letter written to him about a week 
after the Kingsland fire, Thorne claimed that the fire was the work 
of German agents. 

This statement of Clucas' was important, not only because it revealed 
Thorne as a German spy but because it also fitted in perfectly with an 
affidavit which had been obtained a short time previously from Edwin 
Herrmann, Fred Herrmann's brother. An extract is quoted below: 


I remember very well Thorne and Carrol Clucas. They were friends of 
Willie Wohst, and of my brother, Fritz. My brother, Fritz, used to refer to 
Clucas as a ham actor. One of them was carried off a steamer when they 
arrived on a stretcher feigning illness, and was met by a private ambulance, 
the purpose of the plan being to take off the boat a supply of tubes or other 
materials that were being used. I personally went to the steamer St. Paul 
when Thorne and Clucas arrived, and which came in, as I recall it, at the 
slip next to the 23rd Street Ferry on the New York side. . . . 

These tubes mentioned by Edwin were incendiary pencils — yet an- 
other supply which Germany had sent into the United States. 

For some reason or other, at this stage Fred Herrmann concealed the 
fact that he himself personally knew Thorne. It was established, how- 
ever, through three independent witnesses whom the American inves- 
tigators interrogated that Hinsch knew Thorne well and that in 1915 
and early 1916 they had lived a few blocks from each other in Balti- 
more. It is significant, too, that it was only two months before the 
fire that Thorne got his job as employment agent at Kingsland. 

Having thus linked up Thorne to Fred Herrmann and Hinsch, we 
must now turn back once more to the evidence which Herrmann gave 
when examined before the American and German Agents of the 
Mixed Claims Commission. 

Chapter XX 

We have already described how after Fred Herrmann met Hinsch 
they examined a list of factories which Hinsch had marked for destruc- 
tion and that on the list allotted to Herrmann the Kingsland factory 
was included. 

According to Herrmann, after spending considerable time studying 
the layout of the Kingsland plant he came to realize that the factory 
was too well guarded and that it would require an inside man to do 
the job. He accordingly consulted Hinsch, who had been carrying on 
sabotage since 1915 and who had a large number of agents at his 
disposal. Hinsch promised to study the situation. Some time later 
Hinsch called him up at the Hotel McAlpin, where Herrmann was 
staying, and informed him that he had found the right man for him. 
They agreed to meet outside the Hotel McAlpin, and there Hinsch 
introduced Herrmann to Wozniak, a workman employed at the Kings- 
land plant. Herrmann, however, did not like the looks of Wozniak. He 
described him later as a man with "a heavy, thick black mustache, and 
dark eyes, looking sort of cuckoo — staring eyes." He was not sure 
whether he could trust him. Consequently, he asked Hinsch to find 
him another man. On the next day Hinsch turned up with a man 
called Rodriguez, a Porto Rican, one of his agents in Baltimore. Later 
Herrmann introduced Rodriguez to Wozniak and asked Wozniak if 
he could get him employment at the Kingsland plant. Wozniak replied 
that there would be no difficulty, as he had a pull with the Kingsland 
employment agent. He was successful in procuring work for Rodriguez 
in the Kingsland plant. Thereafter Herrmann met the two every four 
or five days to discuss plans with them; and over a period of two or 

three weeks he paid each of them $40 a week. Finally Herrmann 



became convinced that they would be able to do the job and gave 
them each four or five incendiary pencils. 
During his examination, Herrmann v^ent on to explain: 

I showed them how they [the incendiary pencils] worked and told them 
to put them in an old working jacket or something like that, and all they 
had to do was to cut off the top and put them in their pockets and take their 
coats off and hang them up somewhere. I think that it was about two days 
after the fire, there, I met Rodriguez, and I asked him where Wozniak was. 
He said he had not seen him. I said, "I suppose that I'll have to give you 
some money," and I gave him $500.00 — ^I am positive that it was $500.00 — and 
told him that he had better beat it, and I gave him an address, which did not 
exist, if he wanted to keep in touch with me. I had no idea of seeing him 

With this evidence before us we can now hazard a guess as to why 
Hinsch greeted Fred Herrmann with, "Hello, Rodriguez." Was it be- 
cause Herrmann had hired Rodriguez .f' Or was it because the new 
man who took Rodriguez' place on the day of the fire was Herrmann 
himself.? The identity of this new man was never established. When 
interviewed by the American lawyers, Hadler expressed an opinion that 
it was Herrmann. There is no evidence, however, to prove this. Most of 
the records of the Kingsland plant were destroyed in the fire and with 
them the name or alias of Rodriguez' substitute. 

After the fire, according to the evidence filed by the American law- 
yers, Wozniak fled to Mexico and there turned up under the name of 
"Karowski." Later Wozniak was to furnish the Germans with an 
affidavit denying that he had intentionally set fire to Kingsland or that 
he knew Hinsch, Herrmann, or any German agent or that he had ever 
been in Mexico or had used the name of Karowski. 

But against this denial were the affidavits of Altendorf, Hadler, and 
others, who not only identified Wozniak's photographs as that of a 
German agent whom they met in Mexico in 1917 but also testified 
that he was passing under the name of Karowski. Judge Fake, who ex- 
amined Altendorf in 1920, produced a yellow slip of paper which was 
handed to him by Altendorf at this examination and which has been 
in his possession ever since. On that slip of paper, which gave the 


names of the various German agents that Altendorf had met in Mex- 
ico, was the name of Karowski. 

Herrmann testified that, during the time he was with Hinsch in 
Mexico, one day towards the end of 1917 Hinsch told him that 
Wozniak was in Mexico City and that he was going to send him 
around to see him. Herrmann stated that he refused to see Wozniak 
and told Hinsch to keep Wozniak away from him since, to his mind, 
Wozniak was half crazy and he was afraid of him. 

The American investigators had made every effort to locate Wozniak, 
when suddenly, in August 1929, the Germans filed affidavits signed by 
Wozniak which indicated that he was in the United States. Detectives 
were sent to the address shown on the affidavits and were informed 
that he had left just a few days before and had disappeared without 
leaving a forwarding address. 

Mr. Bonynge, thereupon, immediately applied directly to Dr. Tan- 
nenberg. Counsel to the German Agent, asking for Wozniak's address. 
To this there was no reply, and several weeks later, on January 10, 
1930, the American Agent applied to Dr. von Lewinski, the German 
Agent, asking for the information. 

The Wozniak affidavits contained a lead, however. They estab- 
Hshed an alibi showing that Wozniak had been employed by the Santa 
Clara Lumber Company, at Tupper Lake, during August and Septem- 
ber 1917, the period during which Karowski was in Mexico. It was 
evident that both the Germans and Wozniak had spent a considerable 
time in Tupper Lake preparing these affidavits. Therefore, the area 
was watched. On July 5, 1930, Peto suddenly got word that Wozniak 
had again turned up there. 

On being advised of this through Peaslee, Mr. Bonynge addressed 
a letter to Wozniak requesting him to appear before him for a cross- 
examination and handed this letter to Peaslee with instructions that 
he should see that Wozniak got it. 

Realizing that Wozniak was being concealed from them, a force was 
assembled. Peto descended on Tupper Lake from Montreal, and 
Peaslee, accompanied by H. H. Martin, the Counsel for the American 
Agent, advanced northwards from New York City. 

Peaslee reached Tupper Lake at 7:50 a.m. on July 8 and was met 


at the station by Peto, who reported that Wozniak had been last seen at 
Shinnick's Hotel in the company of Mr. Healy, an attorney for the 
German Agent. 

On their way to Shinnick's hotel, a car suddenly turned into the 
road and passed them going in the opposite direction. In it they recog- 
nized Healy and Wozniak. Swinging their car around, Peto and Peas- 
lee set off in hot pursuit. It was a neck-and-neck race for some time, 
until eventually Peto and Peaslee succeeded in getting ahead of the 
fleeing machine and blocking the road with their car. Thus was won 
the bloodless battle of Tupper Lake, and Bonynge's letter was delivered 
to Wozniak. 

There are various versions of what actually happened — ^both sides 
filed a lengthy report with the Mixed Claims Commission. The Ger- 
man version was that they mistook Peaslee and Peto for prohibition 
agents, that their unseemly haste was occasioned by fear that a raid 
was about to be made on Shinnick's Hotel, and that Wozniak would be 
held as a material witness. All of which, said Mr. Bonynge, reminded 
him of Bill in Alice in Wonderland: "Something comes at me like a 
jack-in-the-box, and up I goes in the air like a sky-rocket." 

On his way back from Tupper Lake to New York, Wozniak in an 
unguarded moment had a conversation with the brakeman of the 
train, in the course of which he made some significant disclosures. 
This brakeman, Louis F. Hyatt, subsequently furnished an affidavit to 
Peaslee which read as follows: 

On the morning of July 10, 1930, 1 was on my regular run on train No. 36, 
leaving Albany at 2:45 p-^- The train was composed entirely of pullmans 

except one day coach and one smoker A short time after we left Albany 

a man in the day coach who had no hat and who had a long mustache 
turned up at the ends, and a rather slight build who walked quite erect, mo- 
tioned to me to come to him. I recognized the picture [of Wozniak] which 
has been shown to me this morning and which is attached to this statement 
on which I have put my initials. 

The brakeman then got into conversation with Wozniak: 

During this conversation he [Wozniak] took three or four newspaper 
clippings from an envelope in his pocket, describing about an explosion and 


fire, which had his picture on them and I noticed the resemblance and asked 
him was it him, and he told me yes that was him, but that he wasn't guilty 
of it even though he was being watched and that he was ducking the ones 
who were after him for it. 

I asked him why he was being watched if he wasn't guilty and he said 
that the engineer of the plant was the one that done it. He said that he had 
notified the Russian Government that the shells were no good and that some- 
thing was going to happen, and shortly after that this happened. He said 
that an engineer in the plant had put a sort of mechanical pencil into his coat 
pocket over his machine which caused the explosion and fire. 

He told me had been up to Tupper Lake for about six weeks to look for 
work and that he got wise there that he was being watched and he told me 
how he had checked up on a man buying rubbers there; that he was sus- 
picious of him and that he left there. . . . 

I said to him, "If you're so afraid of these men why don't you get yourself 
locked up?" and he said, "Well, they can't do anything to me, they're just 
trying to get the claims for the company." 

When he was asking about these men and showing me these clippings I 
began to get suspicious that he was, in plain words, a nut, that was my saying 
to the conductor, so I called the conductor's attention to him and said he 
better get a policeman or something the man seemed to me to be a nut or 
crazy. He told me, "No, he isn't insane or he isn't a nut, there is a man in the 
head sleeper watching him and he isn't a nut." 

Later in his argument before the Mixed Claims Commission at The 
Hague hearing, Mr. Bonynge, in commenting on this affidavit of 
Hyatt, stated: 

In this unguarded moment Wozniak stated that an engineer in the plant 
had put a sort of mechanical pencil into his coat pocket over his machine, 
which caused the explosion and fire. Never before had he made any statement 
similar to that, and, of course, that shows perfectly well that he knows that 
there was a pencil that caused that fire and the pencil that caused the fire 
was the pencil that was given to him by Herrmann, and given also to 

Shortly after Wozniak's return to New York, Mr. Bonynge received 
a letter from the German Agent advising him that Wozniak was ready 
to volunteer as a witness and to give his testimony. 


On cross-examining him, Mr. Bonynge quickly realized that 
Wozniak had a prepared story and that in his general denials he was 
backing up the affidavits he had already given to the Germans. To 
judge Wozniak's reliability as a witness, Mr. Bonynge, therefore, 
switched to the divorce proceedings which he had learned Wozniak 
had recently undertaken in Chicago against his wife. At this Wozniak 
grew very excited and in his replies revealed that two months after 
he had given his affidavits to the Germans, he had committed perjury 
in Chicago. In the sworn complaint that he had filed in his divorce 
suit he stated that he had been living in Chicago for more than a year 
preceding. Whereas his examination by Mr. Bonynge showed that he 
had never been in Chicago before in his life. 

In the meantime the American operatives had been investigating the 
alibis that Wozniak had furnished. A man named George Prespare, 
a resident of Tupper Lake, had given the Germans an affidavit in 
which he had declared that on presentation of Wozniak to him he had 
recognized him as one of the men who had worked in Tupper Lake 
during August and September 19 17. Prespare now furnished the Amer- 
ican investigators with an affidavit in which he stated that it could not 
have been in 1917 that he took Wozniak up to the lumber camp of the 
Santa Clara Lumber Company because in 1916 he had sold his wagon 
and was not driving people up to the particular camp where Wozniak 
claimed he was working. Furthermore, when shown six photographs, 
two of them of Wozniak, and four of them of workmen who had 
worked at Kingsland, he identified Wozniak, whom he had seen only 
two months previously; but he also identified two of the other photo- 
graphs as those of men who had worked at the Santa Clara Lumber 
Company; and yet neither of them had ever set foot in Tupper Lake 
in their lives. 

Finally, Wozniak claimed in his affidavit that during the summer of 
1917 he had quit work at the Preston Pond Camp of the Santa Clara 
Lumber Company with one Alex Smith. An examination of the books 
of the Lumber Company revealed that the only time Alex Smith 
worked at the Preston Pond Camp was from January 18, 1918, to 
March 25, 1918. 


With the investigation of these alibis, and the examination of 
Wozniak completed, the dead line for the filing of evidence for The 
Hague hearing had been reached. The voluminous records of exhibits 
and briefs were crated up, and the scene of activities was transferred to 
The Hague. 

Chapter XXI 


The Mixed Claims Commission met on September i8, 1930, at The 
Hague to render a judgment on the evidence presented by Germany 
and the United States in the Black Tom and Kingsland cases. 

The Umpire was the Honorable Roland W. Boyden; the Honorable 
Chandler P. Anderson was the American Commissioner; and the Ger- 
man Commissioner was Dr. Wilhelm Kiesselbach. On behalf of the 
Government of the United States there appeared: the Honorable Robert 
W. Bonynge, American Agent, and Mr. H. H. Martin, Counsel to the 
American Agent. On behalf of Germany: Dr. Karl von Lewinski, 
German Agent; Dr. Wilhelm Tannenberg, Counsel to the German 
Agent; and Mr. T. J. Healy, Assistant Counsel. 

After making appropriate reference to the Peace Palace in which 
they were assembled, an edifice dedicated by the donor, Andrew Car- 
negie, to the cause of peace and the settlement of international con- 
troversies by judicial tribunals, Mr. Bonynge outlined the charge: 

That during the period of American neutrality, the Imperial German 
Government, in accordance with the policy now admitted to have been in- 
augurated by the Foreign Office of the Imperial German Government, 
authorizing and directing sabotage against munitions and munition plants 
in the United States, did employ, through its agents thereunto duly author- 
ized, men who actually set fire to the Black Tom Terminal and to the 
Kingsland plant of the Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Company. 

He then went on to point out the difficulties which Germany had 
set up in the way of the American investigators to prevent their ob- 
taining information. He quoted the numerous instances of obstruction 
and lack of cooperation which we have already mentioned in the pre- 
ceding chapters, and finally stressed two specific instances. 



One of these related to the famous cablegram of January 26, 1915.'* 
In his oral argument reviewing the evidence Mr. Bonynge pointed 
out that the importance of this cablegram had been fully recognized 
by the Umpire at a previous preliminary hearing in Washington. On 
that occasion he had indicated by his questions that, in his opinion, this 
message could not have been the first message relating to sabotage in 
the United States because of the abrupt manner in v^hich the cablegram 
starts: "Information regarding persons suitable for carrying out sabo- 
tage in the United States and Canada can be obtained from the 
following." He went on to state that on the motion of the American 
Agent, the Umpire had requested Germany to produce all the other 
documents preceding and relating to this cable and had indicated to 
Germany, by analyzing the legends upon the cable of January 26, where 
they might find these other documents. 

Germany had thereupon filed an affidavit signed by Nadolny that 
this cablegram was just a passing incident, a blunder of a subordinate, 
that as a staff officer in the office of Section III B of the Great General 
Staff he had allowed himself to be overpersuaded by a fanatic, Sir 
Roger Casement, to issue this cablegram; and that the fact that this 
cablegram had been sent through the Foreign Office was of no sig- 
nificance, because in this instance the Foreign Office had merely acted 
as a forwarding medium. 

In response to the order of the Commission a document had then 
been produced from the files of the Foreign Office which had been 
there all the time but could not be found until the American Agent 
had told the Germans where they could find it. This document was a 
letter from the Foreign Office to Section III B — to Nadolny and to 
Marguerre — directing them to forward the above cable. This proved 
that if anyone had been persuaded by Sir Roger Casement it was not 
Nadolny, but the Foreign Office. 

Germany had then filed another statement from Nadolny in which 
he said that after the sending of the cable "the Foreign Office took the 
position that even sabotage at that time was not permissible, as Amer- 
ica, in spite of its war support, which was contrary to the spirit of 
neutrality, was officially a neutral country." 

* See page 8. » 


When urged by the Commission to produce the original document 
on which the cablegram of January 26 was based, Germany had pro- 
duced it. On it were found the signatures of Count Montgelas, one 
of the highest officials of the Foreign Office, and of Zimmermann, as 
we already know. The Germans next had filed a brief in which they 
stated that "the officials of the Foreign Office in charge of this matter 
changed their minds and came to the conclusion that they had per- 
mitted themselves to be led into a blunder." The brief further stated 
that "the cable of January 26, 1915, was not acted upon but was com- 
pletely disregarded by the addressee. Neither does it make any differ- 
ence in judging the reasons why von Papen disregarded the message 
and why he was in position to do so." 

Mr. Bonynge continued his argument by pointing out that one year 
after Nadolny and Marguerre had sent the cablegram, and more than 
a year before America entered the war, these same two men met 
Herrmann, Hilken, and Dilger in the office of Section III B, handed 
them incendiary pencils, authorized Hilken to pay out any moneys 
that might be required, and ordered them to go back to the United 
States as quickly as possible. 

He then moved on to a discussion of Herrmann's relations with von 
Olshausen, emphasizing Germany's failure to produce the documents 
demanded by him relative to the interviews between the two. 

According to Mr. Bonynge, he had demanded that the German agent 
produce the cables between von Olshausen and the German Govern- 
ment concerning Herrmann, the existence of which had been brought 
out in Herrmann's affidavit. Instead of producing them the Germans 
had filed an unsworn statement by von Olshausen, dated June i, 1930, 
in which he had denied that Herrmann had confessed to him partici- 
pation in the destruction of Kingsland, and had denied that he had 
stated to Herrmann that "we have to shut an eye now and then," 
and had denied sending a cable to Berlin about Herrmann, but had 
admitted sending a written report. 

As Mr. Bonynge was about to continue after this recapitulation of 
what had gone on at the previous hearings, the German Agent indig- 
nantly intervened, claiming it was unnecessary for a diplomatic repre- 
sentative of Germany to swear to a statement and that his word was 


sufficient. Then, referring to the cables and von Olshausen's written 
report, he dramatically stated that he had them in his pocket but could 
not produce them as they were in code — to decipher them would mean 
compromising the German code. 
To this Mr. Bonynge replied : 

Nobody asks anything about the German code. I would not know what 
to do with it if I had it. I do not want the German code. I want what was 
stated in this message. They can have somebody decode it and have somebody 
swear that it is a proper decoding of the message, if they want to be frank 
and give all the evidence in their possession bearing upon this matter. The 
failure of Germany to produce these documents is certainly to be construed 
against Germany, and to be construed as confirming Herrmann's testimony, 
rather than the testimony of Minister Olshausen, because as a witness he is no 
different from Herrmann, except that we would give more credence to his 
testimony if he were not referring to written documents. 

I have never yet learned in my practice that when a man takes the witness 
stand he is exempt from the rules governing all other witnesses because he 
is an official, whether he is Secretary of State or whatever his position is. If 
this were an ordinary proceeding in a domestic court in the United States, 
and we wanted a document from the Secretary of State we would, either 
through a subpoena duces tecum or by a writ of mandamus, compel the 
production of the document. The Secretary of State could not protect himself 
by simply going on the stand and saying, "I have read the document, and 
the document states so and so." He would have to produce the document. 

On page 3 of his report of June i, 1930, the Minister refers to telegraphic 
instructions of the Foreign Office, dated February 15, 1929, which instructions 
the Minister thinks were sent before the Foreign Office had received his 
written report with respect to Herrmann's call about the middle of January, 

It certainly would be interesting to see and to learn what the instructions 
of the Foreign Office were which were drafted without the knowledge of the 
contents of the Minister's report on Herrmann. Who was keeping the Foreign 
Office advised with reference to Herrmann at this time in February, 1929, be- 
fore the Minister had made any report at all ? 

With the receipt of these instructions from the Foreign Office, the German 
Minister to Chile first commenced, according to his testimony, to take an 
interest in the Herrmann matter. 

Why do we not have the instructions he received.? I think he tried to tell 


us what the instructions were, but the instructions came either by a coded 
message or came by a letter to him, and that could be produced and set at 
naught forever the argument I am now making, if my argument is not 
founded upon the facts. Yet Germany stands here before this Commission 
and says that it has made an honest and a fair submission of all facts within 
its knowledge bearing upon these cases. 

Then in an argument which lasted for four days Mr. Bonynge pre- 
sented to the Commission all the evidence which has been outlined in 
the preceding chapters. In the course of this argument he also analyzed 
the evidence which Germany had filed to establish alibis for Witzke 
and Jahnke. His attack on these alibis is best given in his own words: 

The first attempt to prove an alibi for Witzke was when evidence was 
produced that on July 25, 1916,—! think that is the correct date— he made 
apphcation for American citizenship. Witzke, on July 25th, four days before 
the blowing up of the Black Tom, made an application for American citizen- 
ship when he had no intention of ever becoming an American citizen, and 
it is so admitted by the German Agent in his briefs. He must have made it 
for some ulterior purpose. That fact goes to estabHsh that he was laying the 
foundation for establishing an alibi. Then it was demonstrated that even 
though he had made his application for American citizenship on July 25, 
1916, it was still possible, having made it in San Francisco, for him to be in 
New York fifteen hours, I think it was, before the blowing up of the Black 
Tom. The attempt to prove an alibi by making application for American 
citizenship was thus disposed of. It was a common practice, as shown in this 
case, for German agents to apply for American citizenship. Witzke did it. 
Wozniak did it just a few weeks before he made his dramatic appearance 
at the office of the German Consul General in New York. It is proven in 
reference to a number of the other German agents. 

Having destroyed the attempt to prove that alibi, they then examined 
Witzke over again and sought to estabHsh an alibi on another and a different 
basis, although Witzke is supposed to have told his entire story at the time 
he was first examined. 

He was asked on that examination by Dr. Paulig whether he had any 
documentary evidence, any letters or any documents that would establish the 
truth of his statement that he was not in New York at the time of the blowing 
up of the Black Tom. He assured Dr. Paulig that he had nothing. He only 
referred to his notebook, and Dr. Paulig at the conclusion of that examination 


assured Witzke, with clasped hands, in a dramatic scene, that under no 
circumstances would that notebook ever be disclosed to the American 

The only evidence that was introduced that has any bearing at all towards 
establishing an alibi . . . was the letter which was addressed by Witzke to his 
parents. The post mark on that letter is rather difficult to decipher. It is 
deciphered by the German Agent as August 2nd. There may be some ques- 
tion, as you examine the original, as to whether it was August 2nd or August 
i2th. But assuming that it was August 2nd, what they attempt to prove is 
that that letter, post marked in San Francisco on August 2nd, shows that 
he could not have gotten back from New York to San Francisco after blow- 
ing up the Black Tom, or assisted in blowing it up, on July 29, in time to 
mail that letter in San Francisco on August 2nd. 

As this Commission well knows the fact that a letter bears the post mark 
of a certain date, when a man is attempting to estabUsh an alibi, does not 
prove that he actually mailed the letter at that time. Somebody else may have 
mailed the letter for him. That is an old trick 

The only proof that the letters were actually mailed by Witzke on the dates 
which the post marks bear is the evidence of Witzke himself. He does swear 
that he mailed them on those particular dates. But I submit to you gentlemen 
of the Commission that Witzke is an absolutely unreliable witness. . . . 

He made false statements admittedly, under oath, when he was being 
examined on his court martial proceedings. He then stated that he was a 
Russian. He first said he met Jahnke in New York, and afterwards he 
changed it and said he met him in San Francisco. Throughout that entire 
testimony he lied from beginning to end 

As to the new evidence to establish an alibi for Jahnke, Jahnke has also 
been examined a number of times by the German Government, and has given 
three or four or five different affidavits. In his first affidavit he stated that 

he had told the sheer truth and all of his activities No mention at all was 

made by him of the fact that he had ever served as a detective for the Morse 
Patrol in San Francisco. 

Jahnke was a pretty prominent man. He was the confidential adviser 
of Bopp. He was receiving a very comfortable salary from Bopp. There was 
no possible reason why he should ever have served as a detective at the rate of 
twenty-five cents an hour and put in services during the year 1916, I think, 

for some forty-odd days Receiving altogether according to the records of 

the Morse Patrol — not the testimony of Jahnke himself— the large sum of 
eighty-six dollars and some odd cents. 


What is the record they produce? They produce a record o£ the Morse 
Patrol which shows that a man by the name of Jahnke was assigned to do 
some detective work for them on different dates during the year 1916, in- 
cluding a record that a man under the name of Jahnke was working for 

the Morse Patrol on July 12, 15, 16, 29 and 30, 1916 That evidence was 

introduced some time between August 14, 1929, and January 31, 1930. As 
soon as it was introduced, investigations were made of the records of the 
Morse Patrol, and it developed . . . that they had a very careless way of 
keeping records of who actually served. It developed, however, that Jahnke 
was known to the Morse Patrol, that he first went there under the name of 
Borden, an alias; that Ruwe of the Morse Patrol knew he was a German 
spy; that the Morse Patrol had been doing some work for the German 
Consulate General in San Francisco. It developed by the testimony of an 
accountant who went over the books of the company itself, and not in con- 
nection with these cases at all, that their records did not disclose exactly who 
performed services on a certain date; that a substitute might be used for the 
man whose name was given, and that there was no way of telling from 
those records who actually performed the services on the particular days. . . . 

Mr. Bonynge finally summed up the evidence: 

I wish now, gentlemen of the Commission, to sum up very briefly what we 
contend has been established to show that Germany was responsible for the 
blowing up of the Black Tom. I want again to repeat that we are here trying 
a civil action; that the burden of proof which rests upon us is to establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence in the minds of the members of this 
Commission that Germany, as a principal, was responsible for the blowing 
up of the Black Tom. Once we establish that fact, all the details as to how it 
was done, who did it, which particular agent did this thing, how he accom- 
plished it, all the details as to the explosions which occurred, whether one 
was on the land and the other was on a boat, all become immaterial, provided 
we have convinced this Commission by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Germany, as a principal, was responsible for the blowing up of the Black 

In support of that contention I submit to this Commission that we have 
established the following propositions beyond the peradventure of a doubt: 

First, that Germany did specifically, by the cablegram of January 26, 1915, 
authorize and direct the carrying on of sabotage in the United States against 
munitions and munition factories. 


Second, that in pursuance of that poUcy, Germany did send Agents to the 
United States, and employed others in the United States, and armed them 
with the incendiary devices to carry into execution the poUcy which the 
highest powers of Germany had declared was to be pursued in the United 

Third, we have established that one of the Agents thus employed by 
Germany, Hinsch, an admitted German agent, traveled about the country 
with a suitcase which he had to have carefully guarded by an unknown and 
half -demented man. What was the purpose of guarding that suitcase ? Was it 
not because it had in it, not the ordinary clothing of a man who is traveUng 
about the country, but these very incendiary devices? 

Fourth, we have established that Hinsch has admitted that he was traveling 
about the country during the very time this man Kristoff was traveling about 
the country, and that he visited some of the very places Kristoff visited. 

Fifth, we have established, again, that Kristoff himself, on the night of the 
explosion, came home declaring that he had been a party to the explosion. 
We have connected that testimony with the testimony of Witzke that he and 
Jahnke were responsible for the blowing up of the Black Tom, and that he 
has denied those admissions, although we have established beyond doubt 
that the admissions were made; that he has attempted to prove an alibi, has 
made two or three different attempts, when one failed made another; that 
Jahnke has never testified that he performed the services he is alleged to have 
performed in San Francisco at the time, and that his alibi has likewise failed. 

When he had finished with the Black Tom case Mr. Bonynge went 
on to the Kingsland case. After declaring that he had established be- 
yond reasonable doubt that Germany from the beginning of the war 
was engaged in a world-wide campaign of sabotage, and had never 
canceled the sabotage order of January 26, 1915, Mr. Bonynge stated 
in his summing up of this case: 

That immediately following the issuance of this authorization (the cable 
of January 26, 1915) Germany sent to, or selected from its sympathizers in, 
the United States agents to execute the policy authorized by the Foreign 
Office of the German Government, and armed them with the means to carry 
that poHcy into execution. 

That Messrs. Nadolny and Marguerre of the German Staff specifically 
employed Herrmann as a German agent and furnished him with the in- 


cendiary devices to destroy munitions and munition factories in the United 

That Herrmann, in pursuance of the authority given to him, came to the 
United States; with the assistance of Captain Hinsch and other German 
agents, employed Wozniak and Rodriguez to set fire to the Kingsland plant, 
and furnished them with the identical incendiary devices given to him by 
Nadolny and Marguerre for the very purpose of destroying munition 

That Wozniak and Rodriguez, with the assistance of Hinsch, Herrmann 
and other German agents, did actually start the fire that destroyed the 
Kingsland plant. 

On the cojnclusion of Mr. Bonynge's argument, Dr. Karl von 
Lev^inski, the German Agent, took the floor to present Germany's 
argument. He prefaced his plea v^ith a caustic attack on the tactics the 
American lawyers had used in obtaining their evidence and expressed 
regret that these methods had been found necessary in litigation bc- 
tv^een tvv^o governments before an international tribunal. He then took 
exception to the concluding remarks of Mr. Bonynge's summing up 
which had defined his contention that, if once it had been proved 
that Germany was responsible for the destruction of Black Tom and 
Kingsland, it was immaterial what particular German agents accom- 
plished it or how he did it: 

What the American Agent treats as mere details, namely, how it was done, 
who did it, and whether the person who did it was really a German agent — 
these so-called "details" form the actual, and I claim the only, issue in the 
present proceedings. 

To be specific, if the American Agent proves that Witzke or Jahnke 
actually blew up Black Tom, or if he proves that Kristoff blew up Black 
Tom, and that he was a German agent, then, but only then, has he dis- 
charged the burden of proof incumbent upon him. If he is unable to prove 
this, his case must fall, even if it should be considered as estabUshed that there 
existed an authorization to commit sabotage against ammunition factories 
and plants in the United States during neutrality. 

The same is true in the Kingsland case. Assumption, suspicions, even 
possibilities are not enough. Actual proof of the actual fact is the only 
possible basis of recovery in the instant claims. 


The ship sabotage and the inoculation of horses, mules, and cattle in 
the United States he frankly admitted. Dr. von Lewinski argued, how- 
ever, that, although the bombs were placed on ships in American ports, 
the active destruction was timed to take place outside of American 
waters. Tliat presumably was Germany's defense as regards the germ 
inoculation, too, since on the same basis it could be argued that the 
germs were only intended to take effect on the livestock after shipment. 

As regards the sabotage order of January 26, 191 5, Dr. von Lewinski 
claimed that it was never carried out; and as to the instructions issued 
by Nadolny and Marguerre to Hilken, Herrmann, and Dilger he 
averred that they were only to come into effect in the event of the 
United States's entering the war on the side of the Allies. 

The German evidence which had been filed was then reviewed at 
great length by Dr. von Lewinski and Dr. Tannenberg. Without ex- 
ception, every one of those German agents resident in Germany who 
had been accused by the American lawyers had issued a lengthy denial. 
And it was on these denials, especially on that of Hinsch, that Germany 
chiefly based her defense. Hinsch gave an affidavit that at the time of 
the Black Tom explosion all of his time was being taken up with the 
affairs of the Eastern Forwarding Company and the duties connected 
with the loading and unloading of the submarine Deutschland, 

The evidence of Herrmann was attacked as that of a man who had 
testified for both sides and therefore could not be believed. The testi- 
mony of Altendorf was impeached on the grounds that in various 
statements in 1918 and in newspaper articles written by him in 1919 
and 1920 he had given different versions of how Witzke and Jahnke 
had blown up Black Tom. A lengthy exposition was made of the alibis 
which had been established for Witzke, Jahnke, and Wozniak. 

Finally, in the Kingsland case, a strenuous defense was advanced that 
the fire was caused by an industrial accident. In support of this conten- 
tion, affidavits from several Italian workmen who worked at Kingsland 
at the time of the fire had been produced just before the hearing; also 
a report, dated January 18, 1917, from a man named Johnson, who was 
in charge of the guards at Kingsland and who reported on the cause 
of the fire after interviewing several of the workmen present in Build- 
ing 30 at the time of the outbreak of the fire. It was also intimated 


that the American claimants must have known of the existence of this 
report and had purposely ignored it. In reviewing this evidence of 
Johnson, and also of Lascola, one of the Italian workmen, Dr. Tannen- 
berg stated: 

Wozniak was working, in the afternoon of January 11, at the last cleaning 
machine at the northerly end of the last table at the north end of the building. 
There was one table holding about three or four cleaning machines. He was 
at the northerly end of that table, and at approximately 3 145 — or 3 143, accord- 
ing to the Johnson report — he took an uncleaned shell and put it in place for 
cleaning, and as he did so the closed end of the steel shell struck sparks from 
the cast iron pulley which was revolving under the traction of the moving 

The shell did not fit into place at once, and Wozniak gave the shell a push 
in order to make it fit into place better 

The sparks, although unobserved by Wozniak, were seen by other men, 
and in this connection it must be remembered that the shell revolved away 
from Wozniak, so that if any spark was caused, the spark would not appear 
on the side towards Wozniak but on the other side. 

According to the Johnson report of January 18, 1917 (Page 3), the streak 
of sparks which resulted from that contact of shell and pulley was seen by 
George Roberts, Thomas A. Decle, Andrew Roach, Chris Lovett, and 
Thomas Steele, as well as other workmen not named. 

In the Johnson report Johnson refers to the fact that he examined these 
men and that the statements of these men are all substantially in accord 
with what Roberts said. Roberts was working on one of these tables at the 
northerly end of the building, about ten feet away from Wozniak, facing 
Wozniak, as I said before, on one of these tables that were at right angles 
to the tables on which the cleaning machines were placed, and according to 
what Johnson states in his report Roberts saw suddenly a streak of sparks 
coming from the machine, and Johnson states that that observation is sub- 
stantially confirmed by the statements of five, six or more witnesses. 

If Johnson's report does not set forth correctly what the eye witnesses said 
at the time of their examination, why are not those reports produced ? They 
are at the disposal of the claimant company. The fact that they are not 
produced, although the American Agent certainly had a chance to obtain the 
statements, is, in the opinion of the German Agent, conclusive proof that the 
original statements are in accord with what Johnson says in his report about 
the very beginning of the fire at the cleaning machine, a streak of small 


sparks— not a flame one foot long that came with a siss out of the inside 
of the shell. Six or seven witnesses say that the very first beginning was a 
streak of sparks coming from this place. All saw the sparks coming from 
Wozniak's cleaning machine immediately before the fire. That Wozniak did 
not see the sparks is not to be wondered at, as an inspection of the drawing 
of the cleaning machine shown in German exhibit CXXXI will show that 
the sparks must, from the nature of the machine, have landed on the gasoline- 
soaked table behind the high part of the cleaning machine on which he was 
cleaning the shells. 

That the fire started from those sparks which had landed on the table, 
away from Wozniak, behind the cleaning machine, is established also by the 
evidence of Lascola. I refer to the fact that Lascola had been examined by 
Judge Fake and by officials of the Agency of the Canadian Car & Foundry 
Company in Rutherford and in New York immediately after the fire. 

He testified in the deposition which was taken in August of this year 
(Exhibit CXV) that when his attention was called by a sudden squeak and 
he looked at Wozniak's machine, he was only ten feet away from Wozniak's 
machine. He saw little flames between the end of the shell, the closed end 
of the shell against the cast iron pulley, and the pan of gasoline, little flames. 

Dr. Tannenberg continued the argument by outlining in vivid detail 
the evidence of Urciuoli and Ruggiero, the two other Italian v^ork- 
men, and quoted at considerable length from their affidavits. In his 
afladavit Urciuoli had stated that he had been employed as a millwright 
in Building Number 30 for six or eight months and described his 
experiences in the building as foUov^s; 

When the machines had been in use a considerable period, they would 
get hot and would stick. This would cause a friction between the end of the 
steel shaft and the cast iron pulley. On these occasions a very hot spark 
would be thrown and could be seen from the center of the building. When- 
ever I saw these sparks I would hurry to the machine and throw the belt oflF, 
stopping the machine. Again at times the cast iron pulleys would wear in 
the bore of the pulley. The wearing of the cast iron pulley against the steel 
shaft would cause more sparks that were a source of danger. On one occasion 
during the time I was employed in Building Number 30, one of the tables 
caught fire from these causes, namely, from the sparking of the cleaning 
machine, and I put it out with an overcoat which I took from the wall. 


Ruggiero, who according to Dr. Tannenbcrg, was sub-foreman in 
Building 30 for a considerable length of time, had also confirmed this 
by the following statement in his affidavit: 

In case the pulleys were not kept well oiled, they would begin to squeak 
and bind. Occasionally they would stick and fail to rotate, that is, they 
would become "frozen" to the steel pin, on which they were supposed to 
rotate. When this happened the belt on that machine would begin to slip 
over the cast iron pulley, but the pulley would not move. The shell, how- 
ever, would continue to revolve as a result of the friction between the shell 
and the belt. On the occasions when that happened there would be a very 
decided friction between the end of the steel shell (which was moving under 
the belt) and the cast iron pulley, which would not move. In such a case 
the machine would begin to throw sparks. A squeaking machine was always 
considered a danger signal, at which time whoever happened to be in charge 
of that particular section of machines would immediately take the shell out 
and throw the belt so that the millwright could put that particular machine 
in working order. 

During the course of my employment in Building 30, I frequently saw 
cleaning machines throw sparks as a result of friction developing from 
defects in the machine. 

In his rebuttal Mr. Bonynge attacked as well as he could with the 
material at hand the testimony of these "eyewitnesses," but the picture 
of sparking machines and general carelessness in the plant, portrayed 
particularly by Ruggiero and Urciuoli, could not be overcome. As to 
the Johnson report, Mr. Bonynge replied to the charges of the German 
Agent by saying: 

I desire now to refer to the Johnson report upon which a great deal of 

reliance apparently was placed by the German Agent We have had no 

opportunity to make a thorough examination, because it was filed just a few 
days before we left the United States, but I think an investigation of the 
report itself will show that the report was never made to the Agency of 
Canadian Car & Foundry Company. This man was an employee of the Thiel 
Detective Agency. His dudes at the plant were not to examine the witnesses 
and ascertain how the fire occurred. He had a large number of guards, whose 
duty it was to protect the plant. He was desirous of presenting a report to his 


principal, the Thiel Detective Agency, to satisfy the Thiel Detective Agency 
that he and his guards were in no way responsible for the fire 

... A reading of the report — and I don't recall that Counsel for the German 
Agent read from the report at all— will demonstrate that there is not any- 
where in Johnson's first report or supplemental report any statement by him 
that he personally examined any of the workmen in the Kingsland plant; 
but, much more important than that, there is not the sHghtest indication that 
anyone ever took any written statements from any of the witnesses men- 
tioned. On the contrary it appears very clearly from his first report, as well 
as from his second report, that his whole report is third or fourth hand 
hearsay evidence, and that the real purpose of the report was not to account 
for how the fire originated, but to establish that the guards who were under 
his supervision had properly performed their duties He goes on to de- 
scribe what the various guards did, and, at the end of the general commenda- 
tion of his own guards he makes the following statement : 

"All of the guards behaved with commendable courage and judgment, 
and it is largely due to their efforts that every employee in the plant got 
away in safety '* 

This charge against the American Agent [of suppressing the Johnson 
report] is fully disproved and differs entirely from the statement made by the 
American Agent that Germany had suppressed documents which are ad- 
mitted to be in existence and actually in the possession of the German 
Government at the present time, relating to the interviews had by Herrmann 
with the members of the German Legation in Santiago, Chile. 

On Tuesday, September 30, 1930, the Commission adjourned to con- 
sider the evidence. Two v^^eeks later, at Hamburg, October 16, 1930, it 
handed down its unanimous decision dismissing both the Black Tom 
and the Kingsland cases. ^ The decisions and opinions of the Commis- 
sion covered twenty-seven printed pages, but the following extracts 
record in a general sense the findings. 

The Commission held that the authority of persons alleged to be re- 
sponsible for causing both the destructions and to act for and bind the 
German Government was fully established. It ruled on this point that 

The Commission has no difficulty with the question of authority in these 
cases. The persons alleged to be responsible for causing these two fires to be 

* The two terms, The Hague decision and the Hamburg decision, are used 
interchangeably by all connected with the litigation. 


set — either by participating in the act themselves or by employing sub-agents 
of their own — were in such relation to the German authorities, and some o£ 
them in such relation to Nadolny and Marguerre, who were in charge of the 
political section of the German General Staff, or to Hinsch, that Germany 
must be held responsible if they, or some of them, did cause the fires to be set. 
The Commission does not need direct proof, but on the evidence as submitted 
we could hold Germany responsible if, but only if, we are reasonably con- 
vinced that the fires occurred in some way through the acts of certain 
German agents. 

With regard to Black Tom the Commission stated that it was far 
from satisfied that Kristoff had not set fire to the Terminal either alone 
or in company with other parties unknown. It went on to say that it 
did not believe that Witzke or Jahnke had participated in the firing 
of the Terminal. It further stated that Black Tom would have been a 
logical target for any German sabotage agent. But while it felt that 
there was no assurance that Graentnor was not Hinsch or that Hinsch 
did not employ Kristoff it said that it did not feel the Americans, on 
whom was the burden of proof, had established beyond a reasonable 
doubt either that Kristoff was a German agent or that he had actually 
blown up Black Tom. 

In the Kingsland case, after reviewing the evidence, the Commission 
ruled as follows: 

In the Kingsland case we find upon the evidence that the fire was not 
caused by any German agent. 

This conclusion was of course based upon the evidence then before 
the Commission. In reviewing that evidence the Commission said: 

... If we were called upon to guess what caused the fire from the evidence 
of the circumstances, we should without hesitation turn to the machine which 
held the shell which Wozniak was cleaning. There is strongly persuasive 
evidence that these machines required constant watching, that when out of 
order they squeaked and threw out sparks, and that fires, quickly ex- 
tinguished, had previously occurred from this source, and there is some 
evidence from a workman close by of squeaking and of sparks from 
Wozniak's machine just at the time of the starting of the fire. Wozniak 


himself does not mention this in his contemporaneous statements, though he 
later mentioned it merely as a possible explanation. In fact he says that his 
machine was running well that day, though it had sometimes run very hot. 
To Wozniak the fire seemed to originate in the rapidly revolving shell case 
itself and to follow the rag wound around a stick with which he was drying 
the shell case when he withdrew the rag. It is interesting to find that his own 
statement is the only one which bears any resemblance to what would have 
happened if he had used one of the inflammatory pencils with which Herr- 
mann says he supplied him. 

From a reading of the above abstract, it definitely appears that the 
Commission in making the remarks contained in this opinion relied 
largely upon the Johnson report and even more upon the testimony 
of the Italian workmen. Also, the Germans had been aided by the 
natural reluctance of the tribunal to disbelieve the word of a great and 
sovereign nation unless absolute documentary proof could be produced 
showing that a German agent had ordered the firing of the two plants. 

Chapter XXII 


The Hague decision might have broken the stoutest hearts, but the 
Americans had only begun to fight. 

The Germans had sprung a tactical surprise on the American Agent 
by filing at the last moment a mass of new evidence. At, the time this 
was done, the date for The Hague hearing had been fixed; and the 
business of packing the voluminous records, arranging sailings, as well 
as preparing the cases for argument, had left no time for any more than 
cursory investigation of this new evidence, which included not only 
the Johnson report and the sworn statements of the Italian workmen 
at Kingsland, which we will refer to as the Lyndhurst testimony, but 
also the affidavits of Hinsch, Woehst, and Marguerre.''^ 

As their first move in rebuilding the cases the American lawyers 
investigated the Lyndhurst testimony and the Johnson report. They 
knew that Mr. Cahan, one of the directors of the Canadian Car and 
Foundry Company, had conducted an impartial and exhaustive in- 
vestigation immediately after the fire and, after weighing up all the 
evidence, had come to the conclusion that the fire was an act of in- 
cendiarism. They sensed, therefore, that the affidavits of the Italian 
workmen had been falsely inspired. 

Their suspicions were quickly confirmed. When interviewed, R. N. 
Marrone, a notary public of Lyndhurst, who had acted as the stenog- 
rapher in the compilation of the affidavits which had been executed by 
Ruggiero and Urciuoli, testified that the affidavits were dictated almost 
in their entirety by Counsel for the German Agent. 

* The hearing took place at The Hague on September i8, 1930. The Lynd- 
hurst testimony was filed August 9, 1930; the Johnson report on August 26, 1930; 
translation of the testimony of Woehst and Marguerre was filed August 18 and 
25, 1930; and that of Hinsch on August 21, 1930, and September 18, 1930. 



Furthermore, there was proof that the affidavits had been procured 
by the pressure of money, the payment of which had not been disclosed 
to the Commission, and in support of this Marrone produced from the 
files of his nephew by marriage, a Mr. Carella, a series of letters and 
carbon copies of letters exchanged between Carella and Dr. Tannen- 
berg. (Carella had been retained by Dr. Tannenberg to obtain the 
Lyndhurst affidavits.) A portion of the correspondence between Carella 
and Dr. Tannenberg is quoted below: 

April loth, 1931. 
William Tannenberg, Esq., 
loio Investment Building 
15th & K Streets, N.W. 
Washington, D. C. 

Dear Sir: 

Confirming our conversation of March 30th, 193 1, I have informed our 
witnesses as to your decision in the matter. I have been expecting that of 
which we spoke of and these people are continually calling upon me for 
some action. 

It is absolutely urgent that this matter be taken care o£ immediately 
because the opposition is making strenuous efforts to obtain adverse informa- 

Reports will be forwarded to you within the next few days. 

Awaiting an early reply, I beg to remain 

Yours very truly, 

To which Dr. Tannenberg replied: 

April 17, 1931. 
Nicholas A. Carella, Esq. 
298 Ridge Road, 
Lyndhurst, N. J. 

Dear Sir: 

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the loth instant and your 
telegram of today. I have to apologize for not answering your letter 
promptly; however, I postponed my reply for the reason that the instructions 
from Germany for which I had asked had not yet arrived and I was anxious 
to advise you that our conversation had been confirmed. 


The unexpected delay was due to the fact that I was requested to supply 
our Berlin office with detailed information which was required in order to 
enable them to proceed as suggested by me. That does not mean that there 
are any obstacles. I have no doubt that the instructions will be here by 
Monday of next week [April 20th] at the very latest, and I shall not fail 
to inform you immediately as to when you can go to New York. 

I sincerely hope that you wall understand the situation and that the 
unforeseen delay will not have caused you any inconveniences. I also hope 
that I shall have an opportunity to see you again in the near future so that 
I can explain to you the circumstances in more detail. 

You may rest assured that I greatly appreciate your services and that I 
am awaiting your reports with very great interest. 

Yours very truly, 

Wilhelm Tannenberg 

True to his assurance, Dr. Tannenberg encountered no obstacles, for 
on April 20, 193 1, he wrote to Mr. Carella as follows: 

Dear Sir: 

Referring to my telegram of the 17th inst. and to my telegram of the 
following day, I wish to advise you that I have received authority to proceed 
in the matter as suggested. If you will be kind enough to call at the German 
Consulate General in New York, Mr. Loerky, the gentleman whom you 
met there on a previous occasion, will give you the necessary information. 
Hoping to hear from you very soon, I am, 

Very truly yours, 

Wilhelm Tannenberg 

The American lav^ers would have liked to have seen a copy of the 
messages which had passed between Tannenberg and Berlin on the 
subject, but once again Germany did not produce them. 

In another letter, after reporting vivid tales of attempts on the part of 
one of the American investigators to tempt the Lyndhurst witnesses 
with money, and after stressing the difficulties which he was expe- 
riencing with the witnesses, Lascola and Urciuoli, Carella continued: 

I have made every effort to keep these witnesses in line with threats of 
criminal prosecution. Their patience has reached its final pitch and I hope 
that some money will come forthwith to relieve the present situation. 


Apart from the above considerations, Ruggiero, who, prior to The 
Hague hearing, had testified in his affidavit to previous fires v^hich he, 
himself, had extinguished at Kingsland, and had traced the develop- 
ment of the cleaning machines v^^hich, according to him, wtrt continu- 
ously unsatisfactory right down to the time he quit wor\ in December 
igi6, was found on investigation to have worked in Building Number 
30 at Kingsland for a total of three weeks, and to have left the plant in 
August igi6, approximately five months before the fire. Investigation 
also disclosed that Urciuoli did not work in the plant at all during the 
week in which the fire took place. 

It was, however, from Lascola that the most convincing evidence of 
fraud was obtained. On April 26, 1933, three years after he had given 
the affidavit to the Germans, he testified in an aflEdavit written in 
Italian that he had received $50 in a surreptitious manner from "the 
American" who had come with Ruggiero, to get his affidavit, that later 
he had been given an additional $100, but that he had not received the 
expense money which had been promised him for an operation. He 
then went on to add: 

At the time of the fire I was about ten feet away and out of the corner 
of my eye I saw a small flame and saw the man with the rag saturated in 
benzine try to put out fire with it but instead caused the flame to spread 
and increase, and another man threw a pail of water on the flames spreading 
them more and then everybody ran, and this is all, and I told others the 
same thing, and everybody who asked me. 

I was working in Building No. 30 about six months and never saw any 

I was told that the statement I signed three years ago for the American 
who came with Guidetti and Ruggiero, that the machine threw sparks, but 
I did not make this statement and it is not true that this machine threw 

It was noted also that the correspondence between the office of the 
German Agent and Carella showed that a statement was obtained in 
Lyndhurst from one Victor Frangipane. But the statement turned out 
to be immaterial when the claimants checked it. 

In a statement furnished to the American investigators, Frangipane 


closes his affidavit by saying: "It is my opinion that Wozniak purposely 
set this fire." 

Turning now to the Johnson reports of January 13 and 18, 1917, it 
was found that the German exhibit produced at The Hague hearing 
was a carbon copy, that the paper on which the reports were written 
was of very recent manufacture, and the copies could not have been 
made much before the German Agent procured them in August 1930. 

In the opinion of the American lawyers, the introduction of the car- 
bons alone without any explanation that they had been recently copied, 
was sufficient in itself to mislead the Commission, whether innocently 
or not; for a recently written report would not, in the very nature of 
things, be given as much weight as would the original carbon copy. 

The evidence seems clear that these reports, which contained sec- 
ond-hand information, were never submitted to the Agency of the 
Canadian Car and Foundry Company and that in 1917 the only interest 
that Johnson could have had in drafting them was to satisfy the Thiel 
Agency that he and his guards were no way responsible for the fire. 

Had these reports been handed to the Company at the time it con- 
ducted its investigation immediately after the fire, there would have 
been no reason to suppress them as charged by the Germans. As hap- 
pens in the case of all such fires, and as was recently evidenced in that 
of the Graf Zeppelin, there is always a certain amount of conflicting 
evidence from witnesses who sincerely believe that they saw the origin 
of the disaster, but actually only witnessed an after-effect. A series of 
such statements was actually made at the time, but the bulk of evidence 
collected by Mr. Cahan was of such a nature that without hesitation 
he ascribed the fire to an act of incendiarism. "^ 

In his report Johnson mentioned George Roberts (No. 3242) as stat- 
ing that a streak of sparks came from the cleaning machine. An ex- 
amination of the payroll, which had not been in the plant at the time 
of the fire, shows that there was no such person in the Company's 
employ. Urciuoli is another person mentioned by Johnson; and he, as 
we have already shown, was not at the plant during the week of the 

It is also highly significant that Johnson in neither of his reports 


gave any indication of an effort on his part to question Wozniak, the 
employee at whose bench the fire admittedly started. 

Far from the condition of carelessness and neglect which Ruggiero 
and Urciuoli so persuasively sketched, there was produced after The 
Hague hearing a mass of evidence to show that every known safety 
device was employed at Kingsland, and that the plant was extraor- 
dinarily well supervised and eflBciently managed. Mr. George Coe, 
the vice president and director of Johnson and Higgins, a very well- 
known firm of insurance brokers, testified that the engineers' inspec- 
tions were extremely rigid and their reports indicated that the fire pro- 
tection conditions in the plant were excellent. Joseph D. Evans, who 
has had a wide experience with explosives and the manufacture and 
loading of shells, testified that the same type of cleaning machine was 
used to clean millions of shells at other plants as well as at Kingsland 
without the slightest trouble from sparks or fires. Mr. William Hark- 
ness, the works manager at the Kingsland plant, stated that there had 
never been any fire, however small, in Building 30, prior to the fire 
which destroyed the plant. He also testified that an inspector named 
Renz had made an inspection of the motors, wires, and lights in 
Building Number 30 about fifteen minutes before the fire occurred and 
had reported that everything was in perfect order in the building. 
Renz's own affidavit to this effect was filed. 

However, in view of die confidence expressed by the Commission 
at Hamburg in the testimony of the Lyndhurst witnesses, it was 
thought advisable to obtain even further evidence, if possible, to 
demonstrate its falsity. By a piece of good fortune, a search of the Army 
Ordnance Department files disclosed that at the Picatinny Arsenal at 
Dover, N. J., there was found a cleaning machine of the very type 
which had been used at Kingsland. Mr. McCormick, of the Picatinny 
Arsenal, when asked for his expert opinion, testified: 

Throughout the entire period of time during which I had anything to 
do with these machines, from 191 5 until about May, 1926, I have never 
known any of them to throw out sparks or cause fires. Literally millions 
of shells have been cleaned by these machines under my supervision at the 
plants and arsenals which I have mentioned 

Admiral Sir Reginald Hall (top right) 
Director of the British Naval Intelli- 
gence Service. 

From "The Life and Letters of Walter H. 
Page," Courtesy of Houghton Mifflin Company 

Courtesy of Amos J. Peaslee 

Amos J. Peaslee (above) Legal Fer- 
ret. Robert W. Bonynge (at right) 
American Agent before the Mixed 
Claims Commission. 

Keystone Studios 

The Nemesis of Germany 




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Exhaustive tests were made on the machine by experts of the United 
States Government at the Arsenal and it was found that it was im- 
possible for the machine to produce a spark in the manner described 
by Urciuoli and Ruggiero. 

Having established that fraud had been committed in obtaining the 
Lyndhurst testimony, the American lawyers now proceeded to analyze 
the rest of the evidence which Germany had filed prior to The Hague 
hearing. They turned, therefore, to the evidence of Nadolny, Marguerre, 
Hinsch, and Woehst, on which Germany had relied so heavily. It re- 
quired no special perception to discern that here, too, false testimony 
had been given. 

To understand the influence which had been brought to bear on 
these key witnesses, it is of paramount importance to realize that, at 
the very commencement of her defense, Germany deliberately and 
quite brazenly attempted to mislead the Commission as to the sabotage 
cable of January 26, 1915, which authorized the carrying out of sabotage 
in the United States from that date on. 

It was then that Germany instituted her attack on the Black Tom 
and Kingsland claims by denying everything which was not over- 
whelmingly proven and by suppressing evidence, a policy which it 
can now be shown has not been altered throughout the entire history 
of the claims. In following out this defense, Germany was being con- 
sistent — she was following out the same policy of denial which von 
Bernstorff and his aides had so successfully practiced during the 
neutrality period. 

When Nadolny testified that he had sent the cable of January 26, 
1 91 5, to the German Embassy entirely on his own responsibility and 
had used the Foreign Office, as he expressed it, as a mere "technical in- 
termediary," he simply and plainly misrepresented the facts to the 
Commission. Germany admitted this herself when Judge Parker, the 
Umpire at the time, compelled, on pain of drawing unfavorable in- 
ferences, the production of the earlier documents relative to the cable, 
as was described in Mr. Bonynge's argument at The Hague. These 
documents showed that the "irresponsible indiscretion" had been com- 
mitted not by Nadolny, who the Germans tried to prove was a minor 


subordinate, but by the Foreign Office itself, for the cable was sent out 
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Nadolny had also misrepresented facts when he had stated that no 
further instructions were ever sent out after the cable. This was proven 
when the meeting in February 191 6 of Mar guerre and Nadolny 
with Hilken, Herrmann, and Dilger was disclosed. Later Marguerre 
tried to cover this up by furnishing an affidavit in 1930 that Nadolny 
merely introduced Herrmann to him, and left the room before the 
sabotage discussion took place and the incendiary pencils were handed 

Nadolny was not a minor official. He was attached to Section III B 
of the General Staff during the war, where he occupied the important 
post of liaison officer v/ith the Foreign Office. In 1928, at the time his 
evidence was filed with the Commission, he was Minister to Con- 
stantinople, and was subsequently appointed Ambassador to Moscow. 
It can be taken, therefore, that he was not testifying as a simple in- 
dividual, but that he was doing so in the name of Germany. 

Turning now to Marguerre, we find that he had testified : first, that 
he had given definite and explicit instructions to Herrmann at the 
February 191 6 meeting not to commit sabotage in the United States 
during the neutrality period; second, that it was the policy of the Gen- 
eral Staff, of which he was a representative, to limit the instruction of 
agents sent to neutral countries to the commission of sabotage acts 
only after such countries entered the war against Germany; third, that 
Lieutenant Woehst, whom Herrmann had accused of sabotage activities 
in the United States, had been sent to America by the Section only for 
the purpose of obtaining a false passport to proceed to Italy for espi- 
onage purposes, and that he, Marguerre, had given no instructions 
whatever to Woehst for sabotage in the United States and had fur- 
nished him with no incendiary tubes or disease germs. 

Regarding the first point of Marguerre's testimony, the Commission 
itself stated in its Hague decision that it did not believe his testimony. 
As regards the second point, the cables which we have already quoted, 
and all of which Germany has admitted to be authentic, are proof that 
a sabotage campaign was waged in neutral Argentina and China. If 
space permitted, it could also be shown that Germany carried out a 


similar campaign in Roumania, both with germs and explosives, be- 
fore Roumania entered the war. Finally, on the third point, there is 
absolutely conclusive evidence that Woehst was sent to the United 
States as a sabotage agent, in spite of his own denials given in support 
of Marguerre's affidavit. 

Since Germany relied heavily on the testimony of Woehst to break 
down the Herrmann evidence, Woehst having testified that Herrmann 
was not engaged in sabotage during the neutrality period and having 
claimed that he was positive of this because he roomed continuously 
with him until Herrmann's departure for Mexico, it is important to 
examine the evidence which the American investigators produced to 
prove that Woehst had actually been engaged in the United States in 
sabotage activities. On January 11, 1917, Hilken wrote to Arnold^ in 
Argentina with regard to Woehst: 

Our principals abroad [the term used by Hilken to denote Section III B] 
realizing that my other interests require too much of my time and make it 
possible for me to devote my energies to their interests, have sent a young 
man, who arrived here a month ago and whom I have since initiated into 
American trade. He brought with him several new samples which may be 
useful in Argentina. 

In the stubs of Hilken's check books, which were only discovered 
by the American investigators after The Hague hearing, there ap- 
peared for the first time a payment to Woehst on December 13, 1916, of 
the sum of $500. This, together with the date of Woehst's arrival in 
this country and other evidence in the case, conclusively establishes 
that Woehst was the young man whom Hilken referred to in his letter 
to Arnold. 

Apart from Hilken's and Herrmann's affidavits that Woehst was en- 
gaged in actual sabotage activities, there is the testimony of Hildegarde 
Jacobsen, his cousin, who, as the reports of Federal agents show, was 
used both by Woehst and Herrmann as "cover." At a recent exami- 
nation she also testified that 

On the Sunday night [following the Kingsland fire] we rushed off to 
Rochester, N. Y., because spots had appeared on my face and my cousin 

*Head of the German Secret Service in Argentina, whose specialty was in- 
oculation of mules, horses, and catde with anthrax and glanders germs. 

234 "^^^ ENEMY WITHIN 

was afraid that I had contracted an infection from him, as he said that he 
had been handUng some materials which might give me an infection, and 
which might have serious consequences. On this account, my cousin refused 
to permit me to go to a doctor in New York, but took me immediately to 
Rochester where I was examined by our family doctor. My cousin was tre- 
mendously relieved when the doctor diagnosed my complaint as German 

It seems reasonable to assume that Woehst feared that Miss Jacobsen 
had contracted either anthrax or glanders, one of the symptoms of 
which is a violent skin eruption. 

Furthermore, Miss Jacobsen stated that on a recent visit of hers to 
Germany, before her cousin died, he told her that he had falsely denied 
knowledge of the Kingsland destruction because he had had no other 

We must now pass to the series of letters which Woehst sent to 
Hilken in 1920 and 1921, the writing of which he also admitted to Miss 

Although Woehst stated in his affidavit that before he left for 
America he had no idea that Hilken was working for the General 
Staff, yet it is obvious from the context of the following letter both 
that Woehst was engaged in sabotage in the United States and that 
Hilken was well acquainted with Nadolny and Marguerre: 

As I unfortunately have received no answer from you to my last letter, I 
was forced to hand in my claim for damages to the proper authorities for 
foreign claims, and I have been asked by them to submit a confirmation, 
that / was active * in New York and Baltimore from October, 191 6, until 
February, 191 7. 1 request you, therefore, to confirm this so that I will be able 
to use your statement with the department in question. 

I would not like to bring the gentlemen, Marguerre, Capt. von Hulsen and 
Mr. Nadolny into difficulties, and, therefore, must ask you for your assistance. 


Willy Wohst, 

Altona, Moltkestrasse 22 
P.S. In case I do not receive this confirmation from you I am unfortunately 
forced to make my demands for payment from the funds. (G.G.St.) of that 

* Italics are the author's. 


In another letter, Woehst wrote to Mr. Hilken, Senior: 

Now, as at that time your son gave an order on Berlin to send for us 
$15,000, and as this remittance arrived too late [after the severance of the 
diplomatic relations], this money could not be used and must therefore still 
lie to the credit of Mr. Paul Hilken's account. Of course the money cannot 
be returned to the former department as the former existence of this depart- 
ment naturally is not now to be spoken of. 

It is very significant that Woehst w^ls not questioned in any respect 
about these letters at the time he v^as examined in Berlin. 

With regard to Herrmann we find the same false evidence. In his 
testimony Woehst pictured himself as having been in almost daily con- 
tact with Herrmann; he states that Herrmann certainly told him 
"everything which was on his mind," and as a result he stated that he 
was in a position to know that Herrmann never had any designs at 
any time on munitions plants, particularly Kingsland: 

Q. Did Herrmann, outside of this activity [the Intelligence work referred 
to by Marguerre in his affidavit], attend to other matters of the secret service 
independently ? 

A. No. 

Q. Were you with Hermann so frequently that you can say this positively ? 

A. Yes, for during the day we were also constantly together. 

The proof, however, that Herrmann operated apart from Woehst, 
at least on some occasions, is supplied by the letter found by Federal 
agents on February 24, 1917, in Woehst's rooms. It read: 

Dear Hauten [one of Woehst's admitted aliases] : 

If letters come for me from Perth Amboy, open them and heat them. If 
there is any news, you can forward it to the right party 

At the head of this letter are the names of certain ammunition fac- 
tories located in New Jersey. 
On being shown this letter, Woehst said: 

I cannot say now whether the letter ... is genuine. It is certain that the 
statements cannot have had any connection with acts of destruction of any 


munition plant since Hermann, as long as I knew him, did not engage in 
such activities. 

Woehst also testified falsely as to his movements after the Kingsland 
fire. In his affidavit he claimed that he had remained continuously in 
Nev^ York from December 11, 1916, to January 20, 1917, and yet Miss 
Jacobsen, his cousin, later testified: 

On the morning following that fire [Kingsland], Woehst called at the 
Three Arts Club at about 9 a.m., and told me that it was important for him 
to leave town at least for a few days and he wanted me to go with him. He 
was very insistent on going somewhere where there were few people, and 
where it was quiet. I inquired the reason for this and Woehst referred to 
the article in the newspaper about the fire. I asked him if he had anything 
to do with it, and he avoided a direct reply shrugging his shoulders and 

... I went with him to Montclair and stayed at the Hotel Montclair for 
three days, over a week-end from Friday morning until Sunday night. The 
hotel had a large open fireplace and a skating rink on the pond at the foot 
of the hill. 

On Sunday night, January 14, 1917, Woehst and Miss Jacobsen went 
to Rochester, as has previously been shown, where the family physician 
relieved his fears by diagnosing the spots on her face as German 

Hinsch formed the bulwark of Germany's defense at The Hague 
hearing. He attempted to support Marguerre in the general German 
defense, and in so doing showed his willingness to conform his testi- 
mony to Germany's policy, thereby giving proof that he had falsely 
testified. But it is his defense on the specific issues with which we are 
now concerned. 

Hinsch, long before the Black Tom and Kingsland charges were 
made against him, had returned to Germany, where he had become 
the head of a stevedore business in Bremerhaven. When faced with 
the charges, he denied having had any connection with Black Tom or 
Kingsland, and in answer to the very specific statements made by 
Herrmann in 1930, made two assertions: first, that Herrmann's in- 
structions from the General Staff were to proceed against American 


property only if the United States entered the war; and, second, that 
during the period of the two destructions he was so exclusively en- 
gaged with manifold duties relating to the U-boat Deutschland's visits 
to the United States that he could not, and did not, engage in any 
sabotage whatever following Hilken's return from the conference 
with Nadolny and Marguerre in the spring of 191 6. He supported his 
denials by statements that he was in Baltimore and New London 
during all periods during which, if he had been guilty, he might have 
been expected to be in or around New York. In other words, his de- 
fense was essentially an alibi. 

The various statements submitted by Germany from Captain Hinsch 
furnished an interesting example of the practice of German witnesses 
to discuss only matters which were already known and to say nothing 
concerning matters which had not been revealed. Hinsch's first affidavit 
in 1929 was confined to mere statements of denial and makes no dis- 
closure of his sabotage activities which commenced in May 1915. Al- 
though Hilken had specifically charged Hinsch with having collected 
the sum of $2,000 in connection with the Black Tom explosion, Hinsch 
failed to deny or even to mention the allegation. 

Hinsch made a further affidavit in March 1930. This likewise con- 
tained only further brief denials. It was only after Herrmann had testi- 
fied in April 1930 and had been corroborated by Carl Dilger and Felton 
that Hinsch finally admitted having conducted sabotage activities from 
May 1915, under instructions received by him from von Rintelen, to 
whom he was introduced in Baltimore by Hilken. Even at this time 
he made no reference to the $2,000 payment. 

We know that he did assist Hilken in the work connected with the 
visits of the U-boat and that he subsequently had an official position 
with the company which was formed to carry on the U-boat business. 
On the other hand, he gready exaggerated his work in connection 
with it. The importance which Hinsch ascribed to his activities with 
the U-boat Deutschland is evidenced by the fact that in his iio-page 
deposition of August 1930, over 90 pages are devoted to a description 
of his U-boat work. And yet the Deutschland, a boat of most limited 
cargo capacity, made just 2 trips, and then over a period of 14 months 


between the return of Hilken from the General Stai? and Hinsch's de- 
parture for Mexico. It was in American ports just 40 days. 

In addition to this, even during the short period of the Deutsch- 
land's activity, Hinsch was frequently absent from his U-boat service. 
One of the witnesses testified : 

He would come down in the morning and in the afternoons and see how 
the work was progressing along. . . . What he did at other times, I do not 
know. . . . He had a habit of talking to me in the morning . . . saying "good 
morning; how is everything going on?" I would say "all right, sir" and he 
would walk away. 

The whole lengthy examination of Hinsch in Berlin appears to be 
mainly an effort to build up the picture of an all-absorbing task with 
the commercial submarine, permitting no interruptions whatever. It 
was an example of the use to which the familiar "cover" position can 
be put to distract attention from an agent's operations. 

We have proof that the Deutschland completed her loading by July 
20, 1916. (The Black Tom explosion occurred during the early hours 
of July 30.) George Dederer, an employee of the Eastern Forwarding 
Company, was examined under subpoena at Baltimore on August 7, 
1933; and in the course of that examination there was produced a 
carbon copy of a letter addressed to Hinsch in New York dictated by 
Dederer on July 22. The letter was written on Saturday and would not 
have been delivered in ordinary course until the following Monday in 
New York. If Hinsch was never away from Baltimore for a single hour, 
Dederer would not have sent a letter to him in New York. To explain 
the letter, Dederer, who had previously testified for Germany, claimed: 
"This must be due to an oversight or an error of the typist." Hinsch on 
his part suggested "fabrication." And yet the letter came from the 
Eastern Forwarding Company files, and there is not the slightest 
question of its authenticity. 

The next period of any importance is just after the Black Tom ex- 
plosion, at or about the time Hilken claims to have paid Hinsch $2,000 
for his work in connection with the explosion. 

Before The Hague hearing the only evidence which the American 
lawyers had as to this payment was the statement of Hilken. Germany 


denied this payment and stated that Hilken was confusing it with a 
payment of $2,000 in January 1916. 

In December 1931, however, more than a year after The Hague hear- 
ing, Hilken's estranged wife discovered his wartime diary among her 
belongings. In it was an entry confirming August 10, 1916, as the date 
of the $2,000 payment. Final proof, however, was brought forth in 1932 
when the stubs of Hilken's check book came to light. On check stub 
Number 115 a payment of $2,000 was shown on the same date, and 
marked as paid in cash for "Capt. H., Lewis, etc." ("Capt. H." stands 
for Hinsch; and "Lewis" is one of the admitted aliases used by 

Apart from the fact that the American lawyers had now definitely 
established that this payment, which Hilken testified Hinsch told him 
was for the Black Tom job, had been made on August 10, 1916, the 
check stub also furnished indirect proof that Hinsch was in New York 
on this date, since it showed that the money was paid in cash. If there 
is any doubt as to this latter point, another entry in the diary puts 
Hinsch in New York on a date even closer to the explosion. Under 
August 4, 1916, there appears an entry: "Astor Roof with Sir John 
[Hamer] and crowd." As we have already shown, Hinsch attended 
this dinner. 

There is one more important point regarding which it can be estab- 
lished beyond a reasonable doubt that Hinsch testified falsely, and that 
is in regard to his denial that he had ever met Charles Thorne, who 
was the assistant employment agent at the Kingsland plant at the time 
of the fire. 

One of the opinions handed down by the Commission at Hamburg 
in 1930 in reference to the evidence respecting Thorne was that "There 
is a good deal of evidence that throws suspicion of some sort on Thorne 
...but nothing convincing to show Thome's acquaintance with 

The matter might have rested there, but in September 1933 Thorne, 
once thought dead, suddenly came to life. After years of search, detec- 
tives employed by Peto eventually ran him to earth at the Terminal 
Hotel in New York. 

When asked to appear voluntarily for examination, Thorne refused, 


saying that he did not want to have anything to do with the Kingsland 
investigation. He was, therefore, subpoenaed and on September 25 and 
26, 1933, was examined before the United States District Court by Mr. 

Thorne admitted that his true name was Curt Thummel, that he 
was born in Germany, and that his father had served in the German 
Army. About 1903 Thummel emigrated to the United States, and after 
spending several years doing odd jobs, changed his name to Thorne, 
and in 1913 joined the United States Coast Guard. At the outbreak of 
the war he was living in Baltimore; and there, as his natural sympathies 
were with Germany, he came in contact with many of the officers on 
the German boats. He testified that it was towards the end of 1914 
that he was introduced to Hinsch in the bar of the Emerson Hotel in 
Baltimore. Thereafter he often met Hinsch both on land and on the 
"Neckar. After he had known Hinsch for some time and after he had 
resigned from the Coast Guard in May 1916, he was asked by Hinsch 
to do courier work involving the carrying of under-cover messages to 
Europe. This he performed by traveling to England on the S.S. St. 
Paul, having been given detailed instructions in this connection by one 
"Anderson" or "Peterson" at the Union Square Hotel. Thorne later 
abandoned this work, as he was in fear of apprehension in England. 
The man whom we will hereafter call Anderson told him there was 
nothing more to do; and so, around the middle of September 1916, 
Thorne went up to New London where he says Hinsch and the others 
were expecting the submarine Bremen* While in New London, he 
met Paul Hilken at the Hotel Griswold. According to Thorne, Hinsch 
sent him back to New York the same night to see Anderson, who gave 
him instructions to obtain employment in a munitions plant. Thorne 
secured a position at Kingsland, and he admitted that Hinsch sent him 
men at various times whom he wished him to hire. Thorne could re- 
member no names but recalled a man with a German name who was 
hired under another name and another "South American, Portuguese, 
Spaniard or possibly an Italian," both of whom Hinsch had sent out 
for employment at the plant. Thorne also testified that Hinsch and he 

* Germany's second commercial submarine. It never did arrive in the United 
States. The causes of its loss remain one of the mysteries of the seas. 


met at Meyer's Hotel in Hoboken at various times and discussed plans 
for the destruction of the plant; that he saw Hinsch after the fire; and 
that Hinsch had spoken of the good job done in destroying it, men- 
tioning Wozniak's name in this connection. After the Kingsland fire, 
Thorne set up an agency which supplied munitions workers to many 
munitions plants, some of which he mentioned by name; and he stated 
that Hinsch continued to send him men to employ and, from time to 
time, in this connection he saw Hinsch. Hinsch, he stated, came to 
see him finally, telling him he was going to Mexico, and warned him of 
possible danger with the United States in the war. Thorne did not say 
that he knew or ever met Wozniak. He stated that he knew the name 
and who he was and that he had a vague recollection of having seen 
Wozniak but could be no more definite than this about him. He men- 
tioned a man named Ehrhart, for whom he had gotten employment at 
Kingsland at Hinsch's request. Who the "Anderson" or "Peterson" 
was, whom Thorne mentions as being at the Union Square Hotel, we 
do not know. It was a familiar German alias, — Koenig, when testify- 
ing for Germany, stated that he knew Fay under the name of Ander- 
son or Peterson. 

Thome's entire testimony was given in question and answer form, 
and on reading the questionnaire it is difficult to come to any other 
conclusion than that Hinsch knew Thorne well. Furthermore, during 
the examination Thorne and Fred Herrmann were confronted with 
each other. The recognition was mutual, and from the familiar way 
they greeted each other, it was evident to all present that it was not 

In addition to Thome's evidence, there was the testimony of three 
other men'% who gave aflSdavits that they had seen Thorne in Hinsch's 

Faced with this overwhelming evidence, Hinsch then in a further 
affidavit admitted acquaintanceship with Thorne, but excused his 
former denial by saying that it was only a casual one. He then went on 
in an attempt to discredit Thorne by saying: 

* Ballard, Fesmire, and Dillon. 


A similar clumsy invention is Thome's allegation that I sent him to the 
above-mentioned Anderson or Peterson so that he might be employed as a 
courier. It is hardly conceivable, I think, that I would have selected for such 
an important and confidential position a man like Thorne with whom, ac- 
cording to his own presentation, I had comparatively superficial relations 
only, and of whom I could not know anything certain. 

But Hinsch's contention in this respect was not convincing. Spies 
willing to undertake dangerous work were not to be had so easily. 
Thorne was a German, the son of a German Army officer; he had 
lived in Baltimore, where Hinsch lived, and the letter of Clucas's, found 
by the Department of Justice, indicates that he did do some sort of 
work as a German agent. Hinsch, in spite of his denial, had known 
Thorne for more than a year. Kottkamp had picked Herrmann up on 
board a steamer and had utilized his services for espionage work on 
much less acquaintance than Hinsch had had with Thorne. 

The general testimony of Hinsch was in accordance with the de- 
fense which Germany, as we have already shown, fashioned from the 
outset. Being resident in Germany and under the eye of the German 
Government, Hinsch, Woehst, Nadolny, and Marguerre found them- 
selves in precisely the same position in which Herrmann was when 
German officials in Chile got him to sign false statements, except that 
the German Government could put much more pressure on them than 
the German Minister could put on Herrmann. 

Chapter XXIII 

While the fight went on to prove that incomplete, collusive, and false 
evidence had misled the Commission at The Hague hearing and had 
unfairly prejudiced the cases of the claimants, the search for new evi- 
dence continued. 

The American investigators were following up various clues to prove 
that Wozniak was in Mexico in 1917 under the name of Karowski, 
when suddenly a document was produced which, if proved authentic, 
was sufficient to smash the whole German defense. 

While searching through a box of old papers in the attic of his 
former home in Baltimore, at Christmas time in 1930, Hilken found in 
an old Blue Boo\ magazine for January 1917, the message which 
Gerdts testified he had brought from Herrmann in Mexico to Hilken 
in Baltimore. 

Other than the fact that it was a request from Herrmann for $25,000, 
Hilken stated that he had long ago forgotten the contents of the mes- 
sage. Now, as he read it he realized that he had in his hands the evi- 
dence which proved conclusively Germany's guilt in the Black Tom 
and Kingsland cases. At this time, however, Hilken was not particu- 
larly well disposed toward the American claimants because of pub- 
licity which had been given to some of his statements. He had just 
learned of the pending appearance of a series of articles in Liberty 
relative to German sabotage in the United States; and, fearful that the 
production of the message would throw the limelight on him, he hesi- 
tated. Gradually, however, another influence exerted itself on him. 
The Hague decision of the Commission had discredited the evidence 
he had given prior to The Hague hearing, and this had deeply 

wounded his feelings. 



In passing judgment on Hilken for his connection with the German 
sabotage campaign one must reaUze that, although he was an Ameri- 
can citizen, he had had the closest ties with Germany at the time of the 
war, not only on account of his German descent but also because of his 
intimate connection with the North German Lloyd and through it 
with official Germany. His sympathies had been, therefore, all with the 
country of his father, who was later to become the German Consul in 
Baltimore. The intervening years had, however, brought about a 
change in his outlook; wider associations in this country and less de- 
pendence on German interests together with the knowledge that much 
was known already of his wartime activities caused him to resist less 
than others differently situated the efforts which were constantly made 
to get at the truth concerning those activities. 

And so, stung by The Hague decision, which had branded his evi- 
dence as false, he decided to prove to the Umpire that he had told the 
truth. Therefore, on February 26, 1931, Hilken took the magazine to 
Boston, and on February 27, went to the office of the Honorable 
Roland W. Boyden, the Umpire, to show him the magazine. On his 
arrival at Mr. Boyden's office, however, Hilken was told that Mr. Boy- 
den had left for New York and could be found at 44 Broad Street. The 
next morning he went to see Mr. Boyden there and was told that he 
would be in conference for an hour. On his return before the ex- 
piration of an hour he was told that Mr. Boyden had left for Boston. 
"I concluded," said Hilken, "that Mr. Boyden had intentionally 
avoided meeting me, and I made no further efforts to see him." 

Hurt at this seeming affront, Hilken returned home, and the 
magazine might once again have been consigned to oblivion, had not 
Herrmann, who had been absent in Mexico, returned to New York on 
April 18, 193 1. 

Herrmann called on Hilken, who had moved to New York from 
Baltimore. During an evening spent in consuming a demijohn of 
home-made wine, Hilken mentioned his discovery to Herrmann. Herr- 
mann sent word to Peto, who finally succeeded in getting the maga- 
zine from Hilken on April 27, 193 1. 

One can imagine Peto's excitement when he read the message: 

i i ._ .__»> 


Have seen 1755 [Eckhardt] he is suspicious o£ me. Can't convince him I 
come from 19 15 [Marguerre] and 1794 [Nadolny]. Have told him all refer- 
ence 2584 [Hinsch] and I, 2384 [Deutschland], 7595 [Jersey City Terminal], 
3106 [Kingsland], 4526 [Savannah], and 8545 [Tony's Lab.] he doubts me 
on account of my bum 7346 [German] confirm to him thru your channels 
all OK and my mission here I have no funds 1755 [Eckhardt] claims he is 
short of money send [by] bearer U. S. 25000. — Have you heard from Willie 
Have wired 2336 [Hildegarde] but no answer. Be careful of her and con- 
nections Where are 2584 [Hinsch] and 9107 [Carl Ahrendt] Tell 2584 
[Hinsch] to come here I expect to go north but he can locate me thru 1755 
[Eckhardt] I dont trust 9107 [Carl Ahrendt], 3994 [Kristoff], 1585 
[Wolfgang] and that 4776 [Hoboken] bunch If cornered they might get 
us in Dutch with authorities See that 2584 [Hinsch] brings with him all 
who might implicate us tell him 7386 [Siegel] is with me. Where is 6394 
[Carl D.] he worries me remember past experience Has 2584 [Hinsch] seen 
1315 [Wozniak] Tell him to fix that up. If you have any difficulties see 
8165 [Phil Wirth Nat. Arts Club] Tell 2584 [Hinsch] his plan O.K. Am 
in close touch with major and influential Mexicans can obtain old 3175 
[cruiser] for 50000 West Coast What will you do now with America in the 
war Are you coming here or going to South America Advise you drop 
everything and leave the States. Regards to 2784 [Hoppenberg] Sei nicht 
dum mach doch wieder bumm bumm bumm. Most important send funds 
Bearer will relate experiences and details Greetings. 

This message, written in lemon juice in a Blue Boo\, had been de- 
veloped by Hilken in his cellar by passing a hot iron over it. A brov^^n 
imprint of the heel of the iron showed up on some of the pages. A 
portion of the message was written in a numerical code, which was 
decoded by disregarding the first digit and then reading backward the 
other numbers. Thus 1755 stood for page 557 of the Blue Boo\, and by 
holding this page up to the light a series of pin pricks was seen, which 
if taken in order spelled out the word. 

If we now analyze this Herrmann message, we find remarkable 
confirmation of the evidence we have already discussed. 

The opening sentence, that Eckhardt was suspicious of him, is con- 
firmed by Eckhardt's own telegram of April 12, 191 7, which we have 
already quoted. 

"Can't convince him I come from Marguerre and Nadolny." Here 


Hermann is alluding to the February 1916 conference with Marguerre 
and Nadolny in Berlin. 

"Have told him all reference Hinsch and I, Deutschland, Jersey City 
Terminal, Kingsland, Savannah and Tony's Lab." Jersey City Ter- 
minal is, of course, Black Tom. Savannah w^as where they were destroy- 
ing cotton and infecting horses. Tony's Lab. was Dilger's Laboratory, 
at Chevy Chase, where disease germs were propagated. 

"I have no funds. Eckhardt claims he is short of money. Send by 
bearer U. S. 25000." It may be recalled that Gerdts got |i,ooo from 
Hilken and brought it back to Herrmann and delivered a message 
that Hilken was sending the remainder by Hinsch, and also that 
Woehst in his letters to Hilken and Hilken's father had asked what 
had become of the $25,000. 

"Have you heard from Willie?" — ^Willie is Woehst. 

"Have wired Hildegarde but no answer." Hildegarde is Hildegarde 
Jacobsen, Woehst's cousin. This telegram which Herrmann refers to 
was actually intercepted by the United States authorities at the time, 
and Department of Justice records of 1917 show that Miss Jacobsen 
was questioned as to the meaning of this telegram. She later testified 
that she did send Herrmann a reply to this telegram but that it was 
evidently sent to the wrong address. 

"I don't trust Carl Ahrendt, KristofiF, Wolfgang and that Hoboken 
bunch. If cornered they might get us in Dutch with the authorities. 
See that Hinsch brings with him all that might implicate us. Tell him 
Siegel is with us." Here is proof that Kristoff was a German agent. 
Hilken and Herrmann were American citizens, and, therefore, had 
more to fear. Siegel will be dealt with later. 

"Where is Carl D.? He worries me. Remember past experience." 
This refers to an incident described by Herrmann in his 1930 afi&davit. 
According to Herrmann, Carl Dilger, Anton Dilger's brother, was in- 
clined to be indiscreet, and so they sent him to Germany with a coded 
message asking Section III B to keep him over there until the end of 
the war. To their surprise, Carl Dilger returned with incendiary pen- 
cils hidden in the false bottom of his trunk. And when asked if he had 
delivered the message, he confessed that on the approach of a British 
cruiser he had grown afraid, and thrown it overboard. 


"Has Hinsch seen Wozniak ? Tell him to Rx that up." It will be re* 
membered that Herrmann testified when examined by the American 
and German Agents in 1930 that he had paid Rodriguez $500 but 
that he had not paid Wozniak. This was evidently worrying him; 
therefore he told Hilken, the paymaster, "to fix that up." "Tell Hinsch 
his plan O.K can obtain old cruiser for 50000 West Coast." This re- 
fers to the guns which Hinsch sent across the border to Mexico to 
mount on a boat with which he intended to raid American merchant- 
men plying on the West Coast. 

"Regards to Hoppenberg. Sei nicht dum mach doch wieder bumm, 
bumm, bumm." Translated this reads: "Don't be dumb. Make again 
boom, boom, boom." Hoppenberg was the manager of the Eastern 
Forwarding Company. Herrmann explains this passage by stating that 
at the time of the Black Tom explosion, Hoppenberg's windows were 
shattered; and that, when he jokingly complained about it to several 
German agents who were gathered in his office, they told him that 
they would soon again be making "boom, boom, boom." 

The obvious object in Herrmann's mentioning so many past events 
in his message was to furnish proof that it was genuine and had 
actually come from him. Von Eckhardt had doubted his identity, and 
he wanted to make doubly sure that Hilken would not do the same 

The filing in evidence of the Herrmann message, which was done 
on July I, 1931, before the Boston hearing immediately precipitated a 
battle of experts. The Germans claimed that it was a forgery; that the 
date of the magazine meant nothing, since a back number could have 
been bought in some second-hand bookstore and the message written 
and pricked in it. On their side the Americans produced expert testi- 
mony to show that the penetration of the lemon juice writing to the 
reverse side of the paper was an index that it had been done on the 
paper when new, and that the spongy nature of the pin perforations 
indicated that they had been made in new paper. The only point the 
Germans conceded was that the message was in Herrmann's hand- 

Germany's main expert was Albert S. Osborn, the well-known au- 
thority on handwriting and all forms of questioned documents. Such 


was Osborn's reputation that, acting upon the suggestion of the Amer- 
ican Agent, the Commission had tried to secure him as an independent 
expert for itself rather than for either party in the case. Osborn, pre- 
ferred, however, to act in a partisan capacity for Germany. 

As the American claimants expressed doubts whether Osborn really 
had been previously retained by Germany, and also in view of subse- 
quent developments, it is as well to take note of the somewhat re- 
markable letter which Osborn wrote to Dr. Tannenberg at this period. 
The following is an extract: 

. . . The condition the matter is in now is simply as to who is to be my 
employer and who is to pay me. 

This claim represents, I think, a larger amount than any case in which I 
have ever appeared, and of course if my services should be valuable the 
charge for the services naturally should be consistent with the case and the 
work done. My arrangement in cases of this kind is a fixed preliminary 
charge for an examination, which determines whether or not I am to be 
in the case. Then my charge is not a per diem charge in any way but is a 
"fair and reasonable" charge consistent with the circumstances of the case 
and the value of the service. I of course cannot take a case on a contingent 
fee, like a lawyer, but the matter can be left in this somewhat indefinite way 
so that the fee finally will depend upon the importance of the case and the 
value of the service. 

Commissions, as a rule, have a tendency to cut charges and limit them 
unduly, which I suppose is a natural result in order to avoid possible 

There is, of course, another question here and that is the ethical question 
of whether I could appear for the Commission, having been retained by the 
German government in this same case at a previous hearing. I would not, 
of course, appear for the Commission without your approval and I think I 
should require this approval in written form so that I would be relieved of 
any possible criticism for appearing in the case for others than those by 
whom I was first engaged. I am very particular about these matters, and of 
course if you say that you prefer that I should appear before the Commission 
for you, I shall feel obliged to do so on account of my previous employment 
in the case. 

All this, of course, is not presuming that I am appearing in the case for 
the German government, for the Canadian Car and Foundry Company, and 


for the Commission, but that I am simply at the present time being asked to 
appear for the Commission. 

Of course it would be perfectly proper, I think, for you, if you see fit to 
do so, to say to the Commission that you had already interviewed me on 
more than one occasion and that under the circumstances it perhaps would 
be better for me to appear for the German government. 

Notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Bonynge now knew that Osborn 
maintained he had been employed earlier by the German Agent, he 
wrote to the Commission stating that he was still anxious that Osborn 
should appear as an independent expert for it. When approached on 
the matter, the German Agent agreed to release Osborn but on certain 
conditions, one of them being that under no circumstances was Osborn 
to disclose any of the discussions that he, the German Agent, had 
previously had either with Osborn or his son. These conditions were 
not acceptable to Mr. Bonynge, and consequently the matter was 

To meet the battery of German experts, the American claimants 
assembled an even more formidable array of the leading authorities 
here and abroad. 

Finally, for an expert opinion on the handwriting, they employed 
Elbridge W. Stein on Osborn's recommendation. As later the Ameri- 
can Agent submitted a brief accusing Osborn and Stein of collusion, 
this fact should be borne in mind. 

What impresses the layman chiefly in reading through the volumi- 
nous findings of these experts is that the expert opinion of those on 
one side could disagree so diametrically with the results of the same 
tests as applied by those on the other side. There was disagreement on 
the absorbent quality of the paper at the time it was written on, the 
nature of the pen cuts and abrasions caused when writing the message, 
whether or not the heel marks left by the iron in the margins were 
intensification of a yellowing which had already occurred there before 
ironing, and finally on the difference between pin pricks in old and 
new paper. So bitter was the conflict between them that Osborn did 
not hesitate, when criticizing an exhibit produced by the United States 
Bureau of Standards, to declare that it was of "a most peculiar char- 


acter." He then continued that "it is, of course, charitable to say that 
the inaccurate statement is a blunder, but it is difficult to understand 
how an error of this kind could be made by an experienced examiner." 
This immediately brought back the rejoinder that the test made by 
Osborn was "wholly unscientific and unfair." 

It was, however, on a point which had nothing to do with the rela- 
tive age of the message and the paper on which it was written that the 
controversy reached its height, and which in the end once again led 
the American claimants to accuse Germany of fraud in what they 
termed the "Quakers Hoax." 

An examination of the table of contents of the Blue Boo\ in which 
the Herrmann message was written shows pencil checks on the margins 
of the pages, against eleven of the fifteen titles listed. Of the eleven titles 
checked, seven are checked with horizontal dashes resembling minus 
signs, and four with cross marks resembling plus signs. 

But when the magazine containing the Herrmann message first 
came into the hands of Peto and Peaslee, neither they nor any of those 
associated with them had noticed these check marks. They were, there- 
fore, entirely at a loss to understand Germany's purpose in suddenly 
producing 409 assorted copies of Blue Boo\, Red Boo\, and Adventure 
magazines of which 154 contained check marks against stories in the 
tables of contents, 137 of which were horizontal dashes, and 17 were 
crosses in the form of plus signs. 

According to an affidavit executed by Meyers of Abraham's Book 
Store, which deals in second hand books and magazines, these 
magazines came into Germany's possession in the following man- 
ner: In October 1931 a man calling himself Osborn telephoned and 
asked Meyers if he had a copy of the Blue Boo\ for January 1917 
— the same issue in which was written the Herrmann message. Meyers 
informed his questioner that he was out of it. A day or two afterwards, 
on October 28, 1931, Osborn paid a visit to the store, bought a copy of 
the Blue Boo\ for December 1916, and asked Meyers to get him a 
copy of the January 1917 issue. Osborn also questioned Meyers about 
the sales of the latter issue, and was informed that several months 
previously he had sold the only two copies he had had in stock. 

On November 5, 1931, Osborn again visited Abraham's Book 


Store, this time accompanied by Dr. Tannenberg. Both of them ques- 
tioned Meyers closely about the above two sales, and finally Osborn 
asked Meyers if he would sign an affidavit outlining the details. Before 
leaving the store Dr. Tannenberg purchased all the Blue Books for 
19 1 7 which Meyers had in stock. 

On the next day Dr. Tannenberg appeared at Abraham's Book Store 
alone and secured from Meyers an affidavit to the effect that between 
February and April 193 1, one of the two copies of the January 1917 
Blue Boo\ which the store then had in stock was sold to a man who 
"wore an overcoat" and who he "vaguely remembers" was "tall and 
possibly between thirty and forty years old." Later, in commenting on 
this description, Mr. Bonynge stated in his brief that "it was implied, 
of course, that this must have been Herrmann." It may be remembered 
that Herrmann was a man of exceptional height and was at this time 
thirty-five years old. It seems curious that Meyers should have been 
called upon to describe a customer whom he had seen for a few min- 
utes nine months ago. It was also strange that all the corrections in 
this affidavit were made in Dr. Tannenberg's handwriting, as were 
also the verifications of these corrections; Dr. Tannenberg himself 
initialed them with the capital "M." But Meyers later stated that he had 
given his consent to Dr. Tannenberg's doing this. 

It may be noted that Traynor, an American investigator, had pur- 
chased a copy of the January 1917 Blue Boo\ for the claimants' records 
at the same store some time after the Herrmann message magazine had 
been filed with the Commission. It just so happened that on October 
28, the very day Osborn visited Abraham's Book Store, Stein, the 
American claimants' expert, was informed of the purchase. This fact 
became invested with great importance in the minds of the American 

After the purchase of the magazines from the book store, Germany 
put forth the ingenious argument that the similarity between the 
markings in the magazines Dr. Tannenberg had purchased and those 
in the Herrmann message magazine was proof that the latter, like the 
former, was obtained from Abraham's Book Store in 193 1, and there- 
fore could not have been in Herrmann's hands in 1917. 

In support of this theory Germany put in evidence affidavits ob- 


tained from the Quakers Brothers, Horace and John, wherein they 
told a story substantially to this effect: Horace had been, since 191 1, a 
reader of Blue Boo\, Red Book,, and Adventure, and also of the Cos- 
mopolitan. It was his invariable custom to check, in the tables of con- 
tents of these magazines, the title of every story which he read. He did 
this by making horizontal dashes resembling minus signs. Thereafter 
John read the magazines, and it was his invariable custom also to 
check in the tables of contents the title of every story which he read. 
He did this by drawing vertical lines across the horizontal lines previ- 
ously made by his brother, Horace, thus producing crosses. Except for 
possible very rare instances, John never read a story which Horace had 
not previously read. 

This sequence of marking was in fact the keynote of the Quakers 
story and was urged by Germany as proof of the fact that the Herr- 
mann message was written in a Quakers magazine since + marks 
appeared on the table-of-contents pages of the magazine containing 
that message. The American experts immediately made the conven- 
tional tests to determine the sequence of the marks on the Herrmann 
message and the actual sequence turned out to be just the reverse. 
While this was a vital point, the German experts, although aware of 
the test, never made it or, if they did make it, their results were never 
filed; and the accuracy of the American experts' findings on this point 
were never questioned. 

Some time near the end of 1930, Horace Quakers sold to Abraham's 
Book Store the magazines which he had been accumulating since 1911. 
This sale, according to Horace's affidavit, included complete sets of the 
Blue Book for each year from 1911 to 1929, inclusive. If the Quakers' 
story were true and if it could be demonstrated that the Hermann 
message magazine had been marked in the same manner as their 
magazines, the presumption would be nearly irrefutable that Herr- 
mann was the tall man mentioned in Meyers' affidavit and that he had 
faked the message. 

As a result of his examination of the Herrmann message magazine, 
Osborn, the expert for Germany, stated that "a different pencil was 
used in making the vertical, or nearly vertical stroke than was used to 
make the horizontal stroke." In this he was in flat disagreement both 


with Gurrin and with Heinrich, the American experts, in whose 
opinions not only both strokes in each cross mark were made at one 
time, by one person, with one pencil or type of pencil, but that there 
is a similarity of pencils in all the marks in the Herrmann message 
magazine — dashes as well as crosses — with one possible exception. 

After the passage of the Act of June 7, 1933, permitting witnesses be- 
fore the Commission to be examined under subpoena in open court, 
John Quakers was so examined. Testifying with the Herrmann maga- 
zine before him, he said: 

. . . The marks do not look like my brother's, that is the cross marks are 
not mine because I never made a mark like that. These marks are too small. 
Q. You never made such a small mark as that? 
A. No, I never did. 

Q. Now look at the original magazine [the one in which Herrmann wrote 
the message] and state again whether those marks, the vertical marks in the 
cross marks, were marks made by you? 

A. They were not made by me. 

On July 18, 1932, Dr. Tannenberg had Horace Quakers go to Wash- 
ington to inspect the Herrmann message magazine, and took from him 
an affidavit which stated: 

The horizontal pencil marks on the table of contents of this January, 1917, 
copy of the Blue Boo\ magazine also look exactly like the marks I used to 
make. . . . There is no doubt in my mind that these horizontal marks were 
made by me in that particular copy . . . and that this is one of the magazines 
. . . sold ... to Abraham's Book Store. 

Horace had refused to be examined by the American Agent, or on 
his behalf, before the hearing, but when subsequently examined under 
subpoena he made it clear that some of the horizontal strokes in the 
Herrmann message magazine were certainly not his, and gave other 
testimony damaging to the good faith of the German Agent in the 
taking of his affidavit. 

In his testimony under subpoena, Horace stated that the condition 


of the Herrmann message magazine was "entirely different than the 
magazines I sold to Abraham's," but that Dr. Tannenberg or Dr. 
Grossmann explained that the magazine had been much handled and 
might have been artificially aged; he also stated that his identification 
of the magazine for Dr. Tannenberg was based solely on some of the 
horizontal marks, saying, "my affidavit was on the basis of the marks 
which I recognized and not those that I did not recognize." Asked if 
the horizontal marks were not similar to those anybody might make, 
he said, "They naturally are but there is something about them that led 
me to believe they are mine, the stories they are opposite and the gen- 
eral looks of them." When told that the expert evidence showed that 
the horizontal strokes in every one of the four crosses had been made 
after the vertical strokes, he said that, if this were so, it would change 
his opinion. 

Apart from the foregoing, the physical characteristics of the 
Herrmann message magazine themselves indicate that the maga- 
zine was not a Quakers magazine and that it was not sold from 
Abraham's Book Store in 1931. The cover had been separated from it 
with no indication that it had been recently removed. The last page of 
the last story was at some time carefully torn from the magazine. The 
general state of deterioration was far beyond that of any of the maga- 
zines identified as Quakers magazines. On the other hand it was in the 
condition to be expected of the magazine sent by Herrmann to Hilken 
in April 1917. 

Finally, when the American claimants introduced Herrmann to 
Meyers, the latter stated that he was positive that Herrmann was not 
the man whom he described to Dr. Tannenberg as the person who had 
bought a Blue Boo\ of the same issue as the one in which the Herr- 
mann message was written. 

Herrmann testified that the magazine he used for the message was 
bought by him in Havana in 1917, when he was on his way from the 
United States to Mexico, and that he had taken the magazine along 
with him to read on the journey. 

In their frantic endeavors to prove the message a forgery, the Ger- 
mans pointed to the Gerdts affidavit in which he stated that the 
message was written in a book of poetry. They also endeavored to 

<< ._ .__>> 


show that all the agents in Mexico were furnished with secret ink, and 
that, therefore, Herrmann would not have used lemon juice. Finally, 
there was the usual affidavit of denial from Hinsch, who stated that 
Hilken in 19 17 showed him the message which Gerdts had brought 
from Herrmann. He affirmed that this message was a very short one, 
written not in a magazine but in a bound volume with heavy covers on 
it, 8 X 5 inches in size, and that the message consisted merely of an 
identification of Gerdts, with an added request for money, and a re- 
mark that Gerdts would report orally. 

The American investigators now played a trump card. In the mean- 
while, Siegel, the man whom Herrmann mentioned in the message as 
being with him in Mexico City, was uncovered by Herrmann in Reval, 
Esthonia. Herrmann found among his papers an old address of SiegeFs 
in the Baltic Provinces, and by good luck a letter addressed to him 
there was forwarded on to the right destination. After a reply had come 
back from Siegel, Herrmann was sent to Europe to get a statement 
from him. Siegel was delighted to see Herrmann; they chatted about 
old times, and, finally, according to Herrmann, he told Siegel about the 
Commission and explained to him that both sides had agreed to tell all 
they knew in order to arrive at the truth. Siegel agreed to write out a 
statement outlining what he knew about the Blue Boo\ message, but 
balked at having it notarized, explaining that Reval was a small town 
and that he did not want an Esthonian notary to know about his Ger- 
man activities during the war. Therefore Herrmann accepted the fol- 
lowing signed statement from Siegel, and dispensed with the notarial 
seal (translation): 

My name is Adam Siegel; I was born on October, 1883, at St. Petersburg; 
I am a German National, at present living in Reval, Estonia. 

Late in March or early in April, 1917, on board the Spanish steamer 
Monserrat, I met Fritz Herrmann accompanied by Raoul Gortz Pochet, en 
route from Havana to Vera Cruz. 

From Vera Cruz we traveled together by rail to Mexico, D. F., where we 
stopped for the time being at the Hotel Cosmos. In the lobby of the Hotel, 
on the evening of our arrival, we became acquainted with a Major Schwierz 
of the Mexican Army at whose advice we moved soon afterwards to the 


Hotel Juarez, belonging to a certain Otto Paglasch. This was a very poor 
hotel, but very cheap. 

I informed Herrmann of the manner in which I escaped from the Russian 
internment and told him also that while I had no money, I had much time, 
and also a desire to undertake something in the interests of Germany, par- 
ticularly as I had not succeeded in working myself through to Germany. 

On the day after our arrival, Herrmann and Pochet went to see the Ger- 
man Minister, Mr. von Eckhardt. 

. . . Herrmann having received no news, he enlightened me one day about 
his activities, and it was decided to send Raoul Pochet to Baltimore to obtain 
funds. He was given an American magazine to take along. The necessary 
communications were written crosswise to the print in lemon juice on several 
pages of this magazine. The information was written down partly in normal 
writing and partly in code; the code words consisted of a cipher and were 
to be deciphered in a certain way by means of perforations with a needle. 

After the report had first been drawn up on a sheet of paper, I dictated it 
to Herrmann; he wrote it in the already mentioned magazine. 

Raoul Pochet returned from the U. S. A. about the middle of May, but 
brought with him much less money than Herrmann expected, or had asked 
for. He reported that Captain Hinsch would shortly thereafter come himself 
and bring along the needed funds. 

Herrmann showed me today a magazine similar to that used at that time 
to send to Baltimore, likewise the photographs of the printed pages on which 
the report to Baltimore was written in lemon juice at that time. These above 
mentioned photographs were signed by me today. 

Adam Siegel. 

As soon as the Siegel statement was filed with the Commission, 
German agents rushed to interview him. What they told Siegel is not 
known, but the affidavit signed by him before the German Charge 
d' Affaires in Reval is in evidence. In it Siegel charged that Herrmann 
represented himself as acting on behalf of Germany, and claimed that 
when he handed Herrmann the statement, he thought he was testifying 
for Germany. In this affidavit Siegel gave the following version of the 
role he played in the writing of the Herrmann message: 

The secret message came about in the following way; Herrmann had 
drafted it without my having anything to do with it and asked me — since 

C i . . „ > > 


it is difficult to write with invisible ink — to dictate it to him. This I did. I 
also recall that the message was written in a printed volume but — in view 
of my secondary role of the one who dictated — I can no longer swear whether 
it was a magazine or bound book. It seems to me quite possible that the 
printed volume was smaller than the sheets shown to me by Herrmann. The 
size may well have been 8x5 or 9x6 inches. 

Siege! then said: "Nor do I longer recall today whether the message 
. . . was written on printed or unprinted paper." And he went on to add 
that he was "present when the writing was done and the printed vol- 
ume was handed to Gerdts and know positively that during that time 
single sheets of the printed volume were not pricked with a needle 
under certain letters." Siegel, finally, stated that most of the names in 
the message were unknown to him until read over to him by Herr- 
mann at the time of their meeting in Reval. 

The American claimants' answer to Siegel's denial was that it was in 
keeping with Germany's general policy, and that pressure had been 
brought to bear on him to make it. They further added that even if 
Herrmann did represent himself to Siegel as an emissary of Germany 
— which Herrmann denies — that this was all the more reason why 
Siegel told the truth in the statement he gave Herrmann. 

Chapter XXIV 

We must now turn once again to Wozniak; for, whether intention- 
ally or by pure chance, he succeeded in discrediting to some extent the 
Herrmann message in the eyes of the Commission. 

Six American witnesses had furnished affidavits placing Wozniak in 
Mexico in the fall of 191 7 under the name of Karowski, and Germany 
had taken such a definite stand that Wozniak was not in Mexico dur- 
ing this period and had never used this alias that irrefutable proof cor- 
roborating the American affidavits would have constituted evidence of 
the highest importance. Accordingly, the American operatives spared 
no efforts to uncover the truth, and investigations were set on foot in 
Mexico, in the United States, and also in Rawa Russka, the district in 
Austrian Galicia from which Wozniak came. 

In the last-named area the American investigators sought informa- 
tion from the Chief of Police Sochanski, who submitted the following 
report (translated from the Polish language) : 

In reply to your request which was made in j>erson on March 30, 1932, I 
submit the following: 

1/ To the north of the village of Wolka Mazowiecka in the district of 
Rawa Russka there is a village bearing the name of "Karow." This village 
is surrounded by large forests called the "Karowski Forests." 

2/ Before his emigration to America in 1912, Teodor Wozniak, who was 
born in the village of Wolka Mazowiecka in 1884, worked for some time in 
the aforesaid Karowski Forests. 

3/ There is a long established custom in Poland that if several persons 
bearing the same surname inhabit the same district, in order to distinguish 
them from one another, there is added to their surnames the name of the 
particular locaUty where they live or with which they are in this or that way 



4/ The members of the Wozniak family living in the district of Rawa 
Russka are very numerous and it is therefore quite probable that a member 
of said family living or working in the Karowski Forests vv^ould be called 
Karowski Wozniak or Wozniak Karowski and in informal conversation or 
communications simply Karowski. 

It is therefore quite probable that both before he emigrated to America 
and after his emigration Teodor Wozniak used the alias Karowski. 

signed: for the Wojewod: 


Chief of the Surety Division 

On the filing of this report, the Germans also started an investiga- 
tion in this remote section of Poland. This resulted in stirring up the 
inhabitants of Wozniak's native tov^n to a pitch of excitement which 
they had not experienced since Ludendorff was there during the battle 
of Rawa Russka. 

In the meantime McCloy had unearthed in Cleveland two intimate 
friends of Wozniak's who had known him since boyhood, one named 
Golka, the other, Panas. Both of these men furnished affidavits testify- 
ing that Wozniak had written them letters from Mexico in 1917. The 
sworn statement of Panas reads in part as follows: 

. . . While we were Hving in Scranton and before the receipt of these letters 
from Mexico, Wozniak told us that he might go away, that he was apt to 
do some traveUng. 

Not a long time after receipt of the letters Wozniak came to see us in 
Scranton. I cannot recall the date distinctly but I seem to remember that it was 
a holiday, probably Thanksgiving Day of 1917, or St. Demetrius Day [a 
November church festival in Ukrainia]. He asked us if we had the letters 
he had sent us from Mexico and certain other letters we had received from 
him, saying that he needed them. We thought it somewhat strange but 
searched for them and found them and returned them to him. He destroyed 
the letters in front of us and threw them in the coal pail. I remember this 
as it seemed very strange, particularly as he gave us no reason for doing it. 

These letters had been destroyed, and so there was no proof other 

than the word of Golka and Panas that these letters had been written. 

This was the situation when, early in 1931, the American lawyers 


received information through the U. S. Postal authorities that Woz- 
niak had written several registered letters to a Ukrainian named Baran 
in Chicago. Baran turned out to be quite a prominent man among his 
fellow^ countrymen. He was not only a minister of the church but chair- 
man of the Ukrainian Relief Committee. 

Baran was brought to New York late in April 193 1 and, in the course 
of an interview with Peto, disclosed that he had several letters of Woz- 
niak and was sure that several of them were written from Mexico. 
Therefore Baran was sent back to Chicago to fetch them while the 
American lawyers waited in suspense. 

Before delivering the letters, however, he insisted on guarantees that 
Wozniak would not be criminally prosecuted because of any evidence 
contained in them. He also demanded a fee of $2,500 for compensation 
for his time and traveling expenses. But in due course the American 
Agent granted permission for the payment to be made, satisfactory 
guarantees for Wozniak's immunity were furnished, and Baran finally 
handed over the letters on May 27. According to the evidence of these 
three Wozniak letters, one was written from St. Louis on August 10, 
1917, the other two were written from Mexico City on August 28 and 
September 16, 1917, respectively. One of the letters from Mexico City 
reads as follows (translated from the Ukrainian) : 

Mexico City, August 28, 1917 

To Ivan Baran 


in Labor Temple 

E. 14 Street 2 Ave. 

Dear Friend: 

I wanted to write to you sooner but could not. Those damn Germans do 
not want me to write to anyone. Mexico in itself I do not like. The Mexicans 
themselves look like bandits. The houses are not big — but there are also 
better palaces, for example, as in the vicinity where the German Ambassador 
lives — that is, Dennamaca and Liverpool Street. But nevertheless the 
churches here are big and the priests are rich. If you think you will learn 
Mexican quickly then come here — and make a living. I think that I did 
quite wrong by going with the Germans. I am not entirely well — dreadfully 


nervous, and in addition to all this it is dreadfully hot here. There is no 
place to go and if there were, why it is dangerous and I must listen to the 
Germans. But I think that I shall not be here long, I have a little money 
and the Germans promise to give more. Do not tell anybody what I have 
told you — or what I have written you. If you want to write, then write to 
the address F. W. Karowski, Poste Restante, Mexico M. 

I shall try to be back soon. 

Hearty regards. T. I. Vozniak 

When these letters were filed with the Commission, the experts on 
both sides once again had a field day. As in the case of the Herrmann 
message, the only point the experts could agree on was that they were 
written in Wozniak's handwriting. Germany contended that the paper 
on which they were written had been artificially aged. As proof the 
German experts claimed that the watermark in one of the letters was 
made by a dandy-roll prepared for the Mirkow Paper Mills in 1926 by 
a Paris dandy-roll maker. 

As opposed to this the American Agent produced the testimony of 
the owner of the watermark, a Polish paper merchant named Kiper- 
man, who stated: 

. . . This drawing was sent by me in 1909 or 1910 to the firm of Wargunin 
Brothers in St. Petersburg for the manufacture for me of paper with this 
watermark. I do not exactly remember whether, in ordering paper in 1909 
or 1 910, from the firm of Wargunin Brothers in St. Petersburg, same was 
delivered with this watermark. I ordered paper with this watermark from 
the Polish paper mills Mirkow, and Saenger, in 1924 or 1925. Since 1928 
I have not manufactured paper with this watermark. From the enclosed 
photograph, I cannot state whether the paper was made at [by ? ] Mirkow, by 
Saenger or by Wargunin Brothers. 

The Germans answered by filing evidence that Kiperman could not 
have ordered a dandy-roll in 1909 or 1910, because at that time his sale 
of paper products was so small that it was improbable that he owned 
a watermark of his own. 

And so the ball was bounced back and forth from a dozen contro- 
versial points. Germany went so far as to accuse some one on the Amer- 
ican side of putting age stains on one of the letters after it had been 


filed in evidence. This was indignantly denied. The early photostats 
were compared with the more recent ones, and once again the experts 
were brought into action. The American experts, however, were not 
prepared to state that the Wozniak letters were authentic, although sev- 
eral stated that they saw no evidence on the face of the documents to 
prove their lack of genuineness. 

In the meantime one of the most amazing and dramatic episodes of 
the whole struggle took place in New York City — a face to face inter- 
view between Peto and Wozniak. On May 12, 1931, entirely unex- 
pectedly, Wozniak turned up at the Hotel Roosevelt, where Peto was 
staying, and demanded an interview. Being suspicious of Wozniak's 
motives, Peto sent him away and asked him to return on the following 
day. This he did, but in the interim arrangements were made to secrete 
two stenographers in an adjoining room to take down all that Wozniak 
wished to say. 

At 9 A.M. Wozniak was ushered into room 1209, and there Peto 
was ready and waiting for him. The two seated themselves in chairs 
placed up against the connecting door leading to room 1207; and on 
the other side of the door, a few inches away, sat the two stenogra- 
phers, Louis Cahan and Joseph Shaffer, of the Bar Association Steno- 
graphic Service. From the transcript of the questions and answers it 
is obvious that Wozniak's object in visiting Peto was to obtain 
money from him in return for a confession. A direct demand was not 
made; for each time Wozniak started leading up to it, Peto cleverly 
switched the conversation by plying him with questions about the fire. 
These Wozniak answered in the belief that there were no witnesses 
to the conversation and that consequently he was not destroying his 
chances of being paid for a witnessed statement, which alone, he knew, 
would be of any value to Peto. In his answers Wozniak confessed that 
he had set fire to Kingsland and admitted his association prior to the 
fire with German agents, who he frankly admitted were in the Kings- 
land plant plotting its destruction. He refused, however, to give any 
names or to admit knowing Herrmann. He insistently denied that at 
Kingsland he or anyone else had employed incendiary pencils. Instead, 
he intimated that the fire was caused by the use of rags soaked with a 

The Yukon Tr«U 


trong c»»^d 

in-l theiA rs •> \- 

M want rt^" paws^^SctfrTngc. Dig 

your k«*«j, .in-iO^ct t!>«^n^or mc," 
Hot comiFWj'icd^ -■ 

Wallv i\ik tcA jkc<J any W*- ^^^ 
ew the c||}htiinatk/nio{ t!^e |a((j and 

ne<l it. ^ri«"m i^it inner dilaWjg^^vjH' 

Iboked thcm>»v^ careJull^ \^Vo^" sat 
4n a table and t>>;|fl wiiK?t' rfSSivtr 
^Ich he Vamincdn^^yfullv" itiecr the 
acli o^i'n fat prisoner !•« , 

nnnouiv.'*'! «hc Kld'«kccnt, 

ofifK-r.i >locktd «itir. {trk- 

ffuf. atjtJ dif-ajij^aret! into 

htv wippp^d at. the |«^^e 

r 0^ tH^-ifomi, a *tnfcf 

witff.'xvliAm tvl5'< 

a f:oc^ deal, aod 


ley retained «,th«i;^''e<cl 

aod Hrjnc 

The Vital Evidence in the $50,000,000 Claims. 


\<\\ 1 * AO. liUKoi, 


The Best Short Stories of the Month 

The Society Bee. 

Mrs. Tib Tmk<r is MxuViS, liy lis.- -(,<!. t 
and Mr$. Krckr to 1^. t'hs^ wit'.- ih* 

\W ?v\rT Vk Kvne 481 

The New Stories of Tarzan, •BvF(^--R-" n. ,..<..,.!,, 515 

•'Tarzan and the Black Boy" i> the titic of thi- ;;. 

ing tak?s of the wiid-rno^s-rt'ar./d sun of Loni v,.>., .r 

Cupid on the Medway Road. 

A iovt>-story of that satisfactory, convincinj.: .-<«rt which tl 
"Pembma" stories knows so well how to writr. 

B\ Walter Jones 528 

«-.;!..ii; ■;■ ■.■■'. the ntenionii)i<- 


"Art Is Art. 

By Ellis Parker Butler 558 

JaiH'z the jTuileful turns his attention to a para-sitic artist a:,.i ■ 
scalp hanging at his belt— and a check folded in his wail, t 

Down and Out. 

By Charles Wesley Sanders 567 

A story of the men who ^o down to the hmd on r!i!ir<.ia<i 
made her man win his fight against a dangerou> et; 

The White Wolf. 

a Woman who 

Bv Robert Case\ 573 

A vivid and terrible drama of the Biack .Hills country. d>'-.(.-r!li.-^i v. ith notable power 
by the author of "The Midas Touch" and "Th.- Pay-Streak." 

Hoxley Plays a Queer Hand. By Elliott Flower 582 

He was a bit dull, was lloxley, but he was not so obt.ii.-e as to refui-.e a s^'oud tiiir;g 
offered him on a silver salver; a. story with an unusuai twist. ♦ 

Trade at Home. 

By George A. Brings 601 

A business story, pure and simple- that is, it would be if bu.-iiness were Wi-r either 
pure or simple. Anyhow, you'll find it m.o.>t intere,st!ng. 


LOL is ECKSTEIN. Prti.i o . ism i hi. . 

it M PWKVKS New t-ngUoJ Kfpteseautsvi", *> ( 0*1. -. t a. ^ 

Eoatftfil a« •K«3«»4 «.!*«» a»««rr July v4, iWA. jt i- i>^i B» e ..t <.>^ wf i .,<r "^ \ t . . 1 M» '. < is"v 



f. \sN.K i.-)U' Editor. 


Hie Man with One Kan 

By Edwin L, Sabin 608 

I!.' h;(.l but .-OH- oar. ami he f.-ar.-d i^he Wouldn't 
jt r>ut, iJui iov.' afHi-Mr. P.urr found a way. 

f ree Laiues in Diplomacy. By Clarence Herbert New 617 

i- ! :.■ tii.u, u.-; i— ••;; a» arm to .i.nvri a ^o.kI writt-r. Mt^ New is back 

• :s nwi'Ah With "A ( ount^-r.-^trok.,' m Svv,'(!,.n." one of his best stones. 

The (»reat Turn -Outer. 

By Raymond S. Spears 629 


wn }>..s- i^ ts Uk- .disor ol'th*' local {.ai^Tby th« throat™ at»d tht- editor 
HV t'> tw'jnhuVi m «ptt»> «>i it. 

Three Continued Stones 

By Arthur Somers Roche 49Sy | .. 

rnent of this fa.scinatinK mystery-story by the author of the famous - 
»%' nrvad* > the camp of bm enemy; and so he finds sssm the irirl 

Vagabonds of Chance. Bv Georire Washington Ogden 536 

Thi- n..v..I is big in theme and in treat- 
-r typ* s that have made our frontier so 

The l^oyal fUue ( rci-sus. By James Francis Dwyer 592 

- ^^"^y''^ " .Strang.. ,|ut'st to tropic San 
i-\' -Jihair: Laone .strik*-^ down The Red 

A Complete Book-Length Novel 
The Yukon Trail By Wilh'am Maclxod Raine 636 

Afh.. ^n'il,.sh,rvof r..p»'t*>with.wiftartH.^^ 

i •; !r,ik-«* 4rt«j- thst ttof !a tfct 

Frederick Hinsch and His Wife in 
Mexico in 1918. 

Raoul Gerdts. 

They Know the Story Behind the BLUE BOOK Message 


liquid in which something, presumably phosphorus,* had been dis- 

The conversation had reached this point v^hen suddenly one of the 
stenographers coughed. Wozniak jumped up in a rage, rattled the 
locked door, looked through the keyhole, and claimed that it opened 
into a closet in w^hich w^itnesses v^^ere hiding. Peto protested that it was 
simply the door of the adjoining room. This seemed to enrage Woz- 
niak still further. He rushed out of the room and tried to get into the 
next room through the door leading into it from the corridor. Peto, now 
thoroughly alarmed, called Joseph Farrell, one of the assistant man- 
agers of the Roosevelt, who eventually calmed Wozniak and escorted 
him out of the hotel. 

When the stenographic notes in affidavit form and the Wozniak let- 
ters were filed with the Commission, the American Agent moved 
to have Wozniak examined before the Commission; but Dr. Tannen- 
berg refused his consent, and wrote a letter to Mr. Bonynge, the im- 
portant part of which stated: 

When I returned to this country at the end of March, 1931, I had several 
conversations with Wozniak. In these conversations he indicated very 
strongly that he expected payment of a large sum by us. I advised Wozniak 
that no such payment could be made. Wozniak repeated his requests at every 
conversation I had with him and, finally, advised me that if his request was 
not complied with, he would accept an offer which had been made to him 
and which would cause me great regret. I, thereupon, broke off my relations 
with Wozniak and have not seen him since. 

This letter clearly indicated the defense which Germany intended 
to adopt. 

As a result of the finding of the Herrmann message and the Woz- 
niak letters, and also because of other additional evidence which had 
been uncovered by the American investigators, a petition for a rehear- 

* Feuerwasser (fire water), phosphorus dissolved in carbon disulphide, or other 
solvent, was a well-known German incendiary device. The solvent evaporated 
rapidly, leaving the finely divided phosphorus to burn spontaneously with a 
white hot flame that ignited all inflammable material in reach. 


ing of both the Black Tom and Kingsland cases and a reconsideration 
of The Hague decision on the basis of this newly discovered evidence 
v^as filed by the American Agent with the Mixed Claims Commission 
on July I, 1931. 
A hearing was held upon this petition at Boston in the summer of 

193 1. But before a decision was reached Mr. Boy den, the Umpire, died. 
Some time after that, by the agreement of both governments, Mr. 

Justice Owen J. Roberts of the Supreme Court of the United States 
was appointed to succeed Mr. Boyden, and from November 21 to 25, 

1932, the Mixed Claims Commission once again met to consider not 
only the new evidence presented at the Boston hearing but also a large 
amount of additional evidence which had been filed by both govern- 
ments in the interim. 

The arguments based on the evidence which has already been fully 
covered in the preceding chapters were forcefully presented by the 
Agents appearing for their respective governments. So able was the 
presentation, and so controversial was the nature of the evidence, that 
when it came time for the Commission to render its decision, the Amer- 
ican and German Commissioners, the two Judges, were in complete dis- 
agreement. Accordingly, on November 28, 1932, they executed and filed 
a certificate of disagreement in these cases, and thereby certified to the 
Umpire for a decision all the evidence covered at the hearing (except 
the question of the jurisdiction of the Commission to reopen a decision 
previously rendered by it at The Hague). The Umpire in a decision 
handed down on December 3, 1932, (the German Commissioner con- 
curring), dismissed the petition for a rehearing. The American Com- 
missioner filed a separate opinion on December 2, 1932. 

In his opinion, the Umpire adjudged the Wozniak letters to be 
fraudulent. With regard to the Herrmann message, the authenticity 
of which it was incumbent on the Americans to prove, he was unable 
to decide whether it was genuine or not. In analyzing its context, Mr. 
Justice Roberts stated in part: 

The document comprises 254 words. Those that have to do with the re- 
quest for money amount to only twenty. All the remainder are wholly 
irrelevant to the purpose in hand But enough has been said to show in 


how extraordinary a manner this document dovetails with all the important 
and disputed points of the claimants' case and how pat all these references 
are, not to the request for funds but to the claimants' points of proof 


Concerning the testimony of the experts, the Umpire 

It remains to consider whether these doubts can be resolved by recourse 
to the expert testimony. This consists of about one thousand pages. The 
questions submitted to the experts are in my belief novel. They involve at 
the foundation certain known qualities of ink and paper. But as one reads 
the testimony on both sides one is impressed with the fact that the experts 
themselves had to resort to experiment with lemon-juice writing on new and 
old paper to reach their conclusions. Many of the opinions of the experts 
on the one side are countered by diametrically opposite results stated by those 
on the other. I agree with the arguments of both Agents that certain of 
the experiments and tests which they criticize are not beyond fair criticism 
and fail to carry conviction. I entertain no doubt that all the experts retained 
by both litigants were inspired by a desire to do their honest best with a very 
difficult problem... on the expert evidence alone my judgment would be 
left in balance as to the authenticity of the document ... at best, expert 
evidence can usually be only an aid to judgment, and not always in and of 
itself so conclusive as to carry conviction. 

In summarizing his opinion on the message, the Umpire stated: 

As has been indicated, the testimony offered on both sides with respect to 
the message, to say the least, raises grave doubts with regard to it. The 
sources from which it comes [the evidence of Hilken and Herrmann had 
been disbeUeved at The Hague hearing], the circumstances of its production, 
the evidence as to the time and circumstances in which it was written, and 
the silent but persuasive intrinsic evidence which is drawn from its contents, 
makes impossible an affirmative conclusion in favor of the claimants and 
against Germany. The claimants have the burden to estabfish, by a fair 
preponderance of evidence, that this document was written and sent at the 
time claimed. With every disposition to avoid technicality, to be liberal as 
to the interpretation and effect of evidence, and to regard the great difficulties 
under which the claimants have labored in the production of their proofs, 
I yet find myself unable to overcome the natural doubts and misgivings 
which cluster about this document. I am not, therefore, prepared to make a 


finding that this is the missive which Herrmann dispatched to Hilken in 

Prior to handing down his decision, he went on to add: 

It must be borne in mind that whatever may be the belief of any Member 
of the Commission with respect to Germany's general attitude and the 
motives or purposes of its agents, or with respect to the equities of the 
claimants, or that Germany is disentitled to favorable consideration by 
reason of her general poUcy as to American-made munitions and supplies 
for the Allies, this Tribunal sits as a court with the obligation to ignore 
any such considerations and, however liberally construing rules of evidence, 
is still bound to act only upon proof which reasonably leads to the con- 
clusions upon which liability is consequent. 

And finally he concluded his opinion by handing down the follow- 
ing decision: 

... it is my opinion that if the new evidence were formally placed on file 
and considered in connection with the whole body of evidence submitted 
prior to the Commission's opinion of October 16, 1930, the findings then 
made and the conclusions then reached would not be reversed or materially 
modified. . . . 

As soon as the findings were handed down by the Commission, the 
American Agent referred the matter of the Wozniak letters to the 
Department of Justice in order that Wozniak and Baran might be 
indicted if it were found that a fraud against the United States had been 
committed. After fourteen months the Department of Justice reported 
to the State Department that it was not disposed to seek an indictment 
as, among other things, it "entertains considerable doubt... as to 
whether the letters are in fact spurious." 

It must also be stated that the American lawyers themselves enter- 
tained some doubt about the authenticity of the letters, chiefly because 
they were not entirely satisfied that the watermark was in existence in 
19 17. In view of this they suggested to the American Agent that he 
withdraw the letters from evidence rather than allow them to remain 
subject to doubt as to the date of the watermark. After giving the 


matter consideration, the American Agent took the responsibiHty of 
not withdrawing the letters, mainly for the reason that even if the 
letters were false, as neither he nor counsel were convinced was the 
case, they would still serve to prove what had been contended from 
the start, — that Wozniak was a perjurer and fraud whose statements 
and protestations of innocence filed by Germany could not be believed. 
There is no doubt, however, in the minds of the American lawyers 
that actually the submission of the letters was a tactical error; for, in 
their opinion, the Wozniak letters undoubtedly influenced the Com- 
mission in its consideration of the Herrmann message. 

On June 7, 1933, Congress passed a special act which for the first 
time permitted the American Agent to have process issued for the 
appearance of witnesses. Making use of this power, Wozniak was sub- 
poenaed to appear before the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York on August 22, 1933. Here once again 
he was examined as to his participation in the Kingsland fire. 

In the course of this examination he repeated most of the informa- 
tion which he had given to Peto at the Roosevelt Hotel. He confessed 
that he had been in contact with German agents prior to the fire but 
refused to testify as to matters which he believed would involve him 
in direct perjury by reason of his former statements on behalf of Ger- 
many. With regard to the origin of the fire, he now stated definitely 
that it was caused by a rag soaked in phosphorus, which had 
been put on his bench by a German agent. He spoke of rewards 
which he claimed had been promised him and of the failure of Dr. 
Tannenberg to make good such promises. He also produced a letter 
he had written to von Papen, then the Chancellor of the German 
Reich, complaining of his treatment by the German Agent and asserting 
that Germany had been responsible for the destruction of Kingsland. 

By this time, however, Wozniak was a completely discredited wit- 
ness. But even if his admissions were now of little value, the American 
lawyers had gained a point. They had piled up enough evidence to prove 
that Wozniak, one of Germany's principal witnesses prior to The 
Hague hearing, was not the truthful, frugal, honest type of laboring 
man that Germany had then painted him to be. 


If the Commission was right in its verdict on the Wozniak letters 
and they are fraudulent, immediately a whole host of baffling questions 
clamors for an answer. Who inspired the forgeries? Was it a fraud 
hatched by Wozniak and Baran? Or did the Germans deliberately 
foist them on Peto with a view to discrediting the Herrmann message ? 
It must be remembered that Hilken discovered the message in his attic 
just before Christmas, 1930. Prior to this the Germans undoubtedly 
knew both from Gerdts's affidavit of 1929, and from Hinsch, who was 
in Germany, that a message had been written, and that, therefore, there 
was always a possibility of its being produced one day. In fact the 
Germans never tried to deny the existence of such a message but merely 
attempted to prove that the one Hilken produced was not the true 

We will leave the reader to his own speculations on these matters 
and turn now to what we know was a definite attempt to defraud the 
American investigators by means of forged documents. But this time 
they were too smart to be caught. 

In January 1931 a certain party who had previously been connected 
with the Alien Property Custodian's office learned from a Parisian 
gentleman by the name of Michel de Taube that certain documents 
were available in Europe which would prove Germany's responsibility 
beyond doubt for the destruction of Black Tom and Kingsland. 

This information was passed on to McCloy, who was stationed in 
Paris at the time. He soon found out that de Taube was a professor of 
international law and a former member of the faculty of the University 
of Petrograd. De Taube had little information to give McCloy beyond 
the fact that Count Alexander Nelidoff, a Russian then living in Berlin, 
had come to him and said that he had access to vitally important docu- 
ments bearing on the case. The Count had further stated that his 
interest in the cases had been aroused by what he had heard about The 
Hague hearing, then but recently concluded. The Count's reason for 
consulting de Taube, or at least so de Taube told McCloy, was to seek 
advice on the best way of disposing of them to the Americans. De 
Taube had suggested bringing them first to a neutral country before 
opening up negotiations. 

At McCloy's behest, de Taube promised to communicate immedi- 


ately with the Count in BerUn. McCloy was anxious to get possession 
of the documents as soon as possible, but for some reason or other 
their delivery kept being delayed. De Taube alternately assumed an air 
of mystery or pleaded that he was a simple intermediary and did not 
know what was happening in Berlin. At length, after putting through 
several long-distance calls to Berlin, a meeting between Nelidoif and 
McCloy was arranged at The Hague. Then, at the last moment, it was 
canceled; and the rendezvous was transferred to Spa, Belgium; but 
when McCloy arrived there, he found a telegram from Nelidoff which 
announced in guarded language that he had suddenly had to change 
his plans. 

Finally, after a delay of several weeks, McCloy traveled to Berlin 
and there had several clandestine meetings with Nelidoff. Nelidoff 
appeared constantly on his guard, took the greatest precautions against 
being followed, and carried a tear-gas pistol in the shape of a fountain 
pen, which to Nelidofl's consternation nearly exploded one night when 
in his presence McCloy hastily sought a pen with which to take some 
notes. After attempting to get a large sum of money out of McCloy, 
eventually, on April 18 Nelidoff handed him the documents on the 
understanding that payment would be made only after they had been 
examined and found authentic. 

On inspection, the documents proved to consist largely of a number 
of reports from Nadolny under various dates in 1916 and 1917 relative 
to sabotage in the United States. There were also several letters osten- 
sibly written by Stresemann concerning the investigation of certain of 
the activities of von Papen and von Bernstorff in the United States. The 
contents of the documents were such that, if they were proved genuine, 
the evidence supplied by them would be conclusive. 

Immediately McCloy sent for Gerald Francis Gurrin, the well-known 
British handwriting specialist and examiner of questioned documents, 
who came to Berlin at his request. 

After a cursory examination, Gurrin announced that they had all 
the earmarks of being genuine and that, if they were forgeries, they 
were remarkably well done. He reserved judgment, however, until he 
could make further tests and have a chance to compare the signatures 
with genuine specimens, which he was in a position to secure. 


These final tests, however, resulted in Gurrin's giving McCloy an 
opinion that the documents could not be relied upon as genuine. Mc- 
Cloy simultaneously consulted Admiral Hall as to Nelidojfi['s back- 
ground and found out through Hall that Nelidoff v^as v^ell-know^n 
to the British Secret Service. Shortly afterv^ards McCloy received a 
full report from one of its members who seemed to be well informed 
about Nelidoff's activities. This report showed that Nelidoff was at 
the head of a number of forging experts in Berlin, whose business it 
was not only to forge documents of every description but also to de- 
liver them with such secrecy and mystery as to make the recipients 
believe that they were stolen originals. Their work was almost 
perfect, and they were able to get at the material to enable them to 
forge any document for which they thought there would be a sale. The 
report went on to read that Nelidoff was often employed by the Ger- 
man Secret Service to plant so-called official documents on foreign 

It was suggested to McCloy that he lead Nelidoff on to see what he 
would produce. At the same time, he was advised to be careful and not 
to trust any of Nelidoff's associates, but to play with them with the 
knowledge that he was dealing with a shrewd and powerful band of 

McCloy preferred, however, to let well enough alone. After taking 
photostats of the documents he returned them to Nelidoff and for the 
time being heard no more of him. 

On November 13, 193 1, the B, Z. am Mittag, the Berlin midday 
newspaper, carried the following story (translated from the German) : 


The erstwhile Russian Guard Officer, Count Alexander Nelidoff, a striking 
and elegant figure out of the Czarist Court circles, a near relative of the 
Russian Ambassador who died in Paris in 1910, is at present in the Berlin 
jail under the serious accusation of counterfeiting. 

After the collapse of the Russian Empire, Count Nelidoff, who has enjoyed 
a first-class education, his first teachers being Jesuits of Brussels, put his great 
military knowledge at the service of various governments. He left Manchuria 


with the remnants o£ the Horvath Army, came to Constantiople by way 
of Japan, participated in the Wrangel campaign, and finally stranded again 
on the Bosphorus. There the English and French struggled for influence in 
Asia Minor. During the Graeco-Turkish War, and during the Revolution 
against Kemal, Count Nelidoff had a finger in the game, now on one, then 
on the other side. Afterwards, he came to Berlin, where he managed to gain 
entrance into political circles. 

In January of this year, the former Russian Officer MammonoflF was 
arrested in Stockholm, in whose baggage were found bundles of false 
EngHsh pound notes. Mammonoff and NeHdoflF are friends from Russian 
days, and are said to have been in touch with each other since. MammonofiF 
was later extradited to Germany from Stockholm, on account of criminal 
acts committed in Germany. 

A few months ago, Count NeHdoff had managed to obtain connections 
with some German authority, from whom he received large amounts for 
necessary traveUng expenses and disbursements, for services which he prom- 
ised to render. When Nelidoff found it impossible to carry out the objectives 
he had undertaken, he came into conflict with his employer. He offered to 
repay the amount advanced to him, — and paid with English pound notes, 
which came from MammonoflF 's workroom. 

As it was suspected that he was working in collusion with MammonoflF, 
he was arrested, but he denied energetically having received the bank notes 
from MammonoflF. In regard to his source of income during recent years, 
he is very reticent, and seeks to draw in an alleged British journalist, to 
whom he claims to have furnished poUtical documents for some large work. 

It would be interesting to know who the German authority was 
"from whom he received large amounts for necessary traveling 
expenses and disbursements for services which he promised to render." 
One cannot help speculating on what objectives he had undertaken 
and found "impossible to carry out." Of course they may not have had 
anything to do with McCloy, but then it is also possible that they may 

One piece of information which Nelidoff gave McCloy was gen- 
uine. He spoke of a printed report (unpublished) of a commission 
headed by a Professor Delbriick which had included references to Ger- 
man sabotage activities in the United States. From other sources, it is 
known that a few years after the war such a commission was consti- 


tuted to inquire into certain phases of the war; but the publication of 
its report was later suppressed by the German authorities. This report, 
together with the minutes of the Reichstag hearing which took place 
in 192 1 respecting von Rintelen's sabotage mission to the United States, 
are yet further examples of evidence which Germany failed to produce 
before the Mixed Claims Commission. 

Chapter XXV 


It might be well at this point to pause a moment and take stock of the 
position of the American claimants' cause. In The Hague decision given 
in 1930 the original claims for damages had been tried and the Ameri- 
can evidence had been adjudged inconclusive in proving German 
responsibility for the explosions. And nov^ for a second time their 
hopes had been dashed by the Commission's decision of December 3, 
1932, rejecting their plea to reopen the cases on the basis of the nev7 
evidence contained in the Wozniak letters and the Herrmann message. 
But undaunted they continued the fight, believing firmly that Ger- 
many vv^as guilty and that sooner or later they w^ould succeed in con- 
vincing the Commission. Soon after the second decision they came 
upon important evidence v^hich they felt justified them in petitioning 
the Court in May 1933 to reopen the cases on the ground that 

. . . Certain important witnesses for Germany, in affidavits filed in evidence 
by Germany, furnished incomplete, collusive and false evidence which misled 
the Commission and unfairly prejudiced the cases of the claimants. 

Witzke v^as again located just at this time in Hankow, China, in the 
employ of the Hamburg-American Line. Mindful of the fact that Ger- 
many had cited his refusal of permission as an excuse for not filing the 
notebook with the Commission, the American Agent, through the 
Secretary of State, sent the Consul in Hankow the following telegram: 

Dec. 22, 1933, 5 p.m. 
American Consul 
Hankow (China) via V.R. 
Your telegram No. 47, Nov. i, noon. 

Please interview Lothar Witzke and endeavor obtain authority from him 
permitting German Agent Mixed Claims Commission to file with Commis- 



sion notebook delivered by Witzke to Paulig German Foreign Office Berlin 
Summer of 1927 under condition that it is not to be delivered to anyone else 
without Witzke's permission. This notebook according to record is now^ in 
possession of German Agent who takes the position that in the absence of 
authority from Witzke his Government has no right to deal with it contrary 
to the will of the owner. Witzke may be advised that United States not 
interested in possible criminal prosecution relating to matters before Com- 
mission. Telegraph results interview. 

Phillips Acting 

To this the American Consul at Hankow replied as follows: 

Hankow via N.R., dated Dec. 31, 1933 

Secretary of State 


Dec. 31, 4pm 

Department's Dec. 22, 5pm 

Have interviewed Witzke whose attitude in brief is, first, that inasmuch 
as he turned over five or six notebooks and many papers to Paulig he would 
like to know which notebook is referred to and, second, that he wishes the 
Germant Agent or German Government to instruct him that it has no 
objection to the suggested procedure. 


Thereafter Mr. Martin addressed a letter to Dr. Lohmann, the then 
German Agent, requesting him to instruct Witzke that the German 
authorities had no objection. 

Thereupon, three days after Mr. Martin communicated with Dr. 
Lohmann, Witzke had an interview with the American Consul at 
Hankow, who reported as follows: 

Hankow, (Via N.R.) Dated Jan. 5, 1934 
Secretary of State 
Washington, D.C. 
Jan. 5, 6pm 

Witzke called today and stated that since the interview mentioned in my 
unnumbered telegram of Dec. 31, 4 p.m., he has examined his personal 
records and finds that the notebook which the Mixed Claims Commission 
desires to use is one which he has declined to make available to the Com- 


mission and that, with the exception o£ one page which he has already agreed 
to make available, he must again decline to allow the notebook to be used 
because it contains the names of casual acquaintances who have no real 
knowledge of the matters under investigation and whom he does not wish 
to expose to inquiry. 


Although he had received no reply to his first letter, Mr. Martin 
then wrote to Dr. Lohmann again and stated on the basis of the Con- 
sul's radio that Witzke only objected to the filing of the one notebook, 
and therefore he requested Germany to file the other four or five. 

To this letter Dr. Lohmann merely sent the following acknowledg- 

Mixed Claims Commission 

United States and Germany 

German Agency Washington, D.C. Jan. 20, 1934 

Mr. H. H. Martin 
Counsel to the American Agent 
Mixed Claims Commission 
State Department Building 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. Martin: 

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated January 19, 1934, which 
you wrote me subsequent to your communication of January 2nd, concern- 
ing the same matter. 

Yours very truly, 

[Dr.] Job. G. Lohmann 
German Agent. 

It was thus evident from these telegrams and correspondence that, 
first of all some one must have prompted Witzke to change his mind; 
and secondly, that it was Germany, and not Witzke, who objected to 
the filing of the four or Ewt other notebooks. 

In connection with the search by the American investigators for new 
evidence, there come once again into the picture the Irish agitators 
whom Germany had so consistently tried to exploit during the war. 


Of all the Irishmen who could have been of help in sabotage work, 
there was no one who had greater potentialities in 19 14 than Jim 
Larkin. He was a powerful figure in the Irish movement and in the 
radical labor movement. He had the very widest acquaintance among 
factory workers and longshoremen, the particular men among whom 
German agents admit they were especially active. He was quite above 
the level of the ordinary rank and file of those Irishmen who were 
working under or with German agents in this country. He was pecul- 
iarly talented as a labor orator; and, with his radical social views, he 
was in an excellent position to effect strikes amongst the munitions 
workers or to encourage sabotage. 

O'Leary, MacGarrity, Keating, Maguire, and Devoy, famous Irish 
leaders at that time, were working closely in this country with the 
Germans; but Larkin had qualities which none of them possessed. 

The American investigators judged that Larkin must know some- 
thing about the German sabotage campaign, and clues supplied by the 
Military InteUigence Division of the War Department bore them out. 
In 1933 he was located in Ireland, and McCloy had an interview with 
him in Dublin and obtained an affidavit which outlined his connec- 
tions with German agents in the United States. 

Larkin testified that he himself never took part in the actual sabo- 
tage campaign but, rather, confined himself to the organizing of strikes 
to secure both higher pay and shorter hours for workmen and to pre- 
vent the shipment of munitions to the Allies. But because of these 
labor activities, which were highly beneficial to the Germans, they 
accepted him as one of themselves; and Boy-Ed and other German 
leaders constantly tried to get him to use labor for sabotage purposes. 
They also admitted him to their inner councils. He was told of the 
sabotage headquarters at Lakewood, New Jersey, and was shown 
various incendiary devices, one of which, in the light of Wozniak's 
later testimony, is of special interest. This device, as he described it, 
consisted of small "scent bottles" filled with phosphorus in solution, 
a few drops of which sprinkled on papers or rags would cause them to 
burst into flames as soon as the liquid evaporated. 

Early in 191 6 Larkin was present at a meeting of German sabotage 
agents. Various sabotage objectives were discussed; and the destruction 


of Black Tom among other places was decided upon. A plan was 
worked out by means of which a barge laden with explosives at one 
of the Black Tom piers was to be detonated. 

Larkin was walking along Broadway with friends when Black Tom 
blew up. Although he had an airtight alibi, he decided it would be 
expedient to disappear for a time. He went, therefore, to Mexico City, 
where he stopped at the Juarez Hotel. There he met several of the Ger- 
man agents and had several interviews with von Eckhardt. 

The Germans were still intent on his participation in their sabotage 
schemes. He told of a map they showed him on which munitions 
works marked for destruction were shown. Enraged by his continued 
refusal, they got Otto Paglash, the proprietor of the Juarez Hotel, to 
throv/ him out of the hotel. He was broke and was forced to sleep on 
a park bench until he received funds from the United States, when he 
moved to a more comfortable lodging. It was the luckiest move he ever 
made, for on the very morning after he had left the park the tramp 
who had taken the bench he had vacated was found stabbed to death. 

Concluding that he knew entirely too much for his own good, he 
thereupon decided to return to the United States. On the way to the 
border he was attacked on the train by three Mexican desperadoes. He 
succeeded in beating off their attack, however, and got across the border 

Shortly afterwards he was arrested as an anarchist, was convicted, 
and was sentenced to Sing Sing. After the war he was released by 
Governor Alfred E. Smith and deported. 

On McCloy's return to the United States, he proceeded to check up 
on Larkin's statements. In the files of the Military Intelligence Division 
of the War Department a report on Larkin and copies of two tele- 
grams sent by him from Mexico were found. One telegram read: 

Mexico City, Mex. Oct. 17, 1917 


Hotel Fresno Eddy St., San Francisco, Calif. 
See Markin Pacific Building cable me money through bank vital need 
repay later Hotel Turbide. 

James Larkin 


The other read: "Answer urgent need derelict forward letters Hotel 
Juarez cable reply." 
The report stated in part: 

There is no information concerning the purpose of James Larkin's presence 
in Mexico City. From his past conduct it might be inferred that he was 
arranging cooperation between German agents and radicals in this country. 
However, if this were the case it would hardly seem that he would be wiring 
to Bankson in San Francisco for funds. 

When Larkin's affidavit was filed the Germans followed their basic 
defense by issuing a denial and branding the statement as a lie. Further- 
more, through some channel or other they obtained a copy of a cable 
from Larkin to McCloy requesting the latter to pay him ^^50 he 
had promised. Germany attempted to prove that McCloy had bought 
Larkin's evidence. The explanation of the £^^0 is that when McCloy 
met Larkin in Dublin, the latter insisted that his attorney should be 
present at the interview, and also stated that it was only fair McCloy 
should pay the attorney's fees. This he agreed to do immediately on his 
return to London. But in the rush of sailing for the United States the 
next day, he forgot to send the promised sum. On his arrival in New 
York, he found a cable from Larkin reminding him of the matter. 

After all these varied investigations, the possibilities of finding new 
sources to search for evidence seemed about exhausted; and the Black 
Tom and Kingsland investigation appeared to be entering upon its 
final stages. But suddenly, through a former British Secret Service 
officer, it was learned that there existed in Austria documents 
which proved the responsibility of Germany for the destruction of 
both Kingsland and Black Tom. Means were pondered of obtaining 
the documents without arousing the suspicion of Germany ; experience 
had abundantly proved that nothing could be expected of her except 
opposition. Furthermore, as there were many indications that Austria 
and Germany had collaborated to some extent in the commission of 
sabotage in the United States, it was not thought that Austria would 
willingly permit her files to be laid open to the Commission. Any 
direct questions would have put Austria on guard, and therefore Peas- 


lee and McCloy, with the help of their secret service adviser, decided 
to use a little guile in their Austrian investigations. 

It v^as decided that the subtlest plan would be to interest a publisher 
in the publication of material from the pertinent files relating to the 
diplomatic relations of the Central Powers with the United States dur- 
ing the World War. As many years had passed since the war and as 
students of history were gaining more and more access to files once 
closed, they thought some progress in this direction might be made. 
Peaslee and his espionage expert realized that two things were neces- 
sary — an author and a publisher. A well-known Hungarian historian. 
Dr. Otto Ernst, who had published books and articles on material in 
the Austrian archives was offered the job of writing a book along the 
lines indicated, and Lovat Dickson & Thompson, Limited, of London, 
which had published books dealing with German material of a some- 
what similar nature, was engaged as the possible publisher. Mr. Lovat 
Dickson expressed a willingness to undertake the publication of any 
material which Dr. Ernst could furnish, and so advised him. The pub- 
lication would certainly have taken place had the studies not been 
interrupted, and the contract with Dr. Ernst was entirely bonafide. 

Dr. Ernst commenced his work and started sending material to the 
publisher. Gradually he was led to direct his researches more and more 
to matters relating to the causes of the United States's entering the war 
and to matters shedding light on the existence of a sabotage campaign 
there during the period of neutrality. Of course, all this was done with 
the hope that Dr. Ernst would get on the right track and produce in 
the ordinary course of his permitted studies of the Austrian files the 
documents in which the claimants were interested. 

In the course of his researches Dr. Ernst had the assistance of two 
Austrian official archivists, a Dr. Hausknecht and a Herr Schnagl; but 
neither of these men had any contact with Peaslee. They were perfectly 
innocent officials of the War Archives, who quite openly and properly 
supplied material to Dr. Ernst, who they knew would furnish the 
material to a London publisher interested in making public the material 
they were supplying. 

In this way a number of documents relating to German sabotage in 
the United States came to light. One of them, which is in the form of 


a resume of information distributed by the Austrian Military Intelli- 
gence Service, is particularly significant. This resume was based on 
information received from German Army Headquarters, and read as 
follows (translation from the German) : 

United States of America. 

According to the latest news 21 more ammunition factories have been 
blown up. 

The explosion in Kingsland, New Jersey, is reputed to have caused dam- 
ages of $17,000,000, while that in the Du Pont Powder factory $2,000,000. 

Still further "surprises" are said to be impending. 

Vienna, April 27, 1917. 

The distribution list at the foot of this document is as follows: 

Military Chancellery of His Majesty in Baden and Vienna i each 

Operations Division, Supreme Army Command, War Minister i each 

War Minister (MS — Operations Chancellery) 6 

Col. Kundmann i 

Asst. Chief of the General Staff i 

Representative of the Foreign Minister with Supreme Army 

Command 2 

German Representative O. with Supreme Army Command .... i 

Commander of the S W Front i 

Army Group EH Josef i 

Army Group FM Conrad i 

Information Division — Supreme Army Command 3 

Group E 4 

This document and the evidence relating to it show that in 1917 the 
German sabotage organization was sufficiently well established in the 
United States for German Army Headquarters to report with confi- 
dence to the Austrian General Staff that "still further ^surprises' are 
impending." The general wording of the report, taken in conjunction 
with the last sentence, indicates that the 21 ammunition factories, 
including those of Kingsland and Du Pont, were blown up by the Ger- 
man sabotage organization. 

In view of Germany's repeated assertion that all documents relative 


to the wartime activities of her agents in the United States had been 
destroyed, it is of interest to read the following affidavit of Dr. Ernst's: 

At the time that this attached document [the resume quoted above] re- 
ferring to destruction of factories in the United States was discovered, which 
was early in April, 1935, ^ discussed that aspect of my subject with some 
of the employees in the Archives, and was advised that it was quite certain 
there were in Berlin many documents on this subject. Herr Schnagl referred 
to the fact that there is a current exchange of information between BerUn 
and Vienna with respect to official records and that frequently employees 
of Archives in BerUn visit Vienna and vice versa, and he told me that he 
thought it would be easy to have the subject looked into and verified, and 
that he would make an effort to do so before my work was completed. He 
suggested that a request could be sent by the Austrian Government to the 
German Government in Berlin for such records or that he could have some 
of the Austrian Archivists who are from time to time in Berlin make a 
personal investigation. Not long after that Herr Schnagl advised me that 
he had caused a request to be sent to Berlin for the files of Washington 
reports from the German Embassy to the Foreign Office in BerUn during 
the period 1914 to 1917 to be sent down on loan to Vienna. Subsequently I 
inquired of Herr Schnagl whether the files from Berlin had been requested 
and had arrived and I was advised that they had been requested but had 
not arrived. Herr Schnagl assured me, however, that he had the matter in 
mind and would verify the existence of such records in some way before 
I concluded my researches. Later Herr Schnagl told me that while he had 
not yet been able to procure from Berlin the file requested he had succeeded 
in verifying the existence of such files through one of the officers of the 
Kriegarchiv in Vienna, Dr. Albin Hausknecht, who had personally been in 
Berlin. Dr. Hausknecht is a Major in the Austrian Army and is also employed 
as an official in the Austrian Archives. I asked Dr. Hausknecht to supply 
me with a letter to my publishers confirming the results of his investigations 
in Berlin. A photostatic copy of that letter dated May 20, 1935, is attached 
hereto marked "Annex O." I also saw Dr. Hausknecht again two days later 
and discussed with him again his visit to Berlin and asked him to give me 
more of the details respecting it. He said that he examined records in 
Potsdam, am Branhausberg in charge of Dr. Musebeck, Direktor des 
Reichsarchivs in Potsdam and particularly documents under the title "Group 
A" in charge of Oberregierungsrat Rupprecht. I discussed with him the 
question whether the archives were at present easy of access. He said that 


he thought it would be very difficult for anyone not an official to have any 
access to them for scientific or literary purposes and he mentioned the fact 
that he noted that there vvras a man at the door of the building who took a 
very careful record of the times to the minutes when persons entered and 
left the building. He said that such a record of his visit should be in 

Dr. Hausknecht, an official of the Austrian Kriegarchiv in a perfectly 
open manner, with no effort or apparent purpose to do other than 
obtain information contained in the Potsdam Archives, in ordinary 
course ran across a file which he described in brief but definite manner 
in a letter which he wrote to the London publishers: 

In connection with the letter [sic] to you of today, you may be also in- 
terested to know, that in the last week (16-19 ^^Y ^935) > while I was on 
an official archive mission in BerHn, I examined in the German State 
Archives a file of reports from the German Embassy in Washington during 
the period while Count Bernstorff was Ambassador there, — which described 
numerous destructions accompUshed by Germany of ammunition factories 
and stores in the United States during that period. 

Unfortunately before the researches of Dr. Ernst were completed the 
time schedule fixed by the Mixed Claims Commission compelled the 
filing of the results of such researches as had been completed. As soon 
as they were filed the German Government, of course, was in a posi- 
tion to locate the leak and plug it. 

Through von Papen, who was now the German Ambassador to Aus- 
tria, pressure was brought to bear to bar Ernst, Schnagl, and Haus- 
knecht from further research in Vienna. 

The statements of the Austrian Archivists given above are evidence 
of the existence of the documents they refer to, and they are statements 
of men who were unaware of the significance their statements might 
have upon the issues of the Black Tom and Kingsland claims. And 
yet as we have already shown, Germany has consistently refused to 
produce these documents. 

In rebuttal of this testimony, Germany introduced no evidence to 
destroy the implications of the above resume, but presented two 


Statements of denial from Dr. Hausknecht and Herr Schnagl. With 
regard to the above letter which he wrote to the English publishers, 
Dr. Hausknecht claimed that Dr. Ernst wrote the letter for him on 
official stationery of the War Archives, and that he signed it without 
reading it. Dr. Musebeck, Director of the Reichsarchiv in Potsdam, 
testified that his recollection is that Dr. Hausknecht did visit the archives 
on May 16, 1935, and that he asked for an inspection of the files of 
the Supreme Army Command concerning sabotage activities in the 
United States, but that he was advised that he would have to conform 
to certain regulations before these files could be opened to him. 

Chapter XXVI 


It was not until May 1936 that a hearing was held by the Commission 
on the United States* petition of May 4, 1933, alleging that the Com- 
mission had been misled by Germany in the presentation of her evi- 
dence. The three years' lapse of time had been caused by Germany. 
She had first attempted to claim that The Hague decision was final and 
that the Commission lacked the authority to reopen the cases. When 
overruled on this point, she had shifted her efforts to impeding the 
taking of testimony by the American Agent in the American courts. 
She had also used every type of ingenious pretext for delaying the filing 
of her evidence. 

But at last the Commission met in Washington in May 1936 — three 
years after the petition had been filed. The whole issue of perjury, col- 
lusion, and suppression of evidence was argued. But the Commission 
limited itself to ruling on one point only: the question of whether the 
Commission had been misled at the time of the hearing on the Herr- 
mann message and the Wozniak letters by a statement of the German 
Commissioner's to the effect that the American claimants had sup- 
pressed a report by Elbridge W. Stein adverse to the authenticity of the 
documents. In view of this failure to decide the complete issue, we 
shall limit ourselves to a summary of the arguments on the Stein re- 
port and on the allegations of collusion between Osborn and Stein. 

In his brief Mr. Bonynge pointed out that Osborn had been the first 
to say anything about a suppressed report of Stein's: 

Mr. Osborn prepared the way for the story later conveyed to the Com- 
mission that claimants had suppressed a report by one of their own experts 
adverse to the authenticity of the document. On August 13, 1932, in one of 
his three reports of that date, he wrote (An. 78, pp. 1-2) : "The second sur- 



prising reports are from Mr. Elbridge W. Stein, of New York, which merely 
express the opinions that the Herrmann message was written by Herrmann 
and that the Wozniak letters were written by Wozniak, regarding which 
there is no controversy. Mr. Stein is not merely a handwriting expert but 
an expert of national reputation on all classes of problems relating to ques- 
tioned and disputed documents including paper and ink problems relating 
to age of documents. . . ." 

This insinuation of Osborn's had aroused some speculation among 
the American lawyers at the time, but no particular importance was 
attached to it. But suddenly, on the eve of the hearing, Stein wrote a 
letter to counsel on November 4, 1932, alleging suppression of a report 
he asserted he had made on June 10, 1931 (nearly a year and a half 
previously), adverse to the authenticity of the Wozniak letters and the 
Herrmann message. He stated in this letter: 

The printed report of the argument at Boston [July 30-August i, 1931] in 
the Black Tom case leaves no doubt but that the use of my supplementary 
report on the handwriting in the Wozniak letters only is a distinct detriment 
to my reputation as a document examiner of ability and integrity. 

He further stated in this letter that "if my complete report had been 
used as evidence no one could misunderstand what my opinion was 
regarding the documents." He also alleged that the failure of the 
claimants to file the report of June 10 and the use only of the reports 
on handwriting had created the impression that he supported the 
genuineness of documents which he believed to be fraudulent. He said 
specifically, "This I can never allow ... I have sent a copy of this letter 
to Mr. Bonynge so that voluntary action may be taken immediately to 
correct the unfairness." 

Amazed at this letter Mr. Bonynge sent for Stein and in the presence 
of three lawyers for the claimants demanded to know how his hand- 
writing report had been improperly used at the Boston hearing. Stein 
was unable to give any satisfactory explanation, and on the next day 
retracted his letter "in its entirety." 

At the interview on November 5, Stein was also asked point-blank 
whether or not Mr. Osborn or anyone connected with the Commission 


knew of his letter of November 4. In reply Stein gave his absolute assur- 
ance that the story of suppression had not been communicated to Osborn 
or to the Commission, and thereupon the matter was allowed to drop. 

This report of June 10, Stein said, took up the entire question of the 
authenticity of the documents. However, the claimants contended that 
he had been engaged only to report on the handwriting. He produced 
an alleged copy of the suppressed report, the original of which he 
maintained he had sent to the claimants. 

In his brief Mr. Bonynge attacked the truth of these statements on 
the following major grounds: (i) His services had not been engaged 
until June 16 — six days after he claimed to have made the report. He 
therefore had had no reason to make any report whatsoever on June 10. 
Furthermore, he had never been informed that the Wozniak letters 
even existed until June 16. Yet his alleged report of June 10 contained 
a report on them. (2) His alleged report must have been written with- 
out any real study of the Herrmann message. The originals of the 
Herrmann message and the Wozniak letters had nevei* been left with 
him for more than a few hours, but had been studied from photostats 
adequate only for the purpose of passing on the handwriting. (3) The 
copy of the alleged report of June 10 was typewritten, but the date was 
written in by hand. 

In summing up, Mr. Bonynge's brief went on to discuss the relations 
between Stein and Osborn: 

After the Washington decision of December 3, 1932, the American Agent 
and the claimants were shocked to learn that, notwithstanding their interview 
with Mr. Stein on November 5 and the assurances then given, the story of 
suppression had in fact been conveyed to the Commission before the decision. 
The story was false. The reasons which had been given by Mr. Stein as to 
why the Commission should be informed of his alleged report were baseless. 
The letter of November 4 had been retracted. Mr. Stein in fact had no per- 
sonal or professional reason for conveying a false story to the Commission. 

The claimants recalled Mr. Osborn's connection with the Quakers hoax, 
and his use of Mr. Stein to obtain from them the information with which 
that story started. It was Mr. Osborn who would be benefited by the passing 
on to the Commission of this story of suppression. It seemed apparent that 


the only avenue by which this story could have reached the Commission 
was from Mr. Stein to Mr. Osborn and through him to the German Agent. 
Mr. Osborn has indignantly denied collusion with Mr. Stein, but he has not 
specifically denied that he passed this story on to the German Agent. 

The facts above reviewed speak for themselves and the American Agent 
wishes only to add thereto the facts stated below, which show Mr. Osborn's 
attitude from the very beginning, without further comment or characteri- 

. . . Mr. Osborn, when approached by claimants, stated to them that he 
would request his release from Germany in order to enable him to act for 
them, whereas actually, according to Dr. Tannenberg's letter to the Umpire of 
September 8, 1931, he made no attempt whatever to obtain such a release. 
Instead, he urged claimants to employ Mr. Stein. Having accompHshed this, 
as he thought, he refused to substitute a neutral retainer for a partisan 
one, the value of which would depend "on the results" obtained. Mr. Stein 
and Mr. Osborn talked together about this case, and Mr. Stein's alleged 
report is strikingly like Mr. Osborn's own and contains some of the same 
manifest errors made by Mr. Osborn 

Further on the brief stated: 

These sabotage cases are in point. Mr. Stein was not opposing Mr. Osborn, 
he was merely occupying a position in the opposing camp. The only question 
on which Mr. Stein testified was the question of handwriting, and in this 
Mr. Osborn was in agreement. And if Mr. Stein had been employed to pass 
on other questions, his alleged report shows that he would still have been 
in agreement with Mr. Osborn. The testimony of those who heard his 
alleged report read aloud on November 5, 1932, is that it was strikingly 
similar to Mr. Osborn's — even to the making of the same obvious errors, 
such as that the writing fluid used was colored; and that in writing the letter 
"h" in the word "bunch" the pen cut through the paper and wrote the "h" 
on the page below. . . . The absurdity of the first of these errors, and the 
manifest impossibility of the second, are discussed under the heading "The 
Expert Evidence." But it may here be noted that even if Mr. Stein had not 
admitted, as he did, that he and Mr. Osborn talked the sabotage cases over 
in general together, this fact would still have appeared from the similarity 
existing between Mr. Osborn's report and Mr. Stein's alleged report. It would 
seem to be impossible that both men, without conference, could have made 
both errors. 


In rebuttal to these arguments of Mr. Bonynge's the German Agent 
filed only a short affidavit by Osborn in which he denied collusion with 
Stein and called the charge "a cruel and unwarranted slander." He also 
stated that he considered it "unnecessary to dignify these astonishing 
charges by reciting them and answering them in detail." Apart from 
this Germany filed no evidence in denial. 

The identity of the person who had told the German Commissioner 
the suppressed report story was never disclosed. We do know, however, 
that the Commission had never questioned the American Agent con- 
cerning any unfiled report by Stein. During the course of the argument 
the Umpire himself gave an account of what had happened: 

I have known Mr. Albert S. Osborn (handwriting and questioned docu- 
ment expert who appeared for Germany) for many years. When I was in 
practice I retained him in connection with several problems arising with 
respect to documents whose authenticity was contested. At some time he 
referred me to Mr. Elbridge W. Stein as a competent expert in similar 
matters. Mr. Stein, at that time, had an office in the Bulletin Building, 
Philadelphia. On one or more occasions I consulted him. 

Just before the date set for hearing in the sabotage cases (probably some- 
time in November, 1932), Mr. Stein attempted to get into communication 
with me by telephone. He wished an interview with me concerning the 
sabotage cases in which I knew he was a witness for the claimants. I refused 
to allow him to communicate with me. 

During the meetings of the Commission preliminary to the hearing. Dr. 
Kiesselbach (the German Commissioner) advised Mr. Anderson (American 
Commissioner) and me that the claimants had suppressed an expert report 
adverse to the authenticity of the Wozniak letters and the Herrmann mes- 
sage. I cannot say that Dr. Kiesselbach specifically stated the source of his 

The communication naturally disturbed me but I knew of no action that 
the Commission or I, as Umpire, could take in the premises and so stated. 

My impression that there had been some such suppression was strength- 
ened by Mr. Osborn's statement, in one of his affidavits, that it was remark- 
able that no opinion by Mr. Stein, a competent expert in such matters, had 
been submitted as to the age of the documents but only an opinion as to 
handwriting, a matter that was uncontested. 

In the oral argument, the German Agent made no reference to this matter 
and as the American Agent did not refer to it the impression remained that 


there had been a withholding of a report which might have shed light on 
the question argued before the Commission. 

When the Commission had heard the arguments of both Agents on 
all phases of the American petition for the rehearing, it adjourned to 
consider the evidence. It announced its decision on June 6. In the 
decision the Commission limited itself to adjudicating one question 
only — the effect of the suppressed report story on its decision concern- 
ing the authenticity of the Herrmann message and the Wozniak 

In addition, this Commission states through its members present at the 
time that there can be no doubt as to the entire good faith of the then 
German Commissioner when he made his communication. The Umpire and 
the American Commissioner hold, and claimants have shown, that there 
was no sufficient ground for suspicion, and that for this reason claimants are 
entitled to a reconsideration. The German Commissioner, whilst doubting 
that the claimants were actually wrong (especially as in his view mere 
suspicions never can be a basic element of juridical findings) takes the stand, 
that in international arbitration it is of equal importance that justice be done 
and that appearances show clearly to everybody's conviction that justice was 
done. He does not think that the second requirement was satisfactorily com- 
plied with in the present case, and for this reason he accedes to the conclusion 
of the other members of this Commission. It is therefore decided, that the 
decision of this Commission rendered at Washington on the 3rd of Decem- 
ber, 1932, be set aside. This decision reinstates the cases into the position 
they were before the Washington decision was given. It has no bearing on 
the decision rendered at The Hague and does not reopen the cases as far 
as that decision is concerned. Before The Hague decision may be set aside 
the Commission must act upon the claimants' petition for a rehearing. 

The Commission also issued a supplementary order for Germany to 
produce at a subsequent hearing, the date of v^hich was to be fixed 
later, all the documents which she had hitherto refused to surrender. 
It also ordered the American claimants to produce certain records 
which were needed to clarify the evidence. And, finally, it decided to 
call in Stein and Osborn for a special interrogation. The Commission 
then recessed preparatory to holding a meeting on June 17 to fix the 
procedure to be followed in view of its decision. 

Chapter XXVII 

On May 28, 1936, six days before the Umpire rendered his decision set- 
ting aside the Washington decision of December 1932, Germany 
sprang a surprise. Hauptmann von Pfeffer, a representative of the 
German Government, handed to the American Charge d' Affaires in 
BerHn a memorandum for telegraphic dispatch to the Department of 
State extending an invitation to the American Government to send 
over a representative to BerHn in June to discuss an amicable settlement 
of the sabotage cases, and at the same time adding the information 
that Germany had instructed her representative before the Commission 
to apply for "immediate postponement of the pending process dis- 
cussion before the Mixed Claims Commission." 

On June 4 this v^as followed up by another memorandum from 
Hauptmann von Pfeffer delivered to the American Embassy in Berlin 
for transmission to the State Department, and w^hich read as follows: 

As has become known the proceedings before the Mixed Claims Commis- 
sion, Washington, have just been terminated (with the result that the United 
States may reopen the main proceedings) . The last point of the declarations 
of the German Government of May 28, 1936, which had to do with the 
postponement of the proceedings now terminated has thus been transcended 
and settled by the developments. 

The German Government believes that hereby no change has occurred in 
the other points of its declaration and in the mutually discussed arrange- 
ments. Minister President Goering would be pleased to receive the American 
representatives in the course of the month of June in Germany. 

The result was that when the Commission met on June 17 the Ger- 
man Agent asked for a postponement; and the American Agent, in 
consenting, explained that it was for the purpose of negotiating a set- 



The claimants were jubilant over this development, and their hearts 
quickened at the thought of the shov^^er of gold that v^as about to end 
the twice seven lean years of litigation. Mr. Bonynge and Mr. Martin 
lost no time in taking ship for Germany, v^here they wxre soon joined 
by Peaslee. There were few in the American camp who let their minds 
dwell on the last time their champions had set forth on the same 

On reaching Bremen, Bonynge ana Martm were met by Herr von 
Deichmann, who had with him credentials establishing that he was a 
representative of the German Government; and they were advised that 
the German Government desired the negotiations to be held in Munich 
with Hauptmann von Pfeffer. Thereupon, accompanied by von Deich- 
mann, they left at once for Munich. 

Acting in accordance with his instructions from the State Depart- 
ment, the American Agent on the first day of the meeting with Haupt- 
mann von Pfeffer stated that "his position and that of his counsel were 
those of Agent and Counsel respectively before the Mixed Claims 
Commission, United States and Germany, and that they were not 
authorized or privileged to discuss any other matter pertaining to the 
general relations between the two countries and that settlement of the 
sabotage claims must be unconditional and not based upon the con- 
sideration of any other matter."^ 

Von Pfeffer accepted this statement, and the negotiations were 
limited to a discussion of the sabotage claims. Throughout the confer- 
ence von Pfeffer was in constant communication with the Chancellor 
himself. Finally, on July 6, both parties reached an agreement; and von 
Pfeffer signed the accord for Germany, presumably with the full au- 
thorization of his government. This document is known as the Munich 
Agreement. Its terms provided that the Black Tom and Kingsland 
claims (153 in all, if we add in those of the insurance companies) 
should be paid on the following basis : 50 per cent of each claim was to 
be paid immediately in cash out of the Special Deposit Account created 
by the Settlement of War Claims Act; on some of the claims additional 
amounts were to be paid pro rata out of the German bonds which the 

* This quotation is taken from a report which the American agent submitted 
to the Mixed Claims Commission on April 15, 1937. 


German Government had deposited with the United States Treasury to 
secure Germany's obHgations under the Act. The equivalent of 50 per 
cent of the principal and interest of the avv^ards as of September 17, 
1936 (the date to v^hich the Commission had adjourned), amounted 
actually to $25,072,572.77; but only $20,000,000 v^as left in the Special 
Deposit Account at the time. 

The reason for this was that some 6,900 av^ards had been made by the 
Mixed Claims Commission, covering all manner of claims vs^hich could 
possibly arise from the disruption of the economic and social relation- 
ships betv^een the citizens of tv^o great modern states. For the payment 
of these claims the Act had set up some thirteen categories dealing 
with the manner and the order of payment of funds from the Special 
Deposit Account. The awards to American nationals relating to death 
or personal injury were paid first. The small awards of under $100,000 
were paid next. Awards of over $100,000 were paid last, and then only 
up to 80 per cent of the principal plus interest accruing before January 
I, 1928, until 80% of the aggregate of all payments authorized to 
American nationals had been paid. Thus the last group of award 
holders still have certain payments coming to them. 

Since the Black Tom and Kingsland claims alone remained to be 
adjudicated, and as there was only $20,000,000 in cash left in the 
account, none of this money would be available to the other award 
holders if the Black Tom and Kingsland claims were paid. It can be 
seen from this that the interest of the other award holders in this 
balance ^ was highly contingent. There were still, of course, the German 
bonds; but, as Germany had defaulted on their interest payment, they 
were eyed askance. 

But no sooner did certain award holders learn that Mr. Bonynge and 
Mr. Martin had gone to Germany to negotiate a settlement than some 
of them set out to wreck the negotiations. In this they were not im- 
mediately successful; for, before they could take action, the Munich 
Agreement had already been signed. But there were still ways and 
means of upsetting the agreement. 

A prominent New York attorney was retained by some of these 

* Actually the award holders were only interested in this balance to the extent 
of $7,000,000. 


award holders and immediately sent to Germany. Although armed 
with no credentials from the United States Government, he called at 
the German Foreign Office and there had an interview with a high 

The official later reported that the lawyer had informed him that the 
United States Government held that the Munich Agreement was not 
binding because Hauptmann von Pfeffer had no official standing, as far 
as it was concerned, which would enable him to sign international 
agreements regarding the sabotage cases. According to the official's 
recollections of the conversation, the attorney said his clients were 
afraid that the German Government might file the Munich Agreement 
with the Commission and ask for awards to be made in accordance 
with its provisions. 

According to the official, the award holders were determined to fiight 
this move in every way possible: by representations to the United States 
Government, by Federal court action, and by a newspaper campaign. 
They had already induced the Government to permit them to file a 
brief with the Commission. If the Commission should rule against 
them they planned to take legal action to prevent the Secretary 
of the Treasury's paying out money from the Special Deposit Ac- 
count. The official further added that the lawyer had told him that his 
clients had wanted to start an immediate publicity campaign, but he 
had managed to restrain them long enough to give him this oppor- 
tunity of attempting to convince the appropriate German officials of 
the soundness of the award holders' position. 

Naturally the American claimants were greatly incensed at the 
action of the award holders — especially when they stopped to consider 
that these fortunate ones had already received on an average 107 per 
cent of the face value of their initial claims. Mr. Bonynge, however, 
ignored the actions of the lawyer and his clients. On January 5, 1937, 
he filed motions with the Commission for the entry of awards in favor 
of the sabotage claimants in accordance with the Munich Agreement. 
In answer to this the German Agent advised the Commission that he 
would forward the motions to the German Foreign Office for con- 
sideration and that it was his "intention to submit an answer in writ- 


At the same session of the Commission, on January 6, 1937, certain 
award holders filed a petition, as the attorney had told the German 
official they would, asking for leave to be heard in support of a petition 
requesting that the Munich Agreement be rejected as a basis for the entry 
of a decree of award in favor of the sabotage claimants. The award 
holders claimed that the Munich Agreement was in the nature of an 
assignment of funds and that this was illegal, since these funds could 
only be disposed of by the Commission after it had made a formal rul- 
ing that Germany was responsible for the destruction of Black Tom 
and Kingsland. 

The German Government, however, was willing to go through with 
the Munich Agreement only if it would open the way for general 
diplomatic discussions designed to effect a thoroughgoing improve- 
ment in the relations between the two countries. When it saw that the 
American Government was unwilling to accept this view, it calmly pre- 
sented the State Department on April 5, 1937, with a note repudiating 
the Munich Agreement in toto. This communication blandly asserted 
that the award holders' intervention had cast doubt on the possibility 
of ending the litigation before the Commission by an independent 
agreement and also maintained that the German Government had 
never looked on the Munich Agreement as other than a preparatory 
basis for formulating official steps to be taken before the Commission 
by the German Agent, The note then went on to say that the German 
Government considered diplomatic negotiations of a general nature 
a prerequisite to taking any action before the Commission for putting 
the Agreement into force. For these reasons, therefore, the German 
Government wished to continue the cases pending before the Com- 
mission in the status they were in before the Munich conversations. 

During a special hearing before the Commission Mr. Bonynge vigor- 
ously attacked these German assumptions concerning the Munich 
Agreement, maintaining that Germany may have hoped that the settle- 
ment of the sabotage cases would pave the way to other collateral agree- 
ments with Germany, but that at Munich it was specifically understood 
on both sides that the Agreement was not dependent on the settlement 
or discussion of any other matter of difference between the two gov- 
ernments. Affirming that the Munich Agreement was a solemn and 


binding engagement on the part of Germany, he called on the Com- 
mission to make awards in favor of the American sabotage claimants in 
accordance with the Agreement. 

After listening to the arguments of both Agents, the Umpire handed 
down a decision on July 7, 1937, that the Munich Agreement was not 
enforceable by the Commission as the interpretation of international 
agreements was outside its jurisdiction. The Commission also set 
September 15, 1937, ^^ the date of the hearing ordered in the ruling of 
June 6, 1936. 

Thus once again the American claimants had been deceived by Ger- 
many, and once again Germany had gained valuable time in which to 
prepare her defense. But the Americans were not discouraged. Since 
the Washington decision of 1932, the tide had dejfinitely turned in their 
favor, and slowly but surely Germany was being entwined in the coils 
of her own deception. 

As the position now stands the Black Tom and Kingsland cases 
have automatically reverted to the position they were in at the time of 
The Hague decision in 1930. The American claimants are pinning 
hopes of ultimate victory on the Herrmann message; on the mountain 
of proof they have collected that Germany furnished incomplete, col- 
lusive, and false evidence which misled the Commission at The Hague 
hearing; and, finally, on the suppressed documents which the Com- 
mission has ordered Germany to produce. Whether Germany will pro- 
duce all these documents, and in their original form, remains to be 
seen. During the course of this long investigation, in which both sides 
have accused each other of fraud, the production of any vital docu- 
ment has immediately raised a cloud of suspicion. 

There is Httle more to tell now. Both sides are girding up their 
loins in preparation for the coming battle before the Commission and 
striving to plug every possible loophole in their arguments. It might 
be worth recording, however, that the perennial Wozniak bobbed up 
again once more. Without the knowledge of the Commission, he ap- 
plied for American citizenship, and on April 26, 1937, was examined 
in New York City by Examiner Luther W. Throckmorton of the U. S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service. 


At tnis examination Wozniak freely admitted having been in con- 
tact with German agents while employed in the Kingsland plant. He 
stated that he was first approached by a fellow employee named Nick, 
who was either a Russian or a German and who spoke both languages 
fluently. Nick subsequently put him in touch with Herrmann, and 
several meetings were held at night in the Kingsland Cemetery, a 
hundred yards from the plant. At these meetings several German 
agents from Hoboken also were present. The destruction of Kingsland 
was discussed, and Wozniak admitted that Herrmann gave him an 
incendiary pencil. Wozniak claimed, however, that his object in 
attending the meetings was to report the plans of the German agents 
to the Russian Supply Committee, and that he wrote a letter and a 
postcard to warn them. On their paying no attention, he destroyed 
the pencil and let the matter drop. He also conceded that the fire 
broke out at his bench but disclaimed responsibility for it. He gave it 
as his opinion that some one had impregnated with an inflammable 
material the dry rags he had used to swab out the shell in the last 
process of cleaning. 

The most interesting revelations were made, however, when the 
examiner came to his relations with Dr. Tannenberg. His story was 
to the effect that one day in 1929 he was sitting on a bench in Battery 
Park, New York, when a stranger approached him and showed him 
a newspaper in which his name was mentioned in connection with 
the Kingsland fire. On Wozniak's admitting his identity the man 
advised him to get in touch with the German Consul. This he did, and 
in due course he was sent to see Dr. Tannenberg. Thereafter he was 
employed by the Doctor for about forty days at a salary of $10 per 
day looking for witnesses. 

When questioned about the three letters he had written to Baran, 
Wozniak was evasive. He admitted that he had written several letters 
to Baran at the dictation of German agents and that he had given 
these letters to them to mail; but he could not or would not give any 
explanation of the motive. When the examiner tried to pin him down 
as to when he had written these letters he maintained he had done 
so in 1917 and that he had probably given them to Nick to mail. (It 
must be borne in mind that if Wozniak had admitted these letters 


had been written shortly before Baran handed them to the American 
claimants he would have made himself liable to prosecution under 
a conspiracy charge.) Wozniak definitely stated, however, that he had 
never been in Mexico. Although his testimony was evasive in regard 
to the letters and the examiner did not press him concerning them, 
the deduction is obvious that they contained false statements. It seems 
not improbable that he was telling the truth concerning their being 
dictated by German agents but was moving the date back to 1917 
to avoid incriminating himself. 

When questioned about the total amount of money he had received 
from Dr. Tannenberg, he stated that he had received in all $2,000, 
and had been promised a large sum to be paid later when the cases 
were finished. 

He produced a copy of his letter to von Papen in which he com- 
plained that Dr. Tannenberg had not kept his promise. He admitted 
that he had given false evidence in the affidavits he had given Dr. 
Tannenberg but claimed that the Doctor had misled him by telling 
him that the claims for damages in the Black Tom and Kingsland 
cases had been brought by private companies and not by the United 
States Government. 

Needless to say, when Wozniak's petition came up in the United 
States District Court in June it was denied. 

A final humorous touch was contributed by Peaslee on the occasion 
of his sailing for Europe on business connected with the cases. On 
the evening of May 5 he boarded his ship, the S.S. Bremen, about half 
an hour before sailing time. By chance he took up the passenger list 
and as his eye wandered down the alphabet it was suddenly arrested 
by the name of Kurt Jahnke. The thought immediately flashed through 
his mind that the Germans had again tricked him and had had 
Jahnke over here secretly aiding Dr. Tannenberg in preparing his 
defense. The boldness of this did not surprise him — the Germans had 
tried many risky maneuvers before. With the forlorn hope that there 
was still time to get a subpoena served, he dashed into the North 
German Lloyd shed to telephone McCloy. But it was impossible to 
get a marshal down to the pier quickly enough. 


After his return Peaslee had a hearty laugh at his own expense when 
he discovered through the Immigration authorities that this Kurt 
Jahnke was only 35 years old. While he had a lively appreciation of 
the former secret agent's achievements, he was not quite prepared to 
number rejuvenation among them. 

Chapter XXVIII 

What the outcome of the Black Tom and Kingsland cases will be, no 
one yet knows. It is one thing to feel convinced that Germany is guilty 
in both cases; it is another thing to prove it in an international court 
of law, which almost inevitably is inclined to believe the word of a 
government as against that of individual witnesses. Furthermore, Ger- 
man agents did not stand on street corners and advertise what they 
were doing. By 1916 Germany's sabotage directors in the United States 
had become veterans in the field and were sufficiently well versed in 
secret service methods to cover up their tracks. A Hinsch would not 
reveal his identity to a Kristoff. He would employ just the methods 
that Graentnor used. 

Starting out on a cold trail nearly six years after the destruction of 
Black Tom and Kingsland, and after most of the German agents and 
officials involved had scattered to the four corners of the globe, the 
American investigators have had an almost superhuman task. Precious 
years had been lost during which many of the contemporary clues had 
disappeared. The Germans had also been given a breathing spell; and 
by 1924, the period when the investigation really got under way, the 
German Secret Service had once again come to life, the backbone of 
the German Government had been stiffened, and both were ready to 
fight tooth and nail. 

Had the American investigators been on the scene in Berlin just 
after the Armistice their task would have been simple. They could 
have demanded and would have received the sabotage documents which 
the German Government has since either destroyed or secreted. Proof 
that the German Secret Service files were intact at the period was 

furnished by Felstead, a British officer attached to the Inter-Allied 



Control Commission, who marched into the archives and took the 
Edith Cavell file, which he still has in his possession. 

It has also been especially difficult for the American lawyers to con- 
vince the three judges of the Mixed Claims Commission that a sov- 
ereign country such as Germany would resort to fraud and trickery; 
yet such artifices are the stock in trade of all secret services; and in the 
Black Tom and Kingsland cases, the American claimants have had 
to cross swords with the German Secret Service. The German Govern- 
ment is the facade; it is her secret service which has supplied the 
organization which has kept a close eye, not only on all the German 
wartime sabotage agents involved, but also on the movements of the 
American investigators. In the opinion of this author, who spent sev- 
eral years of his life combating the German Secret Service, the methods 
it has employed fighting the American claimants run true to form. 

In no large country other than the United States could Germany have 
carried out the wholesale sabotage campaign which she conducted here 
during the neutrality period. Even a country like Holland, caught 
between the Germans and Allies as though in a nut cracker, would 
not have tolerated for a moment any spy or sabotage activity con- 
ducted against her. The secret services of all the belligerents used 
Holland as a spy base during the war, but all of them were extremely 
careful to avoid any act which might have been interpreted as directed 
against the Dutch. Her police knew the identity and whereabouts of 
the directors of the various secret services, and, precarious though Hol- 
land's position was, they would quickly have been held responsible for 
any hostile acts of their agents. 

The weakness of the United States both then and now is that there 
was, and still is, no American counter-espionage service. The Depart- 
ment of Justice does investigate whatever reports of suspected spy 
activities are sent in from time to time by private citizens, but there is 
no check-up on spies in any way comparable with that which exists 
in other countries. Foreign spies can operate here in comparative 

At least $150,000,000 damage was done in the United States by 
sabotage agents during the World War— not to mention the huge 
loss in potential profits caused by the destruction of factories holding 


millions of dollars' worth of contracts. The same objectives exist today 
and are just as vulnerable. Twenty men willing to give their lives 
could probably put the Panama Canal out of action. Furthermore, 
germ warfare was in its infancy twenty years ago. But tremendous 
strides have been made since, both in developing more deadly and 
concentrated strains of disease bacteria and in perfecting super and 
easier methods of disseminating them. It would be too late to start 
organizing a counter-espionage defense after the outbreak of hos- 
tilities, for in a few days a handful of agents could initiate a nation-wide 
epidemic of plague, cholera, or other deadly diseases. A grim portent 
of this coming form of attack is the recent news from Spain that 
several secret agents have been sentenced to death for spreading sleep- 
ing sickness and typhus behind the Insurgent lines. 

A counter-espionage service cannot be created overnight. Its effi- 
ciency depends on an experienced personnel, on the possession of accu- 
rate records of suspects, on watching these suspects, and on piecing 
together information obtained from all parts of the country. Twenty- 
four hours after the declaration of war in 1914 every suspected German 
spy in France either was under lock and key or had been escorted 
across the frontier. 

Foreign key agents for sabotage and espionage are already here in 
waiting; and when needed others will be quickly recruited from 
among those Fascist, Communist, or other alien organizations which, 
through the chance of war, happen to be lined up on the side of the 
enemy. All this was demonstrated during the World War. Foreign 
spy activities in Mexico are also of special interest. We have seen how 
Mexico was used as a spy base during the war, and it is probable that 
today even in time of peace it is still being used as such. 

Apart from protecting naval and military secrets from the foreign 
spy, and being ready to combat the saboteur in the event of war, a 
counter-espionage service would amply justify its existence by keeping 
a watchful eye on internal subversive movements. In addition it would 
serve to coordinate all pertinent information collected by the various 
law enforcement agencies of the Government, by the local police 
forces, reserve Army Intelligence officers and the American Legion. 
Under present conditions such information tends to be hidden in 


watertight compartments. The Immigration and Naturalization Serv- 
ice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and finally the Secret Service 
Division of the Treasury Department could all be used as channels of 
information and action w^ithout in any way interfering with their 
present functions. 

When we turn to the field of secret service, we find the United 
States in an even weaker position. She is the only large nation that 
does not employ such a service to obtain the war plans of prospec- 
tive enemies and learn about their new weapons. The small Intelligence 
units maintained by the Army and Navy are the only organizations 
of the kind, and their principal object is to serve as a nucleus for 
expansion in time of war. The Military Intelligence, a small section 
of the General Staff, consists of a few officers and stenographers. When 
we consider that its yearly grant is only $30,000, we are not surprised 
to learn that its sole function is to act in an advisory capacity to the 
Staff and to digest the information from foreign press clippings and 
such data as the military attaches are able to gather by keeping their 
eyes and ears open. The Cryptographic Fureau, which functioned so 
efficiently during the latter part of the war and immediately afterward, 
has been discontinued. < 

Today, nearly every European country not only has large and active 
Military and Naval Intelligence Services, as well as effective counter- 
espionage organizations, but also a central secret service operating an 
army of spies whose reports are distributed to the Navy, Army, and 
Foreign Office. 

The combined efforts of American armament manufacturers, re- 
search laboratories, and the specialists of the Army and Navy have 
probably succeeded in keeping equipment up-to-date and may pos- 
sibly have developed some surprise weapons of their own; but in these 
times of rapid changes it is truly dangerous for any country not to be 
fully posted on the military developments of the rest of the world. 
It is futile to think that weapons which are considered inhuman will 
not be employed. Military experts and foreign statesmen agree that 
all international laws will be broken and the most destructive weapons 
that can be devised will be used. Effective defense against new weapons 
can be prepared only if they are known in advance. 


Before the World War, there was an interchange of information 
between the different international armament manufacturers. The re- 
sult was that the heavy siege guns used by the Germans in their attacks 
on Liege and Antwerp were the only weapons of any importance 
which were not common to all armies at the outbreak of hostilities in 
1914. Today almost every country has an official secrets act which 
prevents the interchange of information. 

Spying is undoubtedly on the increase. Hardly a week passes with- 
out the European press's reporting some important spy arrest; and yet 
those who have secret service experience realize that these newspaper 
reports only reflect the bubbling at the surface — that underneath, 
secretly and cautiously, extensive spy networks are being established 
in every country. 

In France alone more spies have been caught since the Armistice 
than were arrested throughout the whole of Europe during the twenty- 
five years preceding the World War. It is disturbing to discover that 
many of the spies arrested in Europe during the last few years have 
been Americans in foreign secret service employ. 

For an annual expenditure of less than one per cent of what we 
lost from German sabotage during the neutrality period we could 
maintain a secret service and counter-espionage organization the peer 
of any in the world. This indeed seems a low rate of insurance to pay 
for rendering the country safe from military surprise and from the 
ravages of subversive agents both foreign and domestic. 



]uly 7, 1 91 4 — Count von Bernstorff sailed for Germany. 

August 2, 1 91 4 — Count von Bernstorff started his return journey to America. 

January i, 191 5 — Incendiary fire at the John A. Roebling Company plant at Trenton.* 

January 3, 191 5 — Mysterious explosion on the S.S. Orton in Erie Basin.f 

January 18, 191 5 — Captain von Papen paid Werner Horn $700 by check Number 87 for his 
work in attempting to destroy the Vanceboro Bridge in Maine. 

January 26, 191 5 — Radio from the General Staff in Germany, signed Zimmermann, to the 
German Embassy, in Washington, for the Military Attache. See page 8. 

February 191 5 — Werner Horn attempted to blow up the Vanceboro bridge at Machias, Maine. 

February 2, 191 5 — Captain von Papen sent the German Consulate at Seattle a check for $1300. 

About February 3, 191 5 — A bomb was found in the cargo of the S.S. Hennington Court. 

Toward the end of February, 191 5 — The S.S. Carlton took fire mysteriously. 

March 191 5 — Carl Schmidt was first employed by Kaltschmidt in Detroit for sabotage activities. 

March 191 5 — Gustave Steven was employed by Kaltschmidt to blow up bridges on the 
Canadian Pacific Railway. 

March 5, 191 5 — Explosion at Du Pont Plant at Haskell, N. J. 

April I, 1 91 5 — ^Explosion of Equitable Powder Plant at Allon, Illinois. 

April 4, 1 91 5 — M}'sterious explosion of caps for shells at the New Jersey Freight Depot, 
Pompton Lakes. 

April 1 91 5 — Lieutenant von Rintelen arrived in the United States. 

April 9, 191 5 — Letter from Captain von Papen to General von Falkenhayn regarding Lieuten- 
ant von Rintelen, and expressing thanks that "the army administration is prepared to employ 
large funds to curtail the supply of war materials for our enemies in every way possible." 

April 20, 19 1 5 — ^Dr. Albert in a letter to the State Secretary of the Interior confirmed the 
understanding that "all measures necessary for the purpose" were to be taken to prevent the 
shipment of munitions to the Allies. 

April 23, 191 5 — Robert Fay arrived in the United States from Berlin, with specific orders to 
engage in sabotage activities and to report to Captain von Papen. 

April 29, 1 91 5 — The S.S. Cressington Court caught fire at sea. 

April 1915 — Two bombs were found in the cargo of the S.S. Lord Erne. 

April 1 91 5 — A bomb was found in the hold of the S.S. Devon City. 

April 1 91 5 — Koolbergen met von Brincken in the Heidelburg Cafe in San Francisco, and 
arrangements were made for his employment in sabotage activities by the German Consul and 
Vice Consul in San Francisco. 

May 3, 1 91 5 — ^Explosion at the Anderson Chemical Company at Wallington, New Jersey, 
costing three lives. 

May 5, 1 91 5 — Count von Bernstorff wrote to Dr. Albert asking him to place $30,000 out of 
the Loan Fund at the disposal of William Wilkie, who had been employed under a formal 
contract, to assist the German Government in work "to obstruct and hinder the delivery of 
orders and toluol and picric acid which have been contracted for by the Allies." 

* This was about the beginning of a long series of mysterious unexplained incendiary fires and 
explosions in properties where supplies for the Allies were being manufactured. 

t As Captain Tunney says regarding the many similar occurrences which followed, "There 
was a maddening certainty about it all that suggested that every ship that left port must have 
nothing in her hold except hungry rats, parlor matches, oil waste and free kerosene." 




May 8, 191 5 — ^Two bombs were found in cargo the S.S. Bank.dde. 

May 10, 1 91 5 — ^Explosion in Du Pont plant at Carney's Point, N. J. 

May II, 1 91 5 — Captain von Papen sent the German Consulate at Seattle $500. 

May 13, 19 1 5 — ^The S.S. Samland took fire at sea. 

May 15, 1 91 5 — Two explosions occurred at the Du Pont plant, Carney's Point, N. J. 

May 21, 1 915 — A bomb was found on board the S.S. Anglo-Saxon. 

May 25, 1 91 5 — An explosion occurred at Du Pont plant, Carney's Point, N. J. 

May 30, 1915 — ^Explosion in Seatde Harbor of dynamite manufactured at Pinole, California, 
which was then located on a barge in Seattle Harbor. The evidence establishes the relations of 
the German Consul General at San Francisco and also the fact that Captain von Papen was in 
Seattle shortly before this explosion and paid money to the German Consul there apparently for 
use in connection with it.* 

May 19 1 5 — ^The S.S. Kirl{ Oswald out of New York laden with supplies for France docked at 
Marseilles and in four sugar bags in her hold were found bombs. 

Early in June 191 5 — Captain Bode went to see Robert Fay "at the Riverside Garage at 
Weehawken," which Fay used as a workshop, and asked Fay to produce some bombs for 
blowing up ships. 

June 2, 1 91 5 — The S.S. Strathway mysteriously took fire at sea. 

June 4, 1 915 — A bomb exploded on the S.S. MinneJiaha while she was at sea. 

June 26, 1 91 5 — Incendiary fire at the Aetna Powder plant at Pittsburgh. 

Summer of 191 5 — Kaltschmidt and his associates were engaged in sabotage activities in 

July 2, 1 915 — ^In a corridor of the main floor of the Senate wing of the United States Capitol 
at Washington used to stand a telephone switchboard — on the night of Friday, July 2, 191 5, 
an explosion near it blew fragments of the board through the walls of the telephone booths 
adjoining . . . Plaster was rent from the walls and ceilings, every door near by was blown open 
. . . (one was a door into the Vice President's office) . . . The east reception room was wrecked. A 
hole was torn in the wall and fragments of windows, mirrors, crystal chandeliers and other 
crystal apparatus flew in every direction. 

July 3, 191 5 — An attempt was made to assassinate J. Pierpont Morgan at his home on 
Long Island by a man named Holt, who was identified as of "German origin" and who also 
apparently participated in the placing of dynamite on ships. 

In running Holt down the authorities discovered, as part of his property, a trunk filled with 
134 sticks of dynamite ... several botdes of sulphuric acid and nitric acid and 197 detonating 

July 7, 1 91 5 — ^Explosion at the Philadelphia Benzol plant at Harrison Brothers. 

July 7, 1915 — Incendiary explosion at the Du Pont plant at Pompton Lakes. 

July 13, 1 91 5 — The S.S. Touraine took fire mysteriously while at sea. 

July 14, 191 5 — ^The S.S. Lord Downshire took fire mysteriously while at sea. 

July 15, 19 1 5 — Incendiary fire Central Railroad grain elevator at Weehawken. 

July 16, 1 91 5 — Incendiary explosion and fire at the Aetna plant at Sinnemahoning, Pennsyl- 
vania, costing five lives. 

July 19, 1 91 5 — ^Incendiary explosion at the Du Pont plant at Wilmington. 

July 20, 1 91 5 — A mysterious fire was discovered in the hold of the S.S. Knutford. 

July 20, 1 91 5 — ^Report by Paul Koenig to Captain von Papen with respect to the payment 
of $150 secured by cashing check of Captain von Papen's, Number 146, on the Riggs National 
Bank, in Washington, dated July 16, 191 5, which funds were paid to a man who had exhibited 
a sample bomb, of a kind previously described by Captain von Papen to Paul Koenig, made to 
resemble a lump of coal. 

July 21, 1 91 5 — Dr. Albert's letter to his wife refers to his collaboration with Herr von 
Papen "in the field known to you." 

July 24, 1 91 5 — Five mysterious fires started in the hold of the S.S. Craigside. 

July 25, 191 5 — ^Munitions train mysteriously wrecked at Metuchen, N. J. 

July 27, 1 91 5 — ^Two bombs were found on board the S.S. Arabic. 

* The detailed dates in connection with this piece of sabotage work have been omitted from 
this chronology. The German Consul and Vice Consuls in San Francisco were indicted and 
convicted in connection with this matter. 


July 28, 1 91 5 — ^Mysterious explosion at the Du Pont works in Wilmington. 

July 29, 1 91 5 — ^Mysterious destruction of a glaze mill in the American Powder Company at 
Acton, Massachusetts. 

August 1, 191 5 — Wolf von Igel rented offices at 60 Wall Street, New York, under a lease 
extending to May i, 191 6, which was later renewed to May i, 191 7. 

From these offices much of the sabotage work was directed. They were known as the head- 
quarters of the "War Intelligence Center" or "Bureau of the Military Attaches" in German 
official circles. The owner of the building was told at the time of the renewal of the lease that 
von Igel was engaged in the "advertising business." 

August 9, 1915 — The S.S. Asuncion de Lamn^^a mysteriously took fire at sea. 

August II, 1 91 5 — Incendiary fire Westinghouse Electric Plant, Turtle Creek, Pennsylvania. 

August 13, 1 91 5 — Bombs were found in the cargo of the S.S, Williston. 

August 16, 191 5 — The denial of the participation of the German Embassy in the work of 
fomenting strikes in munition factories, found in Dr. Albert's files, bears this date. 

August 27, 1 91 5 — Johannes Hendrickus Koolbergen, in a sworn statement, confesses to the 
sabotage work for which he was employed by Mr. Franz Bopp, the German Consul at San 

August 27, 191 5 — ^The lighter Dixie mysteriously took fire while being loaded. 

August 29, 1 91 5 — Explosion in Du Pont Plant at Wilmington, Delaware. 

August 30, 1 91 5 — Michael Kristoff was convicted at Rye, New York, for carrying a revolver. 

August 1 91 5 — Train loaded with 7,000 pounds of dynamite was destroyed at Pinole, 

September i, 191 5 — ^The S.S. Rotterdam took fire mysteriously at sea. 

September 2, 1915 — ^The S.S. Santa Ana took fire mysteriously at sea. 

September 29, 191 5 — Dynamite was found on the pier where the S.S. San Guglielmo was 
about to depart. 

Early Part of October 191 5 — Captain von Papen's office telephoned Robert Fay to come to 60 
Wall Street, and Captain von Papen gave Fay orders regarding the destruction of a "plant 
somewhere in the southern part of Kentucky." 

October 3, 191 5 — Dr. Albert wrote to his wife saying: "I prefer not to say anything in 
detail about what I am doing here. Mr. von P.'s experience is a warning." 

October 4, 191 5 — Captain von Papen paid Dr. A. W. Reissling's expenses for a "journey to 

October 5, 191 5 — A deposit of $25,000 was made to Kaltschmidt's credit by the Chase 
National Bank as directed by Dr. Albert. 

October 11, 191 5 — A mysterious fire occurred in the Baldwin Locomotive Works at Eddy- 

October 24, 191 5 — Robert Fay was placed under arrest and examined at Police Head- 
quarters, New York City. He testified then that he was told by Captain von Papen not 
to make any trouble. Robert Fay's examination at Police Headquarters on Oct 24, 19 15, is in 
part as follows: 

"A. I had to say something and I made a bluff that I could do these things and they said 

it was up to the officials on the other side. I can never go back again. I have been told 

strictly not to make any trouble. 
"Q. Who told you that? 
"A. Von Papen." 

October 25, 191 5 — Paul Daeche, a German sabotage agent connected with Robert Fay, 
was arrested at Weehawken, N. J. 

October 26, 191 5 — Statement of C. L. Wettig regarding the participation of Max Breitung, 
Dr. Kienzle and others in the sabotage work under Captain von Papen. 

October 26, 191 5 — ^The S.S. Rio Lages mysteriously took fire at sea. 

October 28, 1915 — Statement by Louis J. Smith, regarding the orders from the German 
Consul General, von Bopp, of San Francisco, to blow up various things. 

October, 191 5 — A mysterious fire destroyed shops of the Bethlehem Steel Co. 

November 3, 191 5 — A mysterious fire broke out in the hold of the S.S. Euterpe. 

November 6, 191 5 — A mysterious fire broke out on the S.S. Rocfiambeau while at sea. 

November 7, 191 5 — An explosion occurred on the S.S. Ancona while at sea. 



November 8, 191 5 — ^The German Government in a note to the United States State Depart- 
ment flatly denied that any German officers had been connected with passport frauds. 

November 10, 191 5 — ^Mysterious fire at Bethlehem at the Bethlehem Steel Company "of 
which all Germany had had warning and on which the German press was forbidden to 

November 12, 191 5 — Theodore Otto reported to Captain von Papen regarding "an incendiary 
fire" at Bethlehem, saying "the place of the fire presents a sight which does the eye and 
heart good." 

November 26, 191 5 — ^Incendiary fire in the Roebling Plant at Trenton, N. J., where wire 
cables were being made for the Allies. 

December 4, 191 5 — ^The president of the United States requested the recall of Captain Von 
Papen and Captain Boy-Ed. 

December 4, 1915 — Two mysterious fires occurred on board the S.S. Tynningham while at 

December 7, 191 5 — ^The President of the United States sent a message to Congress regarding 
the recall of Captain von Papen and Captain Boy-Ed and officially charged the German Gov- 
ernment with conspiracies against our neutrality. 

December 8, 1915 — ^The Secretary of State of the United States wrote again to Count von 
Bernstorff repeating the request for the immediate recall of Captain von Papen and Captain 
Boy-Ed, saying, "The relations of the two attaches with individuals who participated in illegal 
and questionable activities are established." 

December 10, 1915 — ^The German Ambassador formally notified the Secretary of State 
that the Emperor had recalled Captain Boy-Ed and Captain von Papen in accordance with 
the vidshes of the United States Government. 

December 10, 191 5 — ^Dynamite was found in the coal tender of a munitions train in thr 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad at Callery Junction, Pa. 

December 18, 191 5 — ^Paul Koenig and Richard Leyendecker were arraigned and held in 
$15,000 bail for sabotage activities. Fred Schliendl was arrested the same day. 

December 18, 191 5 — ^The German Government in an authorized wireless to the New York 
Times denied that it ever "accepted the support of any person . . . seeking to promote the cause 
of Germany ... by contravention of law or by any means whatever that could offend the 
American people . . ." and also "absolutely denies" responsibility in any way for the "attacks 
upon property and various of the rights of the American Government." 

December 21, 191 5 — Fred Metzler, Paul Koenig's secretary, and Richard Emil Leyendecker 
went before a grand jury in New York and confessed to their part in Koenig's trip to Canada 
in connection with the second attempt to blow up the Well and Canal. 

December 23, 191 5. — Captain Von Papen sailed for Europe, after his recall at the request 
of President Wilson and on leaving made a statement saying that he had a "clean record" 
and denying all "misrepresentations and calumnies." 

December 23, 191 5 — ^Paul Koenig, Richard Leyendecker and a man named "Justice" were 
indicted by a Federal Grand Jury for the Southern District of New York for a second attempt 
to blow up the Welland Canal. 

December 24, 191 5 — ^Dynamite was found in the cargo of the S.S. Alston while at sea. 

December 26, 191 5 — ^A mysterious fire was discovered in the hold of the S.S. Inchmoor. 

December 26, 19 15 — A mysterious fire was found in the hold of the S.S. Manchuria. 

December 28, 191 5 — Von Rintelen was indicted for fomenting strikes in munitions fac- 

December 29, 191 5 — Captain Boy -Ed sailed for Europe, after his recall by President Wilson, 
saying that he "refrained" from "refuting all the stories which were told about me in the 
American newspapers." 

December, 191 5 — Schleindl, the German reservist who was employed by Paul Koenig to 
work in the National City Bank and procure the reports of movements of munitions, was 

January 2, 191 6 — Captain von Papen's papers disclosing various details of the sabotage 
campaign were seized by the British authorities at Falmouth. 

January 191 6 — The German Government placed $3,500,000 at Dr. Albert's disposal. 

January 10, 191 6 — ^Explosion in the Du Pont powder plant at Carney's Point, N. J. 

January 11, 191 6 — Explosion at Du Pont plant in Wilmington, Del. 


January 15, 191 6 — ^Explosion in the Du Pont plant at Gibbstown, N. J. 

January 15, 191 6 — Count von Bernstorff, when the contents of Captain von Papen's papers 
seized at Falmouth vv^ere reported to him, said, according to the newspapers — "I don't be- 
lieve it." 

January 19, 191 6 — A mysterious fire occurred on the S.S. Sygna while at sea. 

January 19, 191 6 — A bomb explosion occurred on the S.S. Ryndam. 

January 22, 191 6 — ^Two bombs were discovered in the cargo of the S.S. RosebanJi. 

February 2, 191 6 — Von der Goltz made a statement to the British Metropolitan Police 
at Scoriand Yard, in which he described his relations to Captain von Papen, and told of the 
dynamite for sabotage work furnished to him by Captain von Papen and Captain Hans 

February 3, 191 6 — Dr. Albert, in a report "to the State Secretary of the Interior, Berlin," 
pledged the same support to von Igel which he had previously given to Captain von Papen in 
the work of preventing the delivery of war materials to the Allies. 

February 3, 191 6 — A bomb was discovered in the cargo of the S.S. Hennington Court. 

February 12, 191 6 — Bethlehem Projectile Plant destroyed. 

February 16, 191 6 — A mysterious fire occurred in the S.S. Dalton while at sea. 

February 19, 191 6 — ^Explosion in the Union Metallic Cartridge Company plant in Bridgeport, 

February 20, 191 6 — ^Explosion in the Middlesex Analine Co. plant at Bound Brook. 

February 21, 191 6 — A bomb explosion occurred on S.S. Tennyson while at sea. 

February 26, 191 6 — ^A mysterious fire occurred on the S.S. Livingston Court in Gravesend 

February 191 6 — An incendiary fire was started in Houses of Parliament in Ottawa. 

End of February 191 6 — ^The S.S. Carlton caught fire at sea mysteriously. 

April 4, 191 6 — A cargo of supplies for the Allies on the S.S. Marta was damaged. 

April 13, 1916 — ^Du Pont plant at Bluefields, W. Va., wrecked by an explosion. 

April 18, 1 91 6 — ^Wolf von Igel was arrested for sabotage activities and many incriminating 
documents were taken from him. 

April 19, 1 91 6 — Eight men were arrested in New Jersey, principally employees of the 
North German Lloyd Company in connection with the placing of fire bombs upon cargoes 
on ships. 

April 19, 191 6 — ^Robert Fay confessed to his employment as a German sabotage agent, his 
work with von Papen, and his relations to Paul Koenig. 

April 27, 1 91 6 — Fred Schleindl confessed to the United States officers his relations to Paul 
Koenig and his sabotage conferences at the Cafe Bismarck. 

May 10, 1 91 6 — The Adas Powder mixing plant was destroyed. 

May II, 1 91 6 — A plot was discovered to destroy the William Todd Company plant at 
Youngstown, Ohio. 

May 14, 191 6 — ^The munitions cargo of the S.S. California was mysteriously damaged. 

May 14, 1 91 6 — A mysterious fire was discovered in the hold of the S.S. Kandahar. 

May 16, 1 91 6 — ^The Du Pont Powder Company plant at Gibbstown was mysteriously 

May, 191 6 — A large chemical plant in Cadillac, Michigan, was mysteriously destroyed. 

June 7, 1 91 6 — ^Du Pont plant at Wayne, N. J., destroyed. 

July I, 191 6 — Congress authorized the Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice 
to investigate matters at the request of the State Department. Prior to that time the Bureau's 
power of investigation had been very limited. 

July 22, 1 91 6 — ^Explosion in Hercules Powder Works. 

July 26, 27, 28, 29, 191 6 — Michael Kristoff. who had been working at the Eagle Oil Works 
plant at Bayonne, near Black Tom, was absent from the works. 

July 22 to August 4 — It is interesting to note that Dr. Albert's diary, which rarely misses a 
day in recording his social and business activities, is a complete blank for the days July 22, 23, 
24 and 25, and all of the days from July 28 to August 4 inclusive. 

August 18, 191 6 — ^Two attempts were made to blow up the piers of the Pacific Coast 
Steamship Company. 

August 191 6 — ^Robert Fay, who had been in prison at Atlanta, escaped and was assisted 


in reaching Mexico by Paul Koenig and Leyendecker, and various German consuls in 
Savannah, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Chicago, and San Francisco. 

October 2, 191 6 — A mysterious fire was discovered in the hold of the S.S. Philadelphia. 

October 8, 1916. — A mysterious fire occurred on the S.S. Antilla. 

October 28, 191 6 — A mysterious fire broke out in the hold of the S.S. Chicago, and she 
was taken Into the Azores. 

November 5, 191 6 — A fire broke out in the S.S. Ponus and it was put ashore in Falmouth 

November 21, 191 6 — ^Twenty unexploded bombs were found in the sugar cargo of the 
American S.S. Sarnia. She was beached and flooded near Cherbourg. 

November 27, 191 6 — Michael KristofT told Alexander Kassman that "in the middle of the 
night with two men he went over to Black Tom. One man told Michael Kristoff to watch the 
place all round, and he, Michael KristofT, with another man, went to a big steamboat with 
ammunition aboard. . . . Around the ship where I put the dynamite were steamboats and on 
the boats were cars of ammunition. My friend also put on one boat between the cars, and half 
an hour later there was an explosion. . . ." 

November 27, 191 6 — ^The cargo of the S.S. Regina d'ltalia was partly destroyed by a mys- 
terious fire. 

About December i, 191 6, or Earlier — ^Fiodore Wozniak, a Russian workman, was planted 
in the munitions assembling plant. 

December 9, 191 6 — The Midvale Chemical Co. building at Bayway was destroyed by a fire 
and explosion. 

December 27, 191 6 — ^The Bethlehem Steel Co. gas plant was destroyed by an explosion. 

December 31, 191 6 — ^The New York Times estimates that the "incendiary loss in 191 6 was 
easily twenty-five million dollars, or fifteen million dollars above normal." 

January 11, 1917 — ^The Kingsland Assembling Plant was destroyed. 

January 16, 191 7 — Clarence Tomlinson, one of the workmen in the Kingsland factory, 
identified Wozniak as the man at whose machine in the factory the fire started. 

January 17, 191 7 — Maurice Chester Musson, another workman at the Kingsland plant, 
furnished a statement to Judge Fake confirming the probably incendiary origin of the fire. 

March 7, 191 7 — C. J. Scully, a United States officer, reported regarding Fritz Kolb, who 
was at the Commercial Hotel, 212 River Street, Hoboken, "directly opposite the piers of the 
North German Lloyd Line" and says that "in this man's room were found two bombs, one 
loaded, as well as powder and various ingredients used in the manufacture of nitro- 

April 2, 191 7 — ^President Wilson, in addressing Congress regarding the declaration of war, 
repeated the charge that the German Government has engaged in a sabotage campaign. 

April 4, 191 7 — Siegel and Rodriguez [Herrmann] left the United States for Cuba with the 
intention of going to Mexico, according to the statement of Witzke. Witzke indicates that 
these men participated in the arrangement for the Black Tom explosion. 

April 6, 1 91 7 — ^United States declared war on Germany. Nearly all the German agents 
fled to Mexico as rapidly as possible. Destruction of factories, etc., ceased very quickly after 
this date. 



Abraham's Book Store, 250-54 

Act of June 7, 1933, about Claims Commis- 
sion witnesses, 253, 267 

Adams, Albert G., 13-14 

Adams, consul at Hankow, 273-5 

Adventure magazine, 252 

Aetna Powder Co., 69, 104 

Agent, American, in Black Tom and Kings- 
land claims — see Bonynge 
German — see German Agent 

Aguayo, Mr., 190 

Ahrendt, Carl, 245, 246 

Albert, Dr. Heinrich, 4-5, 7, 8, 16, 21, 54, 56, 
62, 70, 104, 105, 107, 149; his duties, 9; 
connection with Wedell, 13; with Bopp, 
23; letter about Igel, 71; involved in 
sabotage, 97-8; method of blocking sup- 
plies, 98-9; creates Bridgeport Projectile 
Co., 99; loses his brief case on the El, 
100; denies evidence, loo-ioi; his meth- 
ods of propaganda, loi; financial trans- 
actions, 102; his files taken from closet, 
102; reports to Berlin, 106; his claim for 
Rintelen, 194 

Alderate, Ramon, 126 

aliases revealed by Koenig's notebook, 65; by 
Herrmann, 191 -2 

Alien Property Custodian, 177, 194, 268 

Allied propaganda, 109 

Allies, munitions for the, 25, 27, 43, 47, 69, 
71, 78, 106, 147; passport control by, 17; 
secret service of, 7 

Altendorf, Paul Bernardo, 114-19, 121, 124, 
126, 140, 203, 204, 218 

American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 135 

American Legion, 301 

American Protective League, 113 

Ancona, 41 

Anderson, Chandler P., 132, 209, 288 

Anglo-Persian Co., 158 

Anglo-Saxon, 37 

Annie Larsen, 30-3 

Antilla, 85 

Archibald, James J., 52, 53 

Argentina, German sabotage activities in, 167, 
168, 169, 170, 233 

armament manufacturers, 303 

Arnold, German agent in Argentina, 168-9, 

Arnold, H. N., 133 
AUanta Penitentiary, 15, 21, 40, 41, 49, 62n., 

67, 89 
Adas Line, 46, 61 
Auerbacker, Freda, 88, 89 
Austria, documents in, 278 seq. 
Austrian Military Intelligence, 280 
Austrian War Archives, 279, 281-3 
Austria-Hungary, 52-3, 114, 155 
award holders, 291-4; their N. Y. attorney, 


Bacon, George Vaux, 88, 150 

Baker, Joseph A., 14 

Balfour, Lord, 153 

Baltimore agents, 46, 47, 60, 72-6. See Hilken 

Ban/(dale, 37 

Bankson, 277, 278 

Banque Beige pour fitrangers, 68 

Baran, Ivan, 260, 266, 268, 296-7 

Barnes, Major R. L., 115, 124 

Barranquilla, Colombia, 181, 184 

Barrett, Judge, 135 

Barth, Henry, 42 

Batavia, Java, 29, 31 

Bayonne, N. J., 81, 82, 83, 84, 85 

Beatty, Charles L., 124 

Becker, Ernest, 45 

Behncke, Admiral, 185 

Belgian-Dutch border, 156 

Bergensfjord, 14, 15 

Berlin, Treaty of, 131 

Bernstorfl, Count Johann von, 11, 16, 19, 21, 
23, 29, 54, 56, 57, 58, 134, 160, 161, 
162, 164, 167, 197, 198, 231, 269 
his functions, 4, 5, 9; goes to Berlin (1914), 
7; returns with espionage attaches and 
funds, 7-8; forbids attempt to invade 
Canada, 19; on Canadian Pacific Sabotage, 
20; on Indian sedition plot, 31; inter- 
venes for Igel, 71; behind Dr. Albert and 
other agents, 102-111; tries to secure em- 
bargo on arms, 106; pressure on German- 
Americans, 106-107; connections vvdth 
agents in S. A. and Orient, 107; with 




Bolo, 107-8; with Mena Edwards, 147; 
work summarized, 108; returns home, 
1 1 1 ; his connection with Sabotage revealed 
in decoded German messages, 166 
My Three Years in America, 105, no 

Bethel, General, 127, 128 

Bethlehem Steel Co., 52, 86, 133, I77n. 

Bcthmann-Hollweg, Chancellor, 103, in 

Bielaski, A. Bruce, 137 

Black Tom Island explosion, 70, 76, 77-84, 
85, 89, 91, 114, 117, 170, 179-80, 184, 
185, 193, 194, I99» 277 
counsel in case, 133, 135; amount of claim, 
I77n.; investigation, 138-49; hearings 
and decisions, see Mixed Claims Com- 

Black Tom underwriters' claim, 1770. 

Blue Boo^ magazines, 243, 245, 250-5 

Boche, Miss, 5 

Bode, Eno, 46, 47, 70, 104, 105 

Boehm, Captain, 20, 71 

Bolo, Paul, 107-108 

bombs, 37-8, 40, 45-6, 50, 147, 218 

Bonynge, Robert W. (American Agent), 132, 
i33» 136, 181, 193, 204, 231, 240, 288, 
290; handicapped by German tactics, 134, 
177-8, 185-6; cross-examines Koenig, 143; 
confers with Lewinski, 176, 191; argu- 
ment at 1930 hearing, 186-7, 206, 209-21; 
letter to Wozniak, 205; cross-examines 
him, 207; in matter of lemon-juice mes- 
sage, 246-57; of Wozniak letters, 263, 
264, 266, 267; argument at 1936 hear- 
ing, 284-7; hunts records in Germany, 
291-2; dealings with award-holders, 293-5 

Bopp, Franz von, 141; in California munitions 
plot, 23-8; in promoting Hindu sedition, 
28-33; connection with Jahnke, 34, 214; 
with Witzke, 35 

Boston hearing (1931), 264 

"Bowen, Juan Bernardo," 30 

Boy-Ed, Captain Karl, 6, 8, 62, 276; his duties, 
9; connection with Ruroedc, 16; with 
Rintelen, 44, 49; watched by U. S. Govt., 
53; recalled, 54, 61; promoted, 55; effects 
of his work in U. S., 55-8; connection 
with Koenig, 67; with Herrmann, 74; 
with Mena Edwards, 146 

Boyd, J. Oswald, 184 

Boyden, Roland W., 132, 209, 244, 264 

Brackett, Henry, 127 

Brasol Boris, 195 

Breitung, Max, 38, 40, 104, 105 

Bremen, 240 

Bremerhaven, 236 

Bridge Street, No. 11 (Rurocde's oflScc), 11, 

13, 14 
Bridgeport Projectile Co., 99, 100, 104 

Briggs, A. M., 113 

Brincken, Wilhelm von, in Canadian sabotage, 

23-4; in California munitions plot, 23-8; 

in promoting Hindu sedition, 28-33; con* 

nection with Jahnke, 141 
British Admiralty, 152, 153, 161 
British Cryptographic Service, 151 seq. 
British Intelligence Commission, 157 
British Intelligence Services, 33, 49, 88, 91, 

113, 150-51, 153, 154, 156, 158, 161, 

163, 198, 270 
British police, 74 
British War Office, 113 

British wireless stations for picking up Ger- 
man messages, 159-60 
Broadway, No. 11 (Boy-Ed's office), 8 

No. 45 (Hamburg-American Bldg., office of 

Koenig and Albert), 5, 8, 6z, 64, 100 
Brown, Captain T. A., 123 
Bruck, J. von, 146 
Brussels Kommandantur coding staff, 155-6; 

wireless station, 155 
Bryan, 78 
Buenz, Dr., 62 
Building 30 at Kingsland, 92, 93, 94, 218, 

220, 221, 228, 230 
Bulgarian Government, 198 
"Bureau of Investigation" — see Koenig and 

Broadway, No. 45 
"Bureau of the Military Attaches" — see Wall 

Street, No. 60 
Burgwin, Major A. P., Judge Advocate, 123, 

124, 126, 139 
Burke, Frank, gets Dr. Albert's bag, 100 
Burns, 78, 84, 142, 143, 144 
Burns (W. J.) Detective Agency, 83 
Butcher, Byron S., 114, 117, 118, 119, 121, 

122, 124 
B. Z. am Mittag, 270-71 

Cabell, Major General de R. C, 127 

Cables, German, 151-2; neutral, 160-61 

Cahan, Louis, 262 

Cahan, Mr., 94, 95, 96, 195, 225, 229 

California, University of, 28 

Calles, General, 114, 116, 118, 119 

Calusa, 35 

Campbell, Major, R. R., 115, 124 

Canada, invasion of, considered, 18-19 

Canadian Car and Foundry Co., 92, 134, 136, 

178, 195, 220, 221, 225, 229, 248. See 

Kingsland works 
Canadian Pacific Railway, 20, 23-4, 32, 71 
Canadian railways, 19, 23-4, 26, 32 
Capitol Building, Washington, loi 
Carella, N. A., 226-7 
Carnegie, Andrew, 209 
Carranza, 119 



Casement, Sir Roger, 8, 162, 165, 210 

Catholic, Herrmann's salesmanship as a, 74 

Cavell (Edith) file, 300 

Central Powers Film Co., 86, loi 

Chakravarti, Dr., 32, 33 

Chandra, Ram, 29-33 

Chapman, consul at Mazatlan, 118 

Chapman, Mrs., 81, 83 

"Charles the Dynamiter" — see Wunncnberg 

Chase National Bank, N. Y. C, 5, 21 

Chevy Chase (Md.) laboratory, 72, 245, 246 

Chicago, 85 

Chile, 190, 242; German Minister to — see 

China, German sabotage activities in, 167 

Christiania, 44 

"cigars" — see bombs 

claimants, 176-7, 273. See award holders 

claims against Germany, 176. See also Black 
Tom, Kingsland, Mixed Claims Commis- 

Clar\, 173 

Clucas, Carrol, 199, 200, 201 

Codes, 6iy 64-5, 152-9, 161-2, 164-5, 166 

Coe, George, 230 

Cologne Gazette, 86 

Conners, E. J., 47 

Copenhagen, 76 

corn shipments spoiled, 51, 167 

Cornac, T. K., 23 

Cosmopolitan magazine, 252 

Coudert Brothers, 133 

Council of War, 91 

Coxe, Major Alexander B., 113 

Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine & Wood, 133, 

Crcssington Court, 36 

Crowley, C. C, 25, 26, 27, 28, 141 

Crowley Laurel Co., 28 

cryptography, 152-4. See Hall, Admiral Sir 
Reginald, and Codes 

Cummings, Charge d'Aifaires in Mexico, 114, 

Curry, Senator, 135 

Daeche, Paul, 39-40 
Dal en, von, 73-4, 242 
dandy-rolls, 261 
Dansey, Colonel, 113 
Davis, Robert, 87, 88-9 

Mrs., 88-9 
Day, Justice, 132 
"D-Cases," 65-7, 68, 142 
Decle, Thomas A., 219 
Dederer, George, 238 
Deichmann, von, 291 
Delbriick, Professor, 271 

Dclmar, Dr., 172, 173, 174, 175, 179. See 

Deman, Col. Ralph H. van, 112-113, 137 
Dernburg, Dr., 7, 57 
Detroit, 26 

Detroit Dcutscherbund, 21 
Detroit Screw Works, 22, 40 
Deutscher Bank, 43 

Deutscher Verein, N. Y. C, 40, 55, 57 
Deutschland, 75, 76, 179, 182, 200, 218, 237, 

238, 245, 246 
Devon City, 37 
Dcvoy, 276 

Dietrichens, Alexander, 69 
Dietz, 118 
Dilger, Anton, 72, 73, 75, 76, 85, 90, 112, 

178, 179, 194, 211, 218, 232, 246. See 

Carl, 72, 178, 237, 246 
documents, experts on questioned, 247 seq., 

Dogger Bank, Battle of the, 162 
Doherty, James, 80 

Dougherty Detective Agency, 78, 84, 142 
Dresden, 35, 127 

Du Pont Powder Co., 69; in Seattle, 25, 27 
Du Pont, 27 

Dumba, Dr., 52, 62, loi 
Dyal, Har, 28, 29 

Eagle Oil Works, 82, 83 

Eastern Forwarding Co., 76, i82n., 218, 238, 

"Eastman Girl" — see Edwards, Mena 

Eastman Kodak Co., 145, 148 

Eckhardt, von, German Minister to Mexico, 
112, 115, 116, 125, i5in., 161, 163-4, 
171, 173. 174-5, 182, 246, 247, 256, 277 

Eddystone (Pa.) munitions plant, 69, 113 

Edison, Thomas A., 50 

Edwards, Mena, 145-9 

Egan, Maurice Francis, 197 

Ehrhart, 241 

Elephant-Butte Dam, 113 

Ellis Island, 77 

Ernst, Dr. Otto, 279-83 

Espionage Act, 49, 60 

Euterpe, 41 

Evans, Joseph D., 230 

Ewing, Sir Alfred, 152-3, 154, 155 

Fake, Judge, 203, 220 

Falcke, Consul General, 16 

Falkland, Batde of, 161 

Farrell, Joseph, 263 

Fatherland, The, loi 

Fay, Robert, 38-41, 53, 65, 67, 241 

Felstead, 299 



Felton, J. Edward, 72-3, 85, 179, 180, 237 

fertilizer, oil put into, 50-51 

Fischer, Dr. Herman, 168 

Fleet, Judge van, 33 

Florinsky, Vice-consul, 197, 198 

Flynn, Chief William J., 39 

forging experts in Berlin, 270 

Fort Leavenworth, 127, 128 

Fort Sam Houston, 122, 123, 124, 127, 139, 

"Forty O. B.," 153 seq. 
Frangipane, Victor, 228-9 
Free, Dr., 80 

French defeatist movement, 107-108 
French Government, 37 
French Secret Service, 164 
Friedrich der Grosse, 45, 192 
Fuchs, George, betrays Koenig, 63-4 

"Gache, Emile V.," 44, 49 

Galicia, Austrian (Wozniak's district), 197, 

Garbade, Friedrich, 45 

Garnett, Christopher B., 132 

Garrity, 78 

Gary (Ind.) powder works, 26 

"Gates, Edward V.," 49 

Gerard, Ambassador James W., 161 

Gerdts — see Pochet 

German Admiralty, 90, 174 

German Agent in claims, 249, 290, 293, 295. 
See Lewinski, Lohmann, Paulig 

German barrier to prevent spy reports and ref- 
ugees' escape, 156-7 

German Club, N. Y. C. — see Deutscher Verein 

German codes, 63, 64-5, 151, 152-9, 161 -2, 
164-5, ^^^i 212, 245; known to British, 
156, 158, 162; this not suspected by 
Germany, 162-5. ^^^ Zimmermann tele- 

German Consuls, consulates, and legations, 18, 

29, 33» 50, 158, 167-70, 190 

in the U. S., 4, 9, 11, 23, 31, 41, 178 
at San Francisco, 23-4, 27, 30, 31, 33 
in New York City, 64, 68, 71 
German counter-espionage service, 165 
German deep-sea cables, 151 -2 
German diplomatic staff in U. S. — see Bern- 
storff, Papen, Boy-Ed, Albert, Dernburg, 
German Embassy, Washington, 4, 5, 8, 15, 18, 

30, 64, 66, 67, 70, 102, 103, 164 
German espionage bureaus, 7. See German 

Military and Naval Intelligence Services 
German Foreign Office, 7, 8, 9n., 11, 29, 43, 
III, 184, 185, 210, 211, 212, 231, 232, 

German funds for sabotage and propaganda, 
4, 7-8, 23, 30, 39, 44, 48, 50, 51, 54, 
63, 66, 87, 88, 102, 107, 108, 112, 116, 
179, 182, 211, 235, 237, 243, 246 

German General Staff of the Army, 7, 8, 39, 
43, 223, 234; of the Navy, 43 

German Government, 31, 50, 66, 103, 187, 
290; attitude toward faked passports, 
15-16; efforts to block munitions exports, 
18; recalls and promotes Papen and Boy- 
Ed, 54-5, 57; protests innocence, 58-9; 
appoints Koenig, 62; pays Seattle ex- 
plosion claims, 28, 134; U. S. declares 
war on, 109; sued for Black Tom ex- 
plosion, 80; attitude toward this and 
Kingsland claims, 134-5; offers settle- 
ment, 176; tricks claimants, 177-8; re- 
fuses to produce Witzke's diary, 185; or 
witnesses, 185-6; general policy during 
litigation, 143, 194, 209, 211, 212, 224, 
225, 227, 231, 237, 242, 257, 275, 278; 
calls lemon-juice message (Herrmann) a 
forgery, 247 (see Quakers Hoax) 

German Literary Defense Committee, 86 

German Military Intelligence Service (Section 
III B), 3, 8, 17, 23, 39, 40, 42, 60, 61, 
84, 90, 91, 114, 117, 137, 162, 186, 197, 
211, 246, 270 

German Military Intelligence Service Center — 
see Wall Street, No. 60 

German Naval Intelligence Service, 7, 61, 74, 
90, 162 
in Antwerp, 86, 87, 171, 173 
in Copenhagen, 73 
in Scheveningen, 86 

German notes to Wilson about peace, 161 

German property in U. S. sequestrated, 176, 

177, 194 
German Red Cross, 107 
German sabotage in neutral countries, 166 

seq., 216, 232-3 
German Secret Service — see German Military 

Intelligence Service 
German ships interned, 37, 45, 62 
German Special Deposit Account, 177, 291-3 
German submarines, 3, 75, 76, 109, 155, 162, 

German War Archives, 281-3 
German "War Intelligence Center" — see Wall 

Street, No. 60 
German wireless, 152, 154, 155, 159-60. See 

German codes 
German-Americans, 4, loi, 106-107 
Germany — see German Government; claims 

against, 176 (see also Black Tom and 

germs, 47, 72-3, 85, 168-70, 218, 232, 246 
Ghadr, 28, 29 



Gibbons, E. V., Inc., 45 

Gibson, 78 

Glasgow, Colonel W. J., 123, 126 

Gleaves, William, 114-15, 115-16, 118, 121, 

122, 124, 126 
Goering, Minister President, 290 
Golka, 259 
Goltz, Horst von der, 55, 146, 154; his plan 

to invade Canada, 18-19; to blow up 

Welland Canal, 19, 30, 70 
"Gordon, Martha" — see Held, Martha 
"Graentnor" (Hinsch), 82, 83, 84, 139, 144, 

191, 193, 223 
Graf Zeppelin. 229 
Grandson, 192. See "Graentnor" 
Grantwood, N. J., tests at, 39 
Greeley Detective Bureau, 142 
Green, Lieut. Peter, 81 
Groat, 78 

Grossmann, Dr., 254 
Guidetti, 228 

Gupta, Heramba Lai, 29, 30, 32, 33 
Gurrin, Gerald Francis, 253, 269-70 
Gustedt, Countess Jennie von, 90 
Guttman, Richard, 50 

"H. 523," 155-7 

Hadler, 193, 203 

Hague, The, 157, 161, 209 

Hague Convention, no 

Hague decision — see Hamburg decision 

Hague hearing, 186-7, 208-24, 225 

Hall, Admiral Sir Reginald, 151, 154-5, I57> 

159, 162-3, 164, 165, 166, 171, 270; his 

ruses to prevent Germany's knowing of 

"40 O. B.," 162-5 
Hamburg-American Building — see Broadway, 

No. 45 
Line, 46, 61, 62, 273 
Hamburg decision, 183, 222-4, 230, 232, 244, 

Hamer, Sir John, 179, 239 
Hansen, Peter, 14 
Harbord, General, 135 
Harkness, William, 230 
Haslam, Sergeant, 140 
Hatzfeld, Prince, 57 
Hausknecht, Dr. Albin, 279, 281-3 
Havana, 51, 170, 190, 254 
Hazel Dollar, 25, 28 
Healy, T. J., 205, 209 
Heinrich, handwriting expert, 253 
Heinrich, Prince, 43 

Held, Martha (123 W. 15th, N. Y. C), 146-9 
Helfferich, 43 
Hercules Powder Co., 69; at Pinole, 25, 27; 

explosion at Seattle works, 25-6, 134 

Herrmann, Carl, 187, 190 
Edwin, 187, 190, 200 

Fred, 90, 112, 175, 186, 201, 218, 237, 
242; appearance, 251; connected widi 
Black Tom plot, 73-5, 76, 179, 211, 212, 
217, 218, 246; with Kingsland plot, 96, 
216-17, 222, 232, 233, 235, 236; with 
Gerdts (Pochct), 85, 181-3; sends lemon- 
juice message to Hilken, 182 {see Quakers 
Hoax); in Chile, 188; story involving 
Kristoff, 188-9; immunity promised, 189; 
returns to U. S., 190, 254; confers with 
Lewinski, 191; is identified as "Rodri- 
guez," 191 -2, 202-3; and identifies 
Hinsch as "Graentnor," 192; connects 
Hinsch with Black Tom plot, 193; de- 
scribes Wozniak, 202; gives incendiary 
pencils to Hinsch and Wozniak, 203; 
knows Thorne, 241 

Hermosillo, Sonora, 118, 119, 120, 121 

Hilken, Henry G., 46, 235 

Paul, 46, 72, 75, 90, 174, 175, 178, 186, 
189, 190, 192, 2i8, 232, 233, 235, 268; 
arrangements for U-boats, 76; helps Herr- 
mann and Pochet to flee, 181; lemon- 
juice message from Herrmann, 182, 183 
{see Quakers Hoax); goes to Chile to see 
him, 188; connection with Black Tom 
plot, 179-80, 211, 238-9 
Mrs. Paul, 239 

Hindus, 28-33 

Hinsch, Frederick, 75, 85, 175, 186, 187, 193, 
197, 201, 245, 247, 268; character and 
record, 46-7; organizes Baltimore group, 
47> 49> 60; sabotage with germs, 72-3; 
with incendiary pencils {q. v.), 76; con- 
nection with Wozniak, 96; flees to 
Mexico, 112; connection with Jahnke, 172;, 
173, 174; with Hilken, 178-9; with Herr- 
mann and Wozniak, 202-3; identity as. 
"Graentnor," 84, 191, 192, 193, 223; 
meets Thorne, 240-42 
connection with Black Tom plot, 179-8(1, 
216, 223; his $2000 payment, 237, 239; 
with Kingsland plot, 217, 223, 225, 231, 
240-42; U-boat service, 237-8; alibi, 218, 
236-8; in Germany after war, 236 

Hitchcock resolution, 106 

Hoboken, N. J., 11, 16, 41, 42, 45, 46, 91, 
241, 245, 246 

Holland, 155-7, 161 

Holohan, U. S. Marshal James, 33 

Hoppenberg, 182, 245, 247 

Hoquiam, Wash., 31, 32 

Horn, Werner, 20-21, 23, 52, 55, 65 

horses and mules, inoculation of — see germs 

Hossenfelder, German Foreign office, 184, 185 

Huecking, Dr. Victor, 132 



Hucrta, President, 48 
Hull, Secretary Cordell, 273 
Hulsen, Captain von, 234 
Hyatt, Louis F., 205-6 

Igel, Wolf von, 5, 11, 12, 21, 31, 42, 49-50, 
56, 58n., 72, 105, 143, 170, 186; takes 
over 60 Wall St. office, 58, 70; code and 
payments shown in his books, 70-71, 88; 
connected with Wunnenbcrg, 87-8; his 
position described by Bernstorff, 103-4; 
meets Mena Edwards, 147 

incendiary pencils, 75-6, 85, 89-90, 201, 203, 
206, 211, 246, 262 

India, sedition in, 28-33, 104, 105 

Indian Independence Committee, 29 

Indian regiments, 29 

influenza epidemic, 169 

ink, secret, 88, 153, 255, 257 

inoculation — see germs 

Inter-Allied Control Commission, 300 

International Law Association, 135 

Interstate Commerce Commission, 84 

Irish, pro-German propaganda among, 9, 104, 
106, 197 

Irish-American agitators, 275-6 

Irish- Americans, 19 

Ishpeming (Mich.) powder works, 26 

I. W. W. agitators, 113, 115, 116, 118, 122, 

Jacobsen, Hildegarde, 233-4, 236, 245, 246 

Jagow, von, 58-9, 108 

Jahnke, Kurt, 85, 186, 196; connection with 
early sabotage, 34; gives warning of Mare 
Island explosion, 34, 196; connection with 
W'itzke, 35, 84; with Wunnenberg, 87, 
171; in Mexico, ii5-i7> 121; with 
Brincken, 141; with Mexican Legation, 
1 71 -2; made sole Agent in Mexico, 174; 
connection with Hinsch, 172, 173; with 
Black Tom plot, 84, 139, 140, 141, 144, 
213, 214-15, 216, 217, 223; alibi, 213-15, 

Jahnke, Kurt — another one, 297-8 

Jansen, Dr., 87 

Jebsen, Fred, 30 

Jersey City Police Department, 81 

Johnson, Captain, 79 

Johnson ly, 78, 79, 81 

Johnson & Higgins, 230 

Johnson's report on Kingsland explosion, 218, 
219, 221, 222, 224, 225n., 229-30 

Josefina, 116, 118 

Justice, Edmond, 62 

Kaltschmidt, Albert Carl, 21-2, 23, 40, 97 
Ida, 22 

Kane, 78 

"Karowski" (Wozniak), 203-4, 243; origin 

of name, 258-9 
Kassmann, Alexander, 83, 139 
Kastner Chemical Co., 69 
Keating, John P., 8, 276 
Kelly, 78 
Kemal Pasha, 271 
Khrabroff, General, 195-6 
Kienzle, Dr. Herbert, 38, 40, 65, 104, 105 
Kiesselbach, Dr. Wilhelm, 131, 132, 176, 177, 

Kingsland underwriters* claim, i77n. 
Kingsland works, explosion at, 76, 87, 92-6, 
114, 170, 179-80, 184, 185, 194, 195-9, 
208-24, 225-42; safety devices at, 230; 
cleaning machines, 230-31 
counsel in case, 133, 135; amount of claim, 
I77n.; witnesses influenced or bribed, 
230-31; hearings and decisions, see 
Mixed Claims Commission 
Kipcrman, Polish paper merchant, 261 
Kirf{ Oswald. 37, 41, 42 
Kleist, Captain von, 42, 45, 47, 49, 70 
Knorr, Wolf ran von, 14-15 
Koenig, Paul, 85, 104, 105, 241; character, 
61-2; activities, 62-3; betrayed, 63-4; his 
organization, 64; code, etc., revealed by 
notebook, 64-8, 142, 149; aliases, 65; 
connection with Schleindel, 68-9; trial 
and internment, 70; connection with 
Wunnenberg, 88; with Black Tom plot, 
142, 143, 144, 149; headquarters — see 
Broadway, No. 45 
Kolb, 199 

Koolbergen, van, 23, 24 
Kopf, Dr. Louis, 113 
"Kottkamp, William" — see Dalcn 
Kraus, Dr., 169 
Kremer, Gustav, 87 
Kretschmann, Baron Hans von, 90 
Kristianiafjord , 44 

KristofT, Michael, connected with Black Tom 
explosion, 81-4, 90, 138, 142, 144, 189, 
216, 217, 223, 246; question of death, 
Krupp's, 30 
Kueck, Consul, 18 
Kuepferle, 17 

labor, American, 108 

Labor Reference Bureau, T04 

"Labor's National Peace Council," 47 

Lackawanna Railroad, 40, I77n. 

Ladenburg, Thalmann & Co., 43 

Lagopetroleum Co., 183 

Lakewood (N. J.) sabotage headquarters, 276 



Lamar, David, 47-8 

Lange, Martin, 146, 149 

Lansing, Robert, 133, 151 

Lansing & Woolsey, 133 

Larkin, James, 276-8; his Black Tom alibi, 277 

Lascola's testimony about Kingsland, 219-20, 

227, 228 

Lawton, E. M., 119, 121, 124 

Layton, S. Le Roy, 181 

League of Nations Covenant, 135 

Leelanau/, 87 

Lefler, William, 22 

Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 78, 80, 81, 82, 

83, 138, 145, 147, 178. See Black Tom 

Island explosion 
lemon juice for invisible message, 182 (see 

Quakers Hoax) 
Leviathan, 171 
Lewinski, Dr. Karl von (German Agent), 132, 

143, 148, 175-6, 186, 191, 204, 206, 225, 

228, 229; at 1930 Hague hearing, 209-21 
Leyden, 78, 80 

Leyendecker, Richard Emil, 63, 65 

Liberty magazine, 243 

Liman von Sanders, 55 

Lipscomb, Captain Joel A., 121, 122, 124 

Literary Digest, 54 

Lody, Karl, 17 

Loerky, of N. Y. German Consulate, 227 

Loewenstein, Benjamin, 179 

Lohmann, Dr. Johann G. (German Agent), 

274-5. See German Agent 
London Daily Mail, 163 
Lord Erne, 37 

Lovat Dickson & Thompson, Ltd., 279, 282 
Lovett, Chris, 219 
Lusitania, 67 
Lubbert, 98 
Lyndhurst testimony, 225-31 

McAdoo, Secretary, 100 

McCloy, J. J., 136, 259, 268-71, 276-7, 279, 

McCormick, Mr., 230 
MacGarrity, Joseph, 8, 276 
Madden, Richard, 16 
Madrid, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174 
Magdeburg, 159 
Maguire, 276 
Maltzan, Attache, 107 
MammonofI, 271 
Manley, Captain John M., 124-5 
Maracaibo, Venezuela, 183, 184 
Mare Island Navy Yard, 34, 117, 196 
Marguerre, Captain, 75, 90, 178, 181, 186, 

187, 189, 210, 216, 217, 218, 223, 225, 

231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 242, 

245. See incendiary pencils 

Marronc, R. N., 225 

Martin, Captain, 38 

Martin, H. H., 132, 186, 193, 195, 209 

Martin, Stanley F., 14 

Martinez & Co., 30 

Mason, Major Alfred, 115, 116 

Maverick,, 30-31, 33 

Mesopotamia, mules for, 168 

message in lemon juice, Herrmann to Hilken, 

182, 243-57 
Metzler, Frederick, 62, 63, 69 
Meunta, Eric, 101-102 
Mexico, 41, 48, 67, 112-28; flight of German 

agents to, 112. See Huerta 
Mexico City, 32, 114, 115, 116, 277, 278; 
German Legation in, 5, 8, 116, 119, 
163-4, 171 
Meyer, Ludwig, 14, 146, 149 
Meyers, book salesman, 250, 251, 252, 254 
Midvale Chemical Co., 85-6 
Mirkow Paper Mills, 261 

Mixed Claims Commission, 80, 84, 138, 178, 
185, 193, 248-9; organized, 131-7; per- 
sonnel, 131-2; counsel, 133, 135-6; pro- 
cedure, 132-3; difficulties raised by Ger- 
many, 134, 177-8, 185-6; search for rec- 
ords, 136-7 (jee Peaslee and Bonynge); 
claims filed with, 176-7 
hearings: The Hague (1930), 186-7, 208-24, 
225; Washington (1932), 264-6, 290; 
Washington (1936), 284-9, 294-5 
decisions: Hamburg (1930), 183, 222-4, 
230, 232, 244, 273; Washington (1932), 
264-6, 273, 290; Washington (i937)> 295 
Moffett, H. M., 1 40-1 
Monserrat, 255 
Montgelas, Count, 211 
Morgan, J. P., loi 
Morgan (J. P.) & Co., 48 
Morse Patrol, 34, 214, 215 
"Mox," 147 
Muller, 14 

Munich Agreement, 291-5 
munitions market, U. S., 44 
munitions plants, explosions in, 36, 54, 217, 

See Kingsland 
munitions shipped as farm machinery, 51 
munitions workers, Thome's agency for, 241 
Musebeck, Dr., 281, 283 
Musson, Morris Chester, 94 

Nadolny, Captain, 75, 90, 178, 181, 186, 189, 
210, 216, 217, 218, 223, 231, 232, 234, 
237, 242, 245, See incendiary pencils 

Nassau Smelting and Refining Co., 179 

National City Bank, N. Y. C, 67, 68, 189, 

National German-American Alliance, 106-107 



Nauen wireless station, i6o, 172 

Heckar, 46, 240 

Nelidoff, Count Alexander, 268, 269, 270-71 

Nelson, Senator, 5 

Neunhofler, William, 115, 183 

neutral telegraph and cable lines, 160-61 

New Orleans agents, 47 

Nick, 296 

Nicolai, Colonel, 7, 90 

N, J. Agricultural Chemical Co., 45 

Noordam, 49 

North German Lloyd Line, 46, 75, 182, 186, 

Norway, 73, 74 
Nuding, A., 118 

N. Y. C. Police Department, 37, 61, 62, 67 
N. Y. Harbor, 39, 45, 46, 77-9 
N. Y. Journal of Commerce, 54 
N. Y. Staats-Zeitung, 100 
N. Y. World, 100 

Oelrichs & Co., 13 

Ohse, Mr., 187 

oil smuggled out of U. S., 50-51 

in Persia, 158 
Old Admiralty Building, 153 
O'Leary, Jeremiah, 8, 91, 276 
Oliver, Admiral Sir Henry, 152-3, 154 
Olshausen, von, German Minister to Chile, 

190, 211, 212 
"Oppegaarde, Karl," 38 
Oppenheim, Colonel, 157 
Osborn, Albert S., 247-50, 284-9 

Pacific Coast Steamship Co., 85 

Page, Walter Hines, 154 

Paglash, Otto, 115, 125, 126, 256 

Palmer (Pilenas), 198 

Panas, 259 

Papen, Count Franz von, 5, 6, 11, 58, 62, 103, 
267, 269; his N. Y. office, 8; duties, 9; 
in passport forgeries, 12-17; connection 
with Goltz, 18-19; considers plan to in- 
vade Canada, 18-19; to blow up Welland 
Canal, 19; and Canadian Pacific R. R., 
20; connection with Bopp, 23; with 
sedition in India, 30, 31, 32; with Fay, 
40; with Rintelen, 44, 49; watched by 
U. S. Govt., 53; recalled, 54, 61; records 
seized, 53-4; promoted, 55; effects of acts 
in U. S., 55-8; connection with Koenig, 
67; with Igel, 71; with Hilken, 75; with 
Albert, 102; with Mena Edwards, 146 

paper, experts on, 247 seq., 261-2 

Paradies, William, 45 

Parker, Edwin B., 132, 231 

Pass-Kremer Hat Band Mfg. Co., 87 

passports, faking neutral, 10-17 

Paulig, Dr. (German Agent), 132, 213. See 
German Agent 

Pcabody Overall Company, Walkervillc, Ont., 

peace, negotiated, 161 

Peaslee, Amos }., 174, 176; on Mixed Claims 
Commission, 135, 136, 137; investigates 
U. S. suspects, 138, 139, 140, 142; seeks 
Allies' records, 150, 151, 165; examines 
decoded German messages in England, 
166-70; discovers new agents' names, 
170; goes to Colombia to see Gerdts 
(Pochet), 1 81-3; to Venezuela to see 
Witzke, 183-5; meets Herrmann in Ha- 
vana, 190-91; gets data on Wozniak, 
195-9, 202-8; finds Clucas, 200; to 
Tuppcr Lake for Wozniak, 204-6; starts 
search for Austrian records, 279; to Ger- 
many to negotiate with Pfeffer, 291, 298 

Peaslee & Brigham, 133, 135 

pencils, experts on, 252-3 

incendiary — see incendiary pencils 

Pershing, General, 135 

Persia, 158 

Peto, Leonard A., 136, 181, 182, 183, 184, 
185, 190, 192, 195, 204, 205, 239, 260; 
gets Blue Book, message that Herrmann 
sent Hilken, 245-6; meets Wozniak, 262 

Pfeffer, Hauptmann von, 290, 291 

Philadelphia, 85 

phosphorus-impregnated rags, 262-3, 267, 276, 

Picatinny Arsenal, 230-31 

Pochet, Raoul Gerdts, 85, 112, 175, 184; con- 
nection with Herrmann, 85, 181, 183; 
story of his flight, 181-3; ordered to get 
funds in N. Y. C, with invisible message 
for Hilken, 182, 243-57; affidavit about it, 
254; described in Siegel's statement, 256 

Poland, 259 

Poole Engineering Corporation, 69 

Port Huron (Ont.) Tunnel, 26 

Posse, Dr., 86 

Pozas, Juan, 50 

Praedel, George, 45 

Prespare, George, 207 

Prieger, Captain F., 74 

Providence Journal, 52, 55, 150 

Quakers brothers, 252-4 
"Quakers Hoax," 243-57 
Quebec fortifications, 62 

radio — see German codes, German wireless, 
British wireless stations 

railway bridges excepted from German sabo- 
tage orders, 8-9 

Ramirez, 125 



Rawa Russka, 258, 259 

Red Boo/{ magazine, 252 

Regina d' Italia, 85 

Reichstag hearing, 272 

Reiss, Mrs. — see Edwards, Mena 

Renz, inspector, 230 

reservists, 10-17 

Respa, Charles Francis, 21, 22 

Reval, Esthonia, 255, 256, 257 

Rico, Julio, 169 

Rigney, Captain John J., 81 

Rintelen, Captain Franz von, 143-4, I4^» I55> 
193-4. 197, 237, 272; career, 42-51; con- 
nections, 43; plans for dealing w^ith prob- 
lem of U. S. munitions shipments, 43-4; 
engages Dr. Scheele, 44-5; uses Friedrich 
der Grosse for making bombs, 45-6; or- 
ganizes Baltimore agents, 46, 178, 179; 
and New Orleans, 47; connection with 
Lamar, 47-8; with Huerta, 48; recalled, 
49; extradited, tried, imprisoned, 49; 
offers to testify, 193-4; his U. S. funds 
seized, 194 

Rio Lages, 41 

Roach, Andrew, 219 

Roberts, George, 219 

Roberts, Justice Owen J., 132; Jiis decision as 
Umpire at 1932 hearing, 264-6; at 1937 
hearing, 295 

Rochambeau, 41 

Rockefeller Institute, 47 

"Rodriguez" (Herrmann?), 95, 191-2, 202-3, 
206, 217 

Roebling (John A.) Company, Trenton, 36, 54 

Rogers, Lucille, 146 

Ross, A. Carnegie, 23 

Rotterdam, 39 

Roumania, 232-3 

Ruge, 98 

Ruggiero's testimony about Kingsland, 220, 
221, 225-31 

Rumscy & Morgan, 133 

Ruroede, Carl, in passport forgeries, 12-17 

Rushnak, Mrs. Anna, 81, 191 

Russel, W. H., 142 

Russian Consulate, N. Y. C, 197 

Russian Embassy, 195 

Russian Government, 68, 80, 92, 93, 107, 
108, 196 

Russian Supply Committee, 195-9 

Rutherford, Rudedge, 86, 88 

Ruwe of the Morse Patrol, 215 

Ryndam, 73 

sabotage activities, lessons to be drawn from 

history of, 299-303 
sabotage order — see Zimmcrmann cablegram 
Sachse, Arthur, 14 

Saenger paper mills, 261 

"Safety Block System," 64 

Satnland, 37 

San Francisco, 23-8, 30, 33, 34, 277 

Sanders, Albert A., 86, 88, 89, 171 

Santa Clara Lumber Co., 204, 207 

Santiago, Chile, 190, 222. See Olshausen 

Sarnia, 85 

Savage Arms Co., 69 

Sayville (L. L) wireless station, 160 

"scent botdes," 276 

Schack, E. H. von, 23, 24, 27 

Scheuch, 98 

Scheele, Dr. Walter T., 42, 44-5, 47, 50-51, 
58, 70; Germany's only pre-war spy in 
U. S., 44 

Schimmel, Walter, 48, 70 

Schlarafia, the, 40 

Schleindl, Frederick, 67-70, 104, 105 

Schmidt, Carl, 21 
Mrs., 22 

Schnagl, 279, 281-3 

Scholz, Walter, 21, 39-40 

Schulenberg, Franz, 31, 32 

Schumacher (A.) & Co., 46 

Schwerdt, Eugene, 146 

Schwerin, von Igel, 55 

Scotland, 74 

Scotland Yard, 150 

Scott, 78, 84, 142, 143, 144 

Seattle, Wash., 25, 27, 28, 31, 134 

"Secret Service Division" of Koenig's organi- 
zation, 64-6 

Section III B — see German Military Intelligence 

Seidlitz, Baroness Ida Leonic von, 197-8 
Russia Yesterday and Tomorrow, 197 

Selkirk Mountains tunnel, 24 

serum, diphtheria, 169 

Setdement of War Claims Act, 176, 177, 291 

Shaffer, Joseph, 262 

Sherman Act, 49 

ships, explosions in, 36-51, 218; means used — 
see bombs 

Shores, Corporal John, 139, 140 

Siberian Railway, 107, 167 

Siebs, Paul, 38 

Sigel, Adam, 245, 246, 255-7 

Sims, Joseph P., 151 

Sims, Admiral William E., 151, 166 

Singh, Ram, 32, 33 

Skal, von, 103, 104 

Sloane, 78 

Smith, Alex, 207 

Smith, Governor Alfred E., 277 

Smith, Lewis J., 25-8 

Sochanski, Chief of Police, 258-9 

Socorro Island, 30, 31 



Southern Pacific Railroad, 25 
Spanish Civil War, 301 
Spec, von, 161 

spontaneous combustion of munitions, ques- 
tion of, 80-81 
Sprio, Rosato, 15 
spying, modern, 303 
St. Paul, 200, 201, 240 
St. Thomas, Ont., 26 
Stahl, Gustave, 67 
Standard Oil Co., 30 

Stapefeldt of the North German Lloyd, 75 
Stark, Dr., 12 
Steele, Thomas, 94, 219 
Stegler, Richard Peter, 16 
Stein, Elbridgc W,, 249, 251, 284-9 
Steinmetz, Erich von, 47, 49 
Stephan, Lieutenant, 173 
Stockholm, 169 
Stresemann, Gustav, 269 
Sturdee, Admiral, 161 
Sun Life Insurance Co., 183 
Swedish Foreign Office, 160 
Swirskaya, Tamara, 198 
Szek, Alexander, 155-8 

Tacoma, Wash., 25 

Tampico oil fields, 75, 175, 181, 183 

Tannenberg, Dr. Wilhelm, 132, 204, 209, 218, 
219, 220, 221, 287; his "Lyndhurst" 
correspondence, 225-7; in dispute over 
lemon-juice message, 248, 251, 253, 254; 
his implied defense in matter of 
Wozniak's confession, 263 

Taube, Michel de, 268, 269 

Tauscher, Captain Hans, 30, 146 

Tenafly, N. J., 69 

Tetra, 87 

Thiel Detective Agency, 221, 222, 229 

Thompson, Sir Basil, 150 

Thorne, Charles E., 199, 200, 201, 239-42 

Throckmorton, Luther W., 295 

Thummel, Curt — see Thorne, Charles E. 

Thwaites, Colonel, 150, 198 

Tidevv^ater Oil Co., 82, 83 

Tirpitz, Admiral von, 6, 43 

T. N. T., 38, 40, 78, 80, 93 

toys, incendiary devices shipped with, 170 

Traynor, 251 

Tunney, Inspector Thomas J., 37-9, 41, 42, 
60, 62, 140, 191 

Tupper Lake, 204-7 

Turks, 158 

Ukrainian Relief Committee, 260 
Umpires in Black Tom and Kingsland claims, 

Union Metallic Cartridge Co., 99 

Urciuoli's testimony about Kingsland, 220, 

221, 225-31 
U. S. Army Intelligence Service, 113, 276, 277 
U. S. Army Ordnance Department, 230 
U. S. Bureau of Standards, 249-50 
U. S. Coast Guard, 240 
U. S. counter-espionage service, 60-61 
U. S. Cryptographic Bureau, 302 
U. S. Department of Justice, 11, 13-15, 17, 21, 

27» 28, 33, 60, 61, 67, 84, 88, 89, 102, 

113. 115. 137. 199, 246, 266 

U. S. Embassy in London, 52; in Berlin, 161, 

U. S. Federal Bureau of Invertigation, 15, 137, 

U. S. Government, 177, 188, 290, 297 
U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 

295, 302 
U. S. Military Intelligence Service, 61, 113, 

114, 137, 140, 191, 302 
U. S. postal authorities, 260 

U. S. Secret Service, 31, 34, 70, 100, 302 
U. S. State Department, 15, 17, 52, 53, 54, 

103, 160, 161, 181, 290 
U. S. Treasury Department, 302 

Valparaiso, Chile, 35, 127, 161, 188 

Vanceboro (Maine) bridge, 20-21, 65 

Vancouver, B. C, 23, 24 

Varase, 197 

Vaterland, 37 

Venezuela, 170, 183, 184 

"Vera," 146 

Versailles, Treaty of, 131 

Victorica, de, 90, 91 

Maria de, 90-91, 139, 198 
Vladivostok, 25, 28, 47, 107 
Voelker, Captain A. H. J., 139 
Volmer resolution, 106 

Waberski — see Witzkc 

Wall Street, No. 60 (Papcn's "Bureau of the 

Military Attaches"), 8, 56, 58, 70, 105, 

Walsh, J. Irving, 146, 148-9 
Wandel, General ron, 44 
"War Intelligence Center" — see Wall Street, 

No. 60 
Wargunin Bros., 261 
Washington Detective Bureau, 83-4 
Washington hearing (1932), 264-6, (1937) 

Wasmuss, Consul, 158-9 
Watermark of Wozniak's letter paper, 261 -2» 

"Weaver, Walter," 25, 27, 28 



Wedell, Count Botho von, 11, 13 

Hans von, obtains fake passports, 11-13, 15 

Weehawken, N. J., 38 

Wegener, 14 

Welland Canal, 19, 30, 63, 70, 71, 103, 147 

Wells, Marie, 146 

Wendhauscn, Wladimir, 120 

Wesendonck, von, 29 

Wettig, Carl, 38 

Whalen, Grover, 142 

Whitehall Trading Co., 38 

Wiedfeldt, Dr., 127 

Wilhelm, Eugene, 86, 87, 171, 173 

Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 43 

Wilhelmshaven Naval Laboratories, 87 

"Williams, James G.," 50 

Wilson, Herbert S., 14 

Wilson, Wcodrow, 9, 52, 53, 1 09-1 10, 127, 
131, I33» 154, 161, 162 

Windsor (Ont.) armory, 22 

"Wisdom, Walter" — see Wiseman 

Wiseman, Sir William, 150 

Witzkc, Lothcr, 34-5, 84, 114, 139, 191, 196; 
mission to Nogales, 1 16-17; admissions to 
Altendorf, 1 17-18; sees Calles, 11 8-1 9; 
actions at Sonora, 119; captured, 120; 
"Waberski" passport, 120; code, 121; 
connection with I. W. W., 122; keeps 
silence, 122-3; trial, 123-6; his testimony, 
125-6; convicted, 127, 140; imprisoned, 
127; appeals, 140; released, 128; connec- 
tion with Black Tom explosion, 140, 144, 
183-5, 213-14, 216, 217, 223; alibi, 213- 
15, 218; in Venezuela, 183-5; diary, 185; 
objections to filing notebooks, 274-5 

Wochst, Wilhelm, 85, 143, 174, 175, 186, 187, 
201, 225, 231, 232-6, 242, 243, 246 

Wolfgang, 245, 246 

Wolpert, Captain Carl, 46, 47, 51, 70, 104, 

Woodhousc, G. W. A., 95-6 

Wozniak, Fiodore, origin and name 
("Karowski"), 258-9; record, 196-9; 
meets other agents, 202; identity and 
activities, 203 seq.; at Tupper Lake, 
204-8; his part in Kingsland explosion, 
94-6, 217, 219-20, 228-31, 241, 247, 296; 
his explanation, 195-6; alibi, 218; Com- 
mission's theory of the accident, 223-4; 
evidence in his letters, 258-60, 296-7; 
one from Mexico City, 260-61; authen- 
ticity challenged, 261-2, 266, 285; meets 
Peto and confesses, 262-3; subpoenaed, 
267; employed by Dr. Tannenberg, 296; 
denies being in Mexico, 297; admits pay- 
ment, 297; petition denied, 297 

Wozniak family, 258-9 

Wright, Howard Paul, 14 

Wunnenberg, Charles N., 86-90, 91, 140, i86 

Yacht Club, N. Y. C, 43 
"Yankees, idiotic," 57, loi 
Yardley, Captain, 124 
Yorkvillc, N. Y. C, 11 
Young, 180 

Zeppelin raids over England, 162 
Zimmermann, 9, 16, 20, 29, 30, 32, 43, 71, 
107, 167 
cablegram ordering sabotage (Jan. 26, 

1915), 8, 210-11, 215, 216, 218, 231 
telegram (to Mexican Legation), 151, 159, 
161, 162-4 


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3 '5132 00252 4072 

University of the Pacific Library 

mdau, Henry.